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SOURCE BOOK

OF THE

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

IN

VIRGINIA

April to July, 1862

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS
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INTRODUCTION

This source book contains a series of extracts from documents relating to the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, assembled for use of students studying that campaign, and brought together to avoid researches. It is especially intended for the Staff School during the course on Military History, to place before them in convenient form, copies of original sources of information, to supplement the invaluable Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

CONRAD H. LANZA,
Colonel, Field Artillery.

The General Staff School.
December 12, 1921.

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Autobiography

OF

OLIVER OTIS HOWARD

MAJOR GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY

VOLUME ONE

NEW YORK
THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
1908

Autobiography of Gen. O. O. Howard

(EXTRACT)

* * * * * * *

Saturday evening, April 5th, brought us to the place of debarkation and I sent two regiments ashore. This was Ship Point intended just then for the main depot of supplies for the army. A dim twilight survey of this landing and the vicinity was my first introduction to the Virginia peninsula. The landscape in the fading light appeared delightful—small openings amid variegated forests generally level, and the roads smooth and promising. A few days later I recorded: The ground is almost all quicksand. I have worked my brigade very hard, making roads and bridges, loading and unloading barges and wagons filled with commissary and quartermaster's stores.

We took up our first camp a little to the south of the landing and in a pretty grove, making my own headquarters at Mr. Pomphrey's house. Mr. Pomphrey passed for a poor man, yet he owned 200 acres of land, 15 slaves, and had a wife quite as much a slave, as the others, to the pipe which she incessantly smoked.

One never saw more grateful people than Mr. Pomphrey and his wife when I proposed to make his house my headquarters. He said with a sigh of relief: "I shall sleep to-night!" Their wilderness had been suddenly transformed into a strange city where soldiers, wagoners, negroes, and camp followers were constantly coming night and day, rummaging and often seizing what they could lay their hands upon. I could not help thinking how my own mother would feel to have her cows shot, her chickens killed, the eggs stolen, and the cellar robbed of an entire winter's supply. Such was the work of some characters who—hard to discover and control near that thickly populated landing—mingled with us.

General McClellan paid us a visit on April 9th, making a brief stay at my headquarters, and a longer one at Richardson's.

There my first knowledge of a difference between him and our much-loved President dawned upon me. His aide-de-camp, Colonel Colburn, complained bitterly to me of the action of the President in taking away over 50,000 troops which had been promised to McClellan. Of course, Mr. Lincoln's promise had been contingent upon the safety of the capital, but at that time I did not know of the contingency and so could make no reply.

I heard McClellan, during this visit, remark to another officer that he found Yorktown a very strong place. He said: "It cannot be carried without a partial siege."

He examined carefully our temporary wharves, structures, and roadways along the shore. He talked very much to the point with our quartermaster in charge and with others; while doing this he partook of a luncheon and indulged in a smoke at Richardson's headquarters; then, with the small staff which had accompanied him, rode away toward Yorktown. I trusted McClellan and sympathized with his disappointments, but had misgivings when I heard the words, "a partial siege at Yorktown!"

For a short time while we were waiting for men and material that belonged to our division to come by other steamers than the *Spaulding*, the days were mainly spent in constructing a "log road" from Ship Point to Yorktown. Indeed, after the first cold and drenching rain, we discovered that that whole vicinage was underlaid with "sinking sand." We constantly beheld whole fields of poor, struggling mules more than half buried in front of heavy wagons with wheels sunken to the hubs. All the roads, which on our arrival had been beautiful and smooth, without rut or stone, had become miry and treacherous. We were toiling on with the vigor of men who knew how to work and were making commendable progress with our corduroying when, on April 16th, the order came to proceed at once to Yorktown and join our corps. Before the close of the 17th all the brigades of Sumner's command were together in "Camp Winfield Scott." This force, usually from this time designated by its number "the Second Corps," was not far from the center of the general line and pretty well back.

My private notes made after our arrival at Yorktown indicate a considerable impatience on my part because of the slowness of the army. The reasons given for so much delay seemed insufficient. A siege party was working on our right indicating circumvalation and regular approaches, and a detachment of our men were throwing up breastworks near the middle of our front line, as though we might have to resist an attack from Magruder.

The morning of April 24th I rode to McClellan's headquarters to pay my respects to him and to some of his staff. The grandeur of that staff greatly impressed me. I had a long talk with my old friend Colonel Kingsbury, chief of ordnance in the field. He said in parting: "General McClellan wishes to get all his batteries in readiness before he opens fire. If our friends could realize the kind of country they are in they would not be impatient." Thus Kingsbury gently rebuked my impatience.

In the afternoon of the same day I went to the extreme left of McClellan's lines and followed the Warwick River in that neighborhood as far as I could on horseback, along its swampy border and impenetrable thickets, and visited Generals Erasmus D. Keyes, Silas Casey, and other acquaintances who were stationed near that flank. During my ride we were crossing a narrow ravine in the midst of which was a sluggish, muddy stream. Lieutenant Nelson A. Miles, my aide-de-camp, rode up and, though usually ardent, wisely checked his horse. Believing I could easily clear the stream at a bound I let my active horse, "Charlie," have the reins. He sprang forward but was unable to make the leap—the ground at the starting point not being firm enough; in fact, the whole bank before and beneath him gave way and we sank to his shoulders in the yielding mud. I scrambled off as best I could and left "Charlie" to himself. After some floundering and few plunges he managed to catch the firm ground. My own mishap saved the remainder of the party from a mud bath.

Warwick Court House consisted of a small, brick schoolhouse, a building for the court, a jail of less size, and one other fair structure, probably intended for a store. Near

at hand was a dilapidated dwelling house. These made up the little village which occupied one clearing. The intervale lands in the neighborhood at that season of springtime were beautiful. Apple and peach trees were in blossom, the grass was a bright green, and all the trees were putting forth their leaves.

CHAPTER XV

The Battle of Williamsburg

FROM April 17 to May 4, 1862, my brigade did not change its camp and was employed by detachments in constructions for siege operations, such as fascines—long bundles of rods or twigs—or gabions—tall baskets without bottoms—for use in lining the openings or embrasures of earthworks through which cannon were to be fired. The men of the division not otherwise employed did picket and guard duty, and were exercised daily in company, regimental, and brigade drills.

In order to be as familiar as possible with the places where I might have to take my command into action, I visited in turn the various portions of our front. On April 26th, after I had set large detachments from my brigade at work and had seen them diligently constructing fascines and gabions, I rode over to the York River in order to examine the water batteries. From that locality the Confederate fort on Gloucester Point across the river was in plain sight, and we could also see the enemy's water battery on the Yorktown side. From our own position to the opposite shore the distance was two miles. Five of the guns in our Battery No. 1 were one hundred pounders, Parrott muzzle-loading rifles, and two two hundred pounders, Parrott. They were mounted on wrought-iron carriages which appeared so slender as to be in danger of being broken by a single recoil. Other batteries had ten-, twenty-, and thirty-pounder Parrott and four and one-half-inch guns in place ready for work. Others had eight- and ten-inch mortars. The next morning I continued my visits and found near the center of our position—directly in front of Sumner's corps—with a field battery having epaulements for six guns, my friend Lieutenant Edmund Kirby in charge; he had just recovered from a serious attack of typhoid fever.

My next ride for information was made May 1st. It was along the front and to examine our first parallel, which was a trench twelve feet wide and three feet deep, the dirt

being thrown toward the enemy. All along the parallel were openings in the embankment for batteries of siege guns. This trench was parallel to the enemy's works and 1,500 yards from them. Accompanied by my brother and aid, Lieutenant Howard, I continued back of the parallel eastward as far as the York River, and we took a good look at the waiting gunboats, some of which had come up the river to coöperate in the siege. We looked at each other and inquired: "How soon shall we do something?"

From day to day we read and wrote letters and had plenty of time to visit each other, as well as to study the slowly growing constructions. Occasionally the enemy would toss a shell over to our side, and now and then roll a ball of iron along our road with motion too swift to touch. A skirmish somewhere on the front line occasionally came off, and sometimes we were startled into abnormal activity by a false alarm; but on the whole we had a long and peaceful sojourn near Yorktown.

Near the end of "siege of Yorktown," Franklin's division was permitted to come to us from McDowell, and remaining on transports, was waiting for the great bombardment before commencing to perform its appointed rôle. But the great bombardment never came.

Sunday morning, May 4th, all at my headquarters had attended to ordinary military duties. Before breakfast I invited to my tent Captain Sewall, my adjutant general, Lieutenant Howard, Lieutenant Balloch, Orderly McDonald, and English manservant, and Charley Weis, a messenger whose sobriquet was "Bony." We read that chapter of Daniel which tells the story of Shadroch, Meshach, and Abednego passing through the fiery furnace unscathed. Then followed, from one of the officers present, an earnest petition to the Lord of Hosts for protection, guidance, and blessing. As soon as breakfast was over I commenced a letter to Mrs. Howard, and, writing rapidly, had finished about two pages, when suddenly, without completing the sentence, I jotted down: "Yorktown is abandoned and our troops are marching in." I added a little later: "I am now,

quarter before eight a.m., under marching orders. Thank Him who doeth all things well."

It was Sumner's entire corps which had received orders of march. Besides the two divisions, Richardson's and Sedgwick's, Sumner's corps still included the Eighth Illinois Cavalry. Our division artillery had four batteries—twenty-four guns. Thus far no change had been made in the entire division, except the transfer of the cavalry to corps headquarters.

From our location south of Yorktown in the rear of all, we were naturally long delayed in taking up the march toward Williamsburg, for the only through routes, already almost impassable after the Confederate columns had waded through them, were thronged with cavalry and the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes. We held ourselves in readiness, impatiently waiting all day the 4th. McClellan's first plan, made known later in the day, designated our division with Sedgwick's and Fitz-John Porter's as the reserve, either to go to Williamsburg, if imperatively needed, or to follow Franklin's division on transports up the York River and support him in his work, or take and hold a landing on the same side of the river twenty-five miles above. To carry out this plan, early on Monday, the 5th, Sedgwick's and our division broke camp and marched to the immediate neighborhood of Yorktown. Here we bivouacked and completed all our preparations for close work—rations in the haversacks and ammunition on the person of each soldier.

Owing to McClellan's siege operations, General Johnston determined to withdraw his Confederate forces just before the destructive bombardment should begin. His retreat toward Richmond was ordered and carried steadily forward. Stuart's cavalry curtained the moving forces on the Yorktown-Williamsburg road, and also on the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road, the two roads leading up the peninsula.

Critics accuse us in the Army of the Potomac of not being early risers, and not being keen to catch the first evidences of evacuation. It is, indeed, a just charge against McClellan's information bureau; the want of information did

enable Johnston to gain a coveted advantage during the first day of his difficult retreat. It was good generalship on his part to so blind McClellan as to his purpose. The withdrawal of the enemy, however, was discovered at dawn almost simultaneously at several points of the front. Heintzelman, in front of Yorktown, seeing fires reflected in the sky and hearing explosions which sounded like a skirmish, had himself taken up in a balloon to make sure of the cause before ordering a general advance, and saw the destruction of magazines, and our pickets, unopposed sweeping over the works which had been so formidable. Hancock, then a brigade commander, was notified also at dawn by two negroes that the enemy had gone.

McClellan, taken thus by surprise, needed time to think and time to intercept Johnston's design. It might be a ruse. So he put Fitz-John Porter's division in the Confederate works to hold them against a possible return. He got Franklin with his fine body of fresh men ready to send in transports up the York, with reserves to follow, and naval gunboats to aid.

The orders to Heintzelman and Keyes were: "Draw in your guards, pickets, and outposts and replenish everything for a march."

Between the Warwick and Williamsburg was a belt of country in breadth from nine to thirteen miles. It was a country of swamps, tangled forests, and small farms here and there, like glades in the woods, connected by wretched lanes. There were only two roads from our front, and one of them the Lee's Mill road, which was connected occasionally with the other, the Yorktown road; and it took watching and tacking to keep off the main thoroughfare from Yorktown to Williamsburg and yet travel toward the latter town. The men marching in the night and rain, on account of the effort required to lift their feet, heavy with adhesive mud, never exceeded one mile an hour. Our people during that march, short as it appears, were like flocks of children playing at blindman's buff. They wandered right and left; they ran into each other; they reached out tentatively for obstacles and gained ground slowly with extreme fatigue.

There were other troubles. When our infantry began its march a warning came along our military telegraph line that everybody should look out for "buried bombs." Torpedoes had been buried in the ground along the paths and roads which led to the Confederate works. Some were also found near wells and springs of water, a few in some flour barrels and sacks in the telegraph office, and one or more near a magazine.

There was with us at Yorktown a young man by the name of D. B. Lathrop, from Springfield, Ohio. He was the son of a widow, and had been, before the war, studying for the ministry. When the war broke out, wishing to do something helpful to the Union cause, he joined that hard-worked and useful body, the telegraph corps. Mr. Lathrop was attached to General Heintzelman's headquarters. As soon as Yorktown was opened, following the wires he hurried to the telegraph office. He sat down at the operator's table and touched the instrument. Instantly an explosion of a percussion shell took place and young Lathrop was mortally wounded.

A little later in the day when Davidson's brigade was about to cross the Warwick at Lee's Mill, Colonel E. C. Mason, of the Seventh Maine, receiving word concerning Lathrop, whom he knew, and fearing torpedoes, went himself in advance of his column on the road beyond the dam. As he was walking slowly he crushed a percussion cap. Brushing away the dirt, he discovered the red wax at the top of the buried shell. Providentially for Mason, only the cap exploded. The colonel then called for volunteers. Upon their hands and knees they crept along and succeeded in uncovering more than a dozen shells. In the approaches to the Yorktown works the torpedoes were usually arranged with a narrow board, upon which a soldier's or horse's tread would effect an explosion. Several horses and men among the first passing troops were killed or wounded by them. McClellan soon set several Confederate prisoners of war to ferret them out.

During Sunday General Stoneman with our cavalry and horse artillery worked his way forward, having small com-

bats with Confederate cavalry under Stuart. Nothing very discouraging checked him, or any of our cavalry detachments, from a steady advance till he came upon the Williamsburg outworks. About a mile and a half from Williamsburg a considerable work called Fort Magruder was located so as to obstruct both the roads of which I have spoken. Fort Magruder had on its right and left several small redoubts, and the whole front was an open field for several hundred yards, except for the slashing of trees and other artificial obstructions.

Stuart had been pressed so hard that the Confederate commander of the rear guard called back into the woods a division of infantry and considerable artillery. As soon as Stoneman's men with a battery of artillery swept into the spaces before these formidable works, they encountered all along their front a terrific fire of both infantry and artillery. Stoneman, thus suddenly repelled, fell back a short distance and called for help, having suffered the loss of some forty men, one piece of artillery, and three caissons, which had sunk deeply in the mud, and the horses of which were nearly all killed or wounded by the prompt Confederate fire.

This partial success determined our enemy to remain a while longer and take advantage of this well-selected checking position. He might possibly overwhelm a part of McClellan's forces before the remainder could wade through the ever-deepening mud to its relief, for the rain had poured down all the day; and, indeed, Johnston needed more time to secure a reasonably safe retreat.

Sumner, being sent forward Sunday morning by McClellan to take care of everything at the front, heard the firing at Williamsburg. He hastened infantry from the heads of columns of both the other corps to Stoneman's support, and at evening, himself being cut off by a sudden Confederate sally, passed the night with one of the brigade commanders. No aids or orderlies from Heintzelman or Keyes could find him. In fact, Heintzelman, judging from his own instructions, thought himself to be in command. General Keyes, leading Casey's and Couch's divisions, had for himself a

similar impression. Heintzelman's head of column under Hooker, now nearest to the James River, had been the first to respond to Stoneman's call for help. Early in the morning of Monday the three not very harmonious corps commanders succeeded in getting together.

After ambitious contention, Sumner's rank was yielded to and his plan to turn the Confederates by our right agreed upon. Heintzelman set out for the left of our line, but was much delayed by ignorant guides. At last he reached Hooker. Hooker had worked up close to the redoubts the night before with deployed lines. The instructions which had come to him were to support Stoneman and harass the enemy, and, if possible, cut off his retreat. Baldy Smith's division he knew was on his right, and other troops in plenty somewhere near. These circumstances were to "Fighting Joe Hooker" just those for winning laurels by a successful assault.

Exactly contrary to Sumner's plan Hooker, already on the ground by daylight, commenced a regular attack on the Confederate right at about 7:30. A fierce and noisy struggle went on there all day. Longstreet came back and brought more troops. Hooker's men, reserves and all, pushed in, and were nearly exhausted, when, about 4 p.m., Phil Kearny managed to get up his division. Hooker's division was at last relieved by Kearny's and fell back to be a reserve. Hooker's soldiers deserved this rest, for they had faced Fort Magruder and those strong redoubts well manned and actively firing for nine hours. Kearny's men charged and cleared the outside point of woods, carried some rifle pits, and silenced troublesome light batteries, so that Kearny declared: "The victory is ours!" His men bivouacked where they had fought.

Thus the battle went on contrary to all planning, working along from left to right. While the operations just recounted were progressing under Heintzelman's eyes, Sumner and Keyes were trying to bring order out of confusion on the right of our line and back to the rear on the Yorktown road.

A passageway across a stream and through the woods around the Confederate left flank having been discovered, Hancock's brigade, somewhat reënforced, was selected to make a turning movement, and its commander fought with it a brilliant and successful engagement against Early, who was badly wounded in this action. Hancock's victorious troops bivouacked on the field in a heavy rain. When this was going on beyond our extreme right, the enemy made strong counter attacks along the Yorktown road from the flanks of Fort Magruder. In resisting these attacks our men from New York and Pennsylvania received a heavy fire, and left many a poor fellow dead or dying upon a plowed field and among the felled timber which protected the fort. The whole conduct of this battle created among our generals so much dissatisfaction, bickering, and complaint that McClellan was induced about three o'clock in the afternoon to come to the front. The fighting was all over when he reached Sumner's headquarters. He gathered what news he could from different points and sent to Washington a dispatch which put Hancock far in advance of all other participants in the engagement.

He thought that General Johnston intended to fight a general battle at that point and that his own troops were outnumbered; so he at once ordered Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions to march from Yorktown to Williamsburg.

Just before sunset that Monday evening, May 5th, my brigade received its marching orders. The rain still continued to pour down. We set out as quickly as possible, my brigade following that of General French. I was obliged to march my men through a narrow roadway across the Yorktown works; the clay mud, which stuck to the men's feet in lumps or masses, was from eight to ten inches in depth. Horses, wagons, mules, and footmen were coming and going both ways and often meeting in the narrow passage. As my brigade passed I remained for some time at the Yorktown sally port. The bits of board attached to torpedoes had not all been removed, but little flags were placed as a warning of the presence of explosives. Some of us became hoarse calling to the soldiers not to move to the right or

left, and not to step on the boards where the small flags were seen. It was dark before I got my brigade past Yorktown.

Almost the entire night was spent in struggling forward. I tried to walk now and then to rest my horse, and for quite a time to allow an officer who was taken suddenly ill to ride, but I found it necessary to hold on by the halter to keep on my feet. Our men straggled dreadfully that night, but as soon as the day dawned they worked their way on to the command. We had finally bivouacked for the night in a rough-plowed field till dawn. My adjutant general, a thin man, gloomily placed his hips between two rails; for myself, with crochets I constructed a wooden horse, fastened one end of a piece of canvas over it, and pulled the other end along the ground to my cheerful fire, and lay down against the canvas for a short, sweet rest.

At last we were halted not far from the battlefield. With a few officers I went to the bloody ground. The Confederates had departed in the night. The open muddy soil and the thickets were still strewn with the swollen dead, whose faces were generally toward the sky. I saw, as I moved along, a little headboard to mark the place of a Union soldier. His form and his face were carefully covered by a blanket. Near him was another in gray clothing left without care. In my heart I wished that he also had been covered. They seemed to be resting together in peace. I thought: "May God hasten us to the close of such a war!" This yearning was deepened by my visits to the hospitals filled with poor sufferers from both armies. United in pain and forced imprisonment, Confederate and Union soldiers there were at peace. But, receiving orders from General Richardson, I myself quickly returned from that gloomy region to my brigade and hurried it back to Yorktown, to wait there for transports which would enable us to follow Franklin up the York River to West Point.

I have seen that, of the two armies, the Confederate brought into action at Williamsburg about ten thousand, and our army from twelve to thirteen thousand. Our aggregate loss, 2,239, was very large, as the troops in general

fought against prepared works. The Confederate loss was from 1,300 to 1,500 men.

Before and after the first battle of Bull Run it will be remembered that I was associated with General Franklin; he and I each commanded a brigade in Heintzelman's division. His associates always respected his ability and had confidence in his judgment. Franklin's division, composed of infantry and artillery, after its arrival had been disembarked on May 3d, at Cheeseman's Landing near Ship Point, with a view to take part in the proposed assault of Yorktown. The morning of the 4th, as soon as McClellan knew of the Confederate withdrawal, he instructed Franklin to reëmbark and take his division to Yorktown. Franklin commenced the work at once, finishing the reëmbarking, as quickly as it could be done, about one o'clock of the 5th. The difficulties of reëmbarking, owing to the weather, to the loading of supplies, and the putting on board of the artillery carriages and other impedimenta, much of which had to be hoisted from rafts, were greater than anybody had estimated. At any rate, there was no unnecessary delay. Proceeding to Yorktown, Franklin received further orders and was ready the same evening to continue on to West Point accompanied by a naval convoy. The naval commander declined to start, owing to the increasing darkness and the danger of navigation during a furious storm. Therefore, the flotilla only left at daybreak on the 6th. Arriving at West Point, the disembarking was begun and the vicinity reconnoitered at three o'clock, but the landing of the artiltery was not completed till the morning of the 7th. Canal boats, which were aground by the bank, were used as wharves.

General Johnston suspected, on account of the fewness of our troops marshaled against him at Williamsburg, that McClellan was sending a flotilla up the York River, to seize a landing place in the vicinity of West Point, and attack from it the flank of his retreating army. The evening of Tuesday, the 6th, General G. W. Smith, commanding the Confederate reserve, had Whiting's division not far from Barhamsville, opposite West Point, and three miles away.

He reported to his chief, General Johnston, that a large body of United States troops had debarked from transports at Eltham's Landing, a little above him, and were occupying not only the open spaces, but a thick wood stretching from the landing to the New Kent wagon road. As this menaced Johnston's line of march he instructed Smith to dislodge our troops. This work Smith directed General Whiting to do. Franklin had put his troops into position as they landed. His flanks were protected by the gunboats, which were at hand, to shell the woods beyond. Each flank rested on swampy creeks running into the river. Besides, he possessed himself, as far as his small force could do so, of the encircling woods. General H. W. Slocum commanded Franklin's left wing, while General John Newton, a loyal Virginian, commanded the right. Whiting, to cover Johnston's army in retreat, bivouacked in a line of battle facing Franklin, but did not attack that evening, as Franklin's troops appeared to be in a position hard to reach. He hoped to attack him as he moved out, but as Franklin did not advance Whiting attacked him furiously in position the next morning, the 7th, at ten o'clock. Franklin, however, in a three hours' conflict secured his landing, which was his object, and not, as Johnston feared, to attack him in flank during his retreat. West Point, the place where the Pamunkey and Mattapony unite to form the York River, and which is the terminus of the Richmond Railway, was now set apart for our new base of operations.

Slowly and steadily through the abounding mud, or by water from Yorktown, the army worked its way to Franklin's neighborhood, while General Johnston, with scarcely any further molestation, was suffered to draw in his forces to the vicinity of the Confederate capital.

CHAPTER XVI

The Battle of Fair Oaks

BY May 16, 1862, McClellan's force was reorganized so as to give to each of his corps commanders two divisions. We moved toward Richmond from our new depot at White House in this order: Porter with the Fifth Corps, Franklin with the Sixth, Sumner with the Second, Keyes with the Fourth, and Heintzelman with the Third. Our first move was to the Chickahominy, a stream flowing from right to left across our line of advance. At first, Heintzelman and Keyes bivouacked near Bottom's Bridge; Sumner's corps, to which I belonged, a few miles up stream; Franklin not far from New Bridge, and Porter near Mechanicsville. Meanwhile the main body of our cavalry, well out, guarded our right and rear with a view to clear the way to McDowell's force, then in front of Fredericksburg, and protect our large depot at the White House and the railroad line from that point to the army.

Porter, with a slight reënforcement to his corps, moved out from our right and fought the successful small battle of Hanover Court House, May 27th, and returned to Mechanicsville. McClellan had placed his own headquarters not far from Franklin, at Gaines Mills. A small detachment of cavalry had reconnoitered through the White Oak Swamp and up the south bank of the Chickahominy to Seven Pines and the Fair Oaks Station, five or six miles from Richmond, and had reported the ground clear of any considerable hostile force. On May 23d, four days prior to Porter's movement, Keyes, and later, the 25th, Heintzelman, had passed over Bottom's Bridge.

McClellan did not like to have his principal supplies dependent on the York River and the railway from the White House landing, and, further, he already meditated working over to the James River to thus secure by the help of the navy a safer base and, as he thought, a better approach to Richmond. He had now over 120,000 men, but his estimate of his enemy on data obtained by his informa-

tion bureau exceeded that number, so very naturally he wanted on the spot McDowell's entire corps which had been promised. With McDowell present he could move his army so as to draw his supplies from the James at once. Without him and with instructions to coöperate with him, far off on his right, he could not do so. McClellan therefore sent only two corps over the Chickahominy instead of moving there with his whole force. This was called a river, but ordinarily it was no more than a creek with low banks, between which water and swamp varied in width from two to three hundred feet. McClellan and his officers deprecated this division of his army even by so small a river, but it appeared a necessity and they sought to make amends for it by building bridges. Sumner's corps built two, one of which was constructed of large logs by the Fifth New Hampshire of my brigade. General Sumner, seeing the water rising from the rains and hoping to hasten the work, gave the men a barrel of whiskey—at the same time answering my objection to its use by saying: "Yes, general, you are right, but it is like pitch on fire which gets speed out of an engine though it burns out the boiler." The two structures were named Sumner's upper and Sumner's lower bridge. Our engineers farther up, when the south bank had been seized by us, repaired the old bridges and threw across others till the Chickahominy appeared but a slight obstruction.

On May 25th Casey's division of Keyes's corps moved forward to Seven Pines, a "crossroads" on the main pike from Williamsburg to Richmond, where the "nine-mile road" comes from New Bridge into that highway. Keyes, being ordered to hold Fair Oaks Railway station in advance of that position, moved again the 29th, placing Naglee's brigade in advance and bringing up Casey's other two brigades, Wessells's and Palmer's, in support, with pickets out in front of all.

Here Casey's division, really too far forward for safety, fortified as well as it could with the time and implements at hand.

Keyes at first intrenched his other division, Couch's, near Savage Station, but a little later brought it up to the vicinity of Seven Pines and there camped it as a second line to Casey facing toward Richmond. Field works were being constructed to cover every approach, particularly the nine-mile road, which, coming from the New Bridge, was joined by a road from Richmond at the Old Tavern. Couch's division, as a reserved line, was arranged to hold the Seven Pines crossroads. His brigades were Peck's, Abercrombie's, and Devens's. The entire corps of Keyes on the ground did not exceed 12,000 men, who stretched forward for more than two miles, and though partially intrenched, were not within very easy support of each other in case of attack by a larger force. On May 29th and 30th Confederate reconnoissances were made against Keyes's corps in order to ascertain the position and strength of our troops in that vicinity.

Heintzelman, when he had crossed the river with his corps, had moved Hooker's division to the neighborhood of White Oak Swamp Bridge, three miles due south of Bottom's Bridge, and Kearny's division forward on the Richmond road about half as far, stopping it a little short of Savage Railway Station. Heintzelman in his own corps had for duty at the first symptoms of battle about 20,000 men. He was the ranking officer and in command of all the troops south of the Chickahominy. The Eighth Pennsylvania and part of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry were present to watch the flanks of Couch and Casey, but not able to do much in such a thickly wooded region. Casey evidently felt the weakness of his force, for when the Confederate reconnoissance occurred on the 30th he sent at once to Keyes for help. Peck's brigade was placed on his left during that alarm.

Now came during that night a most terrific storm; the rain fell in torrents and it was accompanied by high winds. It was difficult to keep our tents standing and in that peculiarly soft soil the mud deepened and the discomforts were beyond description, so that the soldiers in every camp had little rest while the storm continued. The arms and ammunition were not improved by the pouring rain, though

in these respects one side suffered no more than the other. But for some reason those who stand on the defensive are more subject to discouragement and apprehension than those who are in movement.

General Johnston, the Confederate commander, had a few days before planned a combined attack against our troops north of the Chickahominy, similar to that which the Confederates made a month later, but military reasons caused him to change his purpose.

After his reconnoissance of the 30th he was ready to strike on the south bank. The Chickahominy, during the fearful succession of storm bursts, had risen and spread rapidly over all the low ground till the stream had become a broad river.

What could be more favorable to his plan? True, the Confederate artillery might be hindered by the water and soft soil, but seemingly Keyes's corps of the Union army was now isolated and Johnston had in hand five strong divisions. McClellan could reënforce but slowly from the north of the river, for already some of the bridges had been carried away and the others would not long be safe to cross.

The Confederate order of attack was: Hill to concentrate on the Williamsburg road and suddenly, vigorously assail with his division Keyes in front; Hill to be supported by Longstreet, who was to have the direction of all operations from the Williamsburg road to the Confederate right, and whose own division was to follow Hill; Huger's division, starting early, was to move rapidly by the Charles City road, which was southward nearer the James River, and come up in rear of Keyes's position. G. W. Smith with his own and McLane's divisions was intrusted with a double duty to serve as a general reserve and be ready to reënforce Longstreet down the nine-mile road, and also to watch the New Bridge and all other approaches of our corps from the Chickahominy.

Longstreet, despairing of Huger's coöperation, about 12:30 p.m. ordered D. H. Hill to commence the assault. Hill's strong division sprang forward in the road and on both sides of it with lines far overlapping Casey's front. They

crowded forward with slight skirmishing, and at first with but few pieces of artillery and with as little noise as possible, hoping for a surprise.

The capture that morning of Lieutenant Washington, one of Johnston's aids, in front of the Union line, and his conduct after capture had satisfied Casey that an attack from some direction was about to be made. After that, General Casey increased his diligence, striving to finish his redoubts and intrenchments and extend his abatis. Large numbers of men were working with spades and axes when not long after noon two hostile shells cut the air and burst in their neighborhood. Thus Casey was warned and in a few minutes his line of skirmishers, with a fresh regiment in immediate support, became engaged.

The assault was so abrupt and overwhelming that but little resistance was made by those in advance of the main line. The pickets and regiment just sent forward, leaving the dead and badly wounded, were quickly swept away by their advancing enemy. They assailed the center and both wings and had sufficient numbers to whip around the flanks.

When Casey found his unfinished trenches too weak and his fighting force too small to hold back Hill's brigades, his artillery and his musketry making but faint impression, he ordered a bayonet charge by four regiments. General Naglee led the charge and succeeded in pressing all the Confederates in sight in the direct front back across the open space to the edge of the woods. That was, however, but a momentary respite; for from those woods Naglee's men received a fire that they could not stand and quickly ran back to their intrenched lines.

Many of Casey's troops being new levies, after they had once had their ranks broken, scattered off to the rear, falling back even beyond Couch's position. Still, most of them preserved a show of order and were subsequently brought up by their officers as far as Seven Pines to renew the struggle.

Hill, while he attacked with three brigades in front, sent Rains with his brigade to work around Casey's left. He went under cover of the marshy forest, turned, and came up

behind Casey's intrenchments. He thus had a large brigade enfilading our lines and pelting the backs of our soldiers. After losing heavily and inflicting a great loss upon his assailants Casey ordered the abandonment of that front. Our new regiments, which had fought hard till now, broke up badly in the retreat. A regiment from Peck's brigade, sent forward from the left of Couch, delayed Rains sufficiently to enable Casey's men to retire without destruction. Casey passed Couch and gathered up all the remnants he could behind him at Seven Pines.

The line of rifle pits in front of Seven Pines could not long be held by Couch's division—because Couch had first to reënforce Casey and then by the orders of his corps commander he was obliged to extend too much, even as far as he could reach along the nine-mile road. That line of three brigades, Abercrombie's, Devens's, and Peck's, crossed the railroad near Fair Oaks Station. The contest at Couch's new position was at times as fierce as at Casey's, and the line with little or no cover for the defenders was kept till after four o'clock.

As soon as the assailants recovered their breath and were reasonably reorganized by their leaders, they made another vigorous push to complete the destruction of Keyes's corps.

While all this fury of battle was in progress—and over two hours of it had passed—by some extraordinary circumstance Heintzelman, whom McClellan looked to as the veritable commander of all the forces on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy and whose headquarters were near Savage Station, received no word of the hostile attack, until too late to help Casey. At last he was on his way battleward, storming at criminal stragglers and hurrying forward Kearny's division.

With such a battlefield won, with much food, and eight captured cannon and hundreds of prisoners in hand, no wonder there was confidence and enthusiasm in Longstreet's ranks. General Johnston and G. W. Smith at their junction of roads on the Confederate left, had failed to hear the musketry till after 4 p.m., and were at last informed by a

returning messenger. Then they moved straight on toward the battlefield. It was a time for a great success which might bring Confederate independence.

Phil Kearny, following his instructions literally, sent Birney's small brigade to the railway, which took post far back of the staggering line of battle.

After Birney had gone Kearny heard of Casey's retreat and Couch's danger, and received Heintzelman's order for the other brigade with him. Passing through throngs of fugitives he joined Berry at the head of the brigade on the Richmond road and urged the utmost haste. He also sent to Bottom's Bridge for Jameson's brigade left there as a guard.

He now came up to Seven Pines with his head of column in an incredibly short time. The impulsive Kearny found Keyes and Casey together. Couch was with Abercrombie over the railway toward the Chickahominy. Kearny quickly took in the situation; the zigzag rifle trench sheltering crowded men, and the open space in front, from beyond which the Confederate riflemen were firing from both the felled and standing timber. Kearny eagerly asked: "Where is your greatest need?" Casey, cheered by the newcomers, said: "Kearny, if you will regain our late camp the day will still be ours." Kearny just then had only the Third Michigan up. The men moved forward with alacrity; they ran over the open space into the timber and begun a contest as determined as that of their foes, "heedless," said their general, "of the shell and ball that rained upon them." But even when Berry's three other regiments had joined the fiercely fighting line Kearny found that after all his promptness he could effect but little. He gained some ground, then lost it, backing off in fairly good order toward the White Oak Swamp and Hooker, stoutly disputing the ground as he retired.

About the time of Kearny's arrival, Hill's and Longstreet's divisions of Confederates with some reënforcements from their reserves, having four brigade fronts abreast, stretching from the swamps of White Oak to and beyond

Abercrombie at the railroad, more than a mile of breadth, came surging on with cheering and musketry, the charge made the more formidable by the rapid use of our captured cannon turned against our irregular masses herded together at Seven Pines.

It did not take many minutes to break our very attenuated opposing lines. Couch saw the blackness of the storm as it filled the air with fury and speed. Upon the break in what remained of his division he swung off a few regiments of his right, including Abercrombie's brigade, till they were well north of the railroad and parallel to it, and then retired slowly toward Sumner's upper bridge. In the edge of the wood he made a firm stand to check any hostile advance in that direction. As a thundercloud approaches, but stops at a river and passes harmlessly away, giving but a gentle sprinkling, so did this cloud of insurgents approach Couch and his men, touch the woods, and pass on along the railway beyond him. But this portion of Couch's division was thus hopelessly cut off from the rest of its corps.

Meanwhile, Kearny, finding a safe road via the saw mill back of his line, hastened his men to the rear in that way till he reached the defenses at Savage Station which had been constructed originally by General Couch. To this strong place were gathered all the regiments of Keyes except Couch's detachment, and all of Heintzelman's corps including Hooker, now arrived from White Oak Swamp.

Longstreet's forces, exhausted by six hours' fighting, could get no farther. But he knew that for him heavy reënforcements were at hand. Five fresh brigades were partly behind him and partly on his left, extending beyond the Fair Oaks railway station.

As the fresh Confederate troops were coming on cheering and confident there came from their left front, toward the Chickahominy, a sudden check. Some guns of a Union battery opened a cross fire. It was not safe to ignore them and their support. Smith ordered them to be taken at once. Two Confederate brigades attempted that. Then others already somewhat ahead turned

back and joined in the attack. Smith became impatient. He went to the railroad to discover what was the matter. The firing grew worse. No such stubborn resistance should come from that quarter. While Smith, and later, Johnston, are examining this flank interruption, I will explain its cause.

Sumner's corps, we know, lay along the Chickahominy, opposite the battlefield. An order from McClellan restraining him from moving without permission was received by Sumner that morning. We heard the first fitful sound from Casey's guns, and before one o'clock we knew that a hard battle was going on. Sumner at once asked, by telegraph, permission to cross the river. He walked up and down like a caged lion. McClellan first telegraphed him to be ready. He was ready. But to save delay he sent Sedgwick's division with three batteries to his uper bridge and our division to the lower. The order to cross came at last at 2:30 p.m. As Sumner with Sedgwick approached, a part of the upper bridge rose with the water, starting to float off with the current. It was difficult to keep the green logs in place by ropes and withes; great cracks appeared. The engineer officer met Sumner and remonstrated: "General Sumner, you cannot cross this bridge!"

"Can't cross this bridge! I can, sir; I will, sir!'

"Don't you see the approaches are breaking up and the logs displaced? It is impossible!"

"Impossible! Sir, I tell you I can cross. I am ordered."

The orders had come and that ended the matter with Sumner.

When men and horses were once on the bridge they pressed down the logs and accomplished the task more easily than the engineer had believed possible. Beyond the bridge the water was sometimes up to the thighs of Sedgwick's men. Our lower bridge was worse. As soon as French's brigade had crossed, the bridge began to break so much that Richardson turned my brigade, followed by Meagher's, to the upper one. The water was now deeper

on the flats and the mud was well stirred up from the bottom.

Kirby's battery of six light twelve-pounder smooth-bore brass guns, following Sedgwick's leading brigade, had found the road a veritable quagmire. By unlimbering at times and using the prolonges, the cannoneers being up to their waists in water, at 4:45 p.m. three pieces with one caisson were landed on harder ground and put in place for action. A little later came two or more, and the sixth gun was at last dragged out by an abundance of men. Our other batteries were too late for the action.

Couch had sent to Sumner for help, and of his emotion, as he saw our troops approaching, he has made this record: "I felt that God was with us and victory ours!"

We found this command, four regiments and a battery, astride a country road leaving from Fair Oaks Station via Mr. Courtney's and Dr. Kent's houses to the meadow near our bridges, and holding on persistently against the fire of flankers of Smith's Confederate column. Of Sedgwick's leading brigade under General Gorman, Sully's regiment, the First Minnesota, went to the right to secure that flank and the other three to the left of Couch's line. Kirby's guns, as fast as they arrived, and two guns under Lieutenant Fagan, of a Pennsylvania battery on the ground, went into action at once, facing toward Fair Oaks, i. e., in front of the left of Couch's line with their own right at the corner of a grove; behind this grove Couch's infantry line extended. Sedgwick's second brigade, W. W. Burns in command, was formed in reserve and the two regiments present of the third brigade, General Dana commanding, extended the front farther to the left from the flank of Gorman.

Soon the firing was tremendous. This was the interruption—the check to the advance of the Confederate left—which came to them so suddenly. Then there was a brief pause, when General Whiting with his own, Pettigrew's, and Hampton's brigades faced to the left and attacked our troops in line of battle from the nine-mile road.

They advanced straight toward Sumner, firing as they came and shouting.

Our infantry returned the fire in volleys, while the artillery discharges were continued with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy. This fearful fire stopped that first Confederate advance.

Failing in the attempt directly upon the battery, the Confederates tried to reach it through the woods on its right. But limbers brought up ammunition from the caissons buried in the mud of the swamp and returned for more. Each discharge buried the guns, thrails and all, to the axles in the soft soil. Yet, by the help of infantry men standing in rear, the pieces on the left of battery were carried forward and the front changed to the right to meet the Confederates' flank move as they emerged from the woods, and bring upon their front a tremendous fire of canister.

At the same time the infantry on the left of the battery, under Sumner's personal direction, was advanced, and charged the right of the Confederates as they came on. Two guns only could be soon enough extricated from the mud to follow up the enemy's retreat.

At the same time a fourth Confederate brigade, Hatton's, was put in, and in the woods advanced to within a few yards of the Union line, but made no impression.

Thus, all Smith's wing of the Confederate army that night within reach as reënforcements for Longstreet, except Hood's brigade, was diverted, and in this engagement of an hour and a half lost 1,283 men, including the brigade commanders, Hampton and Pettigrew, seriously wounded; the latter was left unconscious on the field and captured, and General Hatton killed.

About sunset General Johnston himself was struck from his horse, severely wounded by a fragment of a shell, and carried from the field. The command of the entire Confederate army then devolved on General G. W. Smith; the defeat of his troops by Sumner did not soften the responsibility of the morrow.

The Battle of Fair Oaks

Our change from the lower to the upper bridge and the difficulties of the march brought my brigade to the battlefield nearly two hours after Sumner's and Sedgwick's timely arrival.

As we approached the front a thick mist was setting in and a dark, cloudy sky was over our heads, so that it was not easy at twenty yards to distinguish a man from a horse. The heavy firing was over. As soon as Sedgwick's advance had pushed the enemy back beyond Fair Oaks Station, Lieutenant Nelson A. Miles, whom I had sent on ahead, returned from the battle, meeting me near the edge of a swampy opening over which the Confederates had charged and been swept back by the counter-charge.

Miles, guiding us, remarked: "General, you had better dismount and lead your horses, for the dead and wounded are here."

A peculiar feeling crept over me as I put my feet on the soft ground and followed the young officer. Some stretchers were in motion. A few friends were searching for faces they hoped not to find. There were cries of delirium, calls of the helpless, the silence of the slain, and the hum of distant voices in the advancing brigade, with an intermittent rattle of musketry, the neighing of horses, and the shriller prolonged calls of the team mules, and soon the moving of lanterns guiding the bearers of the wounded to the busy surgeons: all these things made a weird impression and a desire to be freed from following in the wake of the ravages of war.

I remember that the call of one poor fellow was insistent. He repeatedly cried: "Oh, sir! Kind sir! Come to me!" I walked over to where he lay and asked: "What regiment do you belong to?"

He answered: "The Fifth Mississippi."

I then said: "What do you want?"

He replied: "Oh, I am cold!"

I knew it was from the approach of death, but noticing that he had a blanket over him I said: "You have a good warm blanket over you."

He looked toward it and said gently: "Yes, some kind gentleman from Massachusetts spread his blanket over me, but, sir, I'm still cold."

A Massachusetts soldier had given his only blanket to a wounded man—a wounded enemy.

We silently passed on to our allotted lines. I pondered over my instructions, prepared orders for others, and then, with mingled hope and apprehension and conscious trust in God, lay down to dream of home. Only one of my regiments (the Fifth New Hampshire) was called to the front that evening. The Confederate and Union men were so mixed up by the conflict at dark that they often during the night unwittingly walked into the wrong camp. It had been a costly day to us, but the left wing of our army was not destroyed, and the Confederate casualties were as many as ours. We waited for the morrow to renew the strife, believing that we had come to a decisive battle, maybe the last great struggle of the war.

The sudden check by Sumner and the desperate wounds of Johnston had produced an astounding effect upon the Confederates. At 4 p.m. they were confident, jubilant; at dark they had lost their head and confusion reigned.

General Smith, regarding the morrow, directed General Longstreet to push his successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting on his left. Whiting was to make a diversion, and in extreme case to hold at all hazards the junction of the New Bridge and nine-mile road.

That point was so far back that Smith's orders practically meant that Longstreet alone was to finish the battle. Longstreet, though reënforced, had a hard task, especially under his pivotal orders. He did not and could not do else but hold on a while and finally withdraw.

On the morning of June 1st matters had shaped themselves fairly well for us. From right to left in a bend, concave toward Smith and Longstreet, were the divisions of Sedgwick, Richardson, Kearny, and Hooker. Sumner's troops were at the extreme right, parallel to the nine-mile

road. The Union line then ran along the railway, and finally crossing the railway and turnpike it continued on by the strong works near Savage Station to White Oak Swamp.

Of our division, on Sedgwick's left, French's brigade of four regiments was the front line, my Fifth New Hampshire still covering the whole front as a picket guard. The remainder of my brigade (the Sixty-fourth New York, Colonel Parker; Sixty-first New Work, Colonel Barlow; and the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Miller) formed a second line a few hundred yards back.

General Meagher's brigade of three regiments made a third line, and Hazzard's, Frank's and Petit's batteries, belonging to the division, were located on convenient knolls near the front. Thus at dawn we stood ready for work.

As soon as it was light the Fifth New Hampshire, under Colonel Cross, advanced slowly till it had seized the woods beyond the railroad near Fair Oaks Station. Hazzard quickly found a favorable place for the batteries, whence by a cross fire he commanded all the open spaces. over which the enemy would have to approach us. The guns and battery men were shielded by epaulements hurriedly thrown up.

The first noisy collision of this Sunday morning was about five o'clock; it became a smart reveille to all; first, a brisk skirmish, a few bullets whizzing through the tree tops. Colonel Cross had every man ready. The artillery officers with good field glasses were watching. There was always a strange thrill of interest at such a time. The movement was, however, only a Confederate reconnoissance. The reconnoiterers were hunting for the Fair Oaks Railroad Station, which, unknown to them, had changed occupants. For a brief period their cavalry and infantry showed in the openings along our front, but everywhere found themselves met by Cross's skirmishers, whose steady firing, supported by the rapid cross fire of our batteries, drove them beyond range.

This event increased our caution. Too long an interval between French and Birney, of Kearny's division, was reported—only pickets connecting. French then gained ground to the left, thinning his ranks and taking greater distance from Sedgwick. Still he could not reach far enough, so by Richardson's order I sent Colonel Miller with the Eighty-first Pennsylvania. Miller promptly deployed his men and moved forward till abreast of Colonel Brooke, who commanded French's left regiment. The reason for not connecting with Birney's brigade, now under command of Colonel Ward, was that it was much farther back from the enemy than French expected to find it, and the underbrush was too thick to see very far.

Sumner was now the senior officer south of the Chickahominy, but in command of his own corps only, and Heintzelman commanded his part of the line. The commander of the whole battle was McClellan at his headquarters several miles away. The day's work resulted in spasmodic activities at several points of our front, and no general aggressive movement even after the Confederate partial attacks had been repulsed.

The Fifth New Hampshire was relieved from the skirmish line and placed in reserve. There were but a few minutes to wait. Upon French's left front there came a Confederate attack with two deployed brigade fronts, Armstead's and Pickett's. They moved at a quick walk and, owing to prevalence of the woodland, drew wonderfully near before they were discovered. Along the whole of our front line they opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within fifty yards. French's men instantly returned the fire, and the contest for over an hour was as severe as any in the war.

At this time Miller, of my brigade, who, as we have seen, was to the left of French, saw through the trees the coming troops. He gave the word "Ready!" when some officer near him said: "No, no, colonel, they are our men!" Probably thinking them detached from Ward, Miller in his strong voice commanded: "Recover arms!" and called

out: "Who are you?" They cried: "Virginians!" and instantly fired a volley which killed Colonel Miller and so many of his men that the regiment lost its continuity. A captain, Robert M. Lee, Jr., sprang upon a stump near at hand and rallied six companies. At once I sent Lieutenant N. A. Miles to look up the other four. He soon found them and brought them together at the railroad where there was an open space, and then led them again into action.

It was at this period of the conflict that Richardson sent me to fill the interval made worse by the loss of Miller. I brought the two regiments into line at the railroad—the Sixty-first on the right and the Sixty-fourth to its left.

Just as we were ready to advance the enemy's fire began to meet us, cutting through the trees. My brown horse was wounded through the shoulder, and I had to dismount and wait for another. Turning toward the men, I saw that some had been hit and others were leaving their ranks. This was their first experience under fire. I cried out with all my might: "Lie down!" Every man dropped to the ground; then my staff and field officers aided me in sheltering the men by forming line behind the railroad embankment, but we could not fire yet without the danger of pouring shot into French's line.

In five minutes I had mounted my large gray horse, my brother riding my third and only other one, a beautiful "zebra." In order to encourage the men in a forward movement I placed myself, mounted, in front of the Sixty-fourth New York, and my aid, Lieutenant Charles H. Howard, in front of the Sixty-first. Every officer was directed to repeat each command. I ordered: "Forward!" and then "March!" I could hear the echo of these words and, as I started, the Sixty-fourth followed me with a glad shout up the slope and through the woods; the Sixty-first followed my brother at the same time. We moved forward finely, taking many prisoners as we went and gaining ground leftward, until we came abreast of French's division.

Before reaching French's line I was wounded through the right forearm by a small Mississippi rifle ball. Lieutenant Howard just then ran to me on foot and said that the zebra horse was killed. He took a handkerchief, bound up my arm, and then ran back to the Sixty-first.

As the impulse was favorable to charge I decided to go on farther, and, asking Brooke's regiment on French's left to lie down, called again: "Forward!" And on we went, pushing back the enemy and breaking through his nearest line. We pressed our way over uneven ground to the neighborhood of the crossroads at Seven Pines, where our men the day before had left their tents standing. Behind those tents was found a stronger force of Confederates, kneeling and firing. We approached within thirty or forty yards and, halting on as favorable ground as possible, promptly and efficiently returned their fire.

When at last we halted near the standing tents and I had passed to the rear of the line which was rapidly firing, my gray had his left foreleg broken and though I was not then aware of it, I had been wounded again, my right elbow having been shattered by a rifle shot. Lieutenant Howard was missing.

Lieutenant William McIntyre, of the Sixty-fourth, seeing the condition of my horse, seized me, and put me in a sheltered place on the ground. I heard him say: "General, you shall not be killed." McIntyre himself was slain near that spot, giving his life for mine. The bullets were just then raining upon our men, who without flinching were firing back. As a faintness warned me, I called to Colonel Barlow, who was not far away, to take command. He answered me in a cool, clear voice: "Shall I take command of the whole brigade, sir?" I replied: "No, only of this portion." It would have broken Cross's heart to have forgotten even at such a time his seniority, and the colonel of the Sixty-fourth was also Barlow's senior, but he had failed in the necessary physical strength that day.

Barlow took command and stood his ground until Brooke, to whom I spoke on my way to the rear, brought

up his line. After a little further conflict in that vicinity the Confederates gave way and along our division front the victory was complete.

Meanwhile, to the eastward the enemy passing through the thickets beyond my left flank crossed the railroad, encountering only such slight opposition as the remnants of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania under Lee and Miles could administer, caught sight of the right of Ward's brigade and opened upon them a brisk fusilade. Ward threw back the right of my old regiment, the Third Maine, and moved his other regiments so as to come forward in echelon. He began by firing volleys, then inclining more to the right charged furiously. This was done at the same time Lieutenant Howard and I were leading our two regiments into the mêlée. Ward's vigorous onset cleared that important quarter of the pressing army.

To the left of Ward came Hooker, his front making a right angle with the railroad. He was ready for his part. His advance on account of thickets and swamps was slow but positive.

Thus our division and portions of two others were brought into the Sunday battle. Finally, from the right of Richardson to the left of Hooker had been made a general advance, and the whole obscure and dreadful field of both days compassed by our men. Why was not that Confederate retreat followed up and the fruits of victory secured? After weighing up with care the many reasons which our commanding general has left recorded for not at this time pushing forward his whole strength, I still think that his headquarters were too far away, and that just then and there he lost a great opportunity.

General French's medical director, Surgeon Gabriel Grant, close up to the troops, was operating under fire[1] beside a large stump. He there bound up my arm. I found my brother shot through the thigh, just able to limp along by using his empty scabbard for a cane. He had a fox skin

[1]For this, Dr. Grant received the Congress Medal of Honor.

robe, which had been on his saddle, thrown across his free arm.

"Why weary yourself, Charlie, with that robe?" I asked.

"To cover me up if I should have to stop," he smilingly answered.

Dr. Grant dressed his leg and provided him with a stretcher. I prefered to walk. En route I encountered a soldier among the wounded with his fingers broken and bleeding. He cried out with pain. Seeing me he drew near with sympathy. "You are worse off than I," he said, and putting his arm around me he let me share his strength. We wounded wanderers at last found Courtney's house, a half mile or more north of the Fair Oaks Station.

Dr. Hammond, my personal friend, met me near the house, saw the blood, touched my arm, and said with feeling: "General, your arm is broken." The last ball had passed through the elbow joint and crushed the bones into small fragments. He led me to a negro hut, large enough only for a double bed. Here I lay down, alarming an aged negro couple who feared at first that some of us might discover and seize hidden treasure which was in that bed.

My brigade surgeon, Dr. Palmer, and several others soon stood by my bedside in consultation. At last Dr. Palmer, with serious face, kindly told me that my arm had better come off. "All right, go ahead," I said. "Happy to lose only my arm."

"Not before 5 p.m., general."

"Why not?"

"Reaction must set in."

So I had to wait six hours. I had received the second wound about half-past ten. I had reached the Courtney house about eleven, and in some weakness and discomfort occupied the negro cabin till the hour appointed. At that time Dr. Palmer came with four stout soldiers and a significant stretcher. They placed me thereon, and the doctor put around the arm close to the shoulder the torniquet, screwing it tighter and tighter above the

wound. They then bore me to the amputating room, a place a little grewsome withal from arms, legs, and hands not yet all carried off, and poor fellows with axious eyes waiting their turn.

On the long table I was nicely bolstered; Dr. Grant, who had come from the front, relieved the too-tight tourniquet. A mixture of chloroform and gas was administered and I slept quietly. Dr. Palmer amputated the arm above the elbow. When I awoke I was surprised to find the heavy burden was gone, but was content and thankful.

McCLELLAN'S OWN STORY

THE WAR FOR THE UNION

THE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT IT

THE CIVILIANS WHO DIRECTED IT

AND

HIS RELATIONS TO IT AND TO THEM

BY

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN

LATE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMIES

NEW YORK

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CHAPTER XV

The Peninsular campaign—Landing at Fortress Monroe—That place removed from his command—Secretary Stanton stops all recruiting—Advance on Richmond—Columns under fire—First corps withdrawn from the army.

In the course of description of the operations preliminary to the siege of Yorktown, attention is necessarily directed to the erroneous maps in our possession, and on which certain orders were based. This was but a single instance among many. In fact, it may be broadly stated that we had no military maps of any value. This was one of our greatest difficulties, and always seriously interfered with our movements in the early part of the war. When in presence of the enemy it was necessary to reconnoitre under fire, the accidents of the ground being entirely unknown to us.

It was a peculiar feature of our staff departments before the war that no measures were taken to collect topographical information about our own or any neighboring country. I do not know to what extent this has now been rectified, but there certainly should be some bureau charged with the collection and arrangement of topographical and statistical information in regard to our own and adjacent countries. It is true that the Confederates were no better off for correct maps than ourselves, but they possessed the inestimable advantage of operating on their own ground, which they knew perfectly well; they had plenty of good guides; and as they usually conducted a defensive campaign, they had plenty of time to construct maps and acquaint themselves thoroughly with the ground in the interests of active operations. Moreover, the white people, at least, were usually in their favor and acted as scouts, guides, and spies. Even when the negroes were favorable to us they seldom possessed the intelligence required to give any value to their information. They rarely knew more of the country than the plantations on which they had passed their lives, could give no accurate or intelligible description of roads or accidents of the ground, and their estimates of

numbers were almost always ridiculously inaccurate. If a negro were asked how many Confederates he had seen at a certain point his answer was very likely to be: "I dunno, massa, but I guess about a million."

I went on board the steamer *Commodore* on the afternoon of the 1st of April, off Alexandria, and remained at anchor until an early hour next morning, being engaged all night in giving the necessary orders for the conduct of affairs in front of Washington, the movements of troops, supplies, etc.

I reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d, still under the delusion that I should have an active army of 146,000 and the full control of my base of operations, and that I should receive efficient support from the navy.

According to the best information in our possession in regard to the Peninsula, our main road extended from Fortress Monroe, through Hampton and Big Bethel, to Yorktown; while another existed from Newport News, nearly parallel with the James river, and passing through Warwick Court-House to the Halfway House, where it met the main road from Yorktown to Williamsburg. Both of these roads between Yorktown and the point of the Peninsula were intersected by many streams, and we had information to the effect that many of these crossings—as, for example, Big Bethel, Young's Mill, Howard's bridge, Cockletown, etc.—were strongly entrenched and would be obstinately defended.

Our information seemed also to be clear that the Warwick river ran alongside of the Newport News road, which crossed only an insignificant branch, and that it presented no obstacle to a march on the Halfway House in rear of Yorktown.

After the Fort Monroe movement was decided upon my first intention was to inaugurate the operation by despatching the 1st corps in mass to the Sand-Box, three or four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the entrenched crossings referred to, and receive a base of supplies as near as possible to Yorktown; or else, should the condition of affairs at the moment render it desirable, to land it on the Gloucester side of the York river at the mouth of

Map of the Peninsula



the Severn, and throw it upon West Point. But transports arrived so slowly, and the pressure of the administration for a movement was so strong and unreasonable, that I felt obliged to embark the troops by divisions as fast as transports arrived, and then determined to hold the 1st corps to the last, and land it as a unit whenever the state of affairs promised the best results. A few hours after I had determined to act upon this determination McDowell telegraphed me from Washington, suggesting that the troops should be embarked by divisions, according to convenience, instead of awaiting the arrival of sufficient transports to move his whole corps. Soon after this I was more than once informed that Gen. McDowell and others in Washington had instanced this decision to embark the troops by divisions as a proof that I had disobeyed the President's order as to the formation of army corps, and that I intended to throw obstacles in the way of its fulfilment.

Considerable delay occurred in the arrival of the sailing transports for horses, in consequence of an order being given, without my knowledge, for the steamers to come to Alexandria without them.

The first division which had embarked was Hamilton's, formerly Heintzelman's, of the 3d corps, which sailed on the 17th of March; it was followed by Gen. F. J. Porter's division of the same corps on the 22d of March. Gen. Heintzelman accompanied Porter's division, and was instructed to get his corps in condition for an advance without delay. He was also ordered to encamp his two divisions some three or four miles out from Fort Monroe, in good defensive position, and to push out strong reconnoissances to ascertain the position and the strength of the enemy, without going so far as to destroy the impression that our movements might be intended against Norfolk.

On the 27th he sent Porter towards Big Bethel and Howard's bridge, and Smith towards Young's Mill, on the James river road.

Porter occupied Big Bethel and pushed one brigade four miles further, sending skirmishers on to Howard's bridge, where they saw entrenchments occupied. Deserters re-

ported Magruder at the place with 800 men. Smith went as far as Watt's Creek, where he found no entrenchments, and gained information that the enemy held Young's Mill in strong force. Both divisions returned to their camps after completing the reconnoissance. Heintzelman reported that, from the best information, Magruder had from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and gave not the slightest indication that he thought he could take or invest Yorktown. On the 3d of April there were of my command in the vicinity of Fort Monroe the 3d Penn. Cavalry, the 2d, 5th, and a part of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, a part of the reserve artillery, two divisions each of the 3d and 4th corps ready to move, one division of the 2d corps, Sykes's brigade of U. S. Infantry. Casey's division of the 4th corps was at Newport News, but totally unprovided with transportation. Richardson's division of the 2d corps and Hooker's of the 3d had not yet arrived. The troops ready to advance numbered about 53,000 men and 100 guns—less than 45,000 effectives. The amount of wagon transportation arrived was altogether insufficient for a long movement, and it became necessary to advance in order to establish new depots on the shore more to the front. It was evident that to await any considerable accession of force and transportation would involve a delay of many days; I therefore determined to advance on the 4th of April.

The following telegram of April 3 to Mr. Stanton requires no explanation:

> I expect to move from here to-morrow morning on Yorktown, where a force of some 15,000 of the rebels are in an entrenched position, and I think it quite probable they will attempt to resist us. No appearance of the *Merrimac* as yet. Commodore Goldsborough is quite confident he can sink her when she comes out.

Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under Gen. Wool a division of about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps.

During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the adjutant-general of the army stating that, by the Presi-

dent's order, I was deprived of all control over Gen. Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction.

This order left me without any base of operations under my own control.

On my arrival at Fortress Monroe I was informed that the enemy had been very active for some days past in crossing troops over the James river on the line of communication between Yorktown and Norfolk. Reports were conflicting as to the direction of this movement, but in any event it seemed proper under the circumstances to move on Yorktown as promptly as possible with the troops in hand, in order to invest the place before further reinforcements and supplies could reach it.

On the same day, on the very eve of the advance of the Army of the Potomac into the enemy's country, with the certainty of heavy losses by battle and disease, was issued the order putting a complete stop to the recruiting service for the volunteers and breaking up all the recruiting stations:

General Order No. 33.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, U. S. A.,
"WASHINGTON, April 3, 1862.

"III. The recruiting service for volunteers will be discontinued in every State from this date. The officers detached on the Volunteer Recruiting Service will join their regiments without delay, taking with them the parties and recruits at their respective stations.

"The superintendents of the Volunteer Recruiting Service will disband their parties and close their offices, after having taken the necessary steps to carry out these orders. The public property belonging to the Volunteer Recruiting Service will be sold to the best advantage possible, and the proceeds credited to the fund for collecting, drilling, and organizing volunteers.

"By order of the Secretary of War.

"L. THOMAS,
"*Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.*"

Common sense and the experience of all wars prove that when an army takes the field every possible effort should be made at home to collect recruits and establish depots, whence the inevitable daily losses may be made good with instructed men as fast as they occur, so that the fighting force may be kept up to their normal strength. Failure to

do this proves either a desire for the failure of the campaign or entire incompetence. Between the horns of this dilemma the friends of Mr. Stanton must take their choice.

During the preceding autumn I advocated a system of drafting, but was not listened to. Had it been adopted at that time, when recruiting was rapid and easy, it could have been established and well regulated without difficulty and without any shock to the country. The system as finally adopted was as bad as bad could be, and cannot be defended. It was unnecessary to disturb all the relations of society and the business interests of the country, and the numbers called out were absurdly large.

The numbers of troops on foot in April, 1862, in the various parts of the country, were ample for the suppression of the rebellion, if they had been properly handled and their numbers made good by a constant stream of recruits poured into the old regiments, so as to keep them always at their full strength. Instead of this, spasmodic calls for large numbers of men were made, and the general rule was to organize them into new regiments, often allowing the invaluable old regiments to die out. This system was infinitely more expensive, but gave the opportunity to promote personal or political favorites. The new regiments required a long time to make them serviceable, while the same men placed in the old regiments, under experienced officers and surrounded by veterans would in a few days become efficient soldiers. Another grave defect of this system was the destructive effects on the *esprit de corps* of the old officers and men—an invaluable adjunct in war.

Out of these wholesale drafts grew the system of substitutes and bounties, which cost so many unnecessary millions to the country, and so seriously affected the quality of the troops in the latter years of the war.

Never in the whole history of nations was anything more absurdly and recklessly managed than the whole system of recruiting, drafting, and organization under the regime of Secretary Stanton. When his actions are coolly criticised, apart from the influence of party feeling, his administration will be regarded as unparallel in history for

blunders and ignorant self-assertion. He unnecessarily prolonged the war at least two years, and at least tripled its cost in blood and treasure.

The movement was made by the two roads already mentioned: the two divisions of the 4th corps from Newport News *via* Warwick Court-House; the two divisions of the 3d, supported by Sedgwick's division of the 2d corps, Sykes's brigade, and the reserve artillery, by the road from Hampton and Big Bethel to Yorktown. The advance on Big Bethel would turn the works at Young's Mill and open the way for the 4th corps; while, in turn, the advance of the latter corps on Warwick Court-House would turn the works at Howard's bridge and Ship Point, and open the road of the right column to the immediate vicinity of Yorktown.

Smith's division (4th corps) encamped on the 4th of April at Young's Mill, with one brigade in advance on the road from Big Bethel to Warwick; Couch's division on Fisher's creek.

Porter, on the same day, occupied Cockletown with Morrell's division and a battery, his pickets a mile in advance near Pavis's house; the other brigades of the division less than two miles in rear of Morrell. Averill's cavalry found the Ship Point batteries abandoned. They were strong and well constructed, with deep wet ditches; they had platforms and magazine for siege-guns, all the guns withdrawn; there were excellent quarters for three regiments of ten companies each. Hamilton's division encamped about two miles in rear of Howard's creek. The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry bivouacked with headquarters at Big Bethel. Gen. Heintzelman learned during the evening that there were no batteries between Porter and Yorktown; that Yorktown was strongly fortified; that its garrison until recently consisted of 10,000 men, but was then increased to 20,000 or 25,000; that there were more troops at Williamsburg, and batteries about two miles south of it, and that reinforcements were said to have come from Richmond. Gen. Heintzelman concluded that the enemy had no idea of abandoning Yorktown. During the same afternoon Gen. Keyes, commanding the left column, received information that from 5,000 to 8,000 of the

enemy were strongly entrenched at Lee's Mill. Still ignorant of the true course of the Warwick and its relations to the entrenchments at Lee's Mill, and alive to the necessity of preventing further reinforcements to the garrison at Yorktown, I, on the evening of the 4th, ordered the movements for the 5th as follows:

Smith's division to move at six A.M. *via* Warwick Court-House to the Halfway House on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road; Couch's division to move at the same hour and close up on Smith at the Halfway House; any positions of the enemy met with on the way to be carried by assault without delay; on reaching the Halfway House the corps to occupy the narrow dividing ridge at that point, so as to prevent the escape or reinforcement of the garrison of Yorktown.

Porter's division to close up on its advanced guard at six A.M., and move forward to an intersection of roads about two and three-quarters miles from Yorktown, there to halt and send out reconnoitering parties, to cover the reconnoissances of the engineer officers, etc.

Hamilton's division to move at the same hour and close up on Porter. Sedgwick, temporarily attached to headquarters, to move with the reserves to Dr. Pavis's house, where the road to Lee's Mill diverged, and there await orders.

If Heintzelman found it possible to assault the works at Yorktown immediately, the reserves were in a position to support him; if he found an assault impracticable, and Keyes needed assistance in carrying out his orders, the reserves were in position to move at once to his support. If Keyes had succeeded in passing Lee's Mill and reaching the Halfway House, I should at once have gone to his support with all the reserves and one of Heintzelman's divisions, thus holding the key-point of the operation with four divisions of infantry, the brigade of regulars, the cavalry and artillery reserves.

In consequence of the heavy rains the roads were very bad and the troops moved with difficulty, so that little of Keyes's artillery and none of the ammunition, forage, and provision trains could be brought up. Heintzelman early in

the day came under the artillery-fire of the works of Yorktown, and soon saw that an assault was impracticable. Keyes also found himself brought to a halt by the artillery-fire of the Lee's Mill works, and discovered that they were covered by the Warwick river, rendering any attempt at assault utterly out of the question.

It was at this moment, with the leading division of each column under a hot artillery-fire, and the skirmishers of the 3d corps engaged, being myself with Porter's division, that I received the telegram informing me of the withdrawal of the 1st corps (McDowell's) from my command:

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
"April 4, 1862.

"*Gen. McClellan*:

"By direction of the President Gen. McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War; letter by mail.

"L. THOMAS,
"*Adj.-Gen.*"

CHAPTER XVI

Effects of reduction of the army—Overthrow of the campaign—New campaign with reduced army—Siege of Yorktown.

Soon after receiving the telegram I sent the following to the Secretary of War, dated April 5:

The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoissance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are formidable. Deserters say that they are being reinforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under the circumstances I beg that you reconsider the order detaching the 1st corps from my command.

In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy and active operations have commenced. Two of my divisions have been under fire of artillery during most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished ranks; but whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success.

If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently ask, as a military necessity, that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

On the same day, at ten A.M., I sent the following to Secretary Stanton:

Since Gen. Woodbury's brigade of volunteer engineer troops was only temporarily attached to the 1st corps for special service, and is much needed here, I have directed Gen. Woodbury to bring it here at once. Their services are indispensable.

The following letter was written during the evening of April 5:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF POTOMAC.
CAMP NEAR YORKTOWN, April 5, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adj.-Gen. U. S. A.:

GENERAL: I have now a distinct knowledge of the general position of the enemy in my front. His left is in Yorktown; his line thence extends along and in rear of the Warwick river to its mouth. That stream is an obstacle of great magnitude. It is fordable at only one point (so far as I yet know) below its head, which is near Yorktown; is for several miles unfordable, and has generally a very marshy valley. His batteries and entrenchments render this line an exceedingly formidable one, entirely too much so (so far as I understand it) to be carried by a single assault. I shall employ tomorrow in reconnaissance, repairing roads, establishing a depot at Ship's Point, and in bringing up supplies.

Porter, the head of the right column, has moved as close upon the town as the enemy's guns will permit; he is encamped there, supported by Hamilton's division. Porter has been under fire all the afternoon. But five men killed. His rifled field-guns and sharp-shooters have caused some loss to the enemy. Keyes, with two divisions, is in front of Lee's Mill, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick river. He has been engaged in an artillery combat of several hours' duration losing some five killed. At Lee's Mill we have a causeway covered by formidable batteries. The information obtained at Fort Monroe in regard to the topography of the country and the position and strength of the enemy has been unreliable. He is in strong force and very strong position. If the reconnoissances of tomorrow verify the observations of to-day, we shall be obliged to use much heavy artillery before we can force their lines and isolate the garrison of Yorktown. I omitted to state that I hold the reserves in a central position until I can learn more of the condition of affairs. The present aspect of affairs renders it exceedingly unfortunate that the 1st corps has been detached from my command. It is no longer in my power to make a movement from the Severn river upon Gloucester and West Point. I am reduced to a front attack upon a very strong line. I still hope that the order detaching the 1st corps may be reconsidered. I do not feel that without it I have force sufficient to accomplish the objects I have proposed in this campaign with that certainty, rapidity, and completeness which I had hoped to obtain. The departments will, I trust, realize that more caution will be needed on my part after having been so unexpectedly deprived of so very large a portion of my force when actually having my troops under fire. I have frankly stated what I now consider to be the strength of the enemy's position; the reconnoissances of to-morrow may modify my opinion. Whatever the facts may be, I shall make the best use I can of the force at my disposal, determined to gain my point as completely and as rapidly as may be.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

P. S. All my movements up to this evening were predicated upon the expectation that no more troops would be detached from my command. I have involved my troops in actual conflict upon that supposition, and calculating upon the prompt arrival of the 1st corps as a part of the programme. It has just occurred to me to say that the maps of the Peninsula I sent to the President and secretary are perfectly unreliable; the roads are wrong, and the Warwick river crosses the Newport News and Williamsburg road some three miles above Warwick Court-House, which latter place is about one mile from the road.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen.

This, then, was the situation in which I found myself on the evening of April 5: Flag-Officer Goldsborough had informed me that it was not in his power to control the navigation of the James river so as to enable me to use it as a line of supply, or to cross it, or even to cover my left flank; nor could he, as he thought, furnish any vessels to attack

the batteries of Yorktown and Gloucester, or to run by them in the dark and thus cut off the supplies of the enemy by water and control their land-communication. I was thus deprived of the co-operation of the navy and left to my own resources.

I had been deprived of five infantry divisions, and out of the four left to me there were present at the front five divisions of volunteer regiments, the weak brigade of regulars, Hunt's artillery reserve, and a small cavalry force.

Owing to the lack of wagons Casey did not reach Young's Mill until the 16th. Richardson's division reached the front on the same day. Hooker's division commenced arriving at Ship's Point on the 10th. The roads were so bad and wagons so few that it was with the utmost difficulty supplies could be brought up, and the field-artillery moved with great difficulty. Even the headquarters wagons could not get up, and I slept in a deserted hut with my saddle blanket for a bed.

My telegram of April 7 to the President shows that only 53,000 men had joined me, so that I had not more than 44,000 effectives, and found myself in front of a position which apparently could not be carried by assault. The force was too small to attempt any movement to turn Gloucester without the assistance of the navy, and I was obliged to abandon the plan of rapid turning movements which I had intended to carry out.

All that could be done was to halt where we were, and by close reconnoissance ascertain whether there were any weak points which we could assault, or, failing in that, determine what could be effected with the aid of siege-artillery to cover the attack.

Next day, April 6, I sent the following telegram to his excellency the President:

> The order forming new departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles. I respectfully request that I may not be placed in this position, but that my orders for wagons, trains, and ammunition, and other material that I have prepared and necessarily left behind me, as well as Woodbury's brigade, may at once be complied with. The enemy is

strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the fulfilment of which I need all the aid the government can give me. I again repeat the urgent request that Gen. Franklin and his division may be restored to my command.

I received the following reply from Secretary Stanton:

"The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. Gen. Sumner's corps is on the road to you and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require."

And this from the President:

"Yours of eleven A.M. today received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade under your order has not and will not be interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of Gen. Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

"A. LINCOLN,
"*President.*"

To this I replied, April 7, to the President:

Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply I have the honor to state that my entire force for duty only amounts to about eighty-five thousand (85,000) men. Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only fifty-three thousand (53,000) men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my despatch to the Secretary of War of to-night for the details of our present situation.

I find on the back of my retained copy of this despatch the following memorandum made at the time by myself:

Return of March 31, 1862, shows men present for duty			171,602
Deduct	1st corps, infantry and artillery, . .	32,119	
"	Blenker, ...	8,616	
"	Banks, ...	21,739	
"	Wadsworth, ...	19,318	
"	Cavalry of 1st corps, etc., . . .	1,600	
"	" " Blenker, ...	800	
"	Van Alen and Wyndham, . . .	1,600	
		85,792	85,792
			85,810

Officers, about 3,900.
Total absent from whole command, 23,796.

Despatch to Washington

As this memorandum was a calculation to ascertain only the number of troops left under my command, it did not take into consideration all the troops left behind which did not compose parts of the total of 171,602 for duty. My letters of April 1, show that many more were left in addition to those mentioned in this memorandum.

The telegram referred to in my despatch to the President was the following, of April 7, to Secretary Stanton:

Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely . . . . . The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or at most two, passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns and some siege operations before we assault. All the prisoners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. It seems probable that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands—probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position.

I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the government will be as fully and as speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created.

Since my arrangements were made for this campaign at least (50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my command. Since my despatch of the 5th instant five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins I shall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, scouts, etc. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them. But were I in possession of their entrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result.

Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege-train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works; but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the 1st corps to land upon the Severn river and attack Gloucester in the rear.

My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels unless I can turn Gloucester. I send by mail copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here.

McClellan's Own Story

Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, after the examination of the enemy's defences on the left, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate, and gave me a copy. It describes the situation at that time in some respects so well that I introduce it here:

"HEADQUARTERS, 4TH CORPS,
"WARWICK COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 7, 1862.

"MY DEAR SENATOR: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that *four* army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James river.

"To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James river for fear of the *Merrimac*.

"The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Maj.-Gen. McDowell and Brig.-Gens. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Maj.-Gen. McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

"This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

"I command the James river column, and I left my camp near Newport News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had not all arrived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the advance, and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapidly that many of our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown and the other ending in the James river, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water-side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either.

"The approaches on one side are generally through low, swampy or thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country.

"You will, then, ask why I advocated such a line for our operations? My reasons are few, but, I think, good.

"With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any force opposed to us on Warwick river, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if

the enemy should retreat—and retreat he must—he would have a long way to go without rail or stream transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed.

"Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was that this line, it was expected, would furnish water-transportation nearly to Richmond.

"Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James river, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies.

"You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned from the maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite now that the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect! The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get command of either York river or James river. The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe.

"An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong gunboats could be sent up James river also, our success will be certain and complete, and the rebellion will soon be put down.

"On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy artillery and a great waste of time, life, and material.

"If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal, if not superior, in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army.

"The greatest master of the art of war has said that 'if you would invade a country successfully, you must have *one* line of operations and one army, under one general.' But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap, over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix.

"The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it the rebellion will be crushed. If we lose it the consequences will be more horrible than I care to foretell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain.

"It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st corps to have a separate department, and, as this letter advocates his return to Gen. McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at

all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my senior in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to Gen. McDowell and nothing to Gen. McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last July to the present day supported Gen. McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last and so long as he is my commander, and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and, without modification, the enterprise was certain of success. But, with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success.

"Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hardest you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working *now* to my utmost.

"Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect,

"Your most obedient servant,

"E. D. KEYES,

"*Brig-Gen. Commanding 4th Army Corps.*

"HON. IRA HARRIS,

"U. S. Senate."

The reconnoissances of the 6th and 7th and following days, pushed with great vigor and with some loss, confirmed the impressions gained on the 5th. I verified all these reconnoissances in person, going everywhere beyond our lines of pickets, and resuming my old trade of reconnoitering officer, so anxious was I to find a practicable point of attack. In fact, during the whole siege I exposed myself more in this way than was proper for a general commanding an army; but I had had far more personal experience in sieges than any of those under my command, and trusted more to my own knowledge and experience than I then could to theirs.

It was found that the Warwick valley headed within two thousand yards of the *enceinte of* Yorktown, and within half that distance of the White Redoubt, or Fort Magruder, a strong work, essentially a part of the main works at Yorktown, which were so strong—having ditches from eight to ten feet deep, and more than fifteen feet wide at the top—and so heavily armed with siege and garrison guns, as to render an assault hopeless. The interval between Yorktown and

the Warwick was occupied by strong works, and all the open ground in front, as well as the direct approaches to the town itself, so thoroughly swept by the direct fire of more than fifty guns of the heaviest calibres then known as to render it an act of madness to assault without first silencing the fire of the enemy's artillery. From its head to Lee's Mill the Warwick was flooded by means of artificial inundations, which rendered it unfordable. The dams constructed for this purpose were all covered by strong works so situated as to be unassailable until their artillery-fire was reduced. Below Lee's Mill the river was a tidal stream, not fordable at any stage of the tide. That portion, moreover, was controlled by the fire of the Confederate gunboats in the James river. The valley of the Warwick was generally low and swampy, the approaches to the dams were through dense forests and deep swamps, and every precaution had been taken by the enemy, in the way of felling timber and constructing works, to make a crossing as difficult as possible.

In his report of the 6th of May, immediately after the occupation of Yorktown, Gen. Barnard, chief-engineer of the Army of the Potomac, says:

"They (referring to the groups of works covering the Warwick) are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of them that I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, etc., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most entensive known to modern times. The country on both sides the Warwick from near Yorktown down is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so. If we could take Yorktown or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault. The operations of the siege required extensive preparations.

"I regret that there is not time and means to prepare a complete plan of this enormous system of defences. They should form part of the record of the operations of the Army of the Potomac. The forcing of such a line with so little loss is in itself an exploit, less brilliant, perhaps, but more worthy of study, than would have been a murderous assault, even had it proved successful."

I need only add to this that Gen. Barnard never expressed to me any opinion that an assault was practicable upon any part of the enemy's defences. From the first reconnoissances he was decidedly of the opinion that the use of heavy guns was necessary. More than this, I never, at the time, heard of any contrary opinion from any one, and, so far as I know, there was entire unanimity on the part of the general officers and chiefs of staff departments that the course pursued was the only one practicable under the circumstances.

From Lee's Mill a line of works extended to the enemy's rear to Skiff's creek, so that if we had forced the passage of the Warwick below that point we would have found a new line of defence in front of us, completely covering the enemy's communications.


During the progress of these reconnoissances every effort was made to bring up supplies and ammunition. A violent storm beginning on the 6th, and continuing without cessation for three or four days, almost entirely interrupted the water-communication between Fortress Monroe and Ship Point, and made the already bad roads terrible beyond description. In those days I more than once thought of a reply made to me by an old general of Cossacks, who had served in all the Russian campaigns against Napoleon. I had asked how the roads were in those days, to which he replied: "My son, the roads are always bad in war."

It was not until the 10th that we were able to establish a new depot on Cheeseman's creek, which shortened the haul about three miles. The rains continued almost incessantly, and it was necessary not only to detail large working parties to unload supplies, but details of some thousands of men were required to corduroy the roads, as the only means of enabling us to get up supplies.

As illustrating the condition of things, I insert the following despatch from Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, dated near Yorktown, April 10, to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

"I reached Gen. McClellan's headquarters at seven this evening, having had an accident to the steamer on the way from Fortress Monroe to Ship Point. I was five hours on horseback (making about five

Yorktown


SIEGE OF YORKTOWN
YORK RIVER
YORKTOWN
Chimneys
PARALLEL (1st)
PARALLEL (2d)
PARALLEL
COMPLEX LINES OF TRENCHES
WHITE REDOUBT
REDOUBT
Ravine
Mill
Steam Mill
Wynnsham
Wynnsham Mill
Warwick River
Warwick Co
Temperance Town
Fort Monroe
Old Point Comfort
Hampton Roads
Scale of Miles
200 400 600 800 1000

miles), the roads being almost impassable and so entirely occupied with army wagons I frequently had to leave the road and take to the woods. The severe storm at Fortress Monroe prevented transports from leaving for several days. The facilities for landing at Ship Point are very poor, and for several days it must have been next to impossible to move artillery over such roads. I learn that twelve thousand men are engaged in repairing and building new roads. The difficulties of transportation have been so great that some of the cavalry horses had to be sent back to keep them from starving. I will report my observations of army movements to-morrow, but I see an earnest determination to lose no time in attacking the enemy.

"JOHN TUCKER,
"Assistant Secretary of War."

The following telegram was sent as indicated, on April 10, to Brig.-Gen. Thomas, adjutant-general:

I examined the works on enemy's left very carefully to-day. They are very strong, the approaches difficult; enemy in force and confident. Water-batteries at York and Gloucester said to be much increased; have not seen them myself. Have not yet received reports of engineer officers. I go to-morrow to examine our left. Sharp firing on our right for some time to-day while I was there; no harm done, although their shells burst handsomely. Am receiving supplies from Ship Point, repairing roads, getting up siege artillery, etc.

It seems now almost certain that we must use mortars and heavy guns freely before assaulting. The naval officers urge an attack in rear of Gloucester; I think they are right, but am now too weak to attempt it, unless new circumstances come to my knowledge. The affair will be protracted in consequence of the diminution of my force.

The following was sent to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, on April 8:

Weather terrible; raining heavily last twenty-eight hours; roads and camps in awful condition; very little firing to-day. Reconnoissances being continued under disadvantageous circumstances. Gen. Sumner has arrived. Most of Richardson's division at Ship Point. I cannot move it from there in present condition of roads until I get more wagons. I need more force to make the attack on Gloucester.

To Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas on April 9:

Weather still execrable; country covered with water; roads terrible. It is with the utmost difficulty that I can supply the troops. We are doing an immense deal of work on the roads. Cannot land siege-train until wind moderates. Reconnoissances being pushed and point of attack pretty well determined. Rebels have thrown ten-inch and twelve-inch shells yesterday and to-day without effect. I have now placed all the troops in bivouac just out of shell range, holding all our advanced positions with strong detachments well sheltered. I shall not lose an unnecessary hour in placing our heavy guns in battery, and will assault at the earliest practicable moment. The conduct of the troops is excellent.

Letter from the President

At this time I received the following letter from the President:

"WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

"MY DEAR SIR: Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

"Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

"After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond *via* Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

"As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

"Yours very truly,
"A. LINCOLN."

The portions of this letter referring to the arrangements for the defence of Washington and the Shenandoah have already been fully answered and need not be alluded to again in this place.

As regards the discrepancy of 23,000 men, it is sufficient to say that my estimate was made from the actual latest returns of the men present for duty, and was correct. I have no doubt that the number furnished the President was the aggregate present and absent—a convenient mistake not unfrequently made by the Secretary of War.

The number I gave was correct; that furnished the President was incorrect.

In regard to the employment of Wool's command, the authorities in Washington failed to perceive the irony of my remark in my telegram of April 7, to the effect that the only use that could be made of his command was to protect my communications in rear of the point I then occupied. There were no communications to protect beyond Ship Point, and there was no possibility of the roads to Fortress Monroe being troubled by the enemy. Wool's troops were of no possible use to me beyond holding Fortress Monroe, and would have been of very great use if the surplus had been incorporated with the Army of the Potomac.

The whole force sent forward had not joined me at the date of this letter; it was not until seven days later that Casey, Hooker, and Richardson reached the front line; they could not be brought up earlier. I have already shown the impossibility of attacking earlier or otherwise than we actually did.

When in front of Sebastopol in 1855 I asked Gen. Martimprey, chief of staff of the French army in the Crimea, how he found that the cable worked which connected the Crimean with the European lines of telegraph. He said that it worked admirably from the Crimea to Paris, but

very badly in the opposite direction; and by way of explanation related the following anecdote: He said that immediately after the failure of the assault of June, 1855, the emperor telegraphed Pélissier to renew the assault immediately. Pélissier replied that it was impossible without certain preliminary preparations which required several weeks. The emperor repeated the peremptory order to attack at once. Pélissier repeated his reply. After one or two more interchanges of similar messages Pélissier telegraphed: "I will not renew the attack until ready; if you wish it done, come and do it yourself." That ended the matter.

Referring for a moment to the President's despatch of April 6, it is well to recall the facts that at that time, instead of 100,000 men, I had—after deducting guards and working parties—much less than 40,000 for attack, and that the portion of the enemy's lines which he thought I had better break through at once was about the strongest of the whole, except, perhaps, the town itself.

The impatience displayed at that time, after so greatly reducing my force, is in remarkable contrast with the patience which permitted Grant to occupy months in front of the lines of Petersburg, far inferior in strength to those of Yorktown.

On the 22d of March I had prepared the following:

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

For the operations against Yorktown, Richmond, etc., where we will probably find extensive earthworks heavily garrisoned, we shall require the means of overwhelming them by a vertical fire of shells.

I should therefore be glad to have disposable at Fortress Monroe:

I.	1st.	20	10-inch mortars complete.
	2d.	20	8-inch mortars complete.
II.		20	8-inch siege-howitzers.
III.		20	4½-inch wrought-iron siege-guns.
IV.		40	20-pounder Parrotts.
V.		—	24-pounder siege-guns.

The 20-pounder Parrotts with the batteries will, of course, be counted as available.

I do not know the number of 4½-inch guns available; if not so many as I have indicated, something else should be substituted. I wish Gen. Barry and Col. Kingsbury to consult with Gen. Marcy, to make suggestions as occur to them, and ascertain at once to what extent this memorandum can be filled. It is possible we cannot count upon the navy to reduce Yorktown by their independent efforts; we

must therefore be prepared to do it by our own means. There are said to be at Yorktown from 27 to 32 heavy guns, at Gloucester 14 Columbiads. The probable armament of Yorktown, when exterior guns are drawn in, will be from 40 to 50 heavy guns, from 24-pounders to 8-inch and perhaps 10-inch Columbiads.

Before leaving Washington I detailed Col. Robert Tyler's 1st Conn. regiment as heavy artillery, and placed the siege-train in their charge; it will be seen, as the narrative proceeds, how admirably this splendid regiment performed their most important duties at all times and under the most trying circumstances.

As soon as it became clear that no aid was to be had from the navy, and that we must reduce Yorktown by a front attack, I took steps to increase the number of heavy guns and mortars to the extent shown by the statement of batteries given hereafter. The number of officers of the corps of engineers and of the topographical engineers at my disposal was so small that it was necessary to supplement them by civilian employees kindly furnished by Prof. Bache, of the U. S. Coast Survey, and by details from the line. These civilian employees vied with the officers of the army in the courage, devotion, and intelligence with which they performed the dangerous and important duties devolving upon them. There were but twelve officers of the engineers, including four on duty with the three companies of engineer troops, and six of the topographical engineers. These officers at once proceeded to ascertain by close reconnoissances the nature and strength of the enemy's defences and the character of the ground, in order to determine the points of attack and the nature of the necessary works of attack. Meanwhile the troops were occupied in constructing roads to the depots. Gen. Sumner reached the front on the 9th of April, and was placed in command of the left wing, consisting of his own and the 4th corps. He was in front of the line of the Warwick, while the 3d corps was charged with the operations against Yorktown itself. The following despatch to Secretary Stanton shows the condition of affairs at its date, April 11:

The reconnoissances of to-day prove that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake

it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out the final plan of campaign, I will run the risk and hold myself responsible for the results if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined upon the point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries.

The same day the following reached me:

"By direction of the President, Franklin's division has been ordered to march back to Alexandria and immediately embark for Fortress Monroe.

"L. THOMAS,
"*Adj-Gen.*"

I replied to the secretary: "I am delighted with Franklin's orders, and beg to thank you."

I insert the following letter from my venerable friend, Francis P. Blair, as an indication of the state of feeling at the time:

"WASHINGTON, April 12, 1862.

"*Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan*:

"MY DEAR SIR: There is a prodigious cry of 'On to Richmond!' among the carpet-knights of our city, who will not shed their blood to get there. I am one of those who wish to see you lead a triumph in the capital of the Old Dominion, but am not so eager as to hazard it by hurrying on too fast. The veterans of Waterloo filled the trenches of Gen. Jackson at New Orleans with their bodies and their blood. If you can accomplish your object of reaching Richmond by a slower process than storming redoubts and batteries in earthworks, the country will applaud the achievement which gives success to its arms with greatest parsimony of the blood of its children. The envious Charles Lee denounced his superior, Washington, as gifted too much with that 'rascally virtue *prudence*.' Exert it and deserve his fame.

"Your friend,
"F. P. BLAIR,
"Silver Springs."

My retained copy of the following letter is not dated, but it must have been written somewhere about the 20th of April:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
BEFORE YORKTOWN,

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

SIR: I received to-day a note from Assistant Secretary Watson enclosing an extract from a letter the author of which is not mentioned. I send a copy of the extract with this. I hope that a copy

has also been sent to Gen. McDowell, whom it concerns more nearly, perhaps, than it does me.

At the risk of being thought obtrusive I will venture upon some remarks which perhaps my position does not justify me in making, but which I beg to assure you are induced solely by my intense desire for the success of the government in this struggle.

You will, I hope, pardon me if I allude to the past, not in a captious spirit, but merely so far as may be necessary to explain my own course and my views as to the future.

From the beginning I had intended, so far as I might have the power to carry out my own views, to abandon the line of Manassas as the line of advance. I ever regarded it as an improper one; my wish was to adopt a new line, based upon the waters of the lower Chesapeake. I always expected to meet with strong opposition on this line, the strongest that the rebels could offer, but I was well aware that upon overcoming of this opposition the result would be decisive and pregnant with great results.

Circumstances, among which I will now only mention the uncertainty as to the power of the *Merrimac*, have compelled me to adopt the present line, as probably safer, though far less brilliant, than that by Urbana. When the movement was commenced I counted upon an active and disposable force of nearly 150,000 men, and intended to throw a strong column upon West Point either by York river, or, if that proved impracticable, by a march from the mouth of the Severn, expecting to turn in that manner all the defences of the Peninsula. Circumstances have proved that I was right, and that my intended movements would have produced the desired results.

After the transfer of troops had commenced from Alexandria to Fort Monroe, but before I started in person, the division of Blenker was detached from my command—a loss of nearly 10,000 men. As soon as the mass of my troops were fairly started I embarked myself. Upon reaching Fort Monroe I learned that the rebels were being rapidly reinforced from Norfolk and Richmond. I therefore determined to lose no time in making the effort to invest Yorktown, without waiting for the arrival of the divisions of Hooker and Richardson and the 1st corps, intending to employ the 1st corps in mass to move upon West Point, reinforcing it as circumstances might render necessary.

The advance was made on the morning of the second day after I reached Fort Monroe. When the troops reached the immediate vicinity of Yorktown the true nature of the enemy's position was for the first time developed. While my men were under fire I learned that the 1st corps was removed from my command. No warning had been given me of this, nor was any reason then assigned. I should also have mentioned that the evening before I left Fort Monroe I received a telegraphic despatch from the War Department informing me that the order placing Fort Monroe and its dependent troops under my command was rescinded. No reason was given for this, nor has it been to this day. I confess that I have no right to know the reason. This order deprived me of the support of another division which I had been authorized to form for active operations from among the troops near Fort Monroe.

Thus when I came under fire I found myself weaker by five divisions than I had expected when the movement commenced. It is more than probable that no general was ever placed in such a position before.

Letter to Secretary Stanton

Finding myself thus unexpectedly weakened, and with a powerful enemy strongly entrenched in my front, I was compelled to change my plans and become cautious. Could I have retained my original force I confidentially believe that I would now have been in front of Richmond instead of where I am now. The probability is that that city would now have been in our possession.

But the question now is in regard to the present and the future rather than the past.

The enemy, by the destruction of the bridges of the Rappahannock, has deprived himself of the means of a rapid advance on Washington. Lee will never venture upon a bold movement on a large scale.

The troops I left for the defense of Washington, as I fully explained to you in the letter I wrote the day I sailed, are ample for its protection.

Our true policy is to concentrate our troops on the fewest possible lines of attack; we have now too many, and an enterprising enemy could strike us a severe blow.

I have every reason to believe that the main portion of the rebel forces are in my front. They are *not* "drawing off" their troops from Yorktown.

Give me McCall's division and I will undertake a movement on West Point which will shake them out of Yorktown. As it is, I will win, but I must not be blamed is success is delayed. I do not feel that I am answerable for the delay of victory.

I do not feel authorized to venture any suggestions as to the disposition of the troops in other departments, but content myself with stating the least that I regard as essential to prompt success here. If circumstances render it impossible to give what I ask, I still feel sure of success, but more time will be required to achieve the result.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

The affair known as the one-gun battery is explained by the following instructions and statement:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, April 15, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. W. F. Smith, Commanding Division:

SIR: You will please advance to-morrow morning to stop the work now being carried on by the enemy near and in rear of the "one-gun battery." This can probably be most readily accomplished by throwing sharpshooters well forward to the edge of the stream, leaving in front of the work a clear interval through which four to six guns can shell the working parties and adjacent woods. Your flank towards Lee's Mill should be carefully watched, also towards Wynn's Mill, communicating with Gen. Gorman, who will have orders to prevent an attack upon your right flank from Wynn's Mill. It is probable that by placing your guns near the burned chimneys, as well under cover as possible, they will accomplish the result.

If the enemy are driven entirely away, advance cautiously a few skirmishers across the dam to penetrate the woods and ascertain whether there is any clearing near at hand where you can hold your own. In this event cross over and send for immediate assistance,

which will be promptly afforded. If you find the position across the stream dangerous and untenable, cut the dam.

In any event exercise the utmost caution before crossing the stream. The great object is to stop the work, and merely to take advantage after that of any opportunity that may offer itself to push the advantage. I should prefer stopping the work and attacking when our preparations elsewhere are more advanced. I would prefer making the attack at the one-gun battery a part of a more general plan involving the use of batteries against Lee's Mill and other contiguous points. From the statement of Capt. Hope (had since I wrote the foregoing) I imagine a position can be found on the road at a distance of some twelve hundred yards, whence their works can be shelled with 10-pound Parrotts and probably spherical case from the Napoleon guns. I would be glad to learn that the work is stopped and the enemy taught a lesson.

Please inform Gen. Gorman of your instructions, and inform me as early as possible of your arrangements.

Very truly yours,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

P. S. I send this direct to you for the reason that it is too late to communicate it through the commander of the 4th army corps and give time to execute the movement at a sufficiently early hour.

Upon reflection I think it will, under present circumstances, be wiser to confine the operation to forcing the enemy to discontinue work.

In compliance with these instructions Gen. Smith placed two brigades and three batteries on his left to guard against any attack from Lee's Mill, and commenced operations with his remaining brigade and battery. He posted Mott's battery opposite the dam at a distance of about eleven hundred yards from the works, sent in one regiment through the woods on the right with instructions to open fire on any working parties they might observe, another regiment on the left with similar orders, and held the remaining three regiments in reserve. As soon as our infantry opened fire the enemy replied with shell, upon which Mott opened and kept up a sharp fire for about an hour until he silenced the enemy.

About three o'clock Gen. Smith had placed eighteen guns in position about five hundred yards from the works, supported on either flank by Brook's Vermont brigade, Hancock's being brought up in support. Our guns then opened, the enemy replying for some time with rapidity; when their fire slackened Smith ordered four companies of the 3d Vermont to cross the dam and feel the enemy. On arriving at

the crest of the work they were met by the enemy in force, who had lain secreted, and were forced to retire with a loss of about 20 killed and wounded, after having held the work for some minutes.

Later in the day, after I had left the ground, another reconnoissance was made, under cover of the artillery-fire, by the 4th Vermont on the right, the 5th and 6th on the left, but it was found inpracticable to push further than to the dam, which ground was held. During the night strong entrenchments were thrown up, on the right for four guns within three hundred yards of the work, on the left one with eight embrasures, and in the centre one with four embrasures, the last two within five hundred yards' range. This reconnoissance was conducted with skill and great gallantry, the Vermont troops thus early giving earnest of the high qualities they so often displayed during all the war.

The losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to about 150. The objects of the operation were completely achieved: we prevented further work at this point, prevented the enemy from using the crossing, and ascertained that the line could not be broken there without further preparation in the way of artillery, etc.

The general plan of operations determined upon was to establish batteries of heavy guns and mortars bearing upon Yorktown and Gloucester, their water-batteries, a line of works between Yorktown and the Warwick river, Wynn's Mill, and the "one-gun battery" about a mile lower down the Warwick.

The general order regulating the details of the siege operations, as well as the instructions issued by Gen. Fitz-John Porter, who, on the 26th of April, was assigned to duty as director of the siege, are for the present omitted. I issued all orders relating to the siege through him, making him commandant of the siege operations, and at the same time chief of staff for that especial work. Under the circumstances of the case such arrangement was necessary to relieve me of too much labor, and it worked admirably.

Ground was broken on the night of the 17th of April upon batteries 1, 2, and 3, it being only at that date that

the necessary roads and bridges were completed and the requisite material collected. The first parallel was commenced on the morning of the 25th.

The work was pushed with so much energy that by the night of May 3 all the batteries were completed and nearly all armed; the armament would have been completed on the night of the 5th, and fire opened the next morning.

In all sixteen batteries were constructed, their full armament being two 200-pounder rifled guns, twelve 100-pounder rifled, ten 13-inch mortars, twenty-five 10-inch mortars, seven 8-inch mortars, twelve $4\frac{1}{2}$-inch rifled siege-guns, twelve 30-pounder rifled guns, thirty-two 20-pounder rifled guns, and two 8-inch siege-howitzers, being 114 heavy guns and mortars in all.

In order to conceal our purposes and complete the work with the least possible exposure, none of the batteries were opened, except No. 1, which on the 30th of April opened with excellent effect upon the wharves of Yorktown and Gloucester, in order to prevent the landing of supplies and men.

It was intended to open with all the 114 guns and mortars at once, in order to create the greatest possible moral and physical effect.

Towards the close of the siege it was apparent that the works at Gloucester could not be carried by assault from the rear without some preliminary work in the way of reducing the fire of their batteries on the land side—a matter requiring a good deal of time, and force greater than a single division.

With the force at my disposal it was impossible to reinforce Franklin for that purpose, and I determined, late on the 2d of May, to disembark that division and move it to the front, in order to employ all my force in the assault about to be given, and thus render the result as sure as human foresight could make it. On the 3d, then, Franklin's division was disembarked, and was to have moved to the front on the 4th.

As soon as the fire of the water-batteries was silenced the gunboats, reinforced by the *Galena* under the gallant

John Rodgers, were to run by and take up a position in rear, whence they could get a nearer fire on the defences and control the road leading from Yorktown to Williamsburg.

When this was effected, the artillery of the land defences silenced, and the garrison demoralized by the shell-fire, the columns of assault were to advance from the nearest cover.

The principal assault was to have been upon the line between the Warwick and Yorktown, a column being ready to assault the latter if the effect of the batteries justified it. The enfilading and two counter batteries were prepared against Wynn's Mill, which, with the dam next above it, would also have been assaulted at the same time with the main attack.

The counter batteries against Wynn's Mill enfiladed the lines stretching thence towards the "one-gun" battery, against which latter a mortar battery was also prepared; under cover of these and the fire of the field-batteries an assault was also to be made on the "one-gun" battery. Under cover of the field-guns of the 4th corps a feint was to be made upon Lee's Mill, to be converted into a real attack if the effect of the operations at other points opened the way thereto.

The fire of our batteries would probably have enabled us to assault about noon. As the enemy were practically without bomb-proof shelters, the fire of our forty-two mortars, ten of which were 13-inch and twenty-five 10-inch, should in five or six hours have blown up their magazines and rendered the works untenable for the garrisons. As many of their guns, all in the water-batteries, were *en barbette*, the fire of our seventy-two heavy guns should in the same space of time have dismounted most of their guns; and as the mortars could well continue their fire until the assaulting columns had reached the immediate vicinity of the works, the success of the assault, with very little loss, was reasonably certain.

In order to diminish the risk to the gunboats as much as possible, I proposed to Flag-Officer Goldsborough and to Capt. Smith, commanding the gunboats, that the gunboats

and the *Galena* should run the batteries the night after we opened fire. If the effect of our fire had equalled our expectations so as to justify an assault during the first day's firing, I am very sure that Capt. Smith would have run by the batteries in broad daylight, without awaiting the cover of darkness. I have no doubt whatever that at the latest the dawn of the second day would have seen the gunboats in the rear of the defences, and the assault delivered with entire success and without any heavy loss on our side.

Gen. Johnston told me in Washington, during the winter of 1882 and 1883, that one of his strong objections to holding Yorktown was his apprehension that the gunboats would force the batteries at night and thus render the position untenable. Other Confederate general officers serving there have told me that in their opinion, at the time, the gunboats could easily have effected this on any dark night.

Early in the morning of the 4th of May it was found that the enemy had during the night evacuated all his positions, very wisely preferring to avoid the experiment of withstanding a bombardment and assault. We captured in the works, including Gloucester, seventy-seven guns and mortars, supplied with the ordinary complements, and seventy-six rounds of ammunition to each.

The captured pieces were as follows: one 10-inch Columbiad, thirteen 9-inch Dahlgren guns, sixteen 8-inch Columbiads, two 7-inch heavy guns, one 6½-inch rifle, one 4½-inch rifle, one 2⅘-inch rifle, two rifled 32-pounders, one 8-inch siege-howitzer, three 64-pounders, eight 42-pounders, seventeen 32-pounders, four 24-pounders, one 42-pound carronade, two 8-inch mortars, two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder.

They had evidently removed such guns as they could, probably light guns.

I have been much criticised for not assaulting Yorktown immediately. Perhaps the point has been made clear enough, but at the risk of repetition I will say something more on the subject.

Before starting from Fortress Monroe the best information in our possession clearly indicated that the Warwick river ran nearly parallel with the James, instead of heading

at Yorktown, and it seemed certain that the road from Newport News to Williamsburg did not cross that stream, at least any important branch of it, and that it presented no obstacle to an advance. Upon these data were predicated the orders of April 4 (for the march of the next day, the 5th), according to which Heintzelman was to move into position close to Yorktown, while Keyes was to take up a position in rear of Yorktown, at the Halfway House; Keyes was also ordered to attack and carry whatever he found in front of him. Now, let it be observed that at all points (on the right, centre, and left), we found the enemy's works fully garrisoned and provided with artillery, and that Keyes and his general officers reported that they found the position in their front so strong and so well provided with tropos and artillery that it was impossible to assault with any hope of success. The same state of things was clearly the case in front of the right column, where I was. Now, it is very certain that the only thing to be done was to make close reconnoissances of the enemy's position, in order to discover a vulnerable point. This course was followed, and the unanimous opinion of all was that certain preliminary siege operations were necessary. I assert without fear of contradiction that no one *at that time* thought an assault possible; moreover, that when we saw the works abandoned by the enemy it remained the conviction of all that, with the raw troops we had, an assault would have resulted in simply an useless butchery with no hope of success. The statements made long afterwards by such men as Barnard were simply *ex-post-facto* opinions, gotten up for political purposes, and never could have been really entertained by them. The only fault to be found with the operations at Yorktown is in regard to the slowness with which some of the engineer officers operated. I was often obliged to make just such reconnoissances as I did at Vera Cruz (when a brevet second lieutenant of engineers) to expedite matters. Had Duane been chief-engineer, operations would have progressed much more rapidly. The co-operation of the navy amounted to little or nothing.

CHAPTER XVII

Despatches and letters to subjects treated in the foregoing and following chapters.

"APRIL 6, Sunday, 4 P.M.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: I have received your favor of this date by Col. Key, and hasten to say that I have already written you—*via* Shipping Point—in reply, giving my reason for not having joined you. The time you proposed to proceed with me had elapsed, and particularly the difficulties of my leaving my vessel owing to the want of officers of experience to take care of her.

"I have explained in my note of to-day, and have repeated to Col. Key, the greatly increased strength of the fortifications as seen from this position. The forts at Gloucester are very formidable indeed, and the water-batteries of Yorktown have evidently been increased in dimensions within a few days, as indicated by the new earth.

"As I pointed out to you in our interview, the works to be most apprehended (though they are all too formidable for our vessels, or three or four times their numbers and class) are the guns in mask about one-quarter to one-half of a mile this side of Yorktown, which position I point out to Col. Key.

"The enemy are still on Gloucester Point—how strong I cannot say. So long as he holds that formidable work (or, indeed, upper and lower work) we surely cannot command the York river. All the gunboats of the navy would fail to take it, but would be destroyed in the attempt. Yet I will not hesitate to try the experiment, if required to do so, with this force, however inadequate.

"I have explained to Col. Key that if you turn the masked work, which I fired on to-day and received its fire in return, the guns would command the next water-battery, which is about one-fifth of a mile from it towards Yorktown, as it appears from this ship.

"With those two batteries carried, this force might approach near enough to shell Yorktown at long range, but nothing more. These vessels of this class are not calculated for closer or heavier work.

"As I could not go in time to reach you to-day, as requested, I sent, after despatching my letter to you, the second in rank, Lieut.-Com. Clitz, to confer with you. And now, with Col. Key, I proceed to Wormsley's creek to meet you or Gen. Heintzelman.

"Very truly yours,

"J. F. MISSROOM,

"*Com.*

"To Maj-Gen. MCCLELLAN."

"*Wachusett*, April 10, 1862.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: Enclosed is the report upon the landing from this part of the river at 'Sand-Box,' where it was intended to land troops. Capt. Nicholson says he found a good picket-guard house for cavalry, stables, etc., within the Box, and some cattle near Too's Point. A steamer also penetrated a mile up Back creek to-day—which is within the Sand-Box, and whose entrance

is to the eastward of Too's Point, as shown by the chart, and over which is good eight feet—to within one and a half miles of Wormsley's creek.

"It has been observed to-day that large numbers of infantry have been transported from Yorktown to Gloucester Point. And this afternoon a number of what seemed to be laborers with entrenching tools went to the same point; we conclude either to strengthen the works there or to throw up works opposite to and within long rifle-range of this anchorage. I have been expecting some such movement, and wondering why they did not try it from some point back from the beach so far that our guns (shell) could not reach them. It cannot be prevented by us.

"Very truly yours,

"J. F. MISSROOM.

"To Maj-Gen. McCLELLAN."

"APRIL 11, 6 A.M.

"The enemy very busy last night between Yorktown and Gloucester Point. Schooners observed to be going continually. Enemy may have notice of intention to land troops at Severn and are fortifying its entrance. Ten schooners now in sight.

"J. F. MISSROOM.

"To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN."

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF POTOMAC,
NEAR YORKTOWN, April 8, 1862.

MY DEAR FLAG-OFFICER: Your kind letter received. From the information received thus far I am inclined to think that the "masked battery" on the river-bank below Yorktown is not in existence, but that the gun fired upon Missroom was upon the advanced bastion of the place itself. Porter thinks that he has found a place from which we can enfilade their water-batteries. I go there in a few minutes to look at it. Should it prove to be so, we can enable the gunboats to take an effective part in the contest. The weather is infamous (has been raining hard for the last eighteen hours, and still continues), the roads are horrid, and we have the devil's own time about supplies.

I have made strong representations as to the withdrawal of the 1st corps, which has forced me to abandon the turning movement, and hope that the President may be induced to change his order. . . . The position of the enemy is immensely strong, but we are learning more of it every hour. Our men behave splendidly—brave and patient as men can be. . . . .

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH, *Minnesota.*

"WASHINGTON, April 16.

"*To Gen. McClellan*:

"Good for the first lick! Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery! Let us have Yorktown, with Magruder and his gang, before the 1st of May, and the job will be over.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*"

McClellan's Own Story

"U. S. STEAMER *Wachusett.*"
"YORK RIVER, April 17, 1862.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: In accordance with your request to have shell thrown into Yorktown yesterday, the *Sebago* (side-wheel) was ordered on that service, she being the only vessel here provided with long-range rifle.

"Her fire was returned by two guns of equal range from the enemy with surprising accuracy. One shell passed directly between the 'smoke-stack' and mainmast, a few feet above her deck and another within a few feet of the wheel-house, throwing the water over the vessel, and both within a short distance of her boilers and machinery, which are altogether exposed. Had she been crippled the attempt to withdraw her might and probably would, have caused the sacrifice of other vessels also.

"The *Sebago* is the vessel capable of rendering the most important service in covering the landing of troops, and I submit whether it would not be advisable to defer any attempt to throw shell in Yorktown till night while she can operate on Gloucester with impunity at any time. She draws six feet of water. A single shot in the midship section of that vessel especially, or indeed of either of these gunboats, disables if it do not destroy her.

"Would it not be possible for your cannon to dismount those two rifles with which the enemy fired at the *Sebago* yesterday? They will inflict much damage on our people when Gloucester is held by them, as well as on our vessels.

"The *Sebago* threw shells into Gloucester last night three several times. I am advised that another light-draught steamer, similar to the *Sebago*, is to come here. We cannot have the accuracy of fire from a vessel that the enemy exhibited yesterday.

"Many thanks for the loan of fuses.

"I am, very truly, your obedient servant,

"J. F. MISSROOM, *Com.*

"To Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN."

"WASHINGTON, April 18.

"To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan:

"Your dispatch of this morning received and communicated to the President. He directs me to ask you whether the indications do not show that they are inclined to take the offensive. Banks has moved to Mount Jackson yesterday and to New Market to-day; has taken some locomotives and prisoners.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
April 18, 10 P.M.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Despatch received. I cannot hope such good-fortune as that the enemy will take the offensive. I am perfectly prepared for any attack the enemy may make. He will do nothing more than sorties. I beg that the President will be satisfied that the enemy cannot gain anything by attacking me; the more he does attack the better I shall be contented. All is well. I am glad to hear of Banks's good-fortune.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen.

Confidential.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
April 18, 11:30 P.M.

His Excellency the President:

If compatible with your impressions as to the security of the capital, and not interfering with operations of which I am ignorant, I would be glad to have McCall's division, so as to be enabled to make a strong attack upon West Point to turn the position of the enemy. After all that I have heard of things which have occurred since I left Washington and before, I would prefer that Gen. McDowell should not again be assigned to duty with me.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

"WASHINGTON, April 27, 1862.

"*Maj.-Gen. McClellan*:

"I am rejoiced to learn that your operations are progressing so rapidly and with so much spirit and success and congratulate you, and the officers and soldiers engaged, upon the brilliant affair mentioned in your telegram, repeating the assurance that everything in the power of the departments is at your service. I hope soon to congratulate you upon a splendid victory that shall be the finishing stroke of the war in every quarter. The work goes bravely on.

"Your truly,

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*"

"WASHINGTON, May 1, 2 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan:

"Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it aims indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?

"A. LINCOLN,
"*President.*"

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 1, 9:30 P.M.

His Excellency the President:

I asked for the Parrott guns from Washington for the reason that some expected had been two weeks, nearly, on the way and could not be heard from. They arrived last night. My arrangements had been made for them, and I thought time might be saved by getting others from Washington. My object was to hasten, not procrastinate. All is being done that human labor can accomplish.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 3, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

I regret to learn that Col. Campbell, 5th Penn. Cavalry, has been placed in arrest by Maj.-Gen. McDowell for endeavoring to comply with my positive order to him to report with his regiment for duty at this place. This regiment was never assigned to Gen.

McDowell's army corps, but was detailed by me to Gen. Keyes's corps. I, of course, expected it to follow me as soon as transportation could be provided, and am not a little surprised to learn that my instructions have been interfered with and my force diminished by the action of the commanding officer of the Department of the Rappahannock, in violation of G. O. 29, War Department, adjutant-general's office, March 22, 1862. Under these circumstances I beg the immediate interposition of the War Department to relieve from arrest a meritorious officer, against whom there appears to be no complaint save that of obedience to the orders of his rightful superior. I also ask that the regiment, as well as the 1st N. J., Col. Wyndham, may be permitted to join the army under my command without further delay.

G. B. McClellan,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

"*Wachusett*, York River,
"April 22, 1862.

"My dear General: The carriage on board the *Sebago* is weak. Two carriage-makers are coming to us from Washington; I fear not in time. I am promised, if she come in time, a steamer with 100-pounder rifle.

"The *Corwin* has no battery but a 20-pounder and two sixes, being only a surveying-craft.

"When you commence attack the 100-pounder rifle can assist from the beginning. But I fear our stock of ammunition, especially shell and 'thirty' fuses, will fail us soon.

"I have failed to get what I have asked for from Hampton Roads. Can you loan us some 100-pounder shell and some more 'thirty' fuses for the *Sebago*? She has only about thirty-six fuses of that kind now. Our stock at Hampton Roads was sent to North Carolina.

"Please see the despatch I have just sent Com. Poor. I sent a steamer to land your mortars at two A.M. with tackle.

"I ought to see you more before you open fire on Yorktown, to have a clear understanding. Say when I shall go to you, and I will do so any time at any day after four P.M.

"The enemy's troops showing themselves now near spot last driven from, abreast anchorage.

"Yours very truly,
"J. F. Missroom.

"To Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan."

"We got eleven-inch shell into Yorktown and Gloucester last night.

"J. F. Missroom."

"Fortress Monroe, May 4.

"*Maj.-Gen. McClellan*:

"With my whole heart I do most cordially congratulate you on your brilliant and important achievement. The gunboats shall accompany you up York river.

"L. M. Goldsborough,
"*Flag-Officer.*"

"WASHINGTON, May 4, 1862.

"*Maj.-Gen. McClellan*:

"Accept my cordial congratulations upon the success at Yorktown, and I am rejoiced to hear that your forces are in active pursuit. Please favor me with the details as far as they are acquired, and I hope soon to hear your arrival at Richmond.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*"

"FORT MONROE, May 5, 1862.

"*Maj.-Gen. McClellan*:

"The Secretary of War telegraphs me to inform him how many transports of all descriptions I can command. Please place at my disposal all you can release, expect such as are required for the transportation of stores. . . .

"JOHN TUCKER,
"*Assistant Secretary of War.*"

"CAMP NEAR YORKTOWN, May 5.

"*F. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, Fortress Monroe*:

"In reply to a part of your despatch which the time for the departure of the boat did not admit of answering, and in the absence of Gen. McClellan to the front, I have to inform you that the general has ordered all the available transports to carry troops to West Point and a part of them have started for Cheeseman's creek. Your despatch will be laid before the general this evening.

"R. B. MARCY,
"*Chief of Staff.*"

NEAR WILLIAMSBURG, May 5, 11:45 P.M.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

Mr. Tucker's telegram relating to the vessels was received after Franklin's division had embarked and on the way to West Point. Another division goes in the morning and the last is absolutely necessary to support the first. This movement is of the greatest importance. I will release the vessels just as soon as the troops are landed. Nothing new except what I told you in my last despatch.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

P.S. Some of the main works of the enemy are in our possession, and I am pushing troops forward, but the roads are horrible.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

WILLIAMSBURG, May 6, 3 P.M.

A portion of the army has left upper York, and it would be destruction to deprive me of the water-transportation now. It is absolutely necessary that I should complete the movement now commenced, or the consequences will be fatal.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

McClellan's Own Story

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CAMP WINFIELD SCOTT, May 4, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. Heintzelman, Commanding 3d Corps:

I have received information from Gen. Smith that the enemy are still in front of him in some force of infantry and cavalry. Gen. Stoneman has been ordered to move as rapidly as possible to the Halfway House, and to take possession of the cross-road near that place, to cut off this command, and also to send a strong reconnoissance towards Blen's wharf.

I wish Hooker to follow this movement with the utmost rapidity. When he reaches the point where the road branches off near the Halfway House, to leave a portion of his force there, and with the rest to gain the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road, so as to support Stoneman and aid him in cutting off the retreat of the enemy. The division should move simply with its ambulances and some reserve ammunition, with not more than two days' rations. Should further information from Smith render it necessary to move Kearny's division also, I would be glad to have you take control of the entire movement. Smith is in possession of their works, and the enemy referred to are some distance in rear of them—how far I do not yet know.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

May 4, 1862.

"*Col. A. V. Colburn:*

"SIR: Smith has reported that the enemy is in some force in his front. Keyes has advanced two brigades and a regiment of horse, with three batteries. They have seen no enemy, but have had a few men injured by the bursting of shells left by the enemy.

"I leave immediately to take command on the left. Telegraph me at Smith's, with duplicates for me at Keyes's headquarters.

"Very respectfully,

"E. O. SUMNER,
"*Brig.-Gen. Commanding the Left Wing.*"

"TWO MILES BEYOND YORKTOWN.

"*Gen. Marcy, Chief of Staff:*

"Gen. Stoneman has met the enemy about three miles beyond the Halfway House, and has sent back for the infantry to support him. Two brigades are ahead of me.

"Yours etc.,

"S. V. HEINTZELMAN,
"*Brig.-Gen. Commanding 3d Corps.*"

"HEADQUARTERS, 3D CORPS IN SIGHT OF WILLIAMSBURG,
"6 P.M., Sunday, May 4, 1862.

"*Gen. R. B. Marcy:*

"I have just arrived here, and find Gens. Sumner and Smith here. We will soon have three divisions, and are preparing to attack the rebels, who are entrenched in our front with two pieces of artillery, a regiment or so of cavalry, four or five regiments of

infantry. Our cavalry have been repulsed with a loss of near 40 men and horses killed and wounded. We will soon carry the works. The infantry are only halting a moment to take a bite and rest.

"Yours, etc.,

"S. V. HEINTZELMAN,
"Brig.-Gen."

The following is a fragment of a letter of instructions sent to Gen. Sumner on the morning of the 4th, when he went to assume command on the left; and the condition of affairs then was that the enemy's infantry and cavalry were reported by Smith to be about one and one-half miles in his front in force. I had ordered Stoneman, supported by Hooker, to gain the Halfway House by a rapid march, and thus cut off the retreat of this force in front of Smith. Sumner was ordered to repair the bridges over the Warwick, etc., as quickly as possible, and then to

"Cross the stream with the 5th Cavalry, Smith's and Couch's divisions, and Casey's if necessary. It is possible that Sedgwick's and Richardson's divisions may be needed to reinforce the right. Please hold them subject to the general's orders for that purpose. Should you be informed that they are not needed here you will be at liberty to substitute one of them for Couch's or Casey's division. It is hoped to get Stoneman's command in rear of the enemy before you attack. Watch the enemy closely with your cavalry, and should he retreat attack him without further instructions. The gunboats have gone up the York river, and Franklin's, and perhaps one other division, will follow up to-day. As soon as the bridges are finished you can cross your command and bring them into position, but do not attack unless the enemy retreat or you receive orders from me.

"A. V. COLBURN,
"A. A. G."

It is unnecessary to say that the object of forbidding an attack unless the enemy retreated was to enable Stoneman to get in their rear and thus cut off the entire command.

After the orders to Stoneman, Sumner, and Heintzelman had been issued and were being carried out I received the following:

"HEADQUARTERS, SMITH'S DIVISION, May 4.

"*Gen. McClellan*:

"Gen. Hancock is in front, and, from what I have learned, presume it is nothing but the rear-guard. I will obey his orders as far as engaging them is concerned. The enemy is one and a half miles in front, and it is probably nothing but cavalry covering the retreat.

"W. F. SMITH,
"Brig.-Gen."

McClellan's Own Story

"HEADQUARTERS, SMITH'S DIVISION,
"May 5, 10:30 P.M.

"*Gen. McClellan*:

"There is a direct road from here to Williamsburg behind the big fort. If you send a good man to command, and these men don't leave to-night, we can capture them all in the morning and be at Williamsburg by eight o'clock. If they don't leave to-night they will give us a big fight in the morning, and we shall whip them.

"Don't risk yourself any more, or your commanders, and don't send Richardson to command this column. As far as I can see it is open country for cavalry, but the rain has made the ground soft. I have more troops—or shall have with Brooks—than I need to defend myself, but it is my earnest opinion that your advance up the James should be this way.

"W. F. SMITH."

On the back of a pencil-sketch of the ground is the following:

"Two companies garrison each fort. Fort Magruder is the far one from here—one and a quarter miles; second fort occupied; third fort, near York, is yet unfinished. They seem to be quiet now. Please order Brooks and Ayres to me in the morning at daylight. I have plenty of troops, but wish our own.

"W. F. S."

"MOUNT ZION CHURCH,
May 5, 3 P.M.

"*Gen. McClellan*:

"Owing to delays in the troops coming forward, I have come down here to hasten their march, by direction of Gen. Sumner. Within the last thirty minutes he has sent me two messengers to say that the enemy was gaining ground on him. I fear nothing except a panic amongst our troops, for I am certain we are vastly superior in strength to the enemy. I went myself with a brigade of my corps, which took possession of two works on the left of the enemy. I convinced myself that the enemy commenced his audacious attack upon us to cover a retreat, but, finding that he forces us back, he may convert his feint into something more serious than was at first intended. It may be advisable, if you have troops to spare, to set some of them in motion for this point; but, above all, come yourself.

"The rear of Gen. Kearny has just passed this point on his way to reinforce Gen. Hooker, and the head of his column has probably reached the scene of action; and the firing has ceased for the last ten minutes.

"I write this note because the badness of the road, preventing the rapid concentration of troops, makes me anxious to take precaution against the possibility of reverses. As the roads must soon become absolutely impassable for supplies, our troops must starve unless you can send provision by boats to skirt the shore, and to

be put ashore in small boats. Our position is accessible to York river. The men can live on bread and bacon.

"In haste, your obedient servant,

"E. D. KEYES,
"Brig.-Gen. 4th Corps.

"P.S. An officer from Gen. Hooker's division reports this moment that three of his batteries have been taken by the pieces miring and the horses being killed. This officer reports that the men are exhausted for the want of proper food."

"IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG,
"May 5, 1862. 11:20 A.M.

"Capt. Chauncey McKeever, A. A. G.:

"I have had a hard contest all morning, but do not despair of success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. It is reported to me that my communication with you by the Yorktown road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry can take front by the side of mine to whip the enemy.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"HOOKER,
"Brig.-Gen."

"MAY 5, late at night.

"MY DEAR GENERAL: I did the best I could after getting your order, which was after dark some time. I sent a brigade (Martindale's) to occupy the front of York. The roads were horrible and blocked up by wagons, so that they were impassable. The brigade reached York. I sent some of Hunt's batteries; they got there and halted. The remainder I kept ready to march at two o'clock or as soon as light enough. All are rested and fresh. Sykes's and my other brigades are in camp, also Blake. Franklin, I think, got off. I hope you have got order out of chaos. Capt. Norton says Ingalls told him he had received an order from the secretary to fit out a sea expedition, which would derange his plans considerably. A telegram can always reach me from York. We are ready to move quickly. I have directed Martindale to camp at York.

"Yours ever,

"F. J. PORTER."

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
WILLIAMSBURG, May 7, 1862, 12:30 P.M.

Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff, Camp Winfield Scott:

GENERAL: Headquarters will be moved at once to this place; wagons light. Porter will complete his embarkation as rapidly as possible and join Franklin. The artillery of the divisions Franklin, Sedgwick, and Porter will proceed by water, with the least possible delay to join their divisions, also Franklin's cavalry and as many wagons as possible. Hunt's heavy batteries will move to Brick House landing by water. I will give orders in regard to the rest of Hunt's batteries, the regular infantry, Roach's and Gregg's cavalry shortly.

McClellan's Own Story

Please send me last news from Franklin, and if necessary, send a fast special boat to learn state of affairs, and communicate on return with signal party at Queen's creek, as well as *via* Yorktown by telegraph. The orders for Sumner and Richardson will be given to-day; in the meantime let neither embark without special orders from me: this is imperative.

How soon can the artillery of Franklin, Sedgwick, and Porter be embarked? How soon Franklin's cavalry? How soon will transports be ready for the regular infantry and Richardson? How soon can water-transportation be furnished for Duane and his train? For Woodbury and his trains? How soon for Gregg and Rush? How many wagons has Van Vliet in reserve for general purposes? If you send steamer to Franklin, inform him that Stoneman was some fourteen miles from here a couple of hours ago, and will try to communicate with him *via* Hockaday's Spring this evening. I start Smith's division this evening, and hope to get most of the column in motion by the morning. Will move in person to-morrow morning. Would like to have a gunboat examine Moody's wharf, to see whether burned.

G. B. McClellan,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

"Brick House Point, May 6, 1862.

"*Gen. G. B. McClellan*:

"I am landing at Brick House Point. It is, however, a bad landing; the water shoal for a long distance out—a quarter of a mile from shore. One brigade is landed. The enemy is said to be in force on the road, watching this point; I do not believe it, however. I hope to get the artillery and two other brigades off before morning.

"W. B. Franklin,
"*Brig.-Gen.*"

"Brick House, May 7, A.M.

"*Gen. G. B. McClellan*:

"All of my division has landed except the cavalry. The night passed with nothing unusual except the killing of one picket. We have two prisoners, taken when we first arrived; they belong to a Texan regiment, are very intelligent, but lie, I think. I send them to Yorktown by the *Spaulding*. Dana's brigade is here and will be landed this morning. The indications are that the enemy is in the vicinity.

"W. B. Franklin,
"*Brig.-Gen.*"

"Brick House, May 7, 1862.

"*Gen. G. B. McClellan*:

"The road from Brick House Point to the main road is not as laid down on the photographic or C. S. maps. The right flank and rear are surrounded by a creek, and the left flank has another creek, leaving a small opening through which the road winds. I have ordered an examination to determine more accurately these points, but it is a slow business on account of want of cavalry. I still think that it may be an open question between this point and West Point.

"W. B. Franklin,
"*Brig.-Gen.*"

"Headquarters, Franklin's Division,
"Brick House, May 7, 1862.

"*Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff*:

"General: I have the honor to report that this morning, about seven o'clock, our pickets were driven in on our left flank, and that after skirmishing for about two hours the action became quite sharp at the right extremity of that flank. Our reserves were driven in several times, but returned to their position each time with ardor. Finally we held the position which we had taken in the morning, and at several points of the line advanced our position.

"Wherever we advanced the enemy was found in rifle-pits. The day has been a success, and but for the extreme want of forage and provisions owing to the deficiency of transportation and the difficulty of landing, we might have followed it up. As it is, I congratulate myself that we have maintained our position. Gen. Newton's command was most severely engaged, and his conduct and that of Gen. Slocum, who had charge respectively of the left and right wings, was admirable. All of the officers and men behaved admirably, and with transportation and forage we could move on to-morrow.

"I respectively request that instructions may be given to send up forage and transportation immediately, as we are entirely tied down for want of them. Gen. Sedgwick's infantry has arrived. The killed and wounded amount to nearly a hundred. A more detailed report will be given as soon as possible.

"Very respectfully,
"W. B. Franklin,
"*Brig.-Gen.*"

Camp 19 Miles from Williamsburg,
May 11, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Fortress Monroe:

Without waiting for further official reports which have not yet reached me, I wish to bear testimony to the splendid conduct of Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, under command of Gen. Heintzelman, in the battle of Williamsburg. Their bearing was worthy of veterans. Hooker's division for hours gallantly withstood the attack of greatly superior numbers with very heavy loss. Kearny's arrived in time to restore the fortunes of the day, and came most gallantly into action. I shall probably have occasion to call attention to other commands, and do not wish to do injustice to them by mentioning them now. If I had had the full information I now have in regard to the troops above-named when I first telegraphed, they would have been specially mentioned and commended. I spoke only of what I knew at the time, and shall rejoice to do full justice to all engaged.

G. B. McClellan,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

CHAPTER XVIII

Private Letters.

[*April* 1 *to May* 5, 1862.]

Steamer "Commodore," April 1, 1862, *Potomac River*, 4:15 P.M. —As soon as possible after reaching Alexandria I got the *Commodore* under way and "put off." I did not fell safe until I could fairly see Alexandria behind us. I have brought a tug with us to take back despatches from Budd's Ferry, where I shall stop a few hours for the purpose of winding up everything. I found that if I remained at Alexandria I would be annoyed very much, and perhaps be sent for from Washington. . . . Officially speaking, I feel very glad to get away from that sink of iniquity. . . . .

8 P.M.—I have just returned from a trip in one of the naval vessels with Capt. Seymour to take a look at the rebel batteries (recently abandoned) at shipping Point, etc. They were pretty formidable, and it would have given us no little trouble to take possession of them had they held firm. It makes only the more evident the propriety of my movements by which Manassas was forced to be evacuated and these batteries with it. The trip was quite interesting.

Steamer "Commodore," April 3, *Hampton Roads*, 1:30 P.M.— . . . I have been up to my eyes in business since my arrival. We reached here about four yesterday P.M., ran into the wharf and unloaded the horses, then went out and anchored. Marcy and I at once took a tug and ran out to the flag-ship *Minnesota* to see Goldsborough, where we remained until about nine, taking tea with him.

On our return we found Gen. Heintzelman, soon followed by Porter and Smith, all of whom remained here all night. I sat up very late arranging movements, and had my hands full. I have been hard at work all the morning and not yet on shore. Dine with Gen. Wool to-day at four, and go thence to our camp. We move to-morrow A.M. Three divisions take the direct road to Yorktown, and will encamp at Howard's Bridge. Two take the James River road and go to Young's Mill. The reserve goes to Big Bethel, where my headquarters will be to-morrow night.

My great trouble is in the want of wagons—a terrible drawback; but I cannot wait for them. I hope to get possession, before to-morrow night, of a new landing-place some seven or eight miles from Yorktown, which will help us very much. It is probable that we shall have some fighting to-morrow; not serious, but we may have the opportunity of drubbing Magruder. The harbor here is very crowded; facilities for landing are bad. I hope to get possession of Yorktown day after to-morrow. Shall then arrange to make the York river my line of supplies. The great battle will be (I think) near Richmond, as I have always hoped and thought. I see my way very clearly, and with my trains once ready, will move rapidly. . . .

Telegram—*Great Bethel, April* 4, 1862, 6 P.M.—My advanced guard five miles from Yorktown. Some slight skirmishing to-day. Our people driving rebels. Hope to invest Yorktown to-morrow. All well and in good spirits.

Big Bethel, April 5, 2 A.M.— . . . Have just got through with the orders for to-morrow; have been working very hard, and have

sent off officers and orderlies in every direction. I feel sure of to-morrow. I have, I think, provided against every contingency, and shall have the men well in hand if we fight to-morrow. . . . I saw yesterday a wonderfully cool performance. Three or our men had gone close down to the enemy's position after a sheep, which they killed, skinned, and started off with. They were, of course, fired at frequently, and in the course of their travels a 12-pound shot struck directly by them. They quietly picked up the shot, held on to the sheep, and brought the shot to me, yet warm. I never saw so cool and gallant a set of men; they do not seem to know what fear is.

Near Yorktown, April 6, 1 A.M.— . . . I find the enemy in strong force and in very strong position, but will drive him out. Fitz-John is in the advance on the right, Baldy on the left; they are doing splendidly. Their divisions have been under fire all the afternoon; have lost only about five killed in each, and have punished secesh badly. Thus far it has been altogether an artillery affair.

While listening this P.M. to the sound of the guns I received an order detaching McDowell's corps from my command. It is the most infamous thing that history has recorded. I have made such representations as will probably induce a revocation of the order, or at least save Franklin to me. The idea of depriving a general of 35,000 troops when actually under fire!

To-morrow night I can tell you exactly what I intend doing. We have no baggage to-night, our wagons being detained by the bad roads. I have taken possession of a hut in a deserted secesh camp; found a table therein, and sleep on a horse-blanket, if I find time to "retire." Colburn is copying a long letter; Seth, standing by the fire, looking *very* sleepy. He wakes up and sends his kindest regards, in which Colburn asks to participate. I am sorry to say that your father is snoring loudly in a corner.

April 6, 1:40 P.M.— . . . Did not get to bed until 3:30, and then my bed was a rather rough one, as our wagons did not arrive. Things quiet to-day; very little firing; our people are pushing their reconnoissances and getting up supplies. I shall take the place, but may be some time in effecting it. . . . .

April 8, 8 A.M.—Raining hard all night, and still continues to do so. Am now encamped about five miles from Yorktown; have been here two or three days. Have now visited both the right and left, and, in spite of the heavy rain, must ride to Ship Point and our right immediately after breakfast. All I care for about the rain is the health and comfort of the men. They are more fond of me than ever; more enthusiastic than I deserve; wherever I go it seems to inspire the fullest confidence. . . .

I have raised an awful row about McDowell's corps. The President very coolly telegraphed me yesterday that he thought I had better break the enemy's lines at once! I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself.

April 9, *near Yorktown*, 8 A.M.— . . . . Last night returned late and was fully occupied with reports of reconnoissances, etc., until very late.

It rained nearly every moment yesterday, all the night before, all last night, but has now stopped, though likely to commence again at any moment. It is execrable weather; everything knee-deep in mud; roads infamous: but we still get through it. I have

had great difficulty in arranging about supplies—so few wagons and such bad roads. Rode down to Ship Point yesterday morning.

9 A.M.—Interrupted and unable to finish. Have been bothered all the evening, but am getting things straightened out. . . . Start for the Point in a few minutes.

April 10, 10 P.M.—Have had a pretty long ride to-day. Secretary Fox spent last night with me. As soon as he had gone I rode to Porter's camp, thence to the river-bank to meet Capt. Missroom, commanding the gunboats. Have had an excellent view of the water defences of Yorktown, as well as of Gloucester. The enemy is very strong and is adding to his works and the number of his men. I could see them coming in on schooners. But as my heavy guns are not yet landed, and the navy do not feel strong enough to go at them, I can only hurry forward our preparations and trust that the more they have the more I shall catch. . . .

Yesterday I also spent on the right, taking, under cover of the heavy rain, a pretty good look at the ground in front of York and its defences. I got back about dark, pretty wet and tired out. . . . To-morrow we move headquarters to a much better and more convenient camp further to the front. . . . The present camp is a little too far from the scene of the most important operations.

April 11.—I am just recovering from a terrible scare. Early this morning I was awakened by a despatch from Fitz-John's headquarters stating that Fitz had made an ascension in the balloon this morning, and that the balloon had broken away and come to the ground some three miles southwest, which would be within the enemy's lines. You can imagine how I felt. I at once sent off to the various pickets to find out what they knew and try to do something to save him, but the order had no sooner gone than in walks Mr. Fitz just as cool as usual. He had luckily come down near my own camp after actually passing over that of the enemy. You may rest assured of one thing: you won't catch me in the confounded balloon, nor will I allow any other generals to go up in it. . . . .

Don't worry about the wretches; they have done nearly their worst, and can't do much more. I am sure that I will win in the end, in spite of all their rascality. History will present a sad record of these traitors who are willing to sacrifice the country and its army for personal spite and personal aims. The people will soon understand the whole matter.

April 14, 11 P.M., *Camp Winfield Scott.*— . . . I believe I now know who instigated the attack upon me and the country. . . . So Fox told you all about our troubles. They were severe for some time, but we are pretty well over the worst of them. . . . . I do not expect to lose many men, but to do the work mainly with artillery and so avoid much loss of life. Several brave fellows have already gone to their long home, but not a large number.

I can't tell you how soon I will attack, as it will depend upon the rapidity with which certain preliminary work can be done and the heavy guns brought up. I do not fear a repulse. I shall not quit the camp until I do so to continue the march on Richmond. If I am repulsed once, will try again, and keep it up until we succeed. But I do not anticipate a repulse; am confident of success. . . . . I received to-day a very kind letter from old Mr. Blair, which I enclose for you to keep for me. . . . Remained at home this morning, doing office-work, but rode out all the afternoon; rode to the front and took another look at secesh. . . .

8:30 A.M., 15*th*.—Am about starting for the gunboats, which are anchored near here, to take a better look at the opposite shore. . . . It is raining a little this morning—not much more than a drizzle. . . .

April 18, 1:15 A.M.— . . . About a half-hour ago the accustomed intermittent sound of artillery was varied in its monotony by a very heavy and continued rattle of musketry, with the accompaniment of a very respectable firing of artillery. I started at once for the telegraph-office, and endeavored in vain for some ten or fifteen minutes to arouse the operators at the stations in the direction of the firing. So I ordered twenty of the escort to saddle up, and started off Hudson, Sweitzer, and the Duc de Chartres to learn the state of the case. The firing has ceased now for some minutes, and I am still ignorant as to its whereabouts and cause. Of course I must remain up until I know what it is. I had had Arthur, Wright, Hammerstein, Radowitz, and the Comte de Paris, as well as Colburn, also up, with some of the escort ready to move or carry orders, as the case may be, but just now told them to lie down until I sent for them. It is a beautiful moonlight night, clear and pleasant—almost too much so for sleeping. Poor Wagner, of the Topogs, lost an arm this afternoon by the bursting of a shell; he is doing well, however.

Merrill was severely but not dangerously wounded in the arm yesterday. In Smith's affair yesterday we lost, I fear, nearly 200 killed and wounded. The object I proposed had been fully accomplished with the loss of about 20, when, after I left the ground, a movement was made in direct violation of my orders, by which the remainder of the loss was uselessly incurred. I do not yet know the details nor who is responsible. We have a severe task before us, but we will gain a brilliant success. . . . Colburn is my stand-by—so true and faithful. Many of my aides are excellent. No general ever labored under greater disadvantages, but I will carry it through in spite of everything. I hope Franklin will be here to-morrow or next day. I will then invest Gloucester and attack it at the same time I do York. When the *Galena* arrives I will cause it to pass the batteries, take them in reverse, and cut off the enemy's communications by York river. As I write I hear our guns constantly sounding and the bursting of shells in Secession.

9 P.M.—The firing of last night was caused by the attempt of a part of the enemy to cross the stream in Smith's front. They were repulsed at once; tried it later, and were again driven back.

April 19, 10:30 P.M.— . . . . To-day it has been very quiet; our batteries have merely fired enough to keep the enemy entirely silent at his work in front of Smith and at Wynn's Mill. Last night we commenced a battery, at Farnholdt's house, for five 100-pounder Parrotts and one 200-pounder Parrott; also one for fifteen heavy guns about two thousand yards from the enemy's main defences; another for six and one for five close by. Another for six was armed to-day, and kept down the enemy's fire at Wynn's Mill. To-morrow evening we commence batteries for thirteen mortars. About Monday night we will construct the first parallel and several other batteries in exposed positions, leaving those already commenced to cover the work and render it more safe. We shall soon be raining down a terrible tempest on this devoted place. To-day the enemy sent a flag of truce to Smith, asking a suspension of hostilities to bury the killed of the 16th. The officer who met with Sweitzer acknowledged

that their loss was very severe and the bearing of our men admirable. I received to-day a letter from Burnside, which I enclose. . . .

Franklin arrived yesterday and spent the night in my tent. He is at Ship Point to-night; I expect his division to-morrow. . . . . . . Don't be at all discouraged; all is going well. I know exactly what I am about. I can't go "with a rush" over strong posts. I must use heavy guns and silence their fire; all that takes much time, and I have not been longer than the usual time for such things—much less than the usual, in truth. . . .

I can't tell you when Yorktown is to be attacked, for it depends on circumstances that I cannot control. It shall be attacked the first moment I can do it successfully. But I don't intend to hurry it; I cannot afford to fail. I may have the opportunity of carrying the place next week, or may be delayed a couple of weeks; much, of course, depends on the rapidity with which the heavy guns and ammunition arrive. Never mind what such people as ——— say; they are beneath contempt. . . . I will put in a leaf of holly from the bower some of the men have made in front of my tent to-day. They have made quite an artistic thing of it—holly and pine; it adds much, too, to my comfort, as it renders the tent more private and cool.

April 20, 7:30 A.M.— . . . It has been raining more or less all night, and if it were not for the men I would enjoy the rain, for I rather like to hear it patter on the tent.

I have a fire in my stove this morning, so it is quite comfortable. My tent is the same the aides use for an office; it has a floor of pine boughs—a carpet of boughs, I suppose I ought to say—a table in the middle, a desk in one corner, my bed in another, my saddle in another, a wood pile, etc., in the last. I have a splendid two-legged washstand which Charles' ingenuity devised. Then I have a clothes-rack, consisting of a sapling with the stumps of the branches projecting. So you see I am living quite *en prince.*

April 21.—Yesterday was rather unpleasant; rained a good deal. To-day about the same; not raining much yet, but a kind of drizzle. Had a letter yesterday from Francis B. Cutting, of New York, hoping that I would not allow these treacherous hounds to drive me from my path. Have just replied to it.

April 22, 11:15 P.M.— . . . The enemy has been blazing away a good deal to-day, but hurt nothing, however; he tried his best at a skirmish with some of Smith's men this morning, but was repulsed with loss. It is said that some of his troops were blacks. I do not however, give full credit to this. It seems too improbable to be true. The navy have been firing this morning at long range.

April 23, 7 A.M.— . . . Some few shots fired already, but not many: secesh don't mean to get up very early. I am rather anxious to hear the results of last night's work; for I am in hopes that I can get all the batteries that have been commenced well aimed to-night, so that the first parallel may be commenced at once. The weather has cleared off beautifully again, so that I am in strong hopes we shall have no more rain for some time. You have no idea of the effect of a couple of days' rain in this country; roads, camps, etc., become impassable. . . .

11:30 P.M.— . . . Have been working hard all day, but not in the saddle; it has been head-work in my tent to-day. I am getting on splendidly with "slow preparations." The prince is delighted and thinks my work gigantic. I do believe that I am avoiding

the fault of the Allies at Sebastopol, and quietly preparing the way for great success. I have brought forty heavy guns in battery; to-morrow night I hope to have twelve new guns and five to ten heavy mortars in battery. I begin in the morning the redoubts to cover the flank of the first parallel, which will be constructed to-morrow night. I will not open fire unless the enemy annoys us, hoping to get all the guns in battery and the trenches well advanced before meeting with serious opposition. We have done much more than they suspect. Have ordered a forced reconnoissance of a dangerous point in the morning; it may cost several lives, but I have taken all possible precautions, and hope to gain the information necessary with but little loss. There is no other choice than to run the risk. . . . Everything is as quiet now as if there were no enemy within a hundred miles of us. The *Galena,* under Rodgers, will be here by day after to-morrow.

April 26.—Again raining, and has been all the morning. Grover carried a redoubt of the rebels most handsomely this morning. It was one from which they had it in their power to annoy the left of our parallels, and it was an object to get rid of it. The work was handsomely done; the work carried by assault, and then so much destroyed that it can be of no further use to the rebels. Fifteen prisoners were taken in the affair. We lost three killed, one mortally and about ten others slightly wounded; have not all the details yet. We got eight immense mortars up by water last night; but a canal-boat loaded with empty shells ran aground in sight of secesh, who has been blazing away at them; sent one shot through. He has stopped firing now, probably because he cannot see on account of the rain. To-night we complete the first parallel, which will be nearly four thousand yards long—an immense work. From the manner in which our men pitched into the little redoubt this morning it is clear that the *morale* is on our side. The men found quite a deep and broad ditch in front of the affair, but over it they went without a moment's hesitation!

April 27, *midnight.*— . . . Was engaged with Barnard, Porter, etc., until about one, when I rode to the trenches. Then, of course, had to walk; a good deal was muddy, so it was tiresome. Went over the whole extent and saw everything with care. The enemy have fired a good deal to-day, but the men are now so well covered that no one has been hurt to-day. Commenced to-day batteries for fifteen 10-inch mortars, and to-night another battery for heavy guns; another for ten mortars to-morrow morning; an extension of the parallel on the left commenced to-night. By to-morrow night the parallel shall be finished in all its details, as well as the two covering redoubts on the left. Some time day after to-morrow I hope to have thirty-five mortars in battery. To-morrow night will open a tuyau in advance leading to a new gun-battery fast getting ready to blow secesh up. He will have a bad time of it when we open. Have news this evening *via* Richmond that New Orleans is in our possession. I presume it is true. So the work goes bravely on. . . . Yesterday made Fitz Porter "Director of the Siege"—a novel title, but made necessary by the circumstances of the case. I give all my orders relating to the siege through him, making him at the same time commandant of the siege operations and a chief of staff for that portion of the work. This new arrangement will save me much trouble, and relieve my mind greatly, and save much time. In going over the line of trenches yesterday I found so many blunders committed that I was very thankful to put Porter on duty at once. . . .

The good fellow (Colburn) never leaves me; wherever I ride he sticks close after me. He is one of the very best men I ever knew, so thoroughly honest and reliable. His judgment is excellent and he is perfectly untiring. Day and night are about the same to him, and he will start on a long ride at midnight in a pitch-dark or rainy night with as much good-humor as at midday. "Kentuck" (horse) is still at Fort Monroe sick; will rejoin in a few days, I hope. Marsh is with him, and I am sometimes half-wicked enough to suspect that Marsh finds Fort Monroe more comfortable than camp would be.

April 28, 11:45 P.M. . . . Rode out this P.M., and went over most of the ground from right to left. Commenced some new work still more to the front to-night; as it was exposed and dangerous, and required noiseless and rapid working, I as usual gave it to the regulars to do. Have this moment heard that although the rebels have been firing a great deal (there goes another gun), they have wounded but one man; the men should be well covered by this time, so I fancy the work is safe. I have also (there goes another gun) ordered a lot of rifle-pits for sharpshooters to be pushed out well to the front; we will, I hope, gain a good deal of ground to-night. Am getting on nicely. Will have some more batteries ready for their guns by to-morrow P.M., and will very shortly be able to open on secesh. He tried to annoy one of our working parties this morning with a couple of guns; I sent out a field-battery and silenced him after four rounds.

8 A.M.—Colburn came back from the trenches after midnight, and reported all going on well; the regulars had covered themselves well by that time, and the fire of the enemy had only wounded one man, and that not badly. Clitz was in command of the working party last night. To-day weather good; will not rain. Hope to make good progress this morning. Good deal of firing going on now.

April 30, A.M.—Had a quiet night; very little firing; drove them out of an orchard whence they had been annoying us, and pushed them still further in towards their works. A good deal of firing on their part yesterday; did very little harm, killing some three and wounding four or five of our people. Scarcely a gun fired to-day as yet; we are working like horses and will soon be ready to open. It will be a tremendous affair when we do begin, and will, I hope, make short work of it. . . . Have put the regulars on the exposed portions of the work, they work so much better. A raw, disagreeable day; I fear it will rain—unless it snows; wind from east. . . .

10:30 P.M.—After I got through my morning work went down to see the opening of Battery No. 1. It worked handsomely; drove all the rebel schooners away from the wharf, and made a general scatteration. The effect was excellent. Shall not open the general fire for some four days—I hope on Monday A.M.

Next Morning (*May* 1).—Another wet, drizzly, uncomfortable sort of day. Good deal of firing during the night. I shall be very glad when we are really ready to open fire, and then finish this confounded affair. I am tired of public life; and even now, when I am doing the best I can for my country in the field, I know that my enemies are pursuing me more remorselessly than ever, and "kind friends" are constantly making themselves agreeable by informing me of the pleasant predicament in which I am—the rebels on one side, and the abolitionists and other scoundrels on the other. I believe in my heart and conscience, however, that I am walking on the ridge between the two gulfs, and all that I have to do is to try to

keep the path of honor and truth, and that God will bring me safely through. At all events I am willing to leave the matter in His hands, and will be content with the decision of the Almighty.

May 3, 12:30 P.M.—After the hot firing of to-day everything is so unusually still that I am a little suspicious that our friends may intend a sortie; so I have taken all the steps necessary to be ready for them, and am sitting up for a while to await developments. I feel much better satisfied when they are firing than when they are silent. To-day they have wasted about a thousand rounds and have done us no harm worth speaking of, except (Irish) bursting one of their own guns. We are now nearly ready to open; shall begin, I think, on Monday morning, certainly by Tuesday. If all works well it is not impossible that we shall have Yorktown by Wednesday or Thursday. The task is a difficult one, yet I am sure we have taken the right way to accomplish our purpose, and that we will soon win. I fear that we are to have another storm to-night. We want no more rain, but will make the best of it if it comes. Had plenty of work to do at home all the morning, and in the afternoon rode down to "Shield's House" to meet the new commander of the flotilla, Capt. Smith. . . . I don't half like the perfect quietness which reigns now. I have given orders to take advantage of it and push our approaches as far forward as possible. It don't seem natural. It looks like a sortie or an evacuation. If either, I hope it may be the former. I do not want these rascals to get away from me without a sound drubbing, which they richly deserve and will be sure to get if they remain. . . . . I feel that the fate of a nation depends upon me, and I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of government. Any day may bring an order relieving me from command. If they will simply let me alone I feel sure of success; but will they do it?

May 5, 9:30 A.M.— . . . You will have learned ere this that Yorktown is ours. It is a place of immense strength, and was very heavily armed. It so happened that our preparation for the attack was equally formidable, so that Lee, Johnston, and Davis confessed that they could not hold the place. They evacuated it in a great hurry, leaving their heavy guns, baggage, etc. I sent the cavalry after them at once, and our advance is now engaged with them at Williamsburg. The weather is infamous; it has been raining all night, and is still raining heavily; no signs of stopping; roads awful. I hope to get to West Point to-day, although the weather has delayed us terribly. It could not well be worse, but we will get through nevertheless. The villians (secesh) have scattered torpedoes everywhere—by springs, wells, etc. It is the most murderous and barbarous thing I ever heard of.

CHAPTER XIX

Confederate Retreat—Pursuit towards Williamsburg—Battle of Williamsburg—The horse Dan Webster.

It appears that Gen. Johnston, the Confederate commander, regarded the position of Yorktown and the Warwick as easily held against a simple assault, but as untenable against siege operations, or when we could pass up the York or James rivers; therefore he withdrew as soon as satisfied that we were on the point of using our heavy guns.

He directed the movement to commence at dusk on the 4th of May, Magruder's command to move by the Lee's Mill road, to halt at the junction of roads on the Yorktown side of Williamsburg, and occupy the line of fortifications; Longstreet's division to follow Magruder's; D. H. Hill's and G. W. Smith's divisions to march by the Yorktown road. Longstreet, Hill, and Smith were to pass through Williamsburg, Smith halting on the Barhamsville road far enough out to leave room for the other troops between himself and the town. It was expected that Magruder and Hill would clear the way to enable Longstreet and Smith to start at nine P.M., so that the whole army could reach Williamsburg soon after midnight; but it was sunrise of the 5th before Smith's road was clear, and his rear reached the fortifications near Williamsburg about noon. He found that the fortifications were unoccupied; and as skirmishing was taking place about two miles back, he halted a small body whom he found between the works and Williamsburg, and reported the state of affairs to Gen. Johnston, who ordered back McLaw's brigade and Stuart's cavalry.

Early in the morning of the 4th of May, the moment I learned that our troops were in possession of Yorktown and the line of the Warwick, I ordered Gen. Stoneman in pursuit with all the available force of cavalry and horse-artillery, supported by infantry, on both the Lee's Mill and Yorktown roads to Williamsburg.

The next, and by far the most important, step was to throw Franklin's division, supported promptly and strongly,

as rapidly as possible up the York river by water, to land on its right bank opposite West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever works might exist between that point and Yorktown, and to cut off, if possible, the enemy's trains and troops still south of the mouth of the Pamunkey.

While keeping steadily in view Stoneman's operations and his proper support, I at once turned my attention to expediting the movement up the York river by water. The weather was so bad and the wharf facilities at Yorktown so deficient that it was very difficult to bring order out of chaos, and Franklin's division did not reach its destination until the 6th of May.

On the morning of the 4th, then, Stoneman moved out of Yorktown with four batteries of horse-artillery, the 1st and 6th U. S. Cavalry, the 8th Ill. Cavalry, and Barker's squadron of Ill. cavalry. Hooker's division was ordered to move as rapidly as possible by the same road in support, and Heintzelman was ordered to hold himself in readiness to follow with Kearny's division if necessary.

Smith having reported the enemy's infantry and cavalry in force about one and a half miles in rear of Lee's Mill, Stoneman was ordered to cut off their retreat in the vicinity of the Halfway House. At the same time Sumner, in command of the left, was ordered to restore the bridges over the Warwick and place Smith's and Couch's divisions of the 4th corps, and Casey's if necessary, in front of the reported battle force, endeavoring to hold them where they were until Stoneman could gain their line of retreat; but attacking if they fell back. His pursuit was to be by the Lee's Mill road, with Smith leading. The remaining divisions—those of Porter, Sedgwick, Richardson, and Sykes—were held in readiness to support either Keyes, Heintzelman, or Franklin, as might prove most advantageous. Stoneman was thus ordered not only to pursue and harass the enemy's rear-guard, but also to endeavor to cut off those on the Lee's Mill road in front of Sumner.

About six miles from Yorktown Stoneman came upon the enemy's pickets; two miles further on he came up with their rear-guard, a regiment of cavalry, posted on the fur-

ther bank of a difficult ravine. Gibson's battery soon drove them out of this position. At this point he sent Gen. Emory, with Benson's battery, the 3d Penn., and Barker's squadron, across to the Lee's Mill road to cut off the force in front of Sumner, who was supposed to be advancing by that road. With the remainder of his force Stoneman pushed on as rapidly as safety permitted to occupy the junction of the Yorktown and Lee's Mill roads, about two miles south of Williamsburg. Before detaching Emory, Stoneman had communicated with Sumner's advanced guard, and had also learned that Hooker was close behind on the Yorktown road. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, commanding the advanced guard, consisting of a section of Gibson's battery and a part of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, upon debouching from the wood found himself at the junction of the two roads immediately in front of a strong earthwork (Fort Magruder) flanked by redoubts, and in presence of a strong rear-guard, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, one battery, and three regiments of infantry. With his small force Cooke made immediate dispositions to attack, and Stoneman hastened up the remainder of the 1st Cavalry and of Gibson's battery.

The cleared ground available for the operations of cavalry and artillery was so limited that only about three hundred cavalry and one battery could be brought into action. Foreseeing that he must soon retreat unless promptly supported by the infantry—some two miles in rear at last accounts—Stoneman formed the remainder of his force in a clearing half a mile in rear, in order to cover the withdrawal of his advanced guard, when that became necessary, and sent to hurry up the infantry. With great difficulty, so deep was the mud and so thick the abattis, Gibson got his battery in position, and Col. W. A. Grier formed his regiment (1st U. S.) to support it. Meanwhile the enemy, strongly reinforced from his main body, had thrown himself into the abandoned works, and several regiments of infantry were seen moving in a direction threatening to turn Stoneman's right, on which he directed Maj. L. Williams, commanding the 6th U. S. Cavalry, to make a demon-

stration through the woods on the right in order to check the enemy until the infantry could arrive.

The fire of Fort Magruder upon Cooke's command was producing serious effects, and the 6th Cavalry had come upon a strong force of infantry and cavalry, and was saved from destruction by a gallant charge made by Capt. Saunders, commanding the rear squadron, during the withdrawal of the regiment.

Col. Grier had made two brilliant charges; men and horses were falling rapidly, and the enemy was receiving reinforcements every moment. After having held the position for about three-quarters of an hour Stoneman learned that Hooker could not get up for two hours. Under these circumstances, having done all in his power to hold his position, he fell back upon the clearing already occupied by his reserves, prepared to hold it to the utmost. He at least held the enemy to their works, and gave us the opportunity of fighting the battle of the next day.

As already stated, Gen. Emory was detached at the Halfway House, and on reaching the Lee's Mill road encountered an equal force of the enemy, whom he drove back on the Lee's Mill road, whence they escaped by a circuitous route along the banks of the James. Their escape was accounted for by the fact that Emory could not follow them without abandoning the road he was ordered to hold, and leaving his battery there unprotected, as he had no infantry. Smith's advance reached Skiff's creek at about 11:30, to find the bridge in flames and the road impassable. He therefore, by direction of Gen. Sumner, moved across to the Yorktown road, and following it, reached Stoneman's position at about 5:30 o'clock, Gen. Sumner arriving with him and assuming command of all the troops at the front.

Hooker's division had encountered Smith's filing into the Yorktown road, and was obliged to halt for some three or four hours until it had passed. Subsequently, on its arrival at Chesapeake Church, Gen. Heintzelman turned it off by a cross-road into the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early on the 5th. As soon as Smith

reached the front his division was deployed and directed by Gen. Sumner to attack the works in front of him; but confusion arising in the dense forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt was deferred to the next day.

The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which lasted till the morning of the 6th, and made the roads, already terribly cut up by the enemy's troops and trains, almost impassable. Early in the evening of the 4th I learned that Smith had reached the front, and that at six P.M. two more divisions would soon be ready, and were only waiting to rest the men and let them take a little food before attacking; and that the works would soon be carried, as they were then reported to be held only by a rear-guard of a regiment of cavalry, two guns, and four or five regiments of infantry.

I therefore pushed with redoubled energy the arrangements to throw a force by water to the mouth of the Pamunkey, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that my presence was at all necessary at the front.

The position is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College creek, and the left on Queen's creek; nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds.

The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consisting of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field guns.

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about six hundred yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about forty yards. The woods in front of the position were felled, and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle-pits.

The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula towards Williamsburg, one along the York river (the Yorktown road) and the other along the James (the

Lee's Mill road), unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James river road leaves it about one and three-fourths of a mile below Fort Magruder and unites with the road from Allen's landing to Williamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College creek over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line. At about the same distance from Fort Magruder a branch leaves the York river road and crosses the tributary of Queen's creek on a dam, and, passing over the position and through the woods in its rear, finally enters Williamsburg. This road was commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of works.

On the morning of the 5th the position of our troops was as follows: On the extreme left, Emory holding the road to Allen's farm; next, on his right, Hooker's division; next, in the centre, Stoneman, holding the main road; on his right Smith's division. Kearny, Couch and Casey were still in rear, having bivouacked where the night overtook them. Couch and Casey were ordered to march at daylight to support Smith; at about nine o'clock Kearny was ordered up in support of Hooker.

The battle of Williamsburg was an accident, brought about by the rapid pursuit of our troops. The enemy were very anxious to get beyond West Point before we could reach it by water. Late in the afternoon of the 4th Gen. G. W. Smith was ordered to march at 2:30 A.M. of the 5th, and place his position north of Barhamsville to check any attempt on the Confederate line of retreat from the upper York river. Longstreet and Hill were to follow Smith on the Barhamsville road for about six miles, and then turn off at the Burned Tavern and take the Charles City road to Richmond via Long bridge. Magruder was to move by New Kent Court-House and Bottom bridge. From Barhamsville Smith was to follow Magruder. Smith commanded the troops on the New Kent Court-House road, Longstreet those on the Charles City road. The rain made the roads

so bad that when we caught up with their rear-guard they were forced to reinforce it from their main body, and hold the works as long as possible, in order to enable their trains to escape.

On the afternoon of the 4th Longstreet's division, six brigades, had halted near Williamsburg, four brigades at or in rear of the line of works, two brigades, Wilcox and Colston, on the Richmond side. About seven next morning Wilcox was ordered to return to the line of works and report to Gen. Anderson. Wilcox was placed on the right and about one thousand yards in front of Fort Magruder, and at the time held the right of the Confederate line, posted in the pine-woods with occasional clearings. He supposed that there was nothing but cavalry in his front, but, sending two companies into the woods, they captured three of our infantry soldiers; whereupon he sent in a Mississippi regiment, deployed as skirmishers with orders to advance until forced to halt, and to find out what was in front. Up to this time there had been merely a dropping fire of skirmishers, giving the impression that the woods were held by dismounted cavalry; but now heavy firing followed, and the report came back to Wilcox that three United States brigades were there in position. These brigades composed Hooker's division. And all this must have taken place between nine and ten A.M.

Wilcox immediately sent for reinforcements, and the rest of Longstreet's division gradually came to his support, mostly being placed on his right, Gen. Richard Anderson finally taking command. Early in the afternoon, being apprehensive for his right, Anderson again attacked, took five guns of Webber's battery, and brought Hooker to a standstill, inflicting heavy losses.

Between three and four o'clock Kearny reached the front. He had received the order to advance at nine o'clock, but, from the condition of the roads and their being blocked with troops, with all his energy and exertions he was unable to reach Hooker until the time mentioned. He at once relieved Hooker's exhausted troops, and, promptly attacking, drove back the enemy at every point. Hooker's

losses were severe, and when I saw him, a day or two afterwards, he was much depressed and thought that he had accomplished nothing, so much so that I felt it necessary to encourage him. It was not until some time afterwards that he came to the conclusion that he had accomplished a brilliant feat of arms.

Emory had been left to guard the road leading to Allen's farm, near the James. Being informed on the morning of the 5th that the enemy's right could be turned, he called upon Gen. Heintzelman for infantry to enable him to make the attempt. Late in the afternoon one of Kearny's brigades and two batteries were sent to him for that purpose, "but that was found impracticable from the nature of the locality, the lateness of the evening, and the want of a guide."

While all this was going on our left Sumner reconnoitered the position in the centre and on our right. Finding that one of the redoubts on the Confederate left was unoccupied, he, at about eleven o'clock, ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, to cross by a dam at the foot of one of the large ponds and take possession of it. This he did with five regiments of the division, and, finding the next redoubt also unoccupied, he promptly seized it, and sent for reinforcements to enable him to advance further and take the next redoubt, which commanded the plain between his position and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communication of the troops engaged with Gens. Hooker and Kearny.

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and, as his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for reinforcements. Gen. Smith was twice ordered to join him with the rest of his division, but each time the order was countermanded at the moment of execution, Gen. Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. At length, in reply to Gen. Hancock's repeated messages for more troops, Gen. Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first position, the execution of which Gen. Hancock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already

gained, and fearing to expose his command by such a movement.

As the head of Couch's division did not arrive until one o'clock, it was entirely proper for Gen. Sumner to hesitate about weakening his centre until that hour. The remaining brigades of Couch followed the first immediately, Casey arriving early in the afternoon. Couch's 1st brigade, Peck's, was deployed on Hooker's right, and promptly repulsed the attack made upon it, thus affording Hooker sensible relief. Soon after it was relieved by the other two brigades, who remained undisturbed.

As already stated, as soon as our troops were in possession of the enemy's works, on the morning of the 4th, I gave the necessary orders for the pursuit, and, when all that was accomplished, drove into Yorktown in an ambulance. The enemy had made a free distribution of torpedoes in the roads, within the works, and in places where our men would be apt to go—for instance, near wells and springs, telegraph-offices, and store-houses—so that some of our men were killed. To place mines or torpedoes in the path of assaulting columns is admissible under the customs of war, but such use of them as was made here is barbarous in the extreme. When I entered Yorktown our progress was much delayed by the caution made necessary by the presence of these torpedoes. I at once ordered that they should be discovered and removed by the Confederate prisoners. They objected very strenuously, but were forced to do the work. After Williamsburg one of the Confederate surgeons, sent in to offer to take care of their wounded in our hands, told me that these torpedoes were planted at the close of the evacuation, and mentioned the name of an officer whom he saw engaged in this work.

As soon as we had possession of Yorktown the gunboats started up the York river to ascertain whether the transports with Franklin's division could safely ascend, and to capture any of the enemy's transports they could find.

If the condition of affairs near Williamsburg justified it, I intended going to West Point by water myself. Early

on the 5th I sent Col. Sweitzer and Maj. Hammerstein, of my staff, to the front, to keep me informed of the condition of affairs and the progress of events. I went to Yorktown to expedite the movement by water, and to provide for the transportation of supplies to the troops in advance.

Until about one P.M. I learned nothing indicating that the affair at Williamsburg was more than a simple attack upon a rear-guard, but at that hour I received intelligence that the state of the contest was unfavorable and that my presence was urgently required. Sedwick's division was then held ready to embark in support of Franklin. But I ordered him to move beyond Yorktown a short distance, ready to move to the front if ordered. Porter and Richardson were also instructed to be ready to obey whatever orders they might receive.

I returned at once to my camp to give these and other necessary orders, and, remaining there only a few minutes, started with half a dozen aides and a few orderlies for the front. The distance was more than fourteen miles, over terrible roads, much obstructed by trains; but as I had my most trustworthy horse, Dan Webster, I made better progress than was agreeable to the escort, most of whom had been left behind when I reached the field of battle.

Dan was one of those horses that could trot all day long at a very rapid gait which kept all others horses at a gallop. I think it was on this ride that he earned from the aides the title of "that Devil Dan"—a name which he justified on many another long and desperate ride before I gave up the command of the Army of the Potomac.

Dan was the best horse I ever had; he never was ill for an hour, never fatigued, never disturbed under fire, and never lost his equanimity or his dignity, except on one occasion. That was when we abandoned the position at Harrison's Bar under the orders to return to Washington. From a very natural feeling I remained there until all the trains and troops had left, and, sending forward all the escort and staff, remained alone in the works for a little time, my mind full of the fatal consequences of the order I was forced to carry into execution. At length I mounted and

rode out to join the escort; as I passed through the abandoned works Dan, for the first time in his life, gave vent to his feelings by a series of most vicious plunges and kicks. It was possible that the flies, who had enjoyed a whole army to feed upon, concentrated all their energies upon Dan; but I have always more than suspected that, in his quiet way, Dan understood the condition of affairs much better than the authorities at Washington, and merely wished to inform me in his own impressive manner that he fully agreed with my views as to the folly of abandoning the position, and that he, at least, had full confidence in his master.

Dan and I never quarreled, and the dear old fellow survived the war for many years, dying at a ripe old age in 1879. No matter how long we might be parted—once for nearly four years—he always recognized me the moment we met again, and in his own way showed his pleasure at seeing me. Even on the day of his death, which was a painless one from old age, whenever I entered his stall he tried to rise and greet me, but, unable to do that, would lean his head against me and lick my hand. No soldier ever had a more faithful or better horse than I had in Dan Webster.

Riding through mud and water, often obliged to turn into the woods, but never slackening the pace when the road permitted, I reached the front between four and five o'clock. I found everything in a state of chaos and depression. Even the private soldiers saw clearly that, with force enough in hand to gain a victory, we, the pursuers, were on the defensive and content with repulsing attacks, and that there was no plan of action, no directing head. The front line was formed along the nearer edge of the woods, and the rest massed inactive in the clearings. The troops were weary and discouraged; but my presence at once restored their confidence, and, as they recognized me passing rapidly through their ranks, their wild and joyful cheers told the enemy, as well as our own people, that something unusual had occurred, and that the period of uncertainty and inaction was at an end.

I at once gathered the general officers around me, called upon them for a brief statement of affairs, and promptly made up my mind as to what should be done. This occurred in the clearing, close to the Whittaker House. I found that, owing to some marshy ground, there was no direct communication with the two divisions under Heintzelman on our left; the troops forming the front of our centre were on the hither edge of the woods intervening between us and the enemy, and no one knew whether the enemy were in the woods, and, if so, what force. Hancock, with his unsupported brigade, was still in possession of the abandoned works on the enemy's left; one of Smith's remaining brigades was in line on our right centre, the other and Casey's division massed in rear; two of Couch's brigades formed the centre, with one in reserve.

I ordered a party to move in to the left to reopen communication with Heintzelman. Just then heavy firing began at Hancock's position, which was two miles from the nearest support, and, grasping at once the fact that he held the key of the field of battle, I ordered Smith, who was chafing like a caged lion, to move as rapidly as possible to Hancock's support with his two remaining brigades and Naglee's. Within five minutes of the time I reached the field Smith was off as rapidly as his men could move; Naglee, with his brigade of Casey's division, following the leading regiment of Smith's division. As soon as the head of Smith's column started I ordered the centre to advance into the woods and gain the more distant edge, driving out any of the enemy who might be there. This was promptly done, and I rode in with them, and into the cleared ground in front, in close view of the enemy's works. There were none of the enemy in the woods, but they held the works in considerable force.

Their position was so strong that when my reconnoissance was completed I did not think proper to attack without making arrangements to use our artillery and carefully arrange our columns of attack.

I therefore returned to the Whittaker House, quickly gave orders for the proper posting of the troops in the

centre, and started rapidly for Hancock's position. A little before reaching the dam by which he had crossed I met the column of prisoners whom he had taken.

Before Gens. Smith and Naglee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon them, and, after some terrific volleys of musketry, he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he himself losing only 31 men.

This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and Gen. Hancock merited the highest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed and his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position.

Hancock's command consisted of the 5th Wis., 6th Me., and 49th Penn. regiments of volunteers of his own brigade, and the 7th Me. and 30th N. Y. of Davidson's brigade. Keeping on to Hancock's brigade, I remained there long enough to thank them for their gallant conduct, to appreciate the importance of the position and the value of the success gained. I sent some of the approaching reinforcements to occupy a dangerous mass of woods on the right, and, there being no indication of any new attack by the enemy, I left as soon as Smith arrived with sufficient troops to render the position secure. By the time Smith's troops all arrived and were properly posted it was too dark to attempt any new operations until the next morning.

It was raining heavily and nearly dark when I returned to the Whittaker House, so that nothing more could be done than to arrange for security during the night and a prompt resumption of operations in the morning. All the troops slept on the muddy field, in the rain, with what protection their shelter-tents gave them, and many without food. I was not much better off, for, with the exception of a piece of biscuit for breakfast on the morning of the 6th, I had nothing to eat from the early morning of the 5th until late in the day on the 6th. The night was a horrible one. The little Whittaker House was crowded with

several general officers and their staffs, so that sleep or rest was impossible. It rained hard, and I passed much of the evening among the men, by way of encouraging them, who think little of hardship when their general shares it with them.

It was unfortunate that the absolute necessity of expediting the movement of troops and supplies up the York river detained me so long at Yorktown, and that I did not receive earlier information of the necessity for my presence at the front. All the reports up to those that took me so rapidly to the field, represented the affair as simply one against an ordinary rear-guard, and with good reasons I expected every moment to learn that the enemy was defeated and his works occupied, as the troops on the field of battle were more than enough for the purpose. Could I have arrived at one o'clock it is very certain that Smith, supported by Couch and afterwards by Casey, would have at once debouched from Hancock's ground, and have cut off the retreat of the greater part of the troops engaged against Hooker. Up to the time of Couch's arrival it would probably have been imprudent to move the whole of Smith's division in support of Hancock, but the moment the head of Couch's column appeared near the front it was proper to push Smith forward as rapidly as possible. In fact, Hooker's repulse was of no consequence, except for the loss of life it involved, and his falling back somewhat would only facilitate the decisive advance by our right. When I reached the field the commanding general gave me the impression that, far from our having a simple rear-guard to deal with, the enemy was present in very heavy force. Therefore, to guard against all eventualities, I sent back orders to Porter to occupy Yorktown, and to Sedgwick and Richardson to advance by land in the morning.

During the night Heintzelman reported to me that Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied on for the next day, and that Kearny could do no more than hold his own unless reinforced. But, after fully considering the state of affairs during the evening, I was so confident of the advantage to be derived from Smith's

possession of the decisive point that I determined to carry on our operations with the force then in hand, even were the enemy superior in numbers. If the enemy held their ground and were not superior in numbers, it was certain that an advance by Smith and Casey, with the cavalry, direct on Williamsburg, supported by Couch as the centre was cleared, would cut off all the troops in front of Heintzelman. Even if the enemy proved to be superior in numbers this advance would no doubt cause them to withdraw their right and thus enable Hooker and Kearny to come into line on Smith's left, and I could perfectly well hold my own and keep the enemy in position while the movement to West Point was being carried out. Therefore, during the night, I countermanded the orders to Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed them to return to Yorktown and, together with Porter, embark as rapidly as possible in support of Franklin.

Early on the morning of the 6th it was found that the enemy had abandoned his positions during the night; we at once occupied them and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded, for whose assistance eighteen of the Confederate surgeons were sent by Gen. J. E. Johnston, the Confederate commander.

CHAPTER XX

Advance from Williamsburg—Franklin's movement—Alarm of prisoners in Williamsburg—Plan of the campaign—Orders to move towards north of Richmond—Fatal to the campaign—Movements on this line.

It became clear that we had been opposed by only a portion of the Confederate army, at first by a single rear-guard, which was subsequently considerably reinforced by troops brought back during the first night and the next day to hold the works as long as possible and enable their trains to escape. Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, more than half their army, were engaged. Their losses were heavy, and we captured eight guns and many caissons and wagons, which the deep mud prevented them from carrying off.

Wilcox's Confederate brigade, having received no orders, found itself at half-past ten P.M. of the 5th entirely alone, and moved back beyond Williamsburg, being the last to leave the field. It has been stated that G. W. Smith had been ordered to move at half-past two A.M. of the 5th and take a position north of Barhamsville. He moved at the hour designated, just as a heavy rain commenced. The roads soon became axle-deep in mud, and extraordinary efforts were required to get the wagons along. Late in the afternoon, when the head of the column had nearly reached Barhamsville, Smith received an order from Gen. Johnston to suspend the movement, as a heavy attack had been made on the fortifications at Williamsburg, in which Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions had been engaged. On the two following days Gen. Johnston, learning of Franklin's disembarkation at Brick House, concentrated the greater part of his army near Barhamsville.

It has already been stated that Franklin's division was disembarked on the 3d of May to take part in the approaching assault of Yorktown. Gen. Franklin passed the night of the 3d at general headquarters, his division remaining at Cheeseman's landing. As soon as the evacuation was known I instructed him to re-embark his division immediately and bring it by water to Yorktown, where he would

receive further orders. He at once returned to it and commenced the work, which he carried on with all possible speed, completing it about one o'clock on the 5th. The embarkation was much delayed by the atrocious weather; by the facts that all the ordinary means for loading and unloading were fully occupied with putting supplies ashore for the rest of the army, so that Gen. Franklin was obliged to improvise his own means; that forage and provision for several days had to be reloaded; but most of all by the difficulty of re-embarking the artillery, all the carriages of which had to be unlimbered and floated out on rafts and then hoisted upon the transports. Gen. Franklin's letter explains this subject in detail, and I need only say that the delay was unavoidable and that Gen. Franklin did not lose an unnecessary moment in carrying his order into effect:

"HARTFORD, Feb. 8, 1884.

"*Gen. G. B. McClellan, New York*:

"MY DEAR GENERAL: It so happens that I have just had a correspondence with Howard about the West Point landing in May, 1862, and, as it covers the greater part of the ground indicated in your letter of the 5th inst., I enclose it with this.

"The long time taken to re-embark my division at Poquosin, or Cheeseman's creek, was due—


"1st. To the weather, which you will remember, was atrocious;

"2d. To the fact that such landing facilities as were at hand were fully occupied with getting supplies ashore for the army at Yorktown, leaving me to my own crude devices for getting things aboard; and,

"3d. To the absolute necessity there was for unlimbering all artillery vehicles, in order to pack them in the limited deckspace of the transports that were available.

"This loading the artillery was the great cause of delay. Getting the carriages on the transports was a tedious and exasperatingly slow process. They had to be floated on rafts from the shore to the transports and then lifted several feet to the deck. I do not now remember how the horses were got aboard, but I know that everything was done as quickly as it could be done.

"Then, too, the provisions and forage for several days had to be reloaded in the infantry transports—a tedious process under the circumstances. Towing the artillery transports was a very slow process. These transports were each made of two canal barges placed about as far apart as the width of beam of a single barge, the whole space being decked over, thus. They had been so arranged for the landing that it was contemplated I was to make when I first arrived. They made excellent transports for a short run in smooth water, but they would not steer and were heartbreaking to tow. So we finally started for Yorktown, when an-



other unlooked-for delay occurred by the grounding of many of the transports, which were of all draughts of water. I stayed by until I saw that all would get off, and then started for Yorktown, where I met you in the afternoon and received my instructions. Of course, after arriving at West Point, the landing was slow, although not nearly so slow as the loading. The infantry and artillery were got off during the night, and a line was formed which was rectified and strengthened after daylight. I returned to my headquarters boat to hurry off the transports, which were very slow in moving, and while I was engaged in this business an attack was made on Newton's brigade. I hurried ashore and found that a sharp attack had been made, by Hampton's brigade, I think. They drove Newton out of the woods at first, but the brigade soon retook its position, driving the enemy back; and as the gunboats were in position to shell the woods in front of our line, a few shots from them drove the enemy off and ended the fight. Both lines, however, remained within musket-shot of each other until well on in the afternoon, when the transports returned, bringing Sedgwick's division, I think it was. As my orders only directed me to hold my position, and as my right flank was necessarily in the air and ought to have been turned by the enemy, I was in no condition to have advanced into the interior, and, in fact, under your orders I had no business to make the attempt.

"Truly your friend,

"WM. B. FRANKLIN."

The flotilla experienced great difficulty in reaching Yorktown, which it effected about four o'clock on the 5th. Meanwhile Gen. Franklin, when the greatest difficulties had been overcome, preceded it, and must have reached Yorktown before one o'clock, where he received his final instructions from me.

When the flotilla arrived Gen. Franklin visited Com. Missroom on his flagship and informed him that he was ready to start. The commodore replied that he would not consent to go up the river on a night as dark as that approaching (it was then raining in torrents), and the joint expedition, therefore, waited until the next morning. The commander was entirely correct in this decision to await the morning, for I have not the slightest doubt that the result of an effort to move on such a night would have been the loss of many transports and lives, and the disorganization of the whole expedition.

The flotilla started at daybreak of the 6th; the infantry transports arrived off West Point about noon, and the landing commenced at once. The artillery transports did not arrive until nearly night, and were unloaded without wharves during the night and early in the morning of the

7th. The process of landing was necessarily slow, but not so much so as that of loading up.

At about seven A.M. of the 7th the pickets of Newton's brigade, forming at the left of the line, were driven in, but soon regained the ground.

Skirmishing continued for a couple of hours, when a sharp attack was made by Whiting's division; this was repulsed, and everything then became quiet, our people having regained their original positions, and at some points having made considerable advances.

Franklin's orders were simply to hold his position until reinforced sufficiently to justify an advance. That this was a wise decision is shown by the fact that G. W. Smith witnessed the disembarkation, and, refraining from opposing it, suggested to Gen. Johnston to take measures to cut him off if he advanced beyond the protection of the gunboats. G. W. Smith's entire division, much stronger than Franklin's, was in his front, and soon after the greater part of the Confederate army, ready to overwhelm Franklin had he advanced.

By the time Sedgwick's division was in position to support him, the morning of the 8th, the enemy's rear had passed on towards Richmond; but Franklin's movement had fully served its purpose in clearing our front to the banks of the Chickahominy.

On my way to Williamsburg on the morning of the 6th I passed a cluster of barracks, and, seeing some men lying in them, I dismounted to see who they were. They were filled with our own and the enemy's wounded. The first man I spoke to was one of ours. I asked him who the men around him were. "Oh! that's a secesh; that is one of our men; that's a secesh," and so on. In reply to my question as to how they had been treated by the enemy he said: "Just like their own men." Here were these poor fellows lying together in perfect amity who had met in mortal combat the day before.

The College and other large buildings in Williamsburg were crowded with wounded, almost all Confederates. While in one of the larger hospitals one of my aides came to me

and said that a wounded Confederate desired to speak to me. I went there and found a wounded private soldier belonging to a Virginia regiment, an intelligent, honest-looking man, who said that he had been deputed by his comrades to beg me to spare their lives. I told him that I did not understand him, whereupon he repeated his petition, and I again said that I could not imagine what he meant. He then said that they had been told that we Northern men had come down there to destroy and slay, and that our intention was to kill all the prisoners, wounded and unwounded alike; but that they had been told that I had treated kindly the prisoners I had taken in West Virginia the year before, and thought that perhaps I might be induced to spare their lives. I then relieved his mind by telling him that, although I was perhaps the most brutal among the Northern generals, I would treat them precisely as I did my own wounded.

The poor fellows stretched on the floor around him followed the conversation with keen interest, and I saw by the expression of their faces that they felt much relieved when my final answer came. I was told, after the battle of Fair Oaks, that when the Confederates were for a time in possession of the Camp of Casey's division, Gen. Roger Pryor went around among the wounded, giving them whiskey and water, and that he told them it was a repayment of the kindness with which their wounded were treated at Williamsburg.

During the forenoon of the 6th Confederate surgeons came in (as before stated), under a flag of truce, to offer their services in tending their own wounded. I entertained them as well as could be done without baggage or supplies, and found them to be very agreeable gentlemen. Their services were not needed.

Having gained possession of Williamsburg, the first thing to be done was to get up supplies for the troops, to care for the wounded, to hasten supports to Franklin by water, and to force the pursuit by land in order to open direct communication with Franklin, or to bring the enemy to battle if he halted south of the mouth of the Pamunkey.

The frightful condition of the roads rendered the supply question very difficult, but by repairing the nearest landings on the York river, and by the energy of the quartermaster's department, that task was soon accomplished.

So great were the difficulties of land-transportation that even the headquarters wagons did not reach Williamsburg until the forenoon of the 9th, up to which time I was absolutely without baggage of any kind. Sedgwick's division reached Franklin during the 7th; one brigade of Porter's division got off from Yorktown by water on the afternoon of the 7th, the rest on the 8th, without cavalry or artillery; two brigades of Richardson's division got off on the 11th, the remaining brigade on the 12th. The regular infantry, Duane's engineer battalion, and the light batteries of the reserve artillery marched from Yorktown on the 8th.

Immediately upon our arrival in Williamsburg Gen. Averill was sent forward with a cavalry force to push the enemy's rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned, and captured a number of stragglers. But the roads were so bad and his supplies so scanty that he was obliged to return after marching a few miles. On the next day, the 7th, Stoneman moved with the advanced guard, consisting of the cavalry, horse-batteries, and two regiments of infantry, the 2d R. I. and the 98th Penn.

At ten A.M. his artillery and cavalry had reached a point only two and a half to three miles from Williamsburg; the infantry had not yet joined him. At half-past one P.M. he had come up with the enemy's rear-guard, at about six miles from Williamsburg, and while here he heard heavy firing in the direction of Franklin's position. Stoneman's infantry joined him here, coming up at the double-quick.

He encamped for the night at a church about ten miles from Williamsburg, having been delayed by the condition of the roads and the necessity of procuring and cooking meat for the infantry, who were almost in a famished condition.

At nine A.M. of the 8th he had reached a point fourteen miles from Williamsburg. At half-past three P.M. he reached

with his main body Hockaday's Springs, about six miles and a half from Franklin's position, and there learned that his advanced guard had communicated with Franklin's pickets.

Stoneman learned here that a Confederate force of ten regiments of infantry, one battery, and some cavalry had encamped the night before at Hockaday's Springs, and left that morning *via* Diascund Bridge, and that the enemy were in full retreat upon the Chickahominy. He sent cavalry in pursuit to harass the enemy until dark. This detachment found the enemy at dark strongly posted at New Kent Court-House, and, in accordance with instructions, then returned to the main body of the advanced guard.

On the 9th Stoneman occupied and held the junction of the West Point and Williamsburg roads, about three miles from New Kent Court-House. The occupation of this place occurred as the result of a brisk skirmish in which a portion of the 6th U. S. Cavalry, under Maj. Williams, and Robinson's battery took part; one squadron of the 6th, under the personal command of Maj. Williams, made two very handsome charges.

On the 10th Stoneman sent Farnsworth's 8th Ill. Cavalry some six miles beyond New Kent Court-House, and with his main body moved to Cumberland, leaving New Kent Court-House occupied by two New Jersey regiments and four guns from Franklin's division.

On the 11th he sent Maj. Williams with six companies of cavalry to occupy the railroad-crossing at White House and scout the surrounding country. He was again delayed on the 11th by the necessity of awaiting provisions from Franklin. Stoneman says: "The men have had no sugar or coffee since leaving Williamsburg, and but a very limited amount of hard bread and pork. We have lived principally on fresh meat, sometimes without salt, for the past week; but I have not heard a complaint or murmur."

D. R. Jones's division constituted the rear-guard of the enemy. It consisted of ten regiments of infantry, sixteen pieces of artillery, and the 1st Va. Cavalry. The rear of the rear-guard consisted of one regiment of infantry, three

pieces of artillery, and three squadrons, with which they would check us at every difficult place and then leave. Owing to the peculiar nature of the country, admirably adapted for the operations of an active and vigorous rear-guard, which we had in our front, we could get but one chance to attack him and make it tell—this at Slatesville, from which he was driven with loss. Three miles from Slatesville, at New Kent Court-House, the whole division was drawn up in line of battle, and I thought it expedient to retain with me the New Jersey brigade (two regiments and four guns) and Farnsworth's cavalry.

As soon as a reasonable amount of supplies were received and the roads improved somewhat I resumed the movement by land from Williamsburg. Smith's division marched on the afternoon of the 8th, Couch, Casey, and Kearny on the morning of the 9th. The reserves came up to Williamsburg on the morning of the same day. During the night of the 9th headquarters were four miles in front of Williamsburg with the regulars, the other divisions just mentioned in advance, Hooker at Williamsburg.

On the evening of the 10th headquarters were at Roper's Church, nineteen miles beyond Williamsburg, in easy communication with Franklin; the regulars, Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny near headquarters. We now began to draw supplies from Elthan.

Headquarters remained at Roper's Church until the morning of the 13th, while the troops were moving in such a manner that at the close of that day the disposition was as follows: headquarters, with the division of Porter, Franklin, Sykes (regulars), and the artillery reserves, at Cumberland, now a temporary depot; Couch and Casey at New Kent Court-House; Hooker and Kearny near Roper's Church; Richardson and Sedgwick near Elthan. Gen. Van Alen was left, with a small force, as military governor of Yorktown; Col. Campbell with his regiment, the 5th Pa. Cavalry, at Williamsburg.

On the 14th and 15th it rained heavily and continuously, and somewhat on the 16th. On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Porter, Franklin, and Smith were with

great difficulty advanced to White House. The roads were so bad, narrow, and infrequent as to render the movements of large masses very slow and difficult; so much so that in the movement to White House on the 15th and 16th it required forty-eight hours to move two divisions and their trains five miles.

On the 16th headquarters advanced to White House; and on that day and the next Sykes and the reserve artillery moved up to the same point with no little difficulty, and a permanent depot was established. The weather changed on the night of the 16th, so that the 17th and 18th were clear, warm days.

The 17th and 18th were occupied, while the roads were drying, in closing up all the troops and trains, with the final preparations to advance, and in numerous and extensive reconnoissances pushed in all directions.

It was at this moment, May 18, 1862, that, in consequence of my earnest representations, the President authorized me to organize two provisional army corps, the 5th and 6th, which soon became permanent corps, and the organization of the Army of the Potomac was now as follows:

2d Corps—Gen. Sumner. Consisting of the divisions Sedgwick and Richardson.
3d Corps—Gen. Heintzelman. Consisting of the divisions Kearny and Hooker.
4th Corps—Gen. Keyes. Consisting of the divisions Couch and Casey.
5th Corps—Gen. Fitz-John Porter. Consisting of the divisions Morell, Sykes, and Hunt's reserve artillery.
6th Corps—Gen. Franklin. Consisting of the divisions W. F. Smith and Slocum.

The organization of the cavalry remained unchanged, and, as no new regiments were assigned to the Army of the Potomac except Col. Campbell's, which remained at Williamsburg, we suffered very much during the subsequent operations from the glaring deficiency of the cavalry force in point of numbers.

On the 18th of May headquarters were at White House; the advanced guard held the country nearly to the Chickahominy and well to the north of the railway. The 5th and 6th corps were at White House; the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps were near New Kent Court-House.

The enemy had withdrawn across the Chickahominy, having his main force between New bridge and Richmond. Bottom's, Long, and Jones's bridges were merely watched by small cavalry patrols, and there were no indications even of this with regard to the last two.

The necessity of following the enemy until he was fairly across the Chickahominy, and the question of supplies, had naturally brought the Army of the Potomac into the positions just described, for the James river was not open until the 12th, when the *Merrimac* was destroyed.

The question was now to be decided as to the ultimate line of operations of the army.

Two courses were to be considered; first, to abandon the line of the York, cross the Chickahominy in the lower part of its course, gain the James, and adopt that as the line of supply; second, to use the railroad from West Point to Richmond as the line of supply, which would oblige us to cross the Chickahominy somewhere north of White Oak Swamp. The army was perfectly placed to adopt either course.

Masking the movement by the advanced guard, the army could easily have crossed the Chickahominy by Jones's bridge, and at Coles's ferry and Barret's ferry by pontoon bridges, while the advanced guard, and probably one or two corps, could have followed the movement by Long bridge and under cover of the White Oak Swamp, and the army would have been concentrated at Malvern Hill, ready either to advance upon Richmond by the roads near the left bank of the James, or to cross that river and place itself between Richmond and Petersburg.

With all the aid of the gunboats and water-transportation I am sure that I could have occupied Petersburg and placed the army in position between that place and Richmond, so that the enemy would have been obliged to abandon his capital or to come out to attack in a position of my own choosing, where, with the whole army concentrated, success would not have been doubtful and Richmond would have been the prize of victory.

Reinforcements Asked For

Moreover, the water line of transportation would have insured the prompt and safe arrival of the 1st corps, or such other reinforcements as might have been sent me.

It is needless to state that the army was well placed to follow the second line of operations indicated.

Up to the 18th my repeated and urgent demands for reinforcements by water had been met in such a way as to render it probable that if the 1st corps were ordered up to my support at all, the overland route would have been selected by the authorities in Washington. Among other despatches calling for reinforcements I sent the following:

CAMP AT CUMBERLAND, May 14, 1862.

I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegrams. I beg leave to repeat their substance to your excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult.

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably entrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Richmond may be abandoned without a serious struggle; but the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia south or west of there, and we should be in condition to press them without delay. The Confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States.

I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing foe.

Even if more troops than I now have should prove unneccessary for purposes of military occupations, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the government. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. Sent by water they will soon reach me. Any commander

of the reinforcements whom your excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject.

I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have; and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph shall be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their government, and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their general, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force the more perfect will be our combinations and the less our loss.

For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration to this communication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determination.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

To which, on the 18th of May, I received this reply:

"WASHINGTON, May 18, 2 P.M.

"GENERAL: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered.

"The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that, even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York river than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route.

"He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.

"It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey river.

"In any event you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon Gen. McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five (35) and forty thousand (40,000) men.

"A copy of the instructions to Gen. McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

"At your earnest call for reinforcements he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your injunction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other, by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for frequent co-operation. When Gen. McDowell is in position on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

Stanton's Fatal Order

"The President desires that Gen. McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.

"By order of the President.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*

"Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN."

This order rendered it impossible for me to use the James river as a line of operations, forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north.

Herein lay the failure of the campaign.

The order obliged me to extend and to expose my right in order to secure the junction. As it was impossible to get at Richmond and the enemy's army covering it without crossing the Chickahominy, I was obliged to divide the Army of the Potomac into two parts, separated by that stream. As the order for Gen. McDowell's advance was soon suspended, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage and frustrated the plan of campaign.

Had Gen. McDowell joined me by water I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus have avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and could have had the army united in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream.

McDowell's movement by water would not have jeopardized Washington in the slightest degree. There were troops enough without him to hold the works against anything that the enemy could have sent against them, and the more they sent the easier would my task have been in front of Richmond. But Jackson's movement was merely a feint, and if McDowell had joined me on the James the enemy would have drawn in every available man from every quarter to make head against me. A little of the nerve at Washington which the Romans displayed during the campaign against Hannibal would have settled the fate of Richmond in very few weeks.

The following telegram was received at headquarters, Army of the Potomac, May 24, 1862:

McClellan's Own Story

"Headquarters, Department of Rappahannock,
"Opposite Fredericksburg, May 22, 1862.

"*Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan*:

"I have received the orders of the President to move with the army under my command and co-operate with yours in the reduction of Richmond, and also a copy of his instructions to you in relation to that co-operation. Maj.-Gen. Shields will join me to-day.

"As far (soon) as the necessary preparations for the march can be completed, which I think will be by the twenty-fourth (24th) inst., we shall set forth as (in) the general direction ordered. There is in front of us to impede our advance the secession Army of the Rappahannock, so called, under the command of Joseph R. Anderson, of the Tredegar Iron-Works.

"His force is from 12,000 to 15,000 men, mostly South Carolina and Georgia troops. We shall engage this force on our first day's march, as they are within from six to eight miles of us, posted on and to the right and left of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and in a position of considerable strength. It is my purpose to try and turn this position by throwing a force on their left flank, and cut off their opportunity of receiving any reinforcements from the direction of Gordonsville, and at the same time endeavor to save the railroad bridges. If this can be done another channel of supply can be had for the forces going against Richmond that cannot fail to give great relief to the quartermaster's and commissary departments of your army, and thus facilitate your operations. We cannot rely on this at first, because they now occupy the line, and, I am told, are prepared to destroy the bridges if they are forced to fall back. I beg to ask to what extent can I rely on co-operation from you in my present movement in the way of your cutting off the retreat of the enemy upon Richmond, where they would add 12,000 to the forces against you, and in saving the railroad bridge across the Pamunkey, and to what point on the Pamunkey can you extend your right to join me, and to what point can you cause supplies to be placed for my command, and by what date can I count on finding them ready for me? I shall require subsistence for thirty-eight thousand (38,000) men, and forage for eleven thousand (11,000) animals.

"Irwin McDowell,
"*Maj.-Gen.*"

The following is a copy of the instructions to Gen. McDowell:

"War Department,
"Washington, May 17, 1862.

"General: Upon being joined by Gen. Shield's division you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the forces under Gen. McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers.

"While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between your left wing and the right wing of Gen. McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces.

McDowell Coming

"Gen McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself upon your column before a junction of the two armies is effected.

"A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed.

"By order of the President.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*

"Gen. McDOWELL,
"*Commanding Department of Rappahannock.*"

Having some doubts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of Gen. McDowell, and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this despatch to President Lincoln:

MAY 21, 1862, 11 P.M.

Your despatch of yesterday respecting our situation and the batteries of Fort Darling was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Capt. Goldsborough, and by letter with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford for several days. Circumstances must determine the propriety of a land-attack.

It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy to-day at Bottom's bridge ford, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New Kent road, near Bottom's birdge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with advanced guard, is within one mile of New bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, is about two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headquarters will probably be at Cold Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy are in force on every road leading to Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is on the road from New bridge, encamped along it for four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnson's headquarters are about two miles beyond the bridge.

All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the Confederate authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the action of the city government, the conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of information accessible to me, give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle between the opposing armies.

All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force.

I regret the state of things as to Gen. McDowell's command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Cornith. I would still, most respectfully, suggest the policy of our concentrations here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the probability of his contemplated junction of McDowell's forces with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transportation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me overland in time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoralization. This region is unhealthy for Northern men, and, unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart.

I regret also the configuration of the Department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace the entire field of military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that city.

Again, I agree with your excellency that one bad general is better than two good ones.

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second Article of War will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your excellency; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington.

Should they attempt a movement which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guaredr against by explictly placing Gen. McDowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal feeling which would influence me to disregard them in any particular.

I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result

may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government or that it may close my career.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.

On the 24th I received the following:

"MAY 24, 1862 (from Washington, 24th).

"I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Fort Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting Gen. Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's advance have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

"If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will move Monday morning. *I wish you to move cautiously and safely.*

"You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).

"A. LINCOLN,
"*President.*"

This information, that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericksburg on the following Monday (the 26th), and that he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confident that we would on his arrival be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us.

At a later hour on the same day I received the following:

"MAY 24, 1862 (from Washington, 4 P.M.).

"In consequence of Gen. Bank's critical position I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in their rear.

"A. LINCOLN,
"*President.*

"Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN."

From which it will be seen that I could not expect Gen. McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the President that I would make my calculations accordingly.

CHAPTER XXI

Private Letters

[*May* 6, *to May* 18, 1862]

Williamsburg, May 6, 1862.—I telegraphed you this morning that we had gained a battle. Every hour its importance is proved to be greater. On Sunday I sent Stoneman in pursuit with the cavalry and four batteries of horse-artillery. He was supported by the divisions of Hooker, Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny, most of which arrived on the ground only yesterday. Unfortunately I did not go with the advance myself, being obliged to remain to get Franklin and Sedgwick started up the river for West Point. Yesterday I received pressing private messages from Smith and others begging me to go to the front. I started with half a dozen aides and some fifteen orderlies, and found things in a bad state. Hancock was engaged with a vastly inferior force some two miles from any support. Hooker fought nearly all day without assistance, and the mass of the troops were crowded together where they were useless. I found everybody discouraged, officers and men; our troops in wrong positions, on the wrong side of the woods; no system, no co-operation, no orders given, roads blocked up. As soon as I came upon the field the men cheered like fiends, and I saw at once that I could save the day. I immediately reinforced Hancock and arranged to support Hooker, advanced the whole line across the woods, filled up the gaps, and got everything in hand for whatever might occur. The result was that the enemy saw that he was gone if he remained in his position, and scampered during the night. His works were very strong, but his loss was very heavy. The roads are in such condition that it is impossible to pursue except with a few cavalry. It is with the utmost difficulty that I can feed the men, many of whom have had nothing to eat for twenty-four hours and more. I had no dinner yesterday, no supper; a cracker for breakfast, and no dinner yet. I have no baggage; was out in the rain all day and until late at night; slept in my clothes and boots, and could not even wash my face and hands. I, however, expect my ambulance up pretty soon, when I hope for better things. I have been through the hospitals, where are many of our own men and of the rebels. One Virginian sent for me this morning and told me that I was the only general from whom they expected any humanity. I corrected this mistake. This is a beautiful little town; several very old houses and churches, pretty gardens. I have taken possession of a very fine house which Joe Johnston occupied as his headquarters. It has a lovely flower-garden and convervatory. If you were here I should be much inclined to spend some weeks here. G. W. was one of the whipped community, also Joe Johnston, Cadmus, Wilcox, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Longstreet, Jeb Stuart, Early (badly wounded); and many others that we know. We have all their wounded; eight guns so far. In short, we have given them a tremendous thrashing, and I am not at all ashamed of the conduct of the Army of the Potomac.

Telegram—*Williamsburg, May* 6, 1862, 11 P.M.—The battle of Williamsburg has proved a brilliant victory. None of your friends injured, though our loss considerable. That of the enemy severe. The Quaker army is doing very well. Hancock was superb yesterday.

Williamsburg, May 6, *midnight.*— . . . Am very tired; had but little sleep last night, and have not had my clothes off; besides, was

pretty well wet last night. I have not a particle of baggage with me; nothing but a buffalo-robe and horse-blanket, not even a hair-brush or tooth-brush. . .

Monday, 1 P.M. (8*th*).— . . . I hope to get Smith's division off this afternoon, followed by others in the morning. Stoneman is some fifteen miles in advance, and will, I hope, communicate with Franklin to-night, although I am not yet sure that the enemy may not still be between the two. I shall start to-morrow morning and overtake Smith. I have ordered up headquarters and the accompanying paraphernalia at once, so I hope to get within a few miles of my tooth-brush in a day or two. It is not very pleasant, this going entirely without baggage, but it could not be helped. I find that the results of my operations are beginning to be apparent. The rebels are evacuating Norfolk, I learn. Your two letters of Sunday and Monday reached me last night. It would have been easy for me to have sacrificed 10,000 lives in taking Yorktown, and I presume the world would have thought it more brilliant. I am content with what I have done. The battle of Williamsburg was more bloody. Had I reached the field three hours earlier I could have gained far greater results and have saved a thousand lives. It is, perhaps, well as it is, for officers and men feel that I saved the day. . . .

I don't know where the next battle will occur; I presume on the line of the Chickahominy, or it may be to-morrow in effecting a junction with Franklin. It may suit the views of the masses better, as being more bloody. *I* hope not, and will make it as little so as possible. . . .

Williamsburg, May 8, 2 P.M.— . . . I have moved four divisions already. The reserves have arrived. My wagons have arrived, and in an hour or two I will move myself. . . . I rather think that we have a very severe battle to fight before reaching Richmond, but the men are just in the humor for it. . . . Carpet-bag has at last arrived.

Camp No. 1, *May* 9, 8:30 P.M.—We are fairly started on the march again; my camp is only about four miles from Williamsburg. The road was so much blocked up with wagons that I did not start till late. Smith, Couch, Casey, and Kearny are well in front of me, the regulars close by. To-morrow headquarters start at five A.M., and will pass all but Smith, encamping with or just in rear of him. I hope to see Franklin to-morrow night and learn more of the enemy. . . . The secesh prisoners strongly protested against being obliged to remove the torpedoes at Yorktown, but without avail, for they had to do it. I think they may be more careful next time. I heard this afternoon from Stoneman that they (secesh) had murdered some of our men after they were taken prisoners. I have given orders to hold all their people we have responsible for it. If it is confirmed to-morrow I will send a flag to Joe Johnston and quietly inform him that I will hang two of his officers for every one of our men thus murdered; and I will carry the threat into execution. I will pay them in their own coin, if they wish to carry on war in that manner. I hope there is some mistake about the murders, for I do not wish to make reprisals. It is a sad business at best. . . .

May 10, *Saturday*, 11:45 P.M., *camp* 19 *miles from Williamsburg.* — . . . Am encamped now at an old wooden church, and am in easy communication with Franklin, Porter, etc. Fitz came over to see me this afternoon, and I go over to see him and Franklin to-morrow. To-morrow being Sunday, I give the men a rest, merely closing up some of the troops in rear. I begin to find some Union sentiment in this

country. . . . I expect to fight a very severe battle on the Chickahominy, but feel no doubt as to the result. I saw the effect of my presence the other day in front of Williamsburg. The men behaved superbly, and will do better, if possible, next time. To-morrow I will get up supplies, reorganize, arrange details, and get ready for the great fight, feeling that I shall lose nothing by respecting Sunday as far as I can. Secesh is gathering all he can in front of me. So much the better. I have implicit confidence in my men, and they have in me. What more can I ask? . . .

Sunday, 8 A.M. (*same letter as last*).— . . . As I told you last night, I am giving my men some rest to-day. They need it much for they have for some time been living on long marches, short rations, and rainy bivouacs. . . . My cavalry were within six miles of the upper Chickahominy yesterday. Norfolk is in our possession, the result of my movements. . . .

May 12, *Monday* P.M. (*same letter*).— . . . While I write the 2d Dragoons's band is serenading, and about fifty others are playing tattoo at various distances—a grand sound in this lovely moonlight night. My camp is at an old frame church in a grove. I differ from most of the generals in preferring a tent to a house. I hope not to sleep in a house again until I see you. . . . Are you satisfied now with my bloodless victories? Even the Abolitionists seem to be coming round; judging, at least, from the very handsome resolutions offered by Mr. Lovejoy in the House. I look upon that resolution as one of the most complimentary I know of, and that, too, offered by my bitterest persecutors. But the union of civic merit with military success is what pleases me most; to have it recognized that I have saved the lives of my men and won success by my own efforts is to me the height of glory. I hope that the result in front of Richmond will cause still greater satisfaction to the country. I still hope that the God who has been so good to me will continue to smile upon our cause, and enable me to bring this war to a speedy close, so that I may at last have the rest I want so much. . . . I do need rest. You know I have had but little in my life. But the will of God be done! What is given me to do I will try to do with all my might. . . . I think one more battle here will finish the work. I expect a great one, but feel that confidence in my men and that trust in God which makes me very sanguine as to the result. They will fight me in front of Richmond, I am confident. Defeat there is certain destruction to them, and I think will prove the ruin of their wretched cause. They are concentrating everything for the last death-struggle. My government, alas! is not giving me any aid. But I will do the best I can with what I have, and trust to God's mercy and the courage of my men for the result. . . . We march in the morning to Cumberland, gradually drawing nearer to Richmond.

May 15, *Cumberland*, 2:30 P.M.—Another wet, horrid day! It rained a little yesterday morning, more in the afternoon, much during the night, and has been amusing itself in the same manner very persistently all day. I had expected to move headquarters to White House to-day; but this weather has put the roads in such condition that I cannot do more than get Franklin and Porter there to-day. Headquarters cavalry and Hunt will move there to-morrow; perhaps one or two other divisions as well. We had quite a visitation yesterday in the shape of Secretary Seward, Gideon Welles, Mr. Bates, F. Seward, Dahlgren, Mrs. Goldsborough and one of her daughters, Mrs. F. Seward, and some other ladies whose names I did not catch. I went on board their boat; then had some ambulances harnessed up and took

them around camps. We are just about twenty-five miles from Richmond here, the advance considerably nearer. I don't yet know what to make of the rebels. I do not see how they can possibly abandon Virginia and Richmond without a battle; nor do I understand why they abandoned and destroyed Norfolk and the *Merrimac*, unless they also intended to abandon all of Virginia. There is a puzzle there somewhere which will soon be solved. . . . I am heartily tired of this life I am leading—always some little absurd thing being done by those gentry in Washington. I am every day more and more tired of public life, and earnestly pray that I may soon be able to throw down my sword and live once more as a private gentleman. . . . I confess I find it difficult to judge whether the war will soon be at an end or not. I think that the blows the rebels are now receiving and have lately received ought to break them up; but one can do no more than speculate. Yes, I *can* imagine peace and quietness reigning once more in this land of ours.—It is just *that* I am fighting for! . . . . Still raining hard and dismally; an awful time for the men; the only comfort is that they all have plenty to eat.

9 P.M. (*same day*).— . . . Have received to-day the official copy of the resolutions of the House. I learn that the Abolitionists begin to think that I am not such a wretch after all, or else that it is best to say so.

It was all humbug about my being struck by a piece of a shell at Williamsburg. That reminds me of a joke of the youngsters played upon ——— at Yorktown. They sent him to see an immense "shell" that had fallen in our headquarters camp. He found a larger *oyster*-shell. . . .

I send you a photograph which I have just received from Gen. Blume, chief of artillery in the Prussian army. I knew him abroad, and the old gentleman writes to me occasionally.

Telegram—*May* 16, 1862, *White House.*—Have just arrived over horrid roads. No further movement possible until they improve. This house is where Washington's courtship took place and where he resided when first married. I do not permit it to be occupied by any one, nor the grounds around. It is a beautiful spot directly on the banks of the Pamunkey. All well and in fine spirits. Hope to get our baggage up by water, otherwise will fare badly to-night.

May 16, 11:30 P.M. *White House.*— . . . I rode over a horrid road to this place this morning; spent some time at Washington's house, or at least his wife's, and afterwards rode to the front, visiting, in the course of my ride the old church (St. Peter's) where he was married. It is an old brick church with a rather pretentious tower, more remarkable for its situation than for anything else. The situation is very fine, on a commanding hill. A tablet in the interior records the death of some one in 1690. As I happened to be there alone for a few moments, I could not help kneeling at the chancel and praying that I might serve my country as truly as he did. . . .

May 17, 8:30 A.M. (*same letter*).— . . . We have a change in the weather. It is clear and very hot, so I presume the roads will improve much to-day. I am pushing on the advanced guard and reconnoissances in various directions. We gain some ground every day; but our progress has been slow on account of the execrable nature of the roads, as well as their extreme narrowness and fewness in number, making it a very difficult matter to move large masses of men with any rapidity or convenience. I expect to have our advanced parties near enough to Bottom's bridge to-day to ascertain whether the enemy is

there in much force or not, and by to-morrow or next day to obtain similar information about the other bridges—all of which, bye the bye, are burned, I believe. But the river is fordable, so the difficulty is not insuperable by any means. It is very difficult to divine whether secesh will fight a great battle in front of Richmond or not; I still think they ought to, but there are some circumstances which look somewhat as if they would evacuate. Time only will show, and the trial cannot be long deferred. I am very sorry that we could not have advanced more rapidly; my only consolation is that it has been impossible. Just think of its requiring forty-eight hours to move two divisions with their trains five miles! Nothing could be much worse than that. The fastest way to move is never to move in wet weather.

Midnight— . . . I am now at this present moment involved in a great many different orders for parties to move out at daybreak on reconnoissances. . . .

May 18, *Sunday*, 6 P.M., *White House*— . . . We leave here in the morning. Porter and Franklin march at four and eight A.M., headquarters at seven. We will go to Tunstall's, or perhaps a little beyond it, and will now soon close up on the Chickahominy and find out what secesh is doing. I think he will fight us there, or between that and Richmond; and if he is badly thrashed (as I trust he will be), incline to believe that he will begin to cry *peccavi* and say that he has enough of it, especially if Halleck beats him at Corinth. . . .

Midnight (*same letter*).— . . . I start early in the morning. . . . Those hounds in Washington are after me again.

CHAPTER XXII

White House—The Chickahominy river—Bridges—Battle of Hanover Court-House—Porter's victory—Neglect at Washington—McDowell's retention useless.

White House was a very fine plantation belonging to Mrs. Gen. Lee. It was the residence of Mrs. Custis when she was married to Washington. The ceremony took place in St. Peter's Church, a lonely old building beautifully placed on a commanding hill. I observed within it a tablet commemorating a death which took place in 1690. Finding one's self alone without that historic building, it was a natural impulse to invoke the aid of God to enable me to serve the country as unselfishly and truly as did the great man who had often worshipped there.

The residence at White House was not the original building of the time of Washington—that had been destroyed by fire; but the existing one was constructed on the same foundations.

I neither occupied it myself nor permitted any others to do so, but placed a guard to preserve it. For this natural act of respect for the memory of the greatest man our country has produced I was most violently attacked and maligned by the extreme radicals. I am willing that posterity shall judge between them and myself.

On the 19th headquarters and the 5th and 6th corps advanced to Tunstall's Station, six miles from White House. The rain recommenced on this day, and through it I rode to Bottom's bridge and made a short reconnoissance. The enemy were there, but not in great force. The advanced guard was near New bridge.

The camp at Tunstall's was the most beautiful we occupied during the campaign. Headquarters were on the summit of a hill, commanding a superb view in all directions. The country was highly cultivated, being covered with fine plantations. Towards Richmond large masses of troops were bivouacked, while towards the Pamunkey there were no signs of an army. The contrast between war and peace was

vivid and most impressive. At night when the countless bivouac-fires were lighted the scene was grand and brilliant beyond description. But he must have been devoid of feeling who could regard this magnificent spectacle without a sentiment of most sincere regret that human madness and folly should have made it necessary to march armies through this fair and peaceful land. The Army of the Potomac was mainly composed of good men, who took up arms from the noblest motives; and I doubt whether any troops ever did so little needless damage in a hostile country. But at best a large army leaves a wide swath in its rear, and can not move without leaving the marks of its passage.

On the 20th it again rained heavily. On the evening of the 21st the army was posted as follows:

The advanced guard within a mile of New bridge; the 6th corps three miles from New bridge, with the 5th corps at supporting distance in its rear; the 2d corps on the railway, about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left; the 4th corps on the New Kent road, near Bottom's bridge, having three regiments across the stream covering the rebuilding of the bridge; the 3d corps within easy supporting distance of the 4th corps.

On the 22d headquarters were advanced to Cold Harbor, and on the 26th the railway was in operation as far as the Chickahominy, and the railway bridge across the stream nearly completed.

The Chickahominy river rises some fifteen miles to the northward of Richmond, and unites with the James about forty miles below that city. Our operations embraced the part of the river between Meadow's and Bottom's bridges, covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. In this vicinity the river, in its ordinary stage, is about forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy bottom-lands varying from half a mile to a mile in width.

Within the limits above-mentioned the firm ground lying above high-water mark seldom approaches the river on either bank, and no place was found, within this section, where the high ground came near the stream on both banks.

It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a single violent rain-storm of brief duration would cause a rise of water which overflowed the bottom-lands on both sides, and for many days made the river absolutely impassable without bridges.

When our light troops approached the river on the 20th of May it was found that all the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy on our approach, except that at Mechanicsville, and it became necessary not only to rebuild the old bridges, but also to construct several additional ones. The west bank of the river, opposite New, Mechanicsville, and Meadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions on which to establish his batteries, to enfilade the approaches by the principal roads leading to Richmond on our right, and to prevent the reconstruction of these important bridges. We were thus obliged to select other less exposed points for our crossings.

Had the 1st corps effected its promised junction we might have turned the head-waters of the Chickahominy and attacked Richmond from the north and northwest, while we preserved our line of supply from West Point; but with the force actually at my disposal such an attempt would simply have exposed the Army of the Potomac to destruction in detail, and the total loss of its communications. It is hardly necessary to say that the country in which we operated could supply nothing for the wants of the army, and that were our communications with the depots cut and held by the enemy nothing but starvation awaited us.

When we arrived opposite Bottom's bridge on the 20th the enemy was there in only small force, and, as it was of the utmost importance to secure a lodgment on the right bank before he could concentrate his forces and resist the passage of the stream, I ordered Casey's division of the 4th corps to ford the river at once and occupy the heights on the further bank. This was promptly done, and reconnoissances were immediately pushed forward, while instant steps were taken to rebuild the bridge. The troops were directed

to throw up defences to secure our left flank, and the 3d corps was moved up in support.

Meanwhile our centre and right were advanced to the river, and on the 24th Mechanicsville was carried, the enemy being driven out by our artillery and forced across the bridge, which they destroyed. Gen. Naglee, of Casey's division of the 4th corps, on the same day dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of Seven Pines, and the advance of our left secured a strong position near that place. All the information obtained from negroes, deserters, prisoners, and spies indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy on our left, and to resist the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours in numbers seemed certain. Strong entrenchments had been constructed around the city. Up to this time I had every reason to expect that McDowell would commence his march from Fredericksburg on the morning of the 26th, and it was only during the evening of the 24th that I received from the President the telegram, already given, announcing the suspension of his movement.

So far, then, as immediate operations were concerned, it only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail myself of all possible artificial auxiliaries, to compensate as far as possible for the inadequacy of numbers. I concurred fully with the President in his injunction, contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary, with my limited force, to move "cautiously and safely."

In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability to sudden inundations, it became necessary to construct eleven bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive logway approaches, and often built under fire.

It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of McDowell was only suspended, not revoked; and, therefore, I could not abandon the northern approach and my communications with West Point. To cover these communications, and be prepared to effect the junction with the

1st corps when it advanced, it was necessary to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, and I could not make any serious movement with the forces on the right bank until the communications between the two parts of the army were firmly and securely established by strong and sufficiently numerous bridges.

As the entrenchments around Richmond were strong and heavily garrisoned, it would have been an act of madness and folly had I temporarily abandoned my communications and thrown the entire army across the stream (trusting to the chances of carrying the place by assault) before the troops had exhausted the supplies carried with them.

I was not responsible for the fact that I was obliged to select a faulty and dangerous plan as the least objectionable of those from which I could choose.

On the 24th a very spirited and successful reconnoissance took place near New bridge, which first brought Lieut. (afterwards Gen.) Custer to my notice. His commanding officers commended him highly for his conduct, and I sent for him to thank him. He was then a slim, long-haired boy, carelessly dressed. I thanked him for his gallantry, and asked what I could do for him. He replied very modestly that he had nothing to ask, and evidently did not suppose that he had done anything to deserve extraordinary reward. I then asked if he would like to serve on my personal staff as an aide-de-camp. Upon this he brightened up, and assured me that he would regard such service as the most gratifying he could perform; and I at once gave the necessary orders. He continued on my staff until I was relieved from the command.

In those days Custer was simply a reckless, gallant boy, undeterred by fatigue, unconscious of fear; but his head was always clear in danger, and he always brought me clear and intelligible reports of what he saw when under the heaviest fire. I became much attached to him. In the later days of the war, when he commanded cavalry troops, he displayed a degree of prudence and good sense, in conducting the most dangerous expeditions, that surprised many who thought they knew him well.

In the battle of the Rosebud, against the Sioux, where he lost his life and the whole of his immediate command was destroyed, no one survived to tell the story of the disaster. On that fatal day he simply repeated the tactics that he had so often successfully used against large bodies of Indians; and it is probable that he was deceived as to the strength and fighting capacity of his opponents, and that, from his want of knowledge of the details of the ground where the tragedy occurred, he was suddenly surrounded by overwhelming masses of well-armed warriors, against whom the heroic efforts of his command wasted themselves in vain.

Those who accused him of reckless rashness would, perhaps, have been the first to accuse him of timidity if he had not attacked, and thus allowed the enemy to escape unhurt. He died as he had lived, a gallant soldier; and his whole career was such as to force me to believe that he had good reasons for acting as he did.

With the exception of the 25th, it rained heavily every day from the 22d to the battle of Fair Oaks, and during the day and night of the 30th an unusually violent storm occurred, accompanied by torrents of rain. The valley of the Chickahominy was flooded more than ever; all work on the bridges was suspended, and they became well-nigh impracticable.

The enemy seized the occasion and determined to attack the part of the army that had crossed the Chickahominy, when it would be very difficult or impossible to support it. Exposure and fatigue had brought upon me a violent attack of illness, which confined me to my bed on the 30th and the morning of the 31st. I left my bed to go to the field of battle as soon as I was satisfied of the importance of the crisis. Two corps, the 3d and the 4th, were across the Chickahominy, three on the left bank.

The 4th corps was in position near Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. Kearny's division of the 3d corps was on and near the railroad in advance of Savage's Station. Hooker's division was on the left, near White Oak Swamp. The 2d corps was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, at and near the

Grapevine bridge, in position to support either wing of the army.

The 5th and the 6th corps were also on the left bank, between Mechanicsville and New bridge.

Having been informed late on the 24th that McDowell's advance was suspended, I caused work upon the bridges to be commenced immediately and pushed forward with the greatest vigor; but heavy rains continued to fall from day to day, which flooded the valley and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty years.

The bridges first made, together with their approaches, which were not arranged for such unprecedented high water, were carried away or rendered impassable. It thus became necessary, with immense labor, to build others much larger, more elevated and stable. Our men worked in the water, exposed to the fire of the enemy from the opposite bank.

On the 25th of May I received the following telegram:

"Your despatch received. Gen. Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand (6,000) men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of from 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shennandoah, and on the 24th—yesterday—pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten back into full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manasses Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

"One more of McDowell's brigade is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

"If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach we should be entirely helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no un-

willingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

"Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

"A. LINCOLN,
"President."

On the 25th the following was also received:

"The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Gen. Banks before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, and Geary on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south; in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

"A. LINCOLN,
"President."

To which I replied as follows:

Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prisoners, and contrabands agrees in the statement that the mass of the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. I have no knowledge of Bank's position and force, nor what there is at Manassas; therefore cannot form a definite opinion as to the force against him.

I have two corps across Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed.

On the 26th I received the following:

"We have Gen. Banks's official report. He has saved his army and baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at fifteen thousand (15,000).

"A. LINCOLN,
"President."

Also the following:

"Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to entrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

"A. LINCOLN,
"President."

On the same day I sent the following:

Have cut the Virginia Central Road in three places between Hanover Court-House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think Richmond entrenchments formidable; but am not cer-

tain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day.

The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected by the command of Brig.-Gen. Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route or from sending reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson. At ten A.M. I telegraphed to the President:

I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to Gen. Banks of March 16, to Gen. Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 1 to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg.

On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court-House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to reinforce Jackson or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to unite with us. On the same day I also received information from Gen. McDowell, through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Fredericksburg towards Richmond, and that Gen. McDowell's advance was eight miles south of the Rappahannock.

"WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

"*Gen. McClellan*:

"Following despatch received late last night:

"'*Falmouth, 25th.—To Hon. E. M. Stanton*: I have just examined a lieutenant, three sergeants, and a corporal who came in from the army as deserters this morning. They are, with the exception of one Frenchman, from the North, pressed into service. They are all men of fine intelligence. The lieutenant and the sergeants, who came from the same battery, are positive the army has fallen back to Richmond. The first order was to go at 1:30 P.M. to Hanover Junction, they having heard of McClellan's right wing being at Hanover Court-House and having destroyed the railroad to Gordonsville at that place, which made them fear for their communications.

"'This was suddenly revoked, and an order was read on parade directing the command back to Richmond to take part in the great battle now about to take place there. Two other men thought that the force was going to join Jackson, who was going to get in the rear of my army, and was going into Maryland. This was only surmise; the order for Richmond was written and published. My advance is eight miles beyond Fredericksburg. I hope soon to be able to tell you more precisely where the enemy is. One thing is certain: that,

whether they left here to join Jackson or not, they have not done so yet, and that all the grand masses Geary reports must have come from some other place than here. They left here by stealth, and with dread of being attacked. They went at night, and for a distance by railroad. They thought I had sixty thousand men. (Signed) IRWIN MCDOWELL.'

"E. M. STANTON,
"*Secretary of War.*"

It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force, independently even of the wishes of the President as expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I entrusted this task to Brig.-Gen. Fitz-John Porter, commanding the 5th corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th.

Through a heavy rain and over bad roads that officer moved his command as follows:

Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with the 5th and 6th regiments U. S. Cavalry and Benson's horse-battery of the 2d U. S. Artillery, taking the road from New bridge *via* Mechanicsville to Hanover Court-House.

Gen. Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters and three batteries under Capt. Charles Griffin, 5th U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road.

Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade composed of the 5th and 13th N. Y., the 1st Conn. Artillery acting as infantry, the 6th Penn. Cavalry, and Weeden's R. I. Battery, moved from his station at Old Church by a road running to Hanover Court-House, parallel to the Pamunkey.

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud and rain, Gen. Emory at noon reached a point about two miles from Hanover Court-House, where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in line across the Hanover Court-House road.

Gen. Emory had, before this, been joined by the 25th N. Y. (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's sharpshooters; these regiments were deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly towards the enemy until reinforced by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being captured by the 17th N. Y., under Col. Lansing,

after having been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, followed by Morell's infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's brigade. Warren's brigade, having been delayed by repairing bridges, etc., now arrived, too late to participate in this affair; a portion of this command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a number of prisoners; the remainder followed Morell's division. In the meantime Gen. Martindale, with the few remaining regiments of his brigade and a section of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and artillery in position near Beake's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad; he soon forced them to retire towards Ashland.

The 25th N. Y. having been ordered to rejoin him, Gen. Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court-House.

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with the 2d Me., afterwards joined by the 25th N. Y., to guard the rear of the main column.

The enemy soon returned to attack Gen. Martindale, who at once formed the 2d Me., 25th N. Y., and a portion of the 44th N. Y., with one section of Martin's battery, on the New bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against odds until reinforced.

Gen. Porter was at Hanover Court-House, near the head of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ashland, moved the 13th and 14th N. Y. and Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, pushed the 9th Mass. and 62d Penn., of McQuade's brigade, through the woods on the right (our original left), and attacked the flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the 83d Penn. and 16th Mich., hastened towards the scene of action by the railroad and through the wood, further to the right, and completed the rout of the

enemy. During the remainder of this and the following day our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a number of prisoners.

Capt. Harrison, of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, with a single company, brought in as prisoners two entire companies of infantry with their arms and ammunition. A part of Rush's lancers also captured an entire company with their arms.

The immediate results of these affairs were some 200 of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small arms, and two railroad trains captured.

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing.

Their camp at Hanover Court-House was taken and destroyed.

Having reason to believe that Gen. Anderson, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered Gen. Sykes's division of regulars to move on the 28th from New bridge towards Hanover Court-House, to be in position to support Gen. Porter. They reached a point within three miles of Hanover Court-House, and remained there until the evening of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp.

On the 28th Gen. Stoneman's command of cavalry, horse-artillery, and two regiments of infantry were also placed under Gen. Porter's orders.

On the same day I visited Hanover Court-House, whence I sent the following despatch to the Secretary of War:

MAY 28, 2 P.M.

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory; too much credit cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete; not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in; two companies have this moment arrived with excellent arms.

There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can.

It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's command.

I may not be able to cut them off, but will try; we have cut all but the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available

troops should be collected here—not raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us; if any regiments of good troops remain unemployed it will be an irreparable fault committed.

Having ascertained the state of affairs, instructions were given for the operations of the following day.

On the 28th a party under Maj. Williams, 6th U. S. Cavalry, destroyed the common road bridges over the Pamunkey, and Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna.

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad bridge over the South Anna, and the turnpike bridge over the same stream.

On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of Maj. Williams, Gen. Emory moved a column of cavalry towards Ashland from Hanover Court-House. The advance of this column, under Capt. Chambliss, 5th U. S. Cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad bridge over Stony creek, broke up the railroad and telegraph.

Another column of all arms, under Col. Warren, was sent on the same day by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after Gen. Emory's column had retired, capturing a small party there.

Gen. Stoneman on the same day moved on Ashland by Leach's Station, covering well the movements of the other columns.

The objects of the expedition having been accomplished, and it being certain that the 1st corps would not join us at once, Gen. Porter withdrew his command to their camps with the main army on the evening of the 29th.

On the night of the 27th and 28th I sent the following despatch to the Secretary of War:

Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move in the morning with reinforcements to secure the complete destruction of the rebels in that quarter. In doing so I run some risk here, but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court-House before I can advance.

In reply to which I received the following from the President:

"WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

"I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory; still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. Gen. King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points."

In regard to this telegram of the President it may be remarked that it would have been dangerous and foolish in the extreme to leave Porter at Ashland and Hanover Court-House to hold the railways. I knew that McDowell would not advance for some time, if at all. I could not reinforce Porter sufficiently to enable him to remain in his advanced position without drawing so largely from the main army as to endanger its safety and reduce it to inaction. Moreover, there was no object in running this risk. I had broken the direct line of communication between Richmond and Jackson; had cleared the front of Fredericksburg, so that McDowell could advance unopposed, and had relieved my own right flank and rear from immediate danger.

At 6 P.M. of the 29th I telegraphed the Secretary of War:

Gen. Porter has gained information that Gen. Anderson left his position in vicinity of Fredericksburg at four A.M. Sunday with the following troops: 1st S. C., Col. Hamilton; one battalion S. C. Rifles, 34th and 38th N. C., 45th Ga., 12th, 13th, and 14th S. C., 3d La., two batteries of four guns each—namely, Letcher's Va. and McIntosh's S. C. batteries. Gen. Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday evening *en route* for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges over the telegraph road which they travelled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone.

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force between Fredericksburg and Junction.

The following was also sent on the same day by Gen. Marcy:

"A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under Maj. Williams, 6th Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna railroad bridge at about nine A.M. to-day; a large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning."

In reply to which the following was received from the President:

"Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for their seizure."

On the 30th I sent the following to Secretary Stanton:

From the tone of your despatches and the President's I do not think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces; taken over 750 prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericksburg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porter's movement.

The results of this brilliant operation of Gen. Porter were the dispersal of Gen. Branch's division and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jackson *via* Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road was left entirely open for the advance of McDowell had he been permitted to join the Army of the Potomac. His withdrawal toward Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error; he could do no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate entrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, and probably would have gained possession promptly of that place.

It is very clear that the arrangements I directed in March and on the 1st of April for the defence of Washington

and the Shenandoah would have proved ample to check Jackson without delaying the advance of McDowell. The total disregard of these instructions led to the actual conditions of affairs.

On the 25th of May McDowell's advance was eight miles beyond Fredericksburg. If he had marched on the 26th, as first ordered, he would have found no enemy in his front until he reached the South Anna, on the 27th or early on the 28th. For his telegram of the 25th shows that they had hastily fallen back during the night of the 24th and 25th, and Porter found them at Hanover Court-House and Ashland on the 27th; so that, as things were, Porter's division alone would have insured McDowell's junction with the Army of the Potomac without the slightest difficulty.

Had McDowell advanced, however, my own movements would naturally have been modified.

I would have placed the 3d corps in position to hold Bottom's bridge and the railroad bridge, and to guard our left and communications with West Point. The 4th corps would have been placed near New Cold Harbor, with one division a couple of miles to the westward to watch the crossings of the Chickahominy from Grapevine bridge to Beaver Dam creek, ready to support either the 4th or the 2d corps, as might be necessary.

The 2d corps near Mechanicsville, to hold the crossing opposite thereto and that at Meadow bridge, and prepared to move instantly to the support of the 5th and 6th corps.

The 6th corps through Atlee's Station to the Fredericksburg and Richmond turnpike, to occupy the Virginia Central Railroad and Winston's bridge, and, leaving a sufficient force to hold that point, to move either direct upon the line of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad south of Ashland, or to support the 5th corps in the direction of Hanover Court-House, as circumstances might have required.

The 5th corps would have followed the line of march which Morell's division pursued on the 27th, sending a detached brigade direct from Old Church to Hanover Court-House; and having reached the Central Railroad and the Fredericksburg turnpike, about four miles south of Han-

over Court-House, the mass of the corps would either have moved on Hanover Court-House or in conjunction with the 6th corps on Ashland, as the movements of the enemy might have required. Thus our old positions would have been securely held, McDowell's junction would have been secured in spite of any movements of the enemy, and the chances would have been in favor of our destroying any force of the enemy between the Chickahominy and the South Anna.

The moment these objects were accomplished the 5th and 6th corps would have returned to the vicinity of Mechanicsville. It would then have been easy for McDowell to advance by the Fredericksburg turnpike far enough to turn the batteries covering the Mechanicsville crossings, so that the two armies could unite on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the capture of Richmond could have been accomplished long before Jackson could return to reinforce the garrison.

CHAPTER XXIII

Operations on the Chickahominy—Battle of Fair Oaks—McDowell's corps is coming—Still stretching the right wing—Floods of the Chickahominy—Movement on Old Tavern.

On the 20th of May a reconnoissance had been ordered on the south side of the Chickahominy towards James river. This was accomplished by Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade near Bottom's bridge and pushed forward to within two miles of James river without serious resistance or finding the enemy in force. The rest of the 4th corps, commanded by Gen. E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May.

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 4th corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed, a strong line of rifle-pits opened, and an abatis constructed a little in the rear of the point where the nine-mile road comes into the Williamsburg road.

On the same day Gen. Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps (the 3d) and take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side of the river, he was placed in command of both corps and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp unless in an emergency.

On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's division to Fair Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen. Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field-guns were commenced, and much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the two days following. The picket-line was established, reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp.

On the 30th Gen. Heintzelman, representing that the advance had met with strong opposition in taking up their position, and that he considered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such a disposition of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearny's division about three-fourths of a mile in front of Savage's Station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Casey's division, which held the advance of the 4th corps.

On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were in position as follows: Casey's division on the right of the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks; Couch's division at the Seven Pines; Kearny's division on the railroad, from near Savage's Station towards the bridge; Hooker's division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy. While these lines were being taken up and strengthened large bodies of Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front and right of Casey's position.

During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred. The rain falling in torrents rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy.

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off from the main body by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force (grand divisions of Gens. D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet, and G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division.

It appears from the official reports of Gen. Keyes and his subordinate commanders that at ten o'clock A.M. on the 31st of May an aide-de-camp of Gen. J. E. Johnston was captured by Gen. Naglee's pickets. But little information as to the movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by Gen. Keyes

to be under arms at eleven o'clock. Between eleven and twelve o'clock it was reported to Gen. Casey that the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At this time Casey's division was disposed as follows: Naglee's brigade extending from the Williamsburg road to the Garnett field, having one regiment across the railroad; Gen. Wessells's brigade in the rifle-pits, and Gen. Palmer's in the rear of Gen. Wessels's; one battery of artillery in advance with Gen. Naglee; one battery in rear of the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed in the redoubt. Gen. Couch's division, holding the second line, had Gen. Abercrombie's brigade on the right, along the nine-mile road, with two regiments and one battery across the railroad near Fair Oaks Station; Gen. Peck's brigade on the right and Gen. Devens's in the centre.

On the approach of the enemy Gen. Casey sent forward one of Gen. Palmer's regiments to support the picket-line; but this regiment gave way without making much, if any, resistance. Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pickets were driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch to move Gen. Peck's brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support Gen. Casey's left, where the first attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on in heavy force, attacking Gen. Casey simultaneously in front and on both flanks. Gen. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman for reinforcements, but the messenger was delayed, so that orders were not sent to Gens. Kearny and Hooker until nearly three o'clock, and it was nearly five P.M. when Gens. Jameson's and Berry's brigades of Gen. Kearny's division arrived on the field. Gen. Birney was ordered up the railroad, but by Gen. Kearny's order halted his brigade before arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also despatched for Gen. Hooker to move up from White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at Savage's Station.

As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his command under arms and be ready to move at a moment's warning. His corps, consisting of Gens. Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions.

was encamped on the north side of the Chickahominy some six miles above Bottom's bridge. Each division had thrown a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position.

At one o'clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective bridges, with instructions to halt and await further orders. At two o'clock orders were sent from headquarters to cross these divisions without delay and push them rapidly to Gen. Heintzelman's support. This order was received and communicated at half-past two, and the passage was immediately commenced. In the meantime Gen. Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of Gen. Casey's divison, which Gen. Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. They were reinforced by a regiment from Gen. Peck's brigade. The artillery, under command of Col. G. D. Bailey, 1st N. Y. Artillery, and afterwards of Gen. Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and men in the rifle-pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkenberg, and Adj. Ramsey, of the same regiment, were killed; some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied by Gen. Couch. The brigades of Gens. Wessells and Palmer, with the reinforcements which had been sent them from Gen. Couch, had also been driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by Gen. Casey's division was taken by the enemy.

Previous to this time Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon Gen. Casey's right flank. In making this movement Gen. Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our right and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve and which was now making its way towards Fair Oaks station. Gen. Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments; but, though reinforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery Gen. Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine

bridge, where, hearing that Gen. Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station and prepared to hold the position.

Gens. Berry's and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. Gen. Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods on the left and push forward so as to have a flank-fire on the enemy's lines. This movement was executed brilliantly, Gen. Berry pushing his regiments forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by Gen. Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these woods against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, and by a circuit brought his men into our lines in good order.

Gen. Jameson, with two regiments (the other two of his brigade having been detached—one to Gen. Peck and one to Gen. Birney), moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he too was forced to retreat through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night.

Brig.-Gen. Devens, who had held the centre of Gen. Couch's division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle-pits near Seven Pines.

Meantime Gen. Sumner had arrived with the advance of his corps, Gen. Sedgwick's division, at the point held by Gen. Couch with four regiments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by the greatest exertion Gen. Sedgwick had been able to get one of his batteries to the front.

The leading regiment (1st Minn., Col. Sully) was immediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank,

and the rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre in an angle of the woods. One of Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open communications with Gen. Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time Gen. Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34th N. Y., Col. Sinter; 82d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hudson; 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Kimball; 20th Mass., Col. Lee; 7th Mich., Maj. Richardson—the three former of Gen. Gorman's brigade, the two latter of Gen. Dana's brigade) to advance and charge with the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day.

During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. Gen. Couch's division, and so much of Gen. Casey's as could be collected together, with Gen. Kearny's, occupied the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. Gen. Peck, in falling back on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back to the entrenched camp by Gen. Kearny. Gen. Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he "was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right of the rifle-pits on the other side of the railroad. Gen. Richardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed that he was forced to move Gens. Howard and Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, around by Gen. Sedgwick's bridge, while Gen. French's brigade with the utmost diffi-

culty crossed by the other. Gen. Sedgwick's division, with the regiments under Gen. Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased, and Gen. Richardson on his arrival was ordered to place his division on the left to connect with Gen. Kearny. Gen. French's brigade was posted along the railroad, and Gens. Howard's and Meagher's brigades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed towards the field, but during the night the three batteries of the division were brought to the front.

About five o'clock on the morning of the 1st of June skirmishers and some cavalry of the enemy were discovered in front of Gen. Richardson's division. Capt. Pettit's battery (B, 1st N. Y.), having come upon the ground, threw a few shells among them, when they dispersed. There was a wide interval between Gen. Richardson and Gen. Kearny. To close this Gen. Richardson's line was extended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the position when the enemy, appearing in large force from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range along the whole line. He approached very rapidly, with columns of attack formed on two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting Gen. French's line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of Gen. Richardson's division stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being reinforced and relieved time after time, till finally Gen. Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to Gen. French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell back on that part of the field. On the opening of the firing in the morning Gen. Hooker pushed forward on the railroad with two regiments (5th and 6th N. J.), followed by Gen. Sickles's brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division from its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which

were held by the enemy in force, Gen. Hooker found Gen. Birney's brigade, Col. J. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten Gen. Sickles's brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by Gen. Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direction. He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Col. Ward to support him with Gen. Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by Gen. Hooker with the 5th and 6th N. J., 3d Me., and 38th and 40th N. Y., and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arms and even clothing in his flight. Gen. Sickles, having been ordered to the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road and advanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deployed in the woods in front of him. After a brisk interchange of musketry-fire while crossing the open ground, the Excelsior Brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight.

On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, which was promptly responded to by Gen. Richardson's division. Again the most vigorous efforts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour Gen. Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet-charge, led by Gen. French in person, with the 57th and 66th N. Y., supported by two regiments sent by Gen. Heintzelman, the 71st and 73d N. Y., which turned the confusion of the enemy into precipitate flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken.

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 31st before the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of maneuvering artillery prevented further

pursuit. On the next morning a reconnoissance was sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within five miles of Richmond; but again the impossibility of forcing even a few batteries forward precluded our holding permanently this position. The lines held previous to the battle were therefore resumed.

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed; but the rising waters flooded the log-way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that Gen. Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced.

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where Gen. Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time Gen. Sumner crossed this was the only available bridge above Bottom's bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some four hundred yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and, on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing.

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries established upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured.

The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road

to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his entrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossings as rapidly as possible.

In the meantime the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their positions by a strong line of entrenchments, which protected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster.

On June 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed: "The indications are that Fremont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large body of troops will be at your service."

On the 3d the President telegraphed: "With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so close in your rear, and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it."

To which I replied: "Your despatch of five P.M. just received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days, your excellency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to perfect the communications across it."

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th were explained to the President as follows:

> Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off. Chickahominy flooded; bridges in bad condition. Are still hard at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot reinforce them

here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed (5,000) five thousand. I have not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you will regard this information as confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably greater; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to show you that the Army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's play is before it.

You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have been correct from the beginning in asserting that the serious opposition was to be made here.

And to the Secretary of War on the same day:

June 4.—Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of utmost importance that I should know this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to (7,000) seven thousand. Regard this as confidential for the present.

If I can have five new regiments for Fort Monroe and its dependencies, I can draw three more old regiments from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can well dispose of from fifteen to twenty well-drilled regiments among the old brigades in bringing them up to their original effective strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular and volunteer batteries of artillery, as well as for the regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least one more desperate battle to fight.

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me:

"I will send you five (5) new regiments as fast as transportation can take them; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend sending you a part of McDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Royal, probably as many as you want. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the Fort. Please advise me if this be as you desire."

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows:

In reply to your despatch of two P.M. to-day, I have the honor to state that the Chickahominy river has risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day, up to their waists in water, to complete them.

The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general movement, either of this or the rebel army, entirely out of the question until we have more favorable weather.

I am so glad to learn that you are pressing forward reinforcements so vigorously.

I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the

passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position.

The rebels have several batteries established, commanding the debouches from two of our bridges, and fire upon our working parties continually; but as yet they have killed but very few of our men.

As I did not think probable that any reinforcements would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing despatch that I should be ready to move when Gen. McCall's division joined me; but I did not intend to be understood by this that no more reinforcements were wanted, as will be seen from the following despatch:

June 10.—I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reliance—perhaps none whatever—can be attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy.

I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state; we have another rain-storm on our hands.

I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal.

In the view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done it would better conform to military principles to strengthen this army. And even although the reinforcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements.

I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results.

I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry.

If Gen. Prim returns *via* Washington, please converse with him as to the condition of affairs here.

Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sickness.

On the 11th the Secretary of War telegraphed:

"Your despatch of three-thirty (3:30) yesterday has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the government.

Reinforcements

. . . McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible.

"Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging as fast as possible the new levies.

"Be assured, general, that there has never been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms."

On the 12th and 13th Gen. McCall's division arrived.

On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, under the command of Capt. Royal, stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry numbering about 1,500 men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long bridge. The burning of two schooners laden with forage and fourteen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *eclat,* were the precise results of this expedition.

On the 14th I telegraphed to the Secretary of War:

June 14, *midnight.*—All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage.

It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival.

That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results.

The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained; you know that I have none.

On the 20th I telegraphed to the President:

There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Richmond; he is daily increasing his defences. I find him everywhere in force, and every reconnoissance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel my way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country; by to-morrow night the defensive works covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action and secure the army against the consequence of unforeseen disaster.

All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving reinforcements from Richmond *via* Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent but of suspicious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from the direction of Hanover Court-House. He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner from Col. Kenley's Maryland regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which he left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jackson's troops were then, as he said, moving to Frederick's Hall, along the Virginia Central Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. I immediately despatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascertain the truth of the statement. They were unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court-House, where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were forced to turn back without obtaining the desired information. On that day I sent the following despatch to Secretary Stanton:

June 24.—A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell (fifteen brigades) at Gordonsville on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederick's Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements

of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen.

The following is his reply:

"*June* 25.—We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and Gen. Kelley that Ewell was advancing to New creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information as to his whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middleton, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purported to be dated Gordonsville on the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here."

On the 25th, our bridges and entrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket-line of the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement.

Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williamsburg road was a large, open field; beyond that a swampy belt of timber, some five hundred yards wide, which had been disputed ground for many days. Further in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy.

It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground, and to place Gens. Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support the attack to be made on the Old Tavern, on the 26th or 27th, by Gen. Franklin, by assailing that position in the rear.

Between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of the 25th the advance was begun by Gen. Heintzelman's corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished.

The following telegram was sent to the Secretary of War on the same day:

25*th*, 6:15 P.M.—I have just returned from the field, and found your despatch in regard to Jackson.

Several contrabands just in give information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yesterday.

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate.

But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side.

I feel that there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements.

CHAPTER XXIV

Private Letters

[*May* 20 *to June* 26, 1862]

May 20, 12:30 A.M., *Tunstall's Station.*— . . . I moved headquarters and four divisions here to-day, about six miles from the White House. I rode myself to Bottom's bridge in the rain, and made a short reconnoissance of it. Found the enemy there, though not in great force. The engineers will make a close examination to-morrow morning, driving the enemy's pickets. The advanced guard also is near New bridge. We are gradually drawing near the rascals. I think they intend to fight us in front of Richmond; if they do it will be a decisive battle. Our camp here is one of the most beautiful I ever saw. The country is lovely, and the view from the high hill on which are headquarters is really magnificent. This evening, when the bivouac-fires were lighted, the scene was grand beyond description. There are some very fine plantations in this vicinity. What fools their owners are to submit themselves to the necessity of being overrun and devastated! An army leaves a wide swath in its rear, but my men are generally behaving very well.

May 21, 1:30 A.M., *Tunstall's Station.*— . . . Headquarters will move tomorrow some seven or eight miles more to the front. . . .. .

Wednesday morning (*same letter*).— . . . . Porter's troops have been marching past for a couple of hours, and the rumbling of wagons has been going on for some time. . . .

A little later.—I have just learned that some of our troops have succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge. . . . .

May 22, 6:30 P.M., *camp near Chickahominy.*— . . . . I have just returned from a ride to the front, where I have taken a good look at the rebel lines. I suppose I must have ridden some thirty miles or less to-day.

Some one just brought me a bouquet of wild white flowers—a negro at that. I clutched it most eagerly, as reminding me of one who two years ago became my wife. It is on the table in front of me as I write; in a tin tumbler, to be sure, but none the less pure and white.

May 23, P.M. (*continuation of same letter*).Soon after I finished the last page I was taken quite sick, and continued so most of the night. I have remained in my tent all day, feeling quite miserable, but will be all right and able to ride out in the morning. . . . The occurences of the next few days are quite uncertain. I have secured one passage of the Chickahominy, and hope to get two more to-morrow. I have been within six miles of the rebel capital, and our balloonists have been watching it all day. The intentions of the enemy are still doubtful. I go on prepared to fight a hard battle, but I confess that the indications are not now that he will fight. Unless he has some deep-laid scheme that I do not fathom, he is giving up great advantages in not opposing me on the line of the Chickahominy. He could give me a great deal of trouble and make it cost me hundreds or thousands of lives. . . . God knows that I am sick of this civil war, although no feeling of the kind unsteadies my hand or ever makes me hesitate or waver. It is a cruel necessity. I am very glad that

the President has come out as he did about Hunter's order. . . . If I succeed in getting the two additional passages of the river to-morrow I will move next day. In fact, I hope to have a strong advanced guard within a couple of miles of Richmond to-morrow evening. Then I shall be able to examine the enemy's position and arrange for the battle. I will not fight on Sunday if I can help it. If I am obliged to do so I will still have faith that God will defend the right, and trust that we have the right on our side. How freely I shall breathe when my long task of months is over and Richmond is ours! I know the uncertainty of all human events. I know that God may even now deem best to crush all the high hopes of the nation and this army. I will do the best I can to insure success, and will do my best to be contented, with whatever result God sees fit to terminate our efforts. I am here on the eve of one of the great historic battles of the world—one of those crises in a nation's life that occur but seldom. Far more than my fate is involved in the issue. I have done the best I could; I have tried to serve my country honestly and faithfully. All I can now do is to commit myself to the hands of God and pray that the country may not be punished for my sins and shortcomings.

11 P.M. . . . . Have had some skirmishes and cannonading to-day. Successful in all.

May 25, *Sunday*, 3:30 P.M., *Cold Harbor.*— . . . Have been rather under the weather the last three days. Had to ride out in the rain yesterday, and was kept up very late last night, so I was not so well as I might have been this morning. . . . It cleared off about sunset yesterday, and to-day has been bright and pleasant, drying up the roads rapidly. They have been so cut and bad as to prevent any movements in force or with rapidity. Fortunately the ground dries rapidly here, and will soon be in such condition that we can move anywhere. I have this moment received a despatch from the President, who is terribly scared about Washington, and talks about the necessity of my returning in order to save it. Heaven save a country guided by such counsels! I must reply to his telegram, and finish this by and by. . . . I feel much better this afternoon—quite myself again. . . . If I should find Washington life as bad after the war as it was when I was there, I don't think I could be induced to remain in the army after peace.

10 P.M. (*same letter*).—It seems, from some later despatches I have received, that Banks has been soundly thrashed, and that they are terribly alarmed in Washington. A scare will do them good, and may bring them to their senses. . . . I have a fire in my tent to-night.

May 26, 8 P.M., *camp near New bridge.*— . . . We broke up the last camp about two and moved to this place, which is quite on the banks of the Chickahominy and very near New bridge. It, of course, commenced raining about an hour after we started; but as it was not a very heavy rain, we got on very well. . . . I have been troubled by the old Mexican complaint, brought on, I suppose, by exposure to the wet, but I am really substantially well again. . . . . Fitz starts off in the morning on a trip that will take a day to go and one to return; the object being to cut off and disperse a force of the enemy threatening my right and rear, also to destroy the railroad bridges. When this is done I will feel very comfortable in that direction, and shall be quite ready to attack. My men are in such excellent condition and such good spirits that I cannot doubt the result. The people here have not much Union feeling, but are becoming heartily tired

of the war, especially as they now feel its evils in their midst—a fate from which I pray that God may deliver our own Northern States. My camp is about four and a half to five miles from Richmond. . . . . Had the instructions I left for Banks and Wadsworth been complied with we should have been spared the shame of Banks's stampede. . . I feared last night that I would be ordered back for the defence of Washington!

May 27, 11:45 P.M.— . . . I sent Fitz-John out this morning to "pick up" a large force of the enemy who were threatening my right and rear, also to burn the bridges of the two railways of the South Anna. The old fellow has done splendidly. Thrashed 13,000 badly, and I am momentarily expecting to hear the details of his second attack. We are getting on splendidly. I am quietly clearing out everything that could threaten my rear and communications, providing against the contingency of disaster, and so arranging as to make my whole force available in the approaching battle. The only fear is that Joe's heart may fail him. . . .

New bridge, May 29, 8 P.M.— . . . I rode some forty-odd miles yesterday, got wet, and had nothing to eat all day, and returned to camp about two o'clock this morning, noble old Dan taking me through most splendidly. Found myself quite sick this morning—my old Mexican enemy. I had been fighting against it for several days with more or less success. But this morning I gave up and sent for the doctor, in whose hands I placed myself. . . . Feel a great deal better to-night; the pain gone and my head clearer. . . . Fitz did his work nobly, as I expected. I rode to his battle-field yesterday and several miles beyond it. The railroad bridge across the South Anna was burned yesterday and to-day, thus effectually cutting off railroad communication between Richmond and the North. Lawrence Williams arranged both affairs very handsomely. The country around Hanover Court-House is very beautiful. . . .

June 2, 8 P.M., *New bridge.*—It has been impossible for me to write to you for the last two or three days. I was quite sick on Friday and Saturday; on the last day rose from my bed and went to the field of battle; remained on horseback most of the time until Sunday evening. I came back perfectly worn out and exhausted; lay down at once, and, though I could not sleep much I got some rest. I think to-night will bring me quite up again; I am not anxious. The Chickahominy is now falling, and I hope we can complete the bridges to-morrow. I can do nothing more until that is accomplished. The enemy attacked on Saturday and Sunday with great ferocity and determination; their first attack alone was successful. Casey's division broke. As the other divisions came up they checked the enemy, and we gradually got the better of him; he was badly handled before night. On Sunday morning he renewed the attack and was everywhere repulsed in disorder with heavy loss. We had regained all the ground lost, and more, last night; to-day we are considerably in advance of the field of battle. It is certain that we have gained a glorious victory; I only regret that the rascals were smart enough to attack when the condition of the Chickahominy was such that I could not throw over the rest of the troops to follow up the success; but the weather now seems settled, and I hope the river will be low enough to-morrow to enable me to cross. I am tired of the sickening sight of the battle-field, with its mangled corpses and poor suffering wounded! Victory has no charms for me when purchased at such cost. I shall be only too glad when all is over and I can return where

I best love to be. . . . Your father is quite well; so are all the staff. I don't think any of your friends were hurt in the battle; several colonels killed and some wounded.

June 3, 10 A.M., *New bridge.*— . . . . There has been some heavy cannonading within the last hour, and I learned that the enemy were advancing on Sumner. I am awaiting further news before going to the front; in the meantime working hard at the bridges over the confounded Chickahominy. We may have another fight at any hour now; I can't tell when or where. I expect some 5,500 troops from Fortress Monroe to-night, which will go some ways towards replacing my losses; hope that one regiment arrived last night. If the enemy will give me time to get fresh troops in line I will be obliged to them exceedingly; I am none too strong, I can assure you. But all will go well. . . .

June 5, 9 A.M. (*Thursday*), *New bridge.*—We have had a terrible time during the last few days; torrents of rain constantly falling; ground a sea of mud; the Chickahominy a booming river; bridges swept away; the railroad pretty much used up—in short, about all the troubles that armies fall heir to, except defeat! But I am so grateful that God gave us the victory that I will not complain of minor evils. The enemy must have been very badly whipped not to have renewed his attack under the very favorable circumstances of the last few days.

P.M.—Have been, as usual, interrupted. . . . The enemy has opened from two or three batteries, and is blazing away upon our working parties at the bridges; some of our heavy batteries have opened upon him, and will, I hope, soon silence them. I feel much better to-day, and if secesh will permit me to remain quiet until to-morrow morning I am sure that I shall be quite well. My head feels clearer to-day, and I feel generally better, though somewhat weak. My report of the battle (telegraphic) was incorrectly printed in some respects in the papers, and, of course, raises a tempest in a teapot. I never saw so much selfishness and petty feeling in my life as I have seen developed during this unhappy war. . . . This camp life in the mud is becoming tedious; yet here I am tied up, the confounded river running like mad, and no present chance of crossing the rest of the troops, although we are doing all that can be done. . . . The artillery still keeps up its firing. I must send again for news. . .

June 6.— . . . . The bad weather still continues, horrid in the extreme. . . . It seems that Joe Johnston was seriously, if not dangerously, wounded in the last battle. I had occasion to write him some letters to-day which ought to be answered, so I can probably tell by the reply how it really is. . . . I am receiving reinforcements now which will soon repair our losses and enable me to act with freedom of motion. . . .

10 P.M.— . . . Have been, as usual, very quiet to-day, lying down almost all the time, and leaving my tent scarcely at all. . . . It has at last cleared up, and for some days, I think. It is now quite certain that Joe Johnston was severely wounded last Saturday—now said to be in the shoulder by a rifle-ball. I think there is very little doubt that it is so. That places Smith, G. W., in command. I have drawn nine regiments from Fort Monroe—the first use I made of the command given me of that place; the last of them will be up to-morrow. These will go far towards filling our ranks. The losses in the late battle were about 5,500; of course we have lost many by disease. I am promised either McCall's or King's di-

vision in a very few days. If I learn to-morrow that they will surely be here in three or four days I will wait for them, as it would make the result certain and less bloody. I can't afford to have any more men killed than can be avoided. . . .

June 7, 8:30 A.M. (*same letter*).— . . . The sun is struggling very hard this morning with the clouds; thus far the latter has rather the better of him, but I hope the old fellow will persevere and beat them out in an hour or two. I presume the mystery of the two telegraphic messages has been cleared up before this. I said that *none* of your acquaintances were killed. The operator must have been unmanned by excitement, for my official despatches were terribly bungled in many ways. One of the two similar despatches must have been sent on the operator's own account. I think I sent you but two altogether that day. Did not that solution occur to you?

June 8, 1862.—Gen. Prim and staff, some nine or ten in number, have arrived. They went direct to the battle-field from the railway, so I will be spared until evening, when I shall be in for it. How Charles will make out I cannot imagine. It is a terrible nuisance to take care of these parties in camp. They always come entirely unprovided, and it puts every one to great inconvenience to take care of them. I had sense enough, when I went to the Crimea, to take tents, messing apparatus, servants, horses, etc., so that I was perfectly independent. But none of these foreigners seem to follow so good an example.

I had occasion day before yesterday to send a letter to Joe Johnston in reply to a request of us for permission to send in and get the bodies of a couple of generals and half a dozen colonels supposed to be killed. An answer came yesterday apologizing for the delay in replying to my communication (which involved other matters), and also apologizing for some of his people firing at Sweitzer, who carried the flag of truce. Well, whom do you think the letter came from? From no one else than A. P. Hill, major-general commanding the Light Division. . . . I hope we shall have clear weather for a few days, so that it will be possible to move and use artillery, as well as to get it over the river. You have no idea of the state of the ground now; just as much as a horse can do to make his way! We have pretty quiet times; a little artillery firing and picket-skirmishing by way of breaking the monotony—*voila tout!* I suppose both sides are gathering for the great battle. I have received ten regiments since the battle, nine of which from Fort Monroe, one from Baltimore; and one from Washington will arrive to-night. I am also promised McCall's division at once. If the promise is kept I shall be quite strong again. . . . Am much better to-day—quite myself.

June 9.— . . . A large dose of Spaniards yesterday. Gen. Prim and staff arrived and are quartered on us, some seven in all—a rather inconvenient addition to the mess. On the other hand, however, they are very gentlemanly and a very nice set of people. Gen. Prim speaks only French and Spanish. He is a dark-faced, black-haired, bright, young-looking man of forty-five. I like him much. His chief of staff, Gen. Milans, is a perfect old trump, who speaks English and looks for all the world like a French marquis of the stage. His hair and beard are iron gray; his moustache of the most approved pattern of the Spanish cavaliers of old; a cane suspended to his button-hole; red pants tucked in high boots; a loose green coat covered with silver embroidery; the funniest little hat imaginable—

on the whole a most peculiar picture, such as I never saw before. They are delighted with what they have seen (I hear the funny little fellow's voice now: "G'd-mornin', sir; hope yo' well"), fully appreciate the great difficulties under which we have been laboring, and will do much, I think, towards giving a just idea in Europe of the difficulties we have to contend against in this most singular of all campaigns. . . . I had a telegram from McDowell last evening stating that he was ordered down here with his command, and assuring me that he received the order with great satisfaction. The secretary and President are becoming quite amiable of late; I am afraid that I am a little cross to them, and that I do not quite appreciate their sincerity and good feeling. "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*." How glad I will be to get rid of the whole lot! I had another letter from our friend A. P. H. yesterday in reply to mine to Joe Johnston; so I am now confident that Joe is badly wounded. In my reply sent this morning I ignore Hill entirely, and address mine to the "Commanding General, etc.," so G. W. will have to come out this time. I hope to arrange for a general exchange of prisoners, and thus relieve our poor fellows who have been so long confined. I must do secesh the justice to say that they now treat our wounded and prisoners as well as they can. . . .

June 10, 7:30 A.M.— . . . It is again raining hard, and has been for several hours! I feel almost discouraged—that is, I would do so did I not feel that it must all be for the best, and that God has some great purpose in view through all this. It is certain that there has not been for years and years such a season; it does not come by chance. I am quite checked by it. First, the Chickahominy is so swollen and the valley so covered with water that I cannot establish safe communications over it; then, again, the ground is so muddy that we cannot use our artillery: the guns sink up to their axle-trees. I regret all this extremely, but take comfort from the thought that God will not leave so great a struggle as this to mere chance. If He ever interferes with the destinies of men and nations, this would seem to be a fit occasion for it. So whenever I feel discouraged by adverse circumstances I do my best to fall back on this great source of confidence, and always find that it gives me strength to bear up against anything that may occur. I do not see how any one can fill such a position as I do without being constantly forced to think of higher things and the Supreme Being. The great responsibility, the feeling of personal weakness and incompetency of entire dependence on the will of God, the thousand circumstances entirely beyond our control that may defeat our best-laid plans, the sight of poor human suffering—all these things *will* force the mind to seek rest above. . . . I feel quite well to-day, by far better than at any time before. I think that if I can stand the test of this rainy day all must be right. I will not go out while it rains, if I can help it. . . . The Spaniards are still here, and I fear will remain some time, unless this rain drives them off. Prim is very well, but it *is* a nuisance to be obliged to be polite when one's head is full of more important things. . . . Still raining very hard. I don't know what *will* become of us!

June 11, *New bridge*, A.M.— . . . Am very well to-day, and the weather is good. . . . Will start in half an hour or so for the other side of the river. It threatens rain again, so that I do not believe I can make the entire tour—probably only on Smith and Sumner; do the rest to-morrow. Besides, I do not care to ride too far to-day, as I have not been on horseback before since the day of the

battle. I *must* be careful, for it would be utter destruction to this army were I to be disabled so as not to be able to take command.

Burnside left yesterday; thinks there is a great deal of Union feeling in North Carolina, and that our gaining possession of Richmond will at once bring North Carolina back into the Union. . . . I half-doubt whether there is much Union feeling south of North Carolina. . . . McCall's division has commenced arriving; some of them reached the White House last night. This relieves me very much.

June 12, 8 A.M., *New bridge.*— . . . Am about to break up this camp and move over the Chickahominy to Dr. Trent's house; to the vicinity, at least, for I abominate houses when on the field. In addition have to take a farewell ride some seven or eight miles up this side of the river to look again at the ground and give the last instructions to Porter and Franklin for their guidance on this side of the river. I took quite a ride yesterday, the first since the battle, and got through with it nicely, I am about as nearly well now as I expect to be in this climate; bright and strong enough to fight a much better battle than any yet. I had a wonderful telegram from the Secretary of War last night; he declares that he is and ever has been my best friend!

June 14, *camp at Dr. Trent's, Saturday* A.M.— . . . Your letters reached me yesterday morning just as I was starting out on a hot ride around the lines. Did not return until late, and then they got up a stampede on the other side of the Chickahominy which kept me busy until bed-time. Some of the enemy's cavalry got in to the railroad, cut the telegraph-wires, and burned some wagons. I do not know the particulars yet, but the cavalry and some infantry are out after them, and will, I hope, repay secesh for his impudence. As it is, the telegraph is broken and may not be re-established for several hours. . . . It is terribly hot, so much so that one can hardly exist. I was up before six this morning, and even then found it overpowering; the sun bakes down. I have the best possible place for a camp, right on the summit of a high hill, under the shade of a couple of large walnut-trees, but the trouble this morning is that no air whatever is stirring. Am quite well now; took a long ride in the hot sun yesterday and did not feel it very much; am not quite strong yet, and have to be a little careful. . . . Yesterday morning secesh commenced a very warm fire of artillery quite early, but killed only one man. By and by, however, Smith got some of his sharpshooters near their guns, drove off the gunners and kept them off all day, so that there was no more firing. There has been none to-day. I learn that the enemy moved away their guns during the night; this is probably true. A couple of days more of this weather will dry the roads and fields so as to render them practicable and enable me to try it again. I am heartily tired of inactivity, and shall be only too glad to settle this matter, have the battle, and get through with our work. . . . Senator Rice was here this morning. . . .

June 15, 10:15 P.M., *Camp Lincoln.*— . . . We have had several skirmishes. The rebels have attacked our pickets on several points, but were everywhere beaten back with the loss of several killed and a respectable number of prisoners. . . . .

The worst interruption of all was a "party" of ladies and gentlemen that ——— had no more sense than to insist upon coming up here, Senator ——— and a lot of others. All of whom I was really glad to see, although this was no place for them. I am sorry to say

that when I heard of their arrival I "swore" a little internally, and sent Russell flying out of my tent, declaring that I would not see any of them. But soon afterwards Senator ——— came here, and he was so kind and friendly that I was at once mollified. I talked with him for some time, and he went back to Van Vliet's tent. I then gave to Averill my orders for a surprise-party to-morrow, to repay secesh for his raid of day before yesterday. Then went over to call on Mrs.———. There I *was* in for it. I was presented to all the ladies, listened to Mrs. ———'s version of her trip to Richmond, and very rapidly beat a retreat, giving business as an excuse. Charles got up a lunch for the party, a rainstorm coming on in the meanwhile. When they were nearly through I took Averill over and talked with them for a while. Then they adjourned to my tent. The two dear old mesdames were just as good as they could be; can I say more? When they left they asked me to give them sprigs from the bower in front of my tent, so I send you one, too. . . . I do not think our rain of to-day will do much harm. The chances now are that I will make the first advance on Tuesday or Wednesday. By that time I think the ground will be fit for the movements of artillery and that all our bridges will be completed. I think the rebels will make a desperate fight, but I feel sure that we will gain our point. Look on the maps I sent you a day or two ago, and find "Old Tavern," on the road from New bridge to Richmond; it is in that vicinity that the next battle will be fought. I think that they see it in that light, and that they are fully prepared to make a desperate resistance. I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the "Old Tavern" I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault. I speak very confidently, but if you could see the faces of the troops as I ride among them you would share my confidence. They will do anything I tell them to do. I could not help laughing when, on the day of the last battle, I was riding along in front, a man jumped out in an interval of the cheering and addressed me quite familiarly, saying: "Halloo, George! how are you? You are the only one of the whole crowd of generals that is worth a ———." I won't fill up the last word, but the whole command shouted, "That's so!" . . . I think there is scarcely a man in this whole army who would not give his life for me, and willingly do whatever I ask. I have tried them more than once, and whenever I am near they never fail me. The next battle will doubtless be a desperate one, but I think that I can so use our artillery as to make the loss of life on our side comparatively small. . . .

June 17, 4 P.M.—The weather yesterday and to-day has been splendid. It was clear and bright, but a delightfully cool breeze has been blowing constantly. The roads and fields are drying beautifully. The river is falling rapidly; our bridges are nearly finished, and we shall soon be on the move.

Camp at Trent's House, June 21, 1862, 10 A.M.— . . . We have had good weather for the last few days, and have been improving it as best we could. Both parties are active, but the nature of the country is such as to make our progress difficult in the extreme. I hope to knock secesh out of Old Tavern and its vicinity within a couple of days; shall try it, at all events. . . . I see the Abolitionists have got a new dodge in my behalf—the White House business! In the first place, I never saw Col. Lee in my life, and, of course, never made any arrangement with him. The house was guarded simply from motives of respect for the memory of Washing-

ton, which I thought would be appreciated by every honest person in the country. The adjacent property has been freely used for all necessary purposes. The house has never been needed for a hospital, and would not accommodate over thirty or forty persons anyhow. The "spring" alluded to is one of a great many. There are plenty there, and this one is prohibited only because access to it brings people too near the house. I was not even sure that it was guarded, and do not even now know whether it is anything more than the guard placed over all springs near camps to prevent them from being misused by the men. So you have the truth of the White House story, all of which was in the possession of the secretary some ten days ago. I yesterday sent Tripler down to investigate the whole matter, and when I receive his report will nail the lie to the counter. ——— wrote a letter to the secretary, in which he repeats the spring story as of his own knowledge; that is, he asserts it is a fact! One thing is certain: I will some day or other repay some of these people with interest, and make them feel ashamed of themselves, if there is such a thing in their composition, which I rather doubt. I can't tell you how sick I am of this kind of life. I suppose that it is the "cross" that it is my lot to bear, and that I should not repine. I know it is wrong, and I do my best to bear everything contentedly; but sometimes the old, impatient spirit will break out and I lose my temper. But I will keep on trying to do my best. . . .

June 22, *Sunday*, 3 P.M.— . . . By an arrival from Washington to-day I learn that Stanton and Chase have fallen out; that McDowell has deserted his friend C. and taken to S.! Alas! poor country that should have such rulers. I tremble for my country when I think of these things; but still can trust that God in His infinite wisdom will not punish us as we deserve, but will in His own good time bring order out of chaos and restore peace to this unhappy country. His will be done, whatever it may be! I am anxious as any human being can be to finish this war. Yet when I see such insane folly behind me I feel that the final salvation of the country demands the utmost prudence on my part, and that I must not run the slightest risk of disaster, for if anything happened to this army our cause would be lost. I got up some heavy guns to-day, and hope to give secesh a preliminary pounding to-morrow and to make one good step next day. The rascals are very strong, and out-number me very considerably; they are well entrenched also, and have all the advantages of position, so I must be prudent; but I will yet succeed, notwithstanding all they do and leave undone in Washington to prevent it. I would not have on my conscience what those men have for all the world. I am sorry that I shall lose the dear old Prince de Joinville in a few days; he is obliged to return to Europe. Gen. Prim has sent me his photograph. . . .

It is quite hot this afternoon. . . . It is almost time for our evening skirmish. Secesh has been very quiet to-day; scarcely fired a shot. I am very glad of it, as it has enabled me to give my men a good, quiet rest for Sunday.

June 23, 3 P.M.—I am delighted that you are so much pleased at Orange. It must be a lovely place from your description. Will the doctor invite me to pay you a visit there, do you think? How do you occupy yourself? Or are you contented just to rest and be quiet? That is my idea of happiness now—rest with you and the baby. We have had rather an exciting day of it. The enemy has been making some rather mysterious movements, and I have taken advantage of them to push forward our pickets considerably on the

left. I don't yet know exactly what it means, but so far it has been of advantage to us, and you may be sure that I won't be caught in any trap. We have had a sharp thunder-shower this afternoon, and it will be of benefit by cooling and clearing the air. There has not been rain enough to do any harm yet.

10:30 P.M.— . . . You may be sure that no man in this army is so anxious as its general to finish the campaign. Every poor fellow that is killed or wounded almost haunts me! My only consolation is that I have honestly done my best to save as many lives as possible, and that many others might have done less towards it.

I have had a rather anxious day, the movements of the enemy being mysterious; but I have gained something, and am ready for any eventuality, I think. I have a kind of presentiment that to-morrow will bring forth *something—what,* I do not know. We will see when the time arrives. I expect to be able to take a decisive step in advance day after to-morrow, and, if I succeed, will gain a couple of miles towards Richmond. It now looks to me as if the operations would resolve themselves into a series of partial attacks rather than a general battle.

24*th*, 10 A.M.—I was interrupted just here by some stampede telegrams that kept me up until 1:30 or 2 this morning. In the meantime a terrible storm came up and blew this unhappy sheet into the mud and rain. I send it as it is, however, as a slight specimen of the "sacred soil," also because I am about starting out on a ride, from which I am not likely to return before the mail leaves camp. Nothing of interest this morning; all quiet; weather cloudy, and may rain to-day again.

Telegram—*June* 26, 1862.— . . . Did not write yesterday; was on the battle-field all day. Have been up and in the saddle all night, and do not expect to be able to write more than a line to-day. Will probably be up all night again. . . . Our affair yesterday perfectly successful.

CHAPTER XXV

Beginning of the Seven Days—McDowell coming, but not yet—McClellan resolves on flank movement to the James river—Preparations—Battle of Gaines's Mill—The movement goes on—McClellan charges Stanton with intent to sacrifice the army.

On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply.

The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsular campaign.

I notified the Secretary of War in the following despatch:

12 M.—I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of the Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advanced guard. If this be true you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to outmanoeuvre, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.

On the same day I received the following despatches from the Secretary of War:

"6 P.M.—Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand (5,000) men as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your condition."

"11:20 P.M.—Your telegram of 6:15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the government to send you any more reinforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them.

"Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shields's division and Rickets's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done."

The following was sent at 2:30 P.M.:

Your dispatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, etc., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive.

It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than an hour or two longer.

But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in these communications came to the Army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar after the Seven Days.

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James river, if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, sent up James river. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course.

Early on the 25th Gen. Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitering parties towards Hanover Court-House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolopotamy as far as possible.

Up to the 26th of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it and from the east and northeast. The superiority of the James river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation by land of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end,

from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent.

Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war, but I was confident in the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith.

On the same day (26th) Gen. Van Vliet, chief-quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Col. Ingall's quartermaster at the White House, as follows:

"Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's Station by way of Bottom's bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James river without delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment."

All these commands were obeyed. On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and, if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of Gen. Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further orders.

At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12:30 P.M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn.

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the action.

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy and the right in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's Mill. Seymour's brigade held the left of the line from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Reynolds's the right, principally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek.

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed.

At three P.M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by Gen. Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss.

A rapid artillery-fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by Gen. Seymour with heavy slaughter.

The firing ceased and the enemy retired about nine P.M., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were en-

gaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow bridge and at Mechanicsville.

The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many of the wagons of the 5th corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flank would be reasonably secure and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter carried out my orders to that effect.

It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James river by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge-heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James river as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey.

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam creek, was commenced shortly before daylight and successfully executed.

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered the rear, with the horse-batteries of Capts. Robertson and Tidball; but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that, although the enemy

followed the retreat closely and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him.

About this time Gen. Porter, believing that Gen. Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could.

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, Gen. Porter telegraphed as follows:

"I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin or some other command be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but, relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line."

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed.

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege-guns were still in position at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river.

Morell's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines's Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right towards New Cold Harbor. In this line Gen. Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left; Gen. Martindale's joined his right, and Gen. Griffin, still further to the right, joined the left of Gen. Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in rear of Cold Harbor.

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments; McCall's division, having been engaged on the day before, was formed in a second line in rear of the first; Meade's brigade on the left, near the Chickahominy; Reynolds's brigade on the right, covering the approaches from Cold Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner's bridge, and Sey-

mour's in reserve to the second line still further in rear. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, with five companies of the 5th Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the 1st Regular Cavalry, and three squadrons of the 1st Penn. Cavalry (lancers), were posted behind a hill in rear of the position, and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river.

The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse-batteries from the artillery reserve; the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy.

Shortly after noon the enemy was discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attacked. The skirmishers advanced rapidly and soon the fire became heavy along our whole front. At two P.M. Gen. Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's division of the 6th corps was ordered to cross to the left bank of the river by Alexander's bridge, and proceed to his support.

Gen. Porter's first call for reinforcements, through Gen. Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes through the same officer. By three P.M. the engagement had become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults along the whole front.

At 3:30 Slocum's division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line.

On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or between that and Gaines's house. The enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars of Sykes's division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks.

But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them.

When Gen. Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased Gen. Porter's force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points; and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for Gen. Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened.

About five P.M., Gen. Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division (3d corps), were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again in great force at six P.M., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy.

About seven P.M. they threw fresh troops against Gen. Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 5th Cavalry, and followed, as it was, by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retreat from our position to the hill in rear overlooking the bridge.

French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging towards the bridge.

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that reinforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Gens. French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill, ready to repulse another attack.

During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear-guard, and about six o'clock on the morning of the 28th crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them.

Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The enemy was held at bay. Our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army.

The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal.

Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces or struck down and the guns captured. Dietrich's, Kauerhem's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in the front of Gen. Smith's line on the right of the stream, and, with a battery of siege-guns served by the 1st Conn. Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of Gen. Porter.

So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them.

On the 26th a circular had been sent to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to reinforce Gen. Porter after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours.

Gen. Heintzelman replied:

"I think I can hold the entrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . ."

Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Gens. Hooker and Kearny, and on the Charles City road (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements.

Gen. Keyes telegraphed:

"As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, All I have, if the enemy is as strong as even in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this bank are small enough."

On the morning of the 27th the following despatch was sent to Gen. Sumner:

"Gen. Smith just reports that 'six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of Gen. Sumner.

At eleven o'clock A.M. Gen. Sumner telegraphed:

"The enemy threatens an attack on my right near Smith."

At 12:30 P.M. he telegraphed:

"Sharp shelling on both sides."

At 2:45 P.M.:

"Sharp musketry-firing in front of Burns. We are replying with artillery and infantry. The man on the look-out reports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smith's left; the number cannot be made out."

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, Gen. Slocum's division commenced crossing the river, to support Gen. Porter, soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but, as the firing in front of Gen. Porter ceased, the movement was suspended. At two P.M. Gen. Porter called for reinforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3:25 P.M. sent him the following:

"Slocum is now crossing Alexander's bridge with his whole command. Enemy has commenced an infantry attack on Smith's left. I have ordered down Sumner's and Heintzelman's reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. Go on as you have begun."

During the day the following despatches were received, which will show the condition of affairs on the right bank of the Chickahominy:

Gen. Franklin telegraphed:

"Gen. Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the clearings to the right of James Garnett's house and on the other side of the river opposite it. Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are very good made by Smith."

Afterwards he telegraphed:

"The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I know no details."

Afterwards the following:

"The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross-fire upon them that will silence them."

Afterwards (at 5:50 P.M.) the following was sent to Gen. Keyes:

"Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headquarters without a moment's delay. A staff officer will be here to direct the brigade where to go."

Subsequently the following was sent to Gens. Sumner and Franklin:

"Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front? Can you spare any more force to be sent to Gen. Porter? Answer at once."

At 5:15 P.M. the following was received from Gen. Franklin:

"I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present."

Gen. Sumner replied:

"If the general desires to trust the defence of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments and Meagher, with his brigade, to the right; everything is so uncertain that I think it would be hazardous to do it."

These two brigades were sent to reinforce Gen. Porter, as has been observed.

At 5:25 P.M. I sent the following to Gen. Franklin:

> Porter is hard pressed; it is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of Couch's to this place.
>
> Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible, send a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner.

At 7:35 P.M. the following was sent to Gen. Sumner:

> "If it is possible, send another brigade to reinforce Gen. Smith; it is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him."

From the foregoing despatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent from the right bank of the river to reinforce Gen. Porter, and that the corps commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed adequate. To have done more, even though Porter's reverse had been prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperilling the whole movement across the Peninsula.

The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, which had already turned our right and was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces.

This might probably have been executed on either side of the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank it is possible we might, with our entire force, have defeated the enemy there; but at that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supply-trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle we would have been compelled to fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating

upon our rear; and if, in the chances of war, we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe; and, as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply-train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost.

The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction.

I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river.

During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th all our wagons, heavy guns, etc., were gathered there.

It may be asked why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James river, fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond.

It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communications with the supply-depot at the White House.

We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food; and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and the gunboats, and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla.

The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James, with the exception of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.

On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps commanders at my headquarters, and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution.

Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.

This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's Station, and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army.

Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores.

The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by the chief commissary, Col. Clark, transferred to the James river without loss.

On the morning of the 28th, while Gen. Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's farm, the enemy opened upon Gen. Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be evacuated, but this attack was repulsed by the 23d N. Y., and the 49th Penn. Volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's battery.

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took positions covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains.

During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old entrenchments and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's Station.

General Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve.

They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army.

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
SAVAGE'S STATION, June 28, 1862, 12:20 A.M.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand (20,000), or even ten thousand (10,000), fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army.

If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; but to do this the government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand (10,000) fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow.

I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

McClellan's Own Story

I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.

You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.

CHAPTER XXVI

Continuation of the Seven Days' battles—Allen's field—Savage's Station—White Oak Swamp—Charles City cross-roads—Glendale—Malvern Hill—The army at Harrison's Landing.

The headquarters camp at Savage's Station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th and moved across White Oak Swamp. As the essential part of this day's operation was the passage of the trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the direction of New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications with the gunboats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains.

In the afternoon I instructed Gen. Keyes to move during the night to James river and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank.

Gen. F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him and pro-

long the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James river in rear of these corps, and placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived.

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry early this day on the Quaker road showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary.

The difficulty was not at all with the movement of the troops, but with the immense trains, that were to be moved virtually by a single road and required the whole army for their protection. With exception of the cavalry affair on the Quaker road, we were not troubled during this day south of the swamp, but there was severe fighting north of it.

Gen. Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29, at daylight, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's field, between Orchard and Savage's Stations.

The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond,

Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps. The first line of Richardson's division was held by Gen. French, Gen. Caldwell supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division was held by Col. Brooks with one regiment (53d Penn. Volunteers), with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground a little in rear of Col. Brooks's command.

At nine A.M. the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of Gen. Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of Gen. Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard's battery, and Pettit's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the 53d Penn. kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

Gen. Slocum arrived at Savage's Station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp and relieve Gen. Keyes's corps. As soon as Gen. Keyes was thus relieved he moved towards James river, which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey creek bridge.

During the morning Gen. Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force and advancing towards Savage's Station. He communicated this information to Gen. Sumner, at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's Station. A little after noon Gen. Sumner united his forces with those of Gen. Franklin and assumed command.

I had ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark, at a point where were several field-works, and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad.

Through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the

swamp at Brackett's ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at ten P.M.

On reaching Savage's Station Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods and the right extending down to the railroad. Gen. Brooks, and his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command.

Gen. Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At four P.M. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by Gen. Burns's brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the N. Y. 69th, Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between eight and nine P.M., when the enemy were driven from the field.

Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished during the night in good order. By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp bridge, Gen. French, with his brigade, acting as rear-guard, and at five A.M. on the 30th all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed.

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. Porter's corps was to move forward to James river, and, with the corps of Gen. Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the passage of the supply-trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as well as the crossings of the White Oak Swamp over which the army had passed. Gen. Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White

Oak Swamp bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with Gen. Richardson's division and Gen. Naglee's brigade, placed under his orders for the occasion. Gen. Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road.

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion.

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides. Gen. Keyes and Porter had been delayed—one by losing the road, and the other by repairing an old road—and had not been able to send any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains.

It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in the rear.

I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the obstruction of the roads towards Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near the James river.

Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed, as it was, to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position.

I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably

the passage of the trains and to rectify the positions of the troops.

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and, having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Com. Rodgers's gunboat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply-vessels and the state of things on the river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale ("Nelson's farm"). Gen. McCall's division (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker church. This line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds's brigade, commanded by Col. S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Penn., in reserve; Randall's regular battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and Dietrich's and Kauerhem's batteries of the artillery reserve on the left—all in front of the infantry line. The country in Gen. McCall's front was an open field, intersected towards the right by the New Market road and a small strip of timber parallel to it; the open front was about eight hundred yards, its depth about one thousand yards.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heintzelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles City road. Gen. Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road;

Gen. Kearny's left to connect with Gen. Slocum's left; Gen. McCall's position was to the left of the Long bridge road, in connection with Gen. Kearny's left; Gen. Hooker was on the left of Gen. McCall. Between twelve and one o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade at White Oak Swamp bridge. This artillery-fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Capt. Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Capt. Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns.

Gen. Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempt to cross the White Oak Swamp.

At two o'clock in the day the enemy were reported advancing in force by the Charles City road, and at half-past two o'clock the attack was made down the road on Gen. Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked Gen. McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire.

Gen. McCall, in his report of the battle, says:

"About half-past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part.

"At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre and another on the right centre to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells and boldly advanced, but were both driven back—on the left by the 12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th regiment.

"For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here. . . . At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry-fire of the reserves. The German batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers. . . .

"The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced back. . . .

"Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randall's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge-shape without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the

storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randall's battery, and the 4th regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them.

"Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns.

"It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limbered had their horses killed and wounded, and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part of the 4th regiment before them.

"The left company (B), nevertheless, stood its ground, with its captain, Fred A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success. . . .

"There was no running. But my division, reduced by the previous battles to less than six thousand (6,000), had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them. . . . "

Gen. Heintzelman states that about five o'clock P.M. Gen. McCall's division was attacked in large force, evidently the principal attack; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and adds:

"Gen. Hooker, being on his left, by moving to his right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner with great slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who was with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on Gen. Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. . . .

"This attack commenced about four P.M., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Capt. Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy; each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 63d Penn., Col. Hays, and half of the 37th N. Y. Volunteers."

Gen. McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Capt. De Russy's battery was placed on the right of Gen. Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. Gen. Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from the White Oak Swamp. Late in the day, at the call of Gen. Kearny, Gen. Taylor's 1st N. J. brigade, Slocum's

division, was sent to occupy a portion of Gen. McCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between twelve and one o'clock at night Gen. Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of his divisions, with Gen. Slocum's division and a portion of Gen. Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from Gen. Franklin for reinforcements sent him two brigades which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen. Sumner says of this battle:

"The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About three o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field."

The rear of the supply-trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about four P.M. At about this time the enemy began to appear in Gen. Porter's front, and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while his infantry and some artillery attacked Col. Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry-fire of Col. Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Col. Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy.

It was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the whole line and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from Gen. Franklin, before sending orders to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that Gen. Franklin was falling back; whereupon I sent Col. Colburn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and, if it were

true, to order in Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from Gen. Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already *en route* to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to Gen. Franklin as to the route he was to follow.

Gen. Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived.

I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Com. Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity.

The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 1st of July was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backwards through a wooded country towards a point below Haxall's, on James river. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually towards the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Towards the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the position of the enemy his most obvious lines of attack would come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line (Sykes's division on the left, Morell's on the right), with the artillery of his two divisions advantageously posted,

and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Col. Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege-guns in position on the highest point of the hill.

Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter; next came Kearny and Hooker; next Sedgwick and Richardson; next Smith and Slocum; then the remainder of Keyes's corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and by barricading the roads. Com. Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James river, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flank and to command the approaches from Richmond.

Between nine and ten A.M. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing, with its artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division.

About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter; but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared and was not again heard of. The presumption is that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left.

About three P.M. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearny's left and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground

until the advancing column was within short musket-range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire.

Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was stationed upon Couch's right by Gen. Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the general, and everything held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field.

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to reinforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the ene-

my persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but, despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire. The result was complete victory.

During the whole battle Com. Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy by throwing shell among his reserves and advancing columns.

It was necessary to fall back still further, in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Com. Rodgers, commanding the gunboat flotilla, this could only be done below City Point; concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition made it imperative to reach the transports immediately.

The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, Gen. Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the division on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Penn. Cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieut.-Col. Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battlefield until about seven o'clock of the 2d of July. Meantime Gen. Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the im-

mense number of wagons and artillery-carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, Gen. Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words, "I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him. And when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated." The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's Bar until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear-guard did not move into their camp until everything was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear-guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats.

Great credit must be awarded to Gen. Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge.

High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 1st Conn. Artillery, Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the Seven Days and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.

So long as life lasts the survivors of those glorious days will remember with quickened pulse the attitude of that army when it reached the goal for which it had striven with such transcendent heroism. Exhausted, depleted in numbers, bleeding at every pore, but still proud and defiant, and strong in the consciousness of a great feat of arms heroically accomplished, it stood ready to renew the struggle with undiminished ardor whenever its commander should give the word. It was one of those magnificent episodes which dignify a nation's history and are fit subjects for the grandest efforts of the poet and the painter.*

This movement was now successfully accomplished, and the Army of the Potomac was at last in position on its true line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save those taken in battle when the artillerists had proved their heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the enemy's infantry were in their midst.

During the Seven Days the Army of the Potomac consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less than 8 regiments of cavalry all told. The opposing Confederate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two armies from June 25 to July 2 were:

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Confederate Army	2,823	13,703	3,223	19,749
Army of the Potomac	1,734	8,062	6.053	15,849

The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing.

No praise can be too great for the officers and men who passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every attack made upon them, always in the right place at the

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*In the evening, before his sudden death in the night, Gen. McClellan had been occupied in preparing, from his memoirs, an article for the *Century Mazazine*. Among the manuscript, which we found next morning lying as he left it, the paragraph above, commencing with the words, "So long as life lasts," appeared to be the last work of his pen. The last words he wrote were thus this final expression of his admiration for the Army of the Potomac. I have thought fit to insert them here. W. C. P.

right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disciplined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of ammunition and supplies, and reinforcements to fill the gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn.

It was not until two years later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defence of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.

CHAPTER XXVII

Private Letters

[*June* 26 to *Aug.* 23, 1862]

June 26, 2 P.M., *Trent's.*— . . . Yesterday I wished to advance our picket-line, and met with a good deal of opposition. We succeeded fully, however, and gained the point with but little loss. The enemy fought pretty hard, but our men did better. I was out there all day taking personal direction of affairs, and remained there until about 5:30 P.M., when I returned to camp, and met on my way the news that Stonewall Jackson was on his way to attack my right and rear. I rode over to Porter's soon after I reached camp, and returned about 2:30 A.M. At three I started off again and went to the front, where an attack was expected by some. Finding all quiet, I rode all along the lines and returned here. You may imagine that I am rather tired out. I think that Jackson will attempt to attack our rear. . . .

Have just received the positive information that Jackson is *en route* to take us in rear. You probably will not hear for some days; but do not be at all worried. . . .

Gen. McClellan's headquarter's, June 26, 1862—Telegram, *in cipher, care of Mr. Eckert, who will regard it as private and strictly confidential, and forward it privately to my wife.*—Dear Nell: I may not be able to telegraph or write to you for some days. There will be a great stampede, but do not be alarmed. There will be severe fighting in a day or two, but you may be sure that your husband will not disgrace you, and I am confident that God will smile upon my efforts and give our arms success. You will hear that we are pursued, annihilated, etc. Do not believe it, but trust that success will crown our efforts. I tell you this, darling, only to guard against the agony you would feel if you trusted the newspaper reports. . . .

Telegram—*June* 27, 1:15 P.M.—Heavy firing in all directions. So far we have repulsed them everywhere. I expect wires to be cut any moment. All well and very busy. Cannot write to-day.

Telegram—*McClellan's Headquarters, June* 27.—Have had a terrible fight against vastly superior numbers. Have generally held our own, and we may thank God that the Army of the Potomac has not lost its honor. It is impossible as yet to tell what the result is. I am well, but tired out; no sleep for two nights, and none to-night. God bless you!

Telegram—*McClellan's Headquarters, June* 28.—We are all well to-night. I fear your uncle has been seriously hurt in the terrible fight of yesterday. They have outnumbered us everwhere, but we have not lost our honor. This army has acted magnificently. I thank my friends in Washington for our repulse.

June 29, 3 P.M., *in the field.*—I send you only a line to say that I still think God is with us. We have fought a terrible battle against overwhelming numbers. We held our own, and history will show that I have done all that man can do. . . .

June 30, 7 P.M., *Turkey bridge.*—Well, but worn out; no sleep for many days. We have been fighting for many days, and are still at it. . . . We have fought every day for five days. . . .

Private Letters

July 1, *Haxall's Plantation.*— . . . The whole army is here; worn out and war worn, after a week of daily battles. I have still very great confidence in them, and they in me. The dear fellows cheer me as of old as they march to certain death, and I feel prouder of them than ever.

July 2, . . . *Berkley, James river.*— . . . I have only energy enough left to scrawl you a few lines to say that I have the whole army here, with all its material and guns. We are all worn out and haggard. . . . My men need repose, and I hope will be allowed to enjoy it to-morrow. . . . Your poor uncle was killed at the battle of Gaines's Mills on Friday last. We are well, but very tired. . . .

July 2, 11 P.M.—I will now take a few moments from the rest which I really need, and write at least a few words. . . . We have had a terrible time. On Wednesday the serious work commenced. I commenced driving the enemy on our left, and, by hard fighting, gained my point. Before that affair was over, I received news that Jackson was probably about to attack my right. I galloped back to camp, took a fresh horse, and went over to Porter's camp, where I remained all night making the best arrangements I could, and returned about daybreak to look out for the left. On Thursday afternoon Jackson began his attack on McCall, who was supported by Porter. Jackson being repulsed, I went over there in the afternoon and remained until two or three A.M. I was satisfied that Jackson would have force enough next morning to turn Porter's right, so I removed all the wagons, heavy guns, etc., during the night, and caused Porter to fall back to a point nearer the force on the other side of the Chickahominy. This was most hansomely effected, all our material being saved. The next day Porter was attacked in his new position by the whole force of Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill, and Whiting. I sent what supports I could, but was at the same time attacked on my own front, and could only spare seven brigades. With these we held our own at all points after most desperate fighting. It was on this day that your poor uncle [Col. Rossell] was killed, gallantly leading his regiment. He was struck in the breast, and died in a few hours. Clitz fell that day also. John Reynolds was taken prisoner. I was forced that night to withdraw Porter's force to my side of the Chickahominy, and therefrom to make a very dangerous and difficult movement to reach the James river. I *must* say good-night, now, for I am very tired, and may require all my energies for to-morrow.

July 4, *Berkley.*— . . . You will understand before this reaches you the glorious yet fearful events which have prevented me from writing. We have fine weather to-day, which is drying the ground rapidly. I was quite stampeded yesterday just before your father left. A report came to me that the enemy were advancing in overwhelming numbers, and that none of my orders for placing the troops in position and reorganizing them had been carried out. I at once rode through the camps, clear in front of them, to let them see that there was no danger. They began to cheer as usual, and called out that they were all right and would fall to the last man "for Little Mac!" I saw where the trouble was, halted all the commands, looked at the ground, and made up my mind what the true position was. Started Smith at a double-quick to seize the key-point, followed by a battery of horse-artillery at a gallop. They went up most beautifully, opened on the enemy, drove him off after eighteen rounds, and finally held the place. I pushed Slocum's division up in support,

hurried off Heintzelman's corps to take its position on Franklin's left, supported by Keyes still further to the left, and came back to camp a little before dark with a light heart for the first time in many days. I am ready for an attack now; give me twenty-four hours even, and I will defy all secession. The movement has been a magnificent one; I have saved all our material, have fought every day for a week, and marched every night. You can't tell how nervous I became; everything seemed like the opening of artillery, and I had no rest, no peace, except when in front of my men. The duties of my position are such as often to make it necessary for me to remain in the rear. It is an awful thing.

I have re-established the playing of bands, beating the calls, etc., by way of keeping the men in good spirits, and have ordered the national salute to be fired to-day at noon from the camp of each corps. I have some more official letters to write so I must close this, and must soon start to ride around the lines.

July —, Monday, 7:30 A.M.—I have had a good, refreshing night's sleep. . . . We are to have another very hot day; it is already apparent. I am writing in my shirt-sleeves and with tent-walls raised, etc. . . . Our army has not been repulsed; we fought every day against greatly superior numbers, and were obliged to retire at night to new positions that we could hold against fresh troops. The army behaved magnificently; nothing could have been finer than its conduct. . . .

July 8.— . . . The day is insufferably hot, intense, so much so that I have suspended all work on the part of the men. I have written a strong, frank letter to the President, which I send by your father. If he acts upon it the country will be saved. I will send you a copy to-morrow, as well as of the other important letters which I wish you to keep as my record. They will show, with the others you have, that I was true to my country, that I understood the state of affairs long ago, and that had my advice been followed we should not have been in our present difficulties. . . . I have done the best I could. God has disposed of events as to Him seemed best. I submit to His decrees with perfect cheerfulness, and as sure as He rules I believe that all will yet be for the best. . . .

Midnight.—Everything is quiet now; none awake save the sentinels. I am alone with you and the Almighty, whose good and powerful hand has saved me and my army. The terrible moments I have undergone of late I regard as a part of the cross I have to bear, and, with God's help, will endure to the end when my task is finished. I place myself in His hands, and with a sincere heart say His will be done. Oh! how ardently I pray for rest. Rest with you. I care not where, only that I may be alone with you. We are to have service at headquarters to-morrow morning, and I will endeavor to have it every Sunday hereafter.*

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*The following order will be read with interest in this connection:

General Orders, No. 7.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6, 1861.

The major-general commanding desires and requests that in future there may be a more perfect respect for the Sabbath on the part of his command.

Private Letters

July 9, 9:30 P.M., *Berkley*.—I telegraphed you briefly this afternoon that I thought Secesh had retired. This opinion seems to be fully confirmed, at least to the extent of his having fallen back a certain distance. He is not within six or seven miles of us even with his cavalry, and considerably further with his infantry. I am not sorry, on the whole, that he has gone, for the reason that it will enable my men to rest tranquilly—just what they need. I do not expect to receive many reinforcements for some time. Even Burnside's men are halted at Fortress Monroe by order of the President. His excellency was here yesterday and left this morning. He found the army anything but demoralized or dispirited; in excellent spirits. I do not know to what extent he has profited by his visit; not much, I fear. I will enclose with this a copy of a letter I handed him, which I would be glad to have you preserve carefully as a very important record. . . . My camp is now immediately on the banks of the James river, in the woods. . . .

7 A.M. (10*th*).— . . . Rose a little before six. . . . I do not know what paltry trick the administration will play next. . . . I have honestly done the best *I* could. I shall leave it to others to decide whether that was the best that could have been done, and, if they find any one who can do better, am perfectly willing to step aside and give way. I would not for worlds go through that horrid work again, when with my heart full of care, I had to meet everybody with a cheerful smile and look as lighthearted as though nothing were at stake. . . .

Telegram—*Berkely, July* 10, 1862.—We are all very well and in good spirits. Secesh has gone off and left us for the present. Clitz is certainly in Richmond, recovering from his wounds. If properly supported I will yet take Richmond. Am not in the least discouraged; am in better health than for many months. Your father returned to Washington two days ago.

July 12.—I am sure that God will bring us together again in this world; but, whether so or not, we will try to so live that we may be reunited in that world where we can be happy for ever and never again be parted. . . . In this weary world I have seen but little happiness save what I have enjoyed with you. How very happy our first year of married life was, when we were together! So the baby has more teeth! I suppose when I come back I shall find her handling a knife and fork. When will she begin to say a word or two? I hope she will not begin to do much before I come home. I want to have the fun and satisfaction of watching her progress in life

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We are fighting in a holy cause, and should endeavor to deserve the benign favor of the Creator.

Unless in the case of an attack by the enemy, or some other extreme military necessity, it is commended to commanding officers that all work shall be suspended on the Sabbath; that no unnecessary movements shall be made on that day; that the men shall, as far as possible, be permitted to rest from their labors; that they shall attend divine service after the customary Sunday morning inspection, and that officers and men shall alike use their influence to insure the utmost decorum and quiet on that day. The general commanding regards this as no idle form; one day's rest in seven is necessary to men and animals; more than this, the observance of the holy day of the God of Mercy and of Battles is our sacred duty.

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

and the development of her accomplishments. . . . I enclose with this a letter from Stanton and my reply, which I want you to preserve very carefully with my other "archives," as it may be important. . . .

July 13, *Sunday*, 7:45 A.M.—I have ordered all labor suspended to-day to give the men a chance to think of all they have gone through. We are to have service to-day by the chaplain of Gregg's regiment Penn. cavalry. Next Sunday I think I will invite Mr. Neal to preach for us, provided there is any attendance to-day.

I enclose this in an envelope with some letters I send you; one from Bishop McIlvaine, which will gratify you, I know; another from some poor fellow in Indiana who has named his child after me. If you choose to send out some little present to it, well and good.

1:30 P.M.— . . . Had service this morning by the chaplain of Gregg's regiment, the Rev. Mr. Egan, an Episcopal clergyman of Philadelphia. . . . There never was such an army; but there have been plenty of better generals. When I spoke about being repulsed I meant our failure to take Richmond. In no battle were we repulsed. We always at least held our own on the field, if we did not beat them. . . . I still hope to get to Richmond this summer, unless the government commits some extraordinarily idiotic act; but I have no faith in the administration, and shall cut loose from public life the very moment my country can dispense with my services. Don't be alarmed about the climate. It is not at all bad yet, and we are resting splendidly. The men look better every day. So you want to know how I feel about Stanton, and what I think of him now? I will tell you with the most perfect frankness. I think . . . I *may* do the man injustice. God grant that I may be wrong! For I hate to think that humanity can sink so low. But my opinion is just as I have told you. He has deceived me once; he never will again. Are you satisfied now, lady mine? I ever will hereafter trust your judgment about men. Your woman's tact and your pure heart make you a better judge than my dull apprehension. I remember what you thought of Stanton when you first saw him. I thought you were wrong. I now know you were right. Enough of the creature!

Since I reached here I have received about 8,500 or 9,000 fresh troops. My losses in the battles will not be over 12,000. Burnside has 8,000 (about) at Fortress Monroe, where he was detained by order of the President. He has been in Washington and will probably be here himself to-night when I will know the views of the President. The probability is that I will attack again very soon—as soon as some losses are supplied. I also wish to get off all the sick and wounded.

11:30 P.M.—Have just been at work dictating my report of the recent operations; got as far as bringing Porter back across the Chickahominy. . . . Please reply to Mr. ——— and say that I thank him and feel deeply grateful for his trust and kind feeling, and that I am glad to say that there is no reason for despondency on account of my present position. I flatter myself that this army is a greater thorn in the side of the rebellion than ever, and I most certainly (with God's blessing) intend to take Richmond with it. . . . I trust that we have passed through our darkest time, and that God will smile upon us and give us victory. . . .

HISTORY OF THE ENGINEER BATTALION

A paper read before the
"Essayons Club" of the Corps of Engineers,
Dec. 21, 1868

BY

THOMAS TURTLE

First Lieutenant, Engineers

Extract

* * * * * * *

By act of Congress of August 6, 1861, the U. S. Engineer troops were increased by the addition of three companies of 150 enlisted men each. This latter company was not organized until after the war and the men enlisted for it (only some half dozen) were sent to the engineer companies.

Of the additional companies of engineers, one (Company C) was organized at Boston, and one (Company B) at Portland. These joined the old company (A), at Washington in the fall of 1861. The third additional company (Company D), was organized by transfer from Companies A, B and C, while the Army of the Potomac lay at Harrison's Landing (July 4, 1862).

During the winter of 1861-62 the engineer troops were engaged in the construction of works in the vicinity of Washington and in building a ponton bridge at Harper's Ferry.

From this time to the close of the war the engineer troops were on duty with the Army of the Potomac.

At the siege of Yorktown:

"The Battalion was engaged on the trenches and communications, from the beginning to the end of operations. It furnished superintending and instructing details for parts of the entire line. The Battalion also assisted in making roads, and laid several bridges of pontons, three of the most important of which were composed of batteaux and crossed the north branch of Wormley Creek. The troops of the line at this early period of the war had received no practical instruction in making batteries and throwing up breastworks. The Battalion was drawn upon heavily in consequence, to furnish men, who always performed the duty of laying out the works, and imparting instruction to the troops of the line. Almost the entire line of trenches was in charge of Duane and his officers and men of the Battalion."*

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*Letter of Bvt. Brig.-Gen. C. B. Reece, Major, U. S. Corps of Engineers.

At Fair Oaks the Battalion was under arms during the entire night at New Bridge on the Chickahominy, awaiting orders to throw a bridge; and next morning was engaged in building one bridge and part of another, and in constructing the roads leading to the same. During the construction of these bridges the rebel sharpshooters had possession of the opposite bank of the river.

A portion of the Battalion at the battle of Mechanicsville was ordered to New Bridge for the purpose of tearing up the bridge at that point as soon as the army had crossed. The Battalion was subsequently ordered to Gaines' Mills, where it threw up intrenchments on the right of Gaines' house. Portions of the Battalion were stationed at the different bridges to destroy them as soon as the army should finish crossing. They were under arms all night, and destroyed the bridges just after daylight on June 28, the enemy appearing on the opposite bank before the work of demolition was fairly over. The roads to the rear were also put in proper condition for use, a portion of them being impassable. After the battle of Gaines' Mills the Battalion was ordered to White Oak Swamp in advance of the army to repair the roads and crossing, which were impassable, and to again render them impassable after the army had passed. At Malvern Hill the Engineer Battalion was posted on the edge of a piece of woods to act as infantry. It received orders to slash this piece of timber in such a manner that by cutting a few trees the whole would fall. In this it was assisted by the 4th Maine Volunteers. After the army had left Harrison's Landing the Engineer Battalion, assisted by the Volunteer Engineers, built the bridge near the mouth of the Chickahominy. This bridge was about 2,000 feet in length.

THE ENGINEER BATTALION IN THE CIVIL WAR

By

GILBERT THOMPSON

Private and Corporal in the Battalion during the Civil War. Major, Corps of Engineers, D. C. N. G.

1890-1898

Revised and Rewritten under the Direction of the Commandant Engineer School, U.S. Army

By

JOHN W. N. SCHULZ

Second Lieut., Corps of Engineers

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WASHINGTON BARRACKS, D. C.
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1910

The Peninsula Campaign

* * * * * * *

From March 16 the Battalion was employed in loading steamers and boats with bridge and engineering material, preparatory to the movement of the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe.

On the 17th the companies fell in ready for marching, with teams hitched up, and everything in order for a move.

But it was not until the 26th that the Army finally embarked for its trip down the river. Never had there been seen on the Potomac at Washington such a brilliant spectacle as was presented at night by the hundreds of vessels, with lights at the mastheads—the whole resembling a floating city. The myriad sounds of a vast populace filled the air and echoed along the water. To transport such an army, with its materials, was of itself a prodigious undertaking, and in its successful execution deserving of much admiration.

On March 27, the Battalion on the steamers *Herald* and *Maryland,* with cargoes in tow, left Washington. A small detachment under Sergt. Robert Ayres, of A Company, was left behind to look after some property.

On March 28 we arrived at Fort Monroe, and anchored between the fort and the rip-raps (now Fort Wool) close to the famous *Monitor,* which had steam up, ready for action.

March 29. Reveille at 5 A.M. We disembarked at Hampton Creek, pitched tents, and unloaded material.

April 1. A man of Company C died of pleurisy. The carpenters pulled the boards from a house to make his coffin. He was buried in a cemetery north of the fort.

The forward movement toward Yorktown began the 4th. The Battalion had reveille at 3:30 A. M. We marched at noon, and camped on Big Bethel battle ground. The next day, the Battalion started out early, and although we made but little progress, on account of the terrible condi-

tion of the roads, we kept on until after midnight, when we lay down by the road. After an hour's rest we moved on until noon. The Battalion camped at Camp McClellan. Company B was ordered to Ship Point, and detachments were sent out to fix roads.

April 7. Moved forward and camped on Dr. Power's plantation. Lieutenant Comstock, with a detachment of the Battalion, examined the enemy's position. Hard rains set in and the roads were in a terrible condition.

On April 10 we made gabions, and on the 11th moved to near Wormsley Creek, marching 5 miles. No drums were allowed to be beaten. The detachment under Sergeant Ayres, which had remained in Washington until April 2, arrived in camp, having marched from Hampton by way of Ship Point. The officers made examinations at the front, while the construction of siege material was actively carried on by the Battalion.

During the night of April 14 we built a ponton bridge across Black Creek, but, as we were short of boats, we did not reach the opposite bank. The boats were unloaded in the creek near camp, and under cover of darkness were rowed as quietly as possible out to the open water of York River, and then into the creek where the bridge was to be laid.

On the 17th one of our rafts was caught out on the river and shelled; one boat was smashed, but no one was hurt.

A working detail of New York Zouaves took part in making gabions on April 18th. Details from the companies went to the front and threw up a 16-gun battery on the left; and Battery No. 1, commanding York River, was also started.

Detachments were out at night, in charge of working details of infantry. Although it was expected that the infantry would protect the Engineer parties, arms were generally taken along, and on several occasions, at the prospect of a brush on the picket line, the detail formed into line and loaded for an attack.

April 19. Threw a ponton bridge at night across Wormsley Creek. It was very dark. The enemy's pickets were near, and no noise was made; not even a match was struck. Our troops crossed at daylight.

As the work progressed on the batteries, considerable artillery fire was indulged in. On May 2 work had to be suspended at Batteries 10, 13, and 14 for a while on account of the heavy fire. This unnecessary fusillade, at all times and in all directions, made us think, as afterwards proved to be correct, that Yorktown was being evacuated.

The night of May 3, parties were at work on batteries at various points along the line. The magazines of some had to be enlarged, and repairs of embrasures, etc., had to be looked after.

Sunday morning, May 4, fatigue parties were started out as usual, one to make scaling ladders at the sawmill. A detachment was ordered to Battery 10, and on its arrival found two companies of the Twenty-second Massachusetts Volunteers deployed as skirmishers and ready to advance, as the pickets had reported that Yorktown was evacuated. These companies charged forward with a cheer, and planted their flag on the works, but the Engineer party was not allowed to follow them.

May 5, in a heavy rain, we put the boat train in order, and loaded thirty-four boat wagons. The Battalion was placed in charge of one ponton train complete.

May 8, at 2 P. M., we moved out, and camped on the field where the surrender of Cornwallis had occurred on October 20, 1781.

May 9. The Battalion marched through Yorktown. The next few days we followed the Army, camping as best we could, sometimes without tents or cooked food, as frequently the wagons were not up until after midnight.

May 13. We marched all day, and at dark Company B started out to clear the road of trees which had been felled across it by the enemy. Fires had to be built before any cutting or clearing could be done. The boat train was taken along. Occasionally the boats had to be extricated from the mud by hand, and the road corduroyed in places

to get them through. At daylight every one was so fatigued that to stop even for a moment caused one to fall down asleep. Just as the firm ground at Cumberland Landing was reached, the advance of the infantry came along under command of Brigadier-General Slocum, United States Volunteers, who, not knowing that they had had no rest for twenty-four hours, and angry at their supposed lazy condition, put "Duane's men" under arrest en masse. They were quickly released on arrival at headquarters.

May 14. Starting out at 6 P. M., we marched all night, and reached White House Landing at 8 A. M., the 15th. We were inspected at retreat, and ordered to lay on our arms, ready for an attack. This was the great camp of the Army of the Potomac.

May 20. Camp was moved to near Tunstalls Station, on York River Railroad.

May 21. Lieutenant Comstock made examinations at Bottom Bridge.

May 22. The Battalion moved to Cold Harbor, camping near the junction of the roads. The officers were constantly making surveys and examinations as far as the Chickahominy River, taking men along to assist. The Battalion ponton train was turned over to the Fifteenth and Fiftieth New York Volunteer Engineers.

May 25. Fatigue parties were out all day. At dark, Company B went down to the Chickahominy River, at New Bridge, and, under the cover of the heavy growth of timber along its banks, unloaded a boat train. The work was done so quietly that at 20 yards the noise of the unloading could scarcely be heard. A heavy shower occurred during the night, and the men returned to camp soaked.*

May 27th, at 4 A. M., Companies A and C marched to New Bridge, and threw a pontoon bridge, afterwards taken up, as the enemy's pickets made an advance. While the bridge was being laid, the enemy's pickets were in plain sight, but

*New Bridge was an old road crossing, and this was its local designation. The wooden bridge at this crossing was destroyed on our advance, probably by fire, as the uprights remained and were an annoyance in our later bridge work.

they offered no opposition, not a shot being fired. A portion of Company A, in going out, got mixed up with General Porter's infantry column, and came very near getting into the fight that day at Hanover Court House. After returning to camp, the Battalion moved forward and camped near W. Gaines' house.

On May 31st occurred the Battle of Fair Oaks. The beginning of the battle could be plainly seen from near the Engineer camp. At 5:30 P.M., the Battalion, under arms, went to New Bridge, loaded rifles, and then tried to build a bridge, but without success.*

The work was resumed at daylight, June 1, and two bridges were finally laid by the Battalion.† The valley of the Chickahominy was flooded with water, and extra guy lines were required to hold the boats in position. The Battle of Fair Oaks could be still heard raging below. General Barnard, the Chief Engineer Officer of the Army of the Potomac, ordered Lieutenant Babcock to make an examination of the approaches on the far side. He started across with Sergeant Ayres and twelve men, but they had not proceeded far when, as they turned a bend in the road, they were fired upon by the enemy's pickets; one man, Austin,‡ of Company A, was shot. This detachment was the only one to cross the stream at New Bridge. At night, the church bells at Richmond could be clearly heard—a distance of six and one-third miles.

On June 2, 3, and 4, details were out at the bridges on the Chickahominy.

On the 5th, some of the ponton boats at New Bridge were smashed by shells. At Lower Trestle Bridge, 1 mile

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*The night was intensely dark and the dense foliage of the swamp excluded any little light that was in the heavens. The stream . . . rose rapidly during the night. Captain Duane, who at New Bridge had the simplest task of all—that of bringing his pontons into position between existing abutments—found the darkness, the powerful current, and the rising stream too much to contend with, and postponed his operations until daylight.—*Report of Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard.*

†See Appendix II for an account of the military bridges over the Chickahominy.

‡Austin was the first to receive a serious injury, although the men of the Battalion had had close calls at Yorktown.

below New Bridge, where the swamp was still flooded waist deep, long corduroy approaches were built.

June 6. Lieutenant Cross had a party at Lower Trestle Bridge. The end of the corduroy approach was in sight of the enemy's pickets, and Lieutenant Cross, going out to examine the road, drew their fire, a few of the detachment being wounded.

Details were out every day, also at night. The constant work in the water of the Chickahominy became very trying; the water had fallen; dead animals and filth were encountered; heavy showers at night rendered a dry sleep impossible, and the health of the command suffered.

On June 11 the construction of Duane's Bridge was begun. This was one of the most important bridges on the river, located just westward of the mouth of Boatswain Swamp, and work continued upon it night and day. In places the water was over one's head, but this in some respects was an advantage, as the heavy logs could be floated in place for the stringers. The stream was also examined for some distance by a boat party. A favorable point for a foot bridge was found a short distance upstream, at an old beaver dam.

June 13. The Battalion moved camp to just beyond Dr. Gaines'. Work was continued on the bridges. About this time also, two batteries were laid out near the Hogan house, and a battery close to and covering the approach to New Bridge.

June 17. Duane's Bridge was completed. It was about 900 feet long, was built in a very substantial manner of cribs and corduroy, and was strong enough for the heaviest artillery and trains.

June 19. We moved across Duane's Bridge to "Camp Lincoln," near Dr. Trent's. Orders were very strict about leaving camp. Details were out building batteries near Dr. Gaines' house. The battery at the head of New Bridge received a pounding each day, involving repairs and revetting each night. Lieutenant Comstock with orderlies, accompanied scouting parties which examined the country between the position of the Army and the James River.

June 20. Strict orders were issued about leaving camp, except on pass. A hospital for our sick was fixed up, near a spring, at the edge of the woods adjoining camp.

June 22. A detail of Company B laid out some fortifications at New Bridge, and some new works were also built near Dr. Gaines' house.

June 26. The Battle of Mechanicsville. The Battalion made gabions in the forenoon. In the afternoon we heard the heavy firing and saw the ambulances going to the rear. Detachments were sent out at dark to the bridges, and one large party under Sergeant Pratt, of Company C, left at midnight. He reported to Lieutenant Reese at Dr. Gaines' house, receiving orders to proceed to New Bridge, in order to dismantle the ponton bridge, put the material into the boats, and float the whole down the stream. The men stacked arms at New Bridge, and were under way when they encountered a number of large trees felled across the channel, which had either to be sawed or cut away. They had to work very carefully, as the enemy's pickets had closed down to the bank and could have entered the boats if so disposed, while our own pickets were withdrawn from our shore, at New Bridge, when the ponton bridge was taken up. It was now daylight, and the men were in a critical position, but they continued work, Sergeant Pratt giving them orders to defend themselves with their axes and oars if attacked. Shortly after, orders were received to get the material out on the bank and burn it, and to scuttle the ponton boats, leaving the anchors in them. This was speedily done, and, just as it was completed, an order came to take arms and get away as quickly as possible. During this affair the detachment was for a time caught between the lines, the Battle of Gaines' Mill breaking out while they were taking arms.

The same morning, June 27, a detail under charge of Corporal Flood, of Company A, superintended the construction of a line of rifle pits on the crest of the hill to the front of Smith's Division. A brigade of the enemy moved out to attack, and the Engineer detachment loaded rifles and joined in the defense; the affair turned out, however, to be

only a feint, intended to cover the real movement across New Bridge. From the position on the hill, the smoke of our burning ponton boats could be seen. When the rifle pit was finished, the detail took position in a redoubt at the rear, and finally marched to Savage Station. Detachments were on duty at the bridges to keep them in order. At dark a detail under Lieutenant Reese went to the Grapevine Bridge, with orders to destroy it after the troops had retired to the south bank of the Chickahominy. Another detail, under Lieutenant Cross, was to go to the Woodbury and Alexander Bridge, for a similar purpose.

Toward daylight, the 28th, Brig. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, gave orders personally to Lieutenant Reese: "As soon as this brigade has passed, you will destroy the bridge." But stragglers and small detachments continued to come along, and, more than all else to excite sympathy, the wounded; so that the last span was kept partly in place, or relaid, occasionally, until an hour or more after sunrise. The enemy's skirmishers finally appeared, when the structure was destroyed by cutting the few remaining supports. The axe proved to be a more certain destructive agent than gunpowder. It was a trying all night's task, and almost without rest.

The detachment of twelve men under Lieutenant Cross, going to the Woodbury and Alexander Bridge at daylight, found themselves without infantry support. A skirmish line was made up of half the men, the other half being equipped with axes. A squad of the enemy's cavalry came down upon the party, but was fired upon by the skirmishers and driven back. The bridge was finally destroyed.

Late in the afternoon the Battalion marched to White Oak Swamp, and bivouacked at the head of the corduroy crossing which had been constructed by the volunteer engineers.

June 29. The Army was still on the retreat, bound for the James. During the day the Battalion kept White Oak Crossing in condition. This required unremitting care, as the wagon trains kept moving without a break. It was intensely hot and suffocating in the dense swamp, and as hard

on the men as if the Battalion had been in battle. The retiring troops threw away blankets and coats, at this point, to such an extent that one miry spot was repaired by spreading blankets over light brush. By making layers in this way, and adding earth, a heavy wagon would go over as though on a rubber carpet. At dark, we marched to Charles City Cross Roads, and camped, thoroughly worn out. Our sick were left at Savage Station and captured.*

June 30. The Battalion marched with trains, and reached the James River at Haxall's Landing. We repaired roads and aided in keeping the trains moving. The men were worn out with fatigue and lack of food.

July 1. We moved out early, and marched out to the right so far that the sound of the battle at Malvern Hill was at our left. Lieutenant Babcock posted a picket near the junction of some roads while the Battalion loaded rifles and deployed across the road in line of battle, then lay down on our arms. After remaining at this point for nearly an hour, the Battalion marched back and cut a heavy abattis, which is shown on the maps between Carters Mill Pond and the pike. Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, the commander of the Third Army Corps, personally examined this position, and was emphatic in his demand that it be made absolutely impenetrable. A section of a battery was put in position, with an infantry support, and we made a thorough entanglement in their front. This completed, we returned to our camp at Haxalls, and at dark started on the march down the river. At first we were taken on a wrong road for several miles, so that it was long after daylight when we reached Harrisons Landing. This night's march was the darkest time the Battalion, and probably the whole Army of the Potomac, experienced. It was a sore disappointment to leave in the night, with the knowledge that the enemy had been beaten back in every charge that day at Malvern Hill.

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*These men were taken to Richmond, where they saw our captured ponton boats driven in triumph through the city, a brass band in front.

The famous "Seven Days' Retreat" was at an end, and the Army settled down at Harrisons Landing. It was not, however, a period of inaction for the Engineer troops. Hardly had we finished some coffee the morning of July 2, than we were ordered out to slash a range through the timber, to enable the gunboats to throw shell to protect the camp. We were aided in this by some fresh troops from the Shenandoah Valley.*

July 5. Company D was organized by details of picked men, every one in good health, from the other companies.

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*Our sick list at Harrisons Landing was so large that it was a problem to get a detail for fatigue duty. One day Sergeant Gerber admonished the last and only man of Company A in camp, as follows: "Ven I calls out 'Tur-rn out, Company A,' you Private Rue, tur-rn out."

Appendix II.

Military Bridges Over the Chickahominy, 1862


(Extracts from a paper by
Major Gilbert Thompson, C. E., D. C. N. G.)

There were a number of bridges and crossings, of the Chickahominy, which were destroyed upon the approach of General McClellan, in May, 1862. Some of them date back to the time of the American Revolution, and the rebuilding of these, together with the construction of a few new bridges, caused considerable confusion in their designations, as appears from the official reports and maps of the operations in that vicinity. I have had occasion to unravel some puzzles in which these crossings were involved, and will offer an account of them which I trust will be of interest.

I will begin with the one known as "Bottom Bridge," at the crossing of the Williamsburg stage road to Richmond, about 1 mile below the bridge of the Richmond and York River Railroad. The name is probably derived from the bottom lands characteristic of the Chickahominy.

The division of General Casey reached this place on May 20th, and crossed without opposition, by fording, the next day. The volunteer engineers put the bridge in order for crossing, as also the railroad bridge, over which a locomotive crossed the 27th at 7 P.M. Forty Government bridge builders assisted in the work.

About 2 miles above the railroad bridge another crossing was prepared, designated as "Summer's Lower Bridge." About $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles farther upstream was constructed a bridge on the old site of "Grape-Vine Bridge," and designated sometimes as "Summer's Upper Bridge." This was destined to be the historic bridge of the Army of the Potomac. I know of nothing more heroic or thrilling in the varied


COLD HARBOR
MECHANICSVILLE
Meadow Bridge
Mechanicsville Bridge
Upper Meadow Bridge
New Bridge
Woodbury's Bridge
Lower Trestle Foot Br.
Trestle Bridge
Alexander's Bridge
Sumners Upper or Grapevine Br.
Sumners Lower Br.
MILITARY BRIDGES
ON THE
CHICKOHOMINY RIVER
1862
SCALE
0
2
3 MILES

records of that Army than when General Sumner's men, at the time of the floods and Battle of Fair Oaks, ahead of orders, marched so closely over this bridge to the relief of their advance division as to hold the flooring down by their weight—as soon as the last man had crossed, the bridge floated away. The railroad bridge for several days was the only means of communication between the main body of the Army and its left wing. The other bridges were rebuilt, however, with the exception of Sumner's Lower Bridge, after the floods subsided.

The character of the bottom lands along the Chickahominy River necessitated the construction of long approaches of corduroy, some of which were raised, above the general level, upon stringers. At Sumner's Upper Bridge the solid ground came in comparatively close to the stream. And, although there were stronger and better bridges afterwards built, which I shall mention, this bridge was probably the only one available for the crossing of General Porter's command to the south side of the river after the Battle of Gaines Mill, June 27th.

It is stated in reports, however, that two bridges were used. If so, the second bridge was the one known as the "Woodbury and Alexander Bridge," situated about one quarter of a mile upstream from the former. Upon some maps and in some statements, this bridge is given the single name of "Woodbury," or "Alexander," more frequently the latter. It was named for Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury, commanding the Engineer Brigade of the Army of the Potomac, and for Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers, who selected its site. This was a fine structure, finished June 17th, and built by the volunteer engineers, with working parties from the Ninth and Twenty-second Massachusetts and the Third Vermont Regiments. It crossed the stream at right angles, and then made a turn upstream, along the northern bank. It had a total length of 1,080 feet, and was constructed entirely upon cribs and stringers, so that it would be above, and able to withstand any danger from, floods.

About 2 miles above was a small bridge, suitable for infantry only, known as "Woodbury's Bridge," or as the "Infantry Bridge." This was built by the volunteer engineers, and was situated southward from the Adam's house.

A short distance above this was "Duane Bridge," constructed by the United States Engineer Battalion, under command of Capt. J. C. Duane, assisted by details from General Porter's and Gen. W. F. Smith's commands. This was a first-class structure, in all respects, and about 1,200 feet in length. While it was being built the water had not entirely subsided, and the very heavy stringers could be floated to their place. This bridge was nearly straight, and was the main line of travel from the vicinity of Dr. Gaines' house to the south bank. It was finished June 17th, and, on the 19th, General Headquarters was moved across it and "Camp Lincoln" established, at Dr. Trent's.

Just above this, the Regular Engineers made a crossing, known as the "Foot Bridge," over what looked like an old beaver dam. Only infantry, in single file, could cross it.

The bridges which I have mentioned were the only ones over which regular communication was held by the Army of the Potomac, over the Chickahominy River.

Eight miles above Bottom Bridge, where the main road crossed the Chickahominy, from Cold Harbor to Richmond, was "New Bridge." The original structure was built upon piles, and destroyed when the advance reached there on May 22d. The volunteer engineers took possession of Dr. Gaines' sawmill, and got out sawed timber and framed it for a bridge, 114 feet long, to replace the original "New Bridge." This material was hauled down to the site of the bridge after dark, but was never used. The Regular Engineers, afterwards, built corduroy approaches, and put in two ponton bridges. The material that had been collected for bridges was swept away by the floods of May 31st, but by heroic work, at 8:15 A.M., June 1st, New Bridge was available for crossing by all arms of the service. This was accomplished more easily at this point than elsewhere, because of the fact that the original approaches were by way of a raised earth causeway.

A little over a mile below was built a corduroy bridge, with a couple of pontons in the stream. This was known as the "Lower Trestle Bridge." And at about the same distance above New Bridge was built the "Upper Trestle Bridge," a crib and corduroy structure, located southward from Ellisons Mill, the scene of the Battle of Mechanicsville, June 26th. The approaches to these two bridges were never completed to the firm ground, on the south side, but infantry could have crossed at any time, and if required they could have been made ready in two hours for artillery. In this portion of the Chickahominy bottom it was more open, there being only patches of timber and a fringe of mixed growth along the stream. Consequently, the Engineers and working details were frequently driven from their work by sharpshooters and artillery fire. All these bridges were made available for crossing to the south bank in eighteen days after their almost total destruction by the flood, a considerable portion of this work in the vicinity of New Bridge being accomplished at night.

To add something about the value of these bridges, and of their destruction, during the Seven Days' Battle:

The Upper Trestle Bridge was destroyed by the volunteer engineers, the afternoon of June 26th, during the Battle of Mechanicsville. The same night, Lieutenant Reese, with a detachment of the Regular Engineers, destroyed New Bridge and the Lower Trestle Bridge.

Duane's Bridge, with the approval of General Franklin, was destroyed by Col. B. S. Alexander the afternoon of June 27th, using an infantry regiment for the purpose. The heavy siege pieces mounted at Hogan's and Dr. Gaines' were taken over this bridge, however, before its destruction. It is stated that these guns were drawn away by hand, and that, if a strong bridge had not been in reaching distance, they would have been captured. They were finally put in position on the south side, and covered General Porter's left flank, the afternoon of the 27th, during the Battle of Gaines Mill.

Colonel Alexander found that the work of destruction of Duane's Bridge had been already begun by a small detach-

ment, but by whose orders is unknown. This bridge and the "Foot Bridge," were completely destroyed at sunset.

The Railroad Bridge and the two ponton bridges at Bottom Bridge were probably destroyed, and the boats removed, during the 27th. Therefore, at the close of the Battle of Gaines Mill, the Grape-Vine Bridge and the Woodbury and Alexander Bridge alone remained available for crossing to the south bank. Captain Duane had orders to destroy these bridges after General Porter's troops had crossed, and their destruction has already been recorded in the main part of this History.

A number of regiments are credited with the destruction of some of the foregoing bridges, and by high authorities. It is a safe statement to make, however, that not one of these bridges were destroyed except under the direction of a regular or volunteer Engineer officer, and, with few exceptions, by Engineer troops alone.

TELEGRAPHING IN BATTLE

Reminiscenses of the Civil War

BY

JOHN EMMET O'BRIEN, M.D.

Operator and Cipher-Operator, U. S. Military Telegraph
1862-1866

SCRANTON, PENNSYLVANIA

1910

Extract

* * * * * * *

General Wool had missed and kindly inquired for me, and requested Mr. Sheldon to bring me back to Fort Monroe. McClellan being now on the Peninsula with the army advancing on Yorktown, the telegraph work at Fort Monroe was becoming heavy, so Mr. Sheldon requested that I be returned, and Major Eckert so directed. Richard, Sheldon, Jim Norris and myself were then the operators who, at Fort Monroe, handled and repeated McClellan's business with Washington. With McClellan, in the field, were Harper Caldwell, chief operator; Jesse Bunnell, C. W. Jacques, and others whose names may be found in Plum's history. Jacques and Bunnell were the particularly fast senders at the front, and, in view of the fact that Major Eckert had at first judged my telegraphic skill apparently rather by my youth than by trial, it was amusing when, many times, as I was receiving fast business from those boys, to hear Sheldon, as he looked on, swear till all was blue that never before was such fast stuff taken without a break.

On the single wire and cable above described, pulsed and throbbed, during McClellan's campaign, the hurried orders for supplies, the sharp words about McDowell's Corps, withheld for the defense of Washington, fateful lists of killed and wounded, news of victory and defeat—all the tidings of glory and of horror that pertain to war.

The telegraph worked not only through sea and land, but invaded the clouds, carrying a light wire skyward by balloon near Washington, at Pohick Church, Virginia, and on the Peninsula. I will let Jesse Bunnell tell, in the following letter to me, how Park Spring, who was foreman of line construction with the Army of the Potomac, made these ascensions, and also describe the evacuation of Yorktown. ("M.C." was the telegraphic call for McClellan's headquarters.)

Telegraphing in Battle

"NEW YORK, Nov. 1, 1864.

"Dr. J. E. O'Brien, Scranton, Pa.

"MY DEAR COMRADE: Yours received. The aeronaut who took our wire up on the Peninsula was Professor Lowe, better known amongst us boys as 'Lo! the poor Indian.' So far as I (at 'M C') knew at the time, we were in telegraphic communication with the elevated balloon only two or three times. Park Spring, who was a fair operator, was, I believe, the only one who made these ascensions with Lowe. A double conductor flexible cable looped into the 'M C' wire and we worked direct with Park, who sat in the balloon with a pocket instrument, while Professor Lowe did the rope business, swearing at the men down below, etc. Nothing of any consequence was reported or transacted, however. I think there were no other wired ascensions on the Peninsula.

"At Yorktown, or, rather, before Yorktown, the night it was evacuated, May 4th, I was on duty at 'M C' from 2 A.M. until 8 A.M. The previous evening had been made unusually lively for us by shells from the enemy, who seemed to have determined to give it to us very hot all along the line. We accounted for this by supposing that they were aware that all our heavy guns had at last been gotten into position and that the order was issued to open a terriffic fire the next day. The fact was, they were evacuating Yorktown and shelling us to divert our attention, in which they succeeded perfectly. The tumult kept me awake long after I had turned in at my tent at 8 o'clock P.M., and when Jacques woke me at 2, all was still as death.

"About 3 o'clock I was sitting in the rustic bower which had been built in front of the telegraph tent door, when I saw a light in the sky over Yorktown. It grew larger and appeared to be from a burning building in the town. Then I heard over the wires questions going between the different operators stationed in the front nearest that point, as to 'what was the fire?' Then a few moments later, an order was telegraphed Professor Lowe, at one of these stations, directing him to ascend, observe and report immediately. Then I could dimly see the balloon as it was allowed to rise a hundred feet or more. The report was indefinite, stating that the fire was either a sloop at the wharf or a building in town. But very soon, about 4 o'clock, a sharp, sudden call at the instrument for 'M C' brought a message from, I forget where, stating that a deserter had come in reporting Yorktown evacuated! By the time I had aroused the General and some of his staff and returned to the instrument, several more messages to the same purport from other points were waiting for me, and 'M C' was being frantically called by every one who could get in. The General came to the instrument half-dressed, the staff crowded in and about the tent, telegrams were written or scrawled and rushed to every point on the line, with the result that, in about two hours, our whole army was rushing pell-mell from every point and along every road after the enemy. 'Twas a quick job for 'before breakfast.' They found the enemy, I believe, at Williamsburg. (Near Fort Magruder, two miles before Williamsburg.—*J. E. O'B.*)

"I always recollect this episode as one of the striking occurrences connected with my early experience in the U. S. M. T. I was then but seventeen years old, and felt proud to have been the medium for the transmissions which caused that great army to spring, as one man, from its sleep to pursue the enemy.

"Yours truly,

"J. H. BUNNELL."

Extract

Our wires at the siege of Yorktown connected all the corps headquarters. The two operators, D. B. Lathrop and H. L. Smith, in the intrenchments nearest the town, rushed in with the first of our troops and hastened to the telegraph office to try the Richmond wire. The wires had been cut and left hanging from the pole, and in going to the pole Lathrop trod on a buried torpedo, which exploded, tearing a leg almost off and otherwise injuring him. He died within a few hours. Lathrop was beloved by his comrades, who had his body embalmed and taken to his home at Mount Vernon, Ohio, and erected a monument over his grave. It may be considered a serious charge to say that torpedoes were planted at Yorktown, but this account was attested to me by my comrades at that point, two of whom, Tom Morrison and another, accompanied Lathrop's remains; and, so far as I know, was never doubted by any one at the time. It is, of course, not believed that the treachery was known to, or authorized by, any Confederate officer or any one acquainted with the rules of civilized warfare.

In the rush of McClellan's Corps after the retreating enemy, they encountered them at Fort Magruder, two miles before reaching Williamsburg, and here the Confederates, aided by their fortifications and the nature of the ground, made a determined stand, resulting in the battle of Williamsburg. More vividly than the dispatches of McClellan and his corps commanders, the reports and battle-orders, which I heard on the wire or handled, do I remember the names and regiments of fifteen hundred of our killed and wounded which I "took" from Bunnell or Jacques for transmission North, while the tears were in my eyes and the telegraphic speed was too great to give me time to brush them away.

After Yorktown, the construction party kept the main line up with the troops as they marched, stringing wire loops to corps headquarters when they halted, stringing the wires on poles or trees as the exigencies of the route permitted. Comte de Paris, who was then an aid on General McClellan's staff, attests, in his excellent history of our Civil War, that the Generals were surprised and delighted to find the telegraph at hand at the end of each day's

march, giving them communication with one another and with the base of operations (Fort Monroe).

The instruments of slight resistance and currents of small electro-motive force employed on the well-insulated lines of to-day would hardly have recorded signals or overcome the "escapes" of our field lines of that time. We used "relays" of high resistance and nitric acid batteries of the strongest kind, though these were improved upon in portable apparatus as the war progressed. The operators at the front, too, were experts. Seated perhaps under fire on a stump or cracker-box, while troops and artillery swept by, they would send or take thousands of words of military dispatches at the rate of forty words per minute, without an error. From the battle of Williamsburg to that of Fair Oaks, and in the seven days' fighting, the telegraph assisted largely in handling the several corps of the Army of the Potomac.

At Gaines' Mill, Porter obtained reenforcements at the critical juncture through the promptness of Jesse Bunnell, who tapped the wire as our line of battle receded, and transmitted the necessary dispatches under a heavy fire which killed some of his mounted messengers.

HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA

Source Book

PART II

BY

THE COMTE DE PARIS

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VOLUME II

BOOK I

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PORTER & COATES

The Civil War in America

Vol. II

BOOK I.—RICHMOND

CHAPTER I

Williamsburg

We concluded the former volume with the narrative of the first year of the war, having brought down our review of the campaigns which were being prosecuted in the East and West to within a few days of the anniversary of the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Those campaigns were but the prelude to the far more extensive operations and sanguinary conflicts which we are about to relate.

We shall begin by speaking of the army of the Potomac, of which we have described the slow formation during the autumn and winter of 1861, and of its first movements in the spring of 1862. Whilst the armies of the west have already overrun several States and fought great battles, the former has not yet had an opportunity to seek revenge for the conquerors of Bull Run. In the last chapters of the preceding volume the reader has seen the difficulties of every kind which embarrassed its movements, prevented it from taking the field at an earlier day, and jeopardized the success of the plan of operations so happily conceived by its chief. Nevertheless, after the unlooked-for evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates, after the combats which kept in the valley of Virginia, troops that would have been more useful elsewhere, after Mr. Lincoln's interference in reducing his force to strengthen the garrison of Washington, that army finally embarked at Alexandria, in the last days of March, for the great expedition which was to transfer the seat of war to the vicinity of the enemy's capital; and General McClellan, when he landed upon the

peninsula of Virginia, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, had still a fine army under his command—a numerous army, however imprudently reduced, composed of ardent, vigorous, brave, and intelligent men, although without experience. Recruited among all classes of society, the ranks of this army contained many men of military ability, as yet unknown to the world, and even to themselves, some of whom were about to be sacrificed before they could have a chance of asserting their full worth, whilst others were to be called to direct its long and painful labors. Consequently, despite the mistakes of the government, this army could hope to run a brilliant career upon the ground, classic in the history of the United States, where it was at last to encounter the elite of the slavery troops. It was, in fact, in the peninsula where the soldiers of Washington and Rochambeau completed the glorious work of American emancipation. It was around Yorktown, already made celebrated by the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, that the army of the Potomac was about to fight its first battles; and if it may be permitted to an obscure member of that army to indulge here in a personal reflection, it was the remembrance of the victory achieved by France and America conjointly upon this very soil which caused a throb in the heart of exiles so generously received under the shadow of the flag of the young republic.

Notwithstanding the historical associations which cluster around it, this locality was but little known; and in view of its peculiar configuration, we deem a detailed description necessary to a proper understanding of the operations we are about to relate. Fortress Monroe, situated at the extremity of the peninsula, lies one hundred and fifteen kilometres from Richmond, in a direct line. The route which the Army of the Potomac had to follow was all laid down; it stretched out, bounded on the south by the James River—which is a river (fleuve) at Richmond, and a vast estuary at Newport News—and at the north, first by an arm of the sea called York River, and then by the Pamunky, its principal tributary. The region lying between these watercourses may be divided into two parts. The first, by far

the more important, forms a real peninsula between the salt tide-waters which ascend York River as far as West Point, and the James beyond City Point. This flat country, which is both sandy and marshy, intersected by countless bays, extremely wooded, poor, and thinly peopled, forms the peninsula of Virginia. The second, extending, between the Pamunky and the James proper, to a distance far above Richmond, very undulating, covered with magnificent forests, a little better cultivated than the former, and enlivened here and there by the residences of a few wealthy planters, is divided longitudinally by the Chickahominy, a river rendered famous in the annals of American colonization by the romantic adventures of the traveller John Smith and the Indian maid Pocahontas. This water-course, of little importance from its ordinary volume of water, flows through wooded swamps, where impenetrable thickets alternate with groves of tall white oak, a tree admirably adapted for naval construction, the feet of which are buried in the ooze, while the trunks, as straight as the mast of a ship, rise to extraordinary heights. After a rain-storm, the Chickahominy not only overflows its wooded banks, but, spreading over the adjacent plains, forms a sheet of water which at times is a kilometre in width. This, therefore, was a formidable obstacle in the way of military operations. The river runs parallel with the Pamunky, and cutting off a corner of the peninsula, empties into the estuary of the James at an equal distance from City Point and Newport News. The James on one side, the York River and the Pamunky on the other, form two magnificent lines of communication. The former is navigable as far as Richmond, but the Virginia debarred the Federals from using it. The latter may be ascended as far as White House, a plantation which had formerly belonged to Washington, and was now the property of General Lee. But at the entrance of York River, the two banks of this arm of the sea draw closer, forming a strait commanded by the guns of Yorktown, and batteries erected opposite, at Gloucester Point. Hence the importance which has always attached to the place of Yorktown, around which some slight undulations covered with

rich turf still indicate the trace of the parallel thrown up by the French and American soldiers of 1781. The peninsula itself upon which Yorktown stands is narrowed by a swampy stream, Warwick Creek, which taking its rise at less than two kilometres from the old bastions of this town, empties into the James perpendicularly to its course. It was here that nature had marked out for the Confederates their true line of defence. Having control of James River, thanks to the Virginia, and of York River, owing to the batteries of Gloucester Point, they could not be turned by the Federal navy. The two rivers supplied them with provisions, instead of furnishing the means of attack to their adversaries, and so long as they preserved the line of Warwick Creek, Yorktown could not be invested. All these points, therefore, supported each other mutually. Thirty-two kilometres separated Yorktown from Fort Monroe. Sixteen kilometres farther, another contraction of the peninsula occurs, even narrower than that caused by Warwick Creek, formed by two streams called College Creek and Queen's Creek; one running toward the James, the other toward York River. Near this place stands the oldest university in America, William and Mary College, founded during the reign of William the Third, the spacious building of which, of red and gray brick, together with the courtyards and pavilions, remind one of the English edifices of the eighteenth century, and have an air of antiquity seldom met with in the New World. Around the university is grouped the pretty little town of Williamsburg, the houses of which are surrounded by gardens and shaded by beautiful trees. It was for a time the capital of the colony, when Virginia was richer and had a larger population than at the present day.

Between Fort Monroe and Richmond there is but a single line of railway, which, starting from the latter city, crosses the upper Chickahominy, then the Pamunky at White House, and terminates at West Point, where the latter river and the Mattapony both empty into the salt waters of York River.

Such was the new ground upon which the army of the Potomac was about to fight. The transportation of this army was a difficult task, and was accomplished in a remarkable manner. The first vessels were chartered on the 27th of February; on the 17th of March the first soldier was embarked; and on the 6th of April, all the troops which had not been withdrawn from General McClellan's command were landed upon the peninsula. During this short period of time, four hundred ships, steamers, and sailing vessels, had been collected and taken to Alexandria, and had transported a distance of eighty leagues, 109,419 men, 14,502 animals, 44 batteries, with all the immense material which generally follows such an army, leaving nothing behind them except nine stranded lighters and eight drowned mules.

McClellan had not waited for the end of this operation to take the field. Out of the one hundred thousand men, or thereabouts, he was to have under his command,* he found on the day of his arrival fifty-eight thousand, accompanied with one hundred cannon, in a condition to march. The remainder had either not landed or were without the necessary transportation to take part in a forward movement. Many teams were yet wanting for the numerous wagons, without which troops could not venture among the marshy roads which they were to encounter.

The army was put in motion on the 5th of April, and arrived before Yorktown and Warwick Creek the next day

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*This was the status of the army April 1, 1862:

	Present for active service	On special service or on sick list	Absent	Total
Second corps, Sumner	26,778	1,129	3,130	31,037
Third corps, Heintzelman	33,047	2,795	3,010	38,852
Fourth corps, Keyes	32,924	1,874	3,112	37,910
Regular infantry	3,905	237	623	4,765
Regular cavalry	2,001	170	370	3,141
Reserve artillery	2,731	175	210	3,116
Of different corps	910	73	161	1,144
Total	102,896	6,453	10,616	119,956

without having seen the enemy. The latter had hastily abandoned the few works erected at Big Bethel, in the firm belief that the Federals, who had control of the sea as far as Yorktown, could easily turn all those defences. This first march was not accomplished without some difficulty. The roads were in a deplorable condition. The maps were bad, which was even worse than not having any. They had relied upon those which the officers stationed at Fortress Monroe had taken all winter to prepare, and the several columns, thus misled by false information, could hardly preserve their order of march. Deceived by these incorrect charts as to the direction of Warwick Creek, General McClellan was led to believe that Yorktown could be easily invested. On the 5th, when his right wing appeared before that place, his left encountered the unforeseen obstacle which imparted so much strength to the position of the Confederates. The latter, under General Magruder, had long been preparing for the defence of the peninsula. The fortifications erected by Lord Cornwallis around Yorktown in 1781, within which he had defended himself with a tenacity worthy of the English army, were still in existence. These works were not revetted with masonry, but their profile was considerable. They had been put in order, enlarged, and completed. They were mounted with fifty-six guns, some of very heavy calibre. Batteries had been erected, some along the water's edge and others on the hillocks commanding the river, all of which crossed their fire with that of a large redoubt occupying the sandy promontory of Gloucester Point.

The bastioned fortifications of Yorktown completely enclosed that small town. The line of Warwick Creek which Magruder had selected at the last moment was not so well fortified by art as by nature. The source of this brook lies at twenty-four hundred metres from the bastions of Yorktown, the space between these two points (for the most part open country) being commanded by a lunette, a few breastworks, and an unfinished redoubt. The course of Warwick Creek is bordered throughout by dense forests, through which wind tortuous roads difficult to find, laid

out on a spongy and broken soil. The upper part of this stream is slow and muddy, about twenty metres in breadth, with marshy banks, and commanded on both sides by slight undulations in the ground. It was intersected by five dams, two of which were formerly used to collect the water for milling purposes, the three others having been constructed by Magruder. They produced, by retaining the waters, an artificial inundation, which is the best of all defences. In the rear of each of these dams, the only accessible points to an assailant, rose a small redan. The lower part of the Warwick, subject to the influence of the tide, was surrounded by a triple enclosure of hardened mud, impenetrable cane-brakes, and swampy forests, which forbade approach even to the boldest hunter. This line presented all those peculiarities which render offensive war so difficult in America; but Magruder was not in a condition to dispute its possession for any length of time with the powerful army which had at length encountered his pickets on the 5th of April. The division with which he had been charged to protect the peninsula since the preceding autumn numbered only eleven thousand men. The military authorities of the Confederacy had not guessed or known in advance, as it was pretended at the time, the change of base of the army of the Potomac, or they were singularly careless and improvident, for after McClellan had embarked the greatest portion of his troops at Alexandria, Johnston with all his forces was still waiting for him on the Rapidan. Disturbed by the same fears which had beset Mr. Lincoln, the cabinet of Mr. Davis dared no more than he to uncover their capital; so that on the arrival of McClellan before Yorktown with his fifty-eight thousand men, not a single soldier had as yet been sent to reinforce Magruder. These facts, which have been officially proved since the close of the war, afford the most conclusive evidence in favor of the plan which the commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac had undertaken to carry out. If the line of defence selected by Magruder was naturally strong, it was too much extended, since the Confederate general had only eleven thousand soldiers to occupy about twenty kilometres. He had placed six thousand men at

Gloucester Point and at Yorktown, and in a small work situated on the James, so that he had only five thousand left to defend the whole course of Warwick Creek. Consequently, the Richmond authorities, being fully convinced that he would not be able to maintain himself in that position, sent him a formal order to evacuate Yorktown and to abandon the entire peninsula. But Magruder's obstinacy was proverbial among his old comrades. He refused to obey, and prepared to resist the enemy by placing his troops near the dams and among the few clearings adjacent to the stream, so as to deceive the Federals regarding his real strength. The latter, being received by a well-sustained fire on their appearance, imagined themselves confronted by the skirmishers of an army concealed by the forest; and General Keyes, commanding a column of more than twenty-five thousand men which had thus unexpectedly encountered Warwick Creek, did not consider himself strong enough to force a passage. General McClellan, equally deceived by appearances, thought he had again found behind those mysterious forests the Confederate army which had evacuated Manasses one month before, and did not dare to thrust his sword through the slight curtain which his able adversary had spread before his vision. A vigorous attack upon either of the dams, defended by insignificant works, would have had every chance of success. The enemy could have been kept in suspense by several feints; there were men enough to attempt three of four principal attacks at once; it was easy, in short, to harass him in such a manner that his line of defense would inevitably have been pierced at the expiration of twenty-four hours. In that case Magruder would have paid dear for his audacious resolution, the defenders of Warwick Creek would have been scattered, and Yorktown invested on every side. This place could have been masked until a vigorous bombardment should have compelled it to surrender, and by pressing Magruder close, the whole peninsula would have fallen into the possession of the Federals in a few days. This is what McClellan would not have failed to do if he had known the situation of his adversaries as their published reports have revealed it since. But at

that critical moment no information was received either from spies or from other sources to convey to him the faintest idea of their weakness. The line of defense they had adopted rendered it impossible for him to feel his way before assaulting them seriously. He could not compel them to show themselves except by crossing the narrow dams which intersected Warwick Creek. To attempt this operation he had deemed it proper to wait for the arrival of McDowell's three divisions, which were to turn the enemy's line by the left flank of York River. But on the very evening he reconnoitered the positions of his adversaries he was apprised of the deplorable decision by which the President withdrew from him this entire army corps. An independent command, comprising Fort Monroe and the very country in which the army of the Potomac was then operating, had been created a short time before in favor of General Wool. Finally, the naval force which had been relied upon to assist in the attack on the batteries of Yorktown declared that the necessity of keeping a watch over the Virginia did not permit the detachment of a sufficient number of vessels for that service. This was, indeed, a succession of disappointments, and at a time when it was too late to draw back. It may be argued that this should have been considered as an additional reason for hastening operations, as the chance of obtaining an important success was well worth the risk that might be incurred. The army needed a daring stroke (coup d' audace). Its morale would have suffered less from a sanguinary check than from the fruitless fatigues of a prolonged siege; such a success, in short, would have secured to General McClellan the efficient co-operation of his government. But he would not compromise the young army entrusted to his care in an enterprise which he considered too hazardous. Thinking that the national cause could endure delays and slow movements but not such another disaster as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superiority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his lines.

The Confederates, always under arms, exhausted by continuous service, did not understand what could delay an

attack the issues of which they had such good cause to dread. In the meantime, behind the trees which limited their view, on the southern bank of the Warwick, the whole Federal army was at work, erecting batteries and constructing long solid corduroy causeways through the marshy forests, to make a practicable passage for cannon. But the time which was thus spent was entirely to the advantage of the Confederates. In fact, Magruder's disobedience had been at once acquiesced in. Johnston, leaving the large Federal garrison of Washington to prepare for imaginary combats, quitted the borders of the Rapidan, sending a portion of his forces into the peninsula, while he concentrated himself with the remainder around Richmond.

Some regiments, assembled in haste, had already been forwarded to Yorktown, and Magruder had begun to receive his first reinforcements two days after the arrival of the Federals before that place. When, therefore, after eleven days of reconnaissances and preparatory labors, McClellan determined at last to attack him, his forces were doubled, and his line of defence completed. The numerical disproportion between the two parties, however, was nearly as great as before; for the one hundred thousand men embarked at Alexandria were at last assembled on the narrow extremity of the peninsula, and the President had just informed General McClellan that one of the divisions of McDowell's corps was restored to him; this was Franklin's division, which had been earnestly asked for, and granted as a kind of compromise between the various campaign plans which had been urged upon the acceptance of Mr. Lincoln.

On the 16th of April General McClellan decided to attack the one of the three dams constructed by the enemy which was the lowest on Warwick Creek. Situated at about one thousand metres above Lee's Mills, it formed the centre, and, according to the avowal of the Confederates, the weakest point of their line. A general cannonade was opened, from Yorktown to Lee's Mills, so as not to draw the enemy's attention exclusively to the point where it was intended to begin by silencing his artillery. But instead of making the assault immediately after, the cannonade was prolonged for

six hours, and thus Magruder was given ample time to prepare for defense wherever he might be menaced. At last, towards four o'clock, four companies of the Third Vermont, supported by the fire of twenty-two cannon which had already dismounted two of the three guns in the enemy's work, bravely rushed to the assault of that work. The Federals, crossing Warwick Creek with great boldness below the dàm, took possession of the breastworks which commanded it, after an engagement in which they put to flight two regiments of the enemy, the Fifteenth North Carolina and the Sixteenth Georgia. The most difficult part of the task was accomplished, a foothold having been obtained on the other side of the creek; all that remained to be done was to take advantage of the surprise of the enemy to push regiment after regiment as rapidly as possible across the ford, to pass beyond the breastworks, to take possession of the redoubt, and thus, to pierce the enemy's line; but the generals of various grades who had organized this demonstration had failed to agree beforehand as to the importance it was to assume, and much precious time was lost.

For an hour the foremost assailants exhausted themselves without receiving any other reinforcement than five or six hundred men of the Fourth and Sixth Vermont. The enemy took advantage of this delay to mass all his available forces upon the point menaced: that is to say, more than two divisions. The small body of Federal troops could not attack the redoubt, where the Confederates were increasing in number at every instant, but they made a stubborn defence in the breastworks they had conquered. Being finally overwhelmed by numbers, they were obliged to retire, and recross the river after losing more than two hundred killed and wounded.

Although the Confederates were in a much better condition to repulse that attack on the 16th of April than they would have been on the 6th or 7th, still, if the Federals had followed up the success of the Third Vermont, they would probably have pierced the line of Warwick Creek, and compelled Magruder to fight, without any point of sup-

port, the forty thousand men they could have massed on that strip of land.

This unfortunate affair produced a bad impression on the mind of the soldiers who had seen their comrades sacrificed without any orders being given to go to their assistance. It was moreover, the signals for new delays. On the following day, General McClellan decided to resort to the sure but slow means of a regular siege. The surroundings of Yorktown alone afforded means of approach well adapted for this kind of attack; and on the 17th of April, the first parallel was opened at the head of a ravine situated about two thousand metres from one of the bastions. The inventive and laborious genius of the Americans had there an oportunity to signalize itself. The whole army set to work to cut roads, to construct bridges, to prepare places d'armes, to establish wharves, to dig trenches, and to erect batteries. Nothing was to be seen except manufactures of gabions and fascines. The siege equipage was landed, by dint of patience and exertion; cannon weighing as much as 10,000 kilogrammes, and thirteen-inch mortars, were placed in position. These immense labors, superintended in detail by the general-in-chief, who gave himself up entirely to his old specialty as an engineer officer, were prosecuted with the greatest activity. The woods and some undulations in the ground concealed them from the Confederates, whose shells, thrown at random, generally passed above the workmen, shattering the tall trees of the forest in their career.*

Nevertheless, in spite of all their diligence, the time was passing away, precious time for military operations, for the winter rains were over, and the great summer had not yet set in. The army was impatiently waiting for the moment when all the guns which had been placed in position with so much trouble should finally break the silence, and, crushing the enemy with their fire, compel him to a precipi-

*For one month the headquarters of the army were within reach of the enemy's projectiles. The latter tried in vain to discover their locality, and during that entire month but one single Confederate cannon-ball whistled above the tents of the general staff.

tate retreat. The commanders contemplated the new works which were being thrown up as if by magic along the whole Confederate line, by great gangs of negroes and soldiers; they thought of the assault which would probably follow the bombardment, and were measuring with some uneasiness the vast space of ground swept by the fire of the adversary, which their young soldiers would have to pass over.

The decisive moment was drawing near, and both sides seemed to be preparing for it with equal ardor. Indeed, the combat of Lee's Mills had fully vindicated Magruder in the councils of the President of the Confederacy, and notwithstanding the advice of Lee, his chief of staff, and of Johnston himself, who were in favor of waiting for the enemy in front of Richmond, Mr. Davis had sent the last-mentioned general into the peninsula with all his army, where he was to hold out at least until all the valuable material accumulated in Norfolk could be placed in safety.

On the other hand, Franklin's division had rejoined McClellan on the 22d of April. It had at first been intended for the investment of Gloucester Point, but instead of attempting a sudden assault in that direction, McClellan had preferred to leave it for a few days on board the transports which had brought it over, in order that it might take advantage of the effect of the bombardment to ascend York River at the first signal. Everything was to be ready for the 5th of May; but the day before, at dawn, the Confederate army had disappeared; it had evacuated Yorktown during the night. This movement had been determined upon since the 30th of April, at a council of war held in Yorktown by Jefferson Davis, Lee, Johnston, and Magruder. The evacuation of Norfolk, which followed as a result, was to be effected at the same time.

To ascertain the range of some one-hundred and two-hundred pounders which had just been placed in position, a few projectiles had been thrown into Yorktown. The sight of the damage they had caused was a wholesome warning to the Confederate chiefs, who, knowing themselves to be on the eve of a bombardment, had no desire to wait for its effects. When this decision had been adopted, Johns-

ton emptied his magazines, moved away his material and wagons, and established at the halting-places designated in his line of retreat such provisions as his army would need every evening after a rapid march. In order to conceal his movements, he had sacrificed his heavy artillery, which had kept up a continuous fire upon the besiegers to the last moment, the intensity of which had even been doubled on the evening of the 3d of May so as to deceive them more thoroughly. Seventy-one guns of various calibres were the only trophies abandoned to the Federals. The only thing which distracted from the merit of this able retreat was the commission of certain barbarous acts which the usages of war do not justify. Bombshells and infernal machines were placed in the huts and storehouses, so that they would explode under the feet of the first persons who might be drawn thither by curiosity. A few unfortunate individuals having been killed in this manner, General McClellan very properly employed the Confederate prisoners in ridding Yorktown of these dangerous snares.

When the Federal artillerists beheld the first rays of the sun lighting up the abandoned entrenchments, they felt for a moment stupified. So much labor should at least have ended in a fight, and they had not even the satisfaction of trying those new guns from which they had expected such powerful effects. It was a serious disappointment to all. They were compensated, however, by the immediate prospect of a forward march and a campaign which promised to be thenceforth full of activity.

In evacuating Yorktown the Confederates abandoned York River to the Federals. The latter, therefore, had control of one of the flanks of the peninsula, and were able, by means of a landing, to demolish all the defences by which the enemy might have attempted to stop them between Yorktown and West Point. The army of the Potomac could not allow Johnston to escape a second time, as he had already done at Manassas. It was important to overtake him at all hazards, in order if possible to turn his retreat into a rout, or at least not to allow him leisure to interpose a new barrier against the Federal army on its march upon the

Confederate capital. The peninsula is so narrow that in many places the roads, which passed through it longitudinally, are merged into a single road—a road where wagons can only proceed in single file, and where, as it is impossible for more than four men to march abreast, the troops are obliged to break by the flank. To make an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, accompanied by immense material, follow this single road, was simple impossibility; the head would have reached West Point before the rear had left Yorktown; it became necessary to take advantage of the opening of York River to transport a part of the army by water. Franklin's division was already embarked, and the numerous transports which performed the victualling service for the army took three others on board, to land them near the mouth of the Pamunky in York River, so as to menace seriously the line of retreat of the Confederate army. The land route was reserved by McClellan for the remainder of the army. The advance-guard consisted of Stoneman's division, comprising a little over four regiments of cavalry, two of which were regulars, and four batteries of regular horse artillery. Hooker's division followed on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, while Smith, crossing Warwick Creek at Lee's Mills, struck into a cross-road to the left leading to within sixteen hundred metres of Williamsburg, where it again joined the main road. Kearney's division held itself in readiness to follow Hooker, and those of Couch and Casey to march in rear of Smith.

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Confederate army, which had been carefully planned, was conducted with the greatest order. A large quantity of the material had been transported to West Point by water, whence it could be forwarded to Richmond by rail, and a considerable portion of the army was one or two days' march in advance of the rear-guard. The task of covering this retreat had been entrusted to Longstreet's corps, whose chief had already given token of those remarkable qualities which made him the best of Lee's lieutenants. The Hampton legion closed up the march; this name was given to a brigade of cavalry, accompanied

by a few pieces of artillery, which had been raised in South Carolina by the general whose name it bore. The small space of ground on which Williamsburg is built was designated by nature to have an important bearing on the retreat of the Confederates. It was a narrow gate, easily kept closed, through which the whole army had to file in a single column, and which it was necessary to guard against the seizure of the enemy until the last man had passed.

Defensive works of considerable strength had been constructed there. The two streams, College Creek and Queen's Creek, which as they wind through the dense woods, form numerous ponds in their course, take their rise at a distance of one kilometre from each other. The swamps by which they are surrounded soon render them impassable even for infantry. The space intervening between these two watercourses was for the most part occupied by a cultivated clearing. The woods had been cut down, and the skirt of the forest, being thus extended farther to the south-east by this abatis, described a concave arc of a circle enveloping this small open plateau at the south from one stream to the other. It was here that the two roads from Lee's Mills, on the south, and from Yorktown, on the east, met. A large work closed at the gorge, called Fort Magruder, rose at a distance of three or four hundred metres in the rear of this intersection; it commanded both roads and the entire isthmus. To the north-east and to the south-west the Confederates had constructed, on the west bank of the two streams where the forest had been cut down, a chain of small redoubts, which defended the few passages practicable for infantry. These passages consisted of three dams, two on Queen's Creek and one on College Creek, so narrow that a few men lying in ambush would have barred their approaches to a whole column.

Longstreet, after evacuating Yorktown during the night of the 3d-4th of May, proceeded rapidly toward Williamsburg, situated two thousand seven hundred metres beyond Fort Magruder, on the road to Richmond, for he intended to make there his first halt on the journey. The Federals allowed him to gain a precious advance during the first

hours of that difficult retreat, for they were not early risers in the Union armies. The disappointment was so great at the sudden departure of the Confederates that at first it could not be believed and when the evidence was conclusive, everything had to be organized for an advance, which had not been contemplated. The troops had eaten nothing; the rations had not been distributed; many regiments had sent their wagons to a distance of several leagues to obtain them. In short, the cavalry division only took up its line of march between ten and eleven o'clock, Hooker at one o'clock, Smith a little later, and the other three divisions only at the close of the day. With a little more celerity the Confederate detachments which fell back upon Williamsburg from Lee's Mills would have been intercepted by the Federal cavalry before they could have reached that town.

In spite of all his activity, Stoneman was unable to repair the delay, which could not be imputed to him. Stimulated by certain indications which revealed to him the recent passage of the enemy, such as bivouac fires still burning, he hurried the march of his division; but the Confederate troops who followed the Lee's Mills road had too much start. They were overtaken only by a small detachment led by the Duc de Chartres, which was not strong enough to check the enemy's column; the Federal cavalry, however, had the good fortune to pick up a few prisoners on its flanks. Whatever might have been Stoneman's diligence in other respects, he could not have seriously embarrassed Longstreet's march; for unforeseen accidents supervened to delay still further the infantry destined to sustain him, and thus deprived him of the last chance of overtaking the enemy in time. There was an entire ignorance of the country at the Federal headquarters, the ground already occupied, of which the engineers had made some rough sketches, being the only section known; consequently, mistakes were unavoidable. Having reached the forks of one of the numerous roads which pursue their winding course from clearing to clearing, Smith's division, which kept to the left, took a wrong direction, and struck again into the principal road

between Yorktown and Williamsburg. It thus passed in front of Hooker's division, to which this road had been assigned, stopped its heads of column, and threw confusion into the march of the troops who were huddled together with their artillery and baggage on a single road. From this moment it became impossible to compel the enemy to fight in front of the pass he had fortified; for while the Federal columns were advancing very slowly along the crowded road on the right, on the left the advance guard, consisting of Emory's brigade of cavalry, having no infantry to support it, was forced to watch the enemy at a distance. The latter, plunging finally into the forest which connected Queen's and College Creeks, reached Fort Magruder and the chain of adjoining works. The artillery of the Hampton Legion, together with a few regiments of infantry which formed the rear-guard, finding this formidable line of defences very convenient, hastened to occupy it in order to hold the Federals in check, who were pressing them very close; and when the latter appeared on the edge of the forest, they were received by a tremendous fire. In the meantime, the Sixth Cavalry, having discovered a fordable crossing of Queen's Creek, vigorously charged upon the Confederates, drove them from their advanced positions, and captured their first redoubt; but the latter, having taken refuge in the second, soon obliged the assailants to fall back. The sight of the numerous works occupied by the enemy was a real discovery to the Federals; they had no more idea of their existence than they had of Warwick Creek a month before. The Confederates, on their part, fearing, no doubt, to be taken in flank by the landing of troops on York River, had no thought at first of availing themselves of these works; they had made no preparations for defending them, and it was only when Hampton was closely pressed that, finding them in his path on the evening of the 4th, he occupied a portion of them in order to retard the march of the Federals. As will be seen presently, the Confederate generals whose duty it was to cover the retreat were themselves very little acquainted with the position and importance of some of these entrenchments.

Stoneman had lost about forty men by the fire of the redoubts, and one of his guns remained immovable in the swamp. He had retired on this side of the forest to wait for the infantry, which was slow in coming up; General Sumner, whose rank gave him the command, had stopped this infantry, within five kilometers of Fort Magruder, not being then aware that the enemy was so near him. When the din of battle struck the ear of that old and valiant soldier, he immediately pushed forward Smith's division; but it was already getting dark, and before these troops could be deployed for battle the increasing darkness compelled them to postpone the fight till the next day. Sumner himself having insisted, despite the obscurity of the night, upon reconnoitering the enemy's position in person, fell among their pickets, was fired upon at short range, became lost in a swamp, from which he was unable to extricate himself, and passed the entire night at the foot of a tree between the two hostile lines. In the meanwhile, Hooker, finding the road he followed obstructed by Smith, took the one to the left, which had originally been assigned to the latter. His intention was to turn the enemy's works and enter Williamsburg the same evening. But after marching a considerable distance in the night, he was obliged, like the rest, to halt his columns to avoid going astray.

The dawn of the next day, the 5th of May, was sad and gloomy. Torrents of rain had during the whole night deluged the bivouacs of the young Federal soldiers, most of whom were without rations and covering. The wet roads had become frightful mud-holes. On the left the division of Hooker, on the right that of Smith, with Stoneman's cavalry, were in the presence of the enemy; but these troops had waited in vain during the entire night for orders from Sumner, their common chief, of whose misadventures they had no knowledge; the three divisions of Kearny, Couch, and Casey, designed to support them, could only communicate with them through an almost impassable road from twelve to fifteen kilometres in length; finally, the remainder of the troops were slowly embarking at Yorktown under the direction of the general-in-chief. Such was the situa-

tion of the army of the Potomac on the morning of the 5th of May.

The Confederates had all the advantage of position on their side. Longstreet had been made aware of the error he had committed in not occupying and strengthening the lines of defence around Williamsburg by the engagement of his rear-guard on the evening of the 4th. During the night he countermanded the march of his whole corps and brought it back into these lines; this time he was determined to dispute their possession with the Federals with the utmost vigor, and to keep the latter in check sufficiently long to place the rest of the army out of reach of their attacks.

Only a portion of his troops had arrived and taken position inside of the works, when, toward seven o'clock in the morning, Hooker, emerging out of the Lee's Mills road, attacked his right. Longstreet's artillery, posted inside of Fort Magruder and in the adjacent redoubts, crossed its fire with that of the Confederate infantry over the narrow open space which the assailants had to cross. The latter, being actually afraid to maneuver under such a fire, had deployed their battalions before crossing the forest. But the thickness of the undergrowth having broken their ranks, they no longer possessed that compactness which is required for a vigorous charge; and instead of pushing forward, they halted on the edge of the wood. Unable to overcome this obstacle, they ambushed themselves in the abatis, from whence they opened fire upon the enemy. The three batteries of the division came to their assistance and boldly took position at the point most exposed, which was at the outlet of the road; but the enemy's missiles were soon concentrated upon them, overthrowing gunners and horses before they were able to fire a single shot. The Federals were not discouraged on this account; willing hands came forward to serve the guns; they even succeeded in gaining an advantage over the Confederate cannon and in silencing the fire of Fort Magruder. At the juncture the Confederates seemed to be wavering; but Hooker's soldiers, who had been under more fire than they, had suffered too seriously to take advantage of this momentary hesitation.

The remainder of Longstreet's corps reached the scene of action and assumed the offensive in its turn. In order to preserve his position, Hooker was obliged to engage his very last man. A desperate struggle took place in the abatis; the two hostile lines wavered in front of each other; the Federals were driven back several times, but their lost ground was as often recovered. It was now one o'clock. Hooker had been sustaining the fight alone since morning; no reinforcements had reached him, no order, no message; while along the rest of the line the utmost silence prevailed. To the left he had sent Emory with his cavalry and three regiments of infantry to try to attack the Confederate line by crossing the dam which intersects College Creek; but Emory, afraid of going astray, proceeded with the utmost caution, and wasted the whole day without reaching the enemy. On the right of Hooker, Smith's division was drawn up across the Yorktown road, in the rear of the wood, very narrow at this place, which intercepts the view of Fort Magruder; but although this division was only separated by fourteen or fifteen metres from that which is engaged, there was no connecting link between them, the wood which stretches between the two roads they had followed remained unoccupied, and even unexplored.

Smith had not yet fired a single shot. The three corps commanders of the army of the Potomac, whom chance had brought together, had established their headquarters alongside of his division; they held a conference; and as is almost invariably the case under similar circumstances, they secured no concert of action to the Federal Army. There was but one movement ordered to be made in the course of the morning. Having been informed of the existence of the dams which obstruct the passage of Queen's Creek, they sent to seize it one of Smith's brigades, commanded by General Hancock, a young officer but little known at the time. There yet remained Smith's two other brigades, his artillery and that of the cavalry division, about six or seven thousand men, with thirty pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the constantly increasing din of battle in which Hooker was engaged on the left, despite the urgent

messages of the latter, Sumner refused to bring his troops under fire, and confined himself to hastening the arrival of those already on the march. Doubtless he had then but a very small force at his disposal to cover the outlet of the Yorktown road—an outlet which it was essential to defend at all hazards; for the least symptom of a retreat would have thrown the long column which crowded that road into indiscribable confusion. But the surest way of maintaining his ground would have been to engage the fight along the whole line, thereby dividing the forces of the enemy instead of allowing his adversary to concentrate his troops, to crush one of his wings, as he was actually doing. Indeed the repeated efforts of the Confederates succeeded at last in shaking the confidence of Hooker's soldiers, who felt themselves unsupported; they lost the abatis where they had held out so long, and while still fighting, slowly fell back across the woods which they had occupied in the morning. Two batteries, the horses of which have all been killed, are left upon the ground. In falling back Hooker uncovers the left flank of the troops who had remained under arms on the Yorktown road while he was fighting. The wood by which they are surrounded shut out the enemy from view, but the balls whistling among the trees and dealing destruction in their ranks announce his approach. Consequently, a certain amount of disquietude is manifested among these young soldiers who are preparing for battle under the blows of an adversary yet invisible.

The situation was becoming serious; but the critical moment was selected by fortune for a sudden change. Stimulated less by Sumner's pressing orders than by the sound of cannon which called him to the field, Kearney comes at last to Hooker's assistance. Pushing his division along the road, which is encumbered with wagons, he has turned to the left, like the latter, and after making his men, fatigued by a long march, throw off their knapsacks, he deploys them with as much precision as if on a drill-ground. Of a character difficult to manage, of a quick temper, of a

sharp and satirical turn of mind, this admirable soldier became a different man as soon as he found himself in the presence of the enemy. His calmness, his piercing glance, his clear voice, his orders, always precise, inspired the confidence of all those who served under him. Deploying two brigades in line of battle and holding the third in reserve, he allows Hooker's soldiers to pass between the intervals of his battalions, and takes up the battle in the wood in their place. He arrives in time to rescue one of the two batteries abandoned a moment before, which the enemy was about to seize. The latter, after a stubborn resistance, is driven back as far as the abatis; but he maintains himself a long time on that difficult ground, being supported by the fire from his own works. A final effort on the part of the entire division wrests at last a portion of the abatis from the Confederates, at the very time that the darkness of the evening is beginning to spread over the long-contested battlefield.

On the right the Federals have at last decided to take part in the battle. Toward four o'clock, just as Kearny was coming to Hooker's assistance, the head of the long column which followed the Yorktown turnpike emerges into the clearing where Smith's troops are drawn up. Peck's brigade, which is the first to make its appearance, enters the wood and vigorously attacks the left of the forces opposed to Hooker and Kearney, thus making a valuable diversion in favor of the latter. The first to reach the scene of conflict at this opportune moment are the Lafayette Guards; encouraged by their commander, Colonel de Trobriand, and sustained by their French animation, they have overcome all the obstacles in the road. They penetrate into the wood, seeking with a damp smoke, where the balls whistle through the thick foliage of the forests, and gaily rush forward in search of that baptism of fire the honor of which is reserved to all, but for which many among them will have to pay with their lives. In the meanwhile, on the extreme right, Hancock with his brigade had crossed Queen's Creek in the morning, and finding a small redoubt unoccupied on the other bank had planted himself in it. This redoubt was a

link in the chain of works of which Fort Magruder was the centre. Finding no enemy before him, Hancock fearlessly advanced with his three or four thousand men; a second and a third redoubt, likewise deserted, are passed, when he arrives at last in sight of the left flank of Fort Magruder and the whole Confederate army. If he had been at the head of a division, he might have fallen suddenly upon the enemy, and probably obtained a decided success. But his force was not strong enough to attempt such a bold stroke, being so far from the reach of any reinforcements. The utmost that he could do was to hold the position of which he had so unexpectedly taken possession, and to await for the arrival of a sufficient force to avail himself of the advantages which it offered. But the reinforcements he asked for were refused, as they had been to Hooker, the only replies to his urgent appeals being repeated orders to fall back. Feeling how important it was to hold a position which took all the enemy's defences in the rear, and which would probably cost waves of blood to reconquer, he contented himself by merely evacuating the foremost redoubt, and determined to defend the others at all risk. Fortunately for the Federals, if their general staff was deficient, that of their adversaries was even more so, and the connection which such a corps ought to preserve between all sections of an army was entirely wanting in the Confederate ranks. In consequence of this defect of organization, Longstreet was not apprised of Hancock's movement, nor of the menacing position which the latter had taken upon his flank. It is certainly strange that the Confederates should have allowed those four Federal battalions to remain in peaceful possession during a whole day of a redoubt by which their entire line of defense could be turned; but is it not more singular that none of them thought of occupying the works they had constructed with their own hands in anticipation of such a struggle?

It is already four o'clock; Hooker has been driven back into the woods, and the approaches to Fort Magruder are entirely free; it is at this juncture that Longstreet turns his attention, for the first time, toward his left, and per-

ceiving Hancock, thinks of dislodging him. He sends against Early's brigade, the commander of which was destined, like his young adversary, to play an important part during the remainder of the war. Seeing the Federals fall back upon the farthest redoubt, Early's soldiers imagine that they are already in flight and rush upon them; but being received at point-blank range by a well-directed fire, they are driven back in disorder. The Federals, urged on by the valiant Hancock, pursue them sword in hand. It is now five o'clock—the moment when Kearny comes into line at the other extremity of the battle-field.

General McClellan at last arrived among the combatants. While a salvo of musketry and the hurrahs of Hancock's brigade announced to him this brilliant passage-at-arms from a distance, the Federal troops, massed in various places along the road, who had felt most keenly the absence of all direction during the battle, received their chief with acclamations. The Confederates, on their side, satisfied in having held their ground around Fort Magruder, did not attempt another attack against Hancock. Night came on while the various Federal corps recently arrived were taking their position, and the left was forming a connection with the right; the continuation of the battle was therefore adjourned to the next day.

Recognizing at first glance the importance of the position so fortunately maintained by Hancock, McClellan saw at once that all the Confederate defences were turned, and that the troops assembled around him would suffice to make them fall. Besides, the obstruction of the road over which he had just passed had convinced him that the two divisions whose embarkation he had suspended at the moment of his departure, to forward them to the scene of action, would not arrive in time if the battle was renewed. He therefore ordered them back to the transports which were to convey them to West Point. He was not, however, without some uneasiness regarding the issue of the next day's fight; for with such young soldiers a panic was always to be feared; and having desired to take the offensive, he thought the enemy might try to forestall him by an early

morning attack. But Johnston, who had only halted for the purpose of covering his retreat, and who was aware of his great numerical inferiority to the Federals, saw that a longer stay in front of Williamsburg with Hancock on his flank might compromise the very existence of the troops who had been in action the day before. During the night he ordered Longstreet to evacuate all the positions he had so vigorously defended, and hastily resume his march in the direction of Richmond with all his troops. This was a wise decision; for at Williamsburg he could have made but a short resistance, the Federals having it always in their power to land troops higher up the York River and menace his line of retreat. Besides, it never had been his intention to prolong the struggle in the peninsula. It was only through necessity, and in order to resist the persistent attacks of Hooker, that he had been finally induced to impart the proportions of a pitched battle to a simple affair of the rear guard. This battle was a first ordeal to most of the troops engaged on both sides; it showed how much the spirit of the two armies had been improved since the beginning of the war. Early's brigade, which, while charging Hancock's troops, cried out to them ironically, "Bull Run," learnt to its own cost that it had committed an anachronism. Differing widely from the encounter of which the Manassas plateau had been the scene the preceding year, this bloody and undecided battle continued during an entire day on a narrow space of ground, marks, in fact, the real commencement of the long struggle between the two large armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia, which after unheard-of sacrifices on both sides, terminated in the annihilation of the latter at the end of three years.

The town of Williamsburg was full of Confederate wounded. The spacious halls of the college, which had been converted into a hospital, presented a painful sight to the uninitiated. But the most cruel sufferings were reserved for those soldiers of both parties who had fallen in the midst of the abatis. Hidden under the branches of the felled trees, they escaped for a long time the most active search, and on the third day after the battle some were

taken out who had yet a spark of life. During the evening of that same day the dry wood was set on fire by accident; the conflagration spread rapidly, and stifling the agonizing cries of those who were perhaps still waiting for the succor of their friends, swept away the last traces of the victims of the struggle.

The Confederates had three thousand men disabled, and left six hundred unhurt prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The latter lost two thousand and seventy-three men in killed and wounded, and six hundred and twenty-three prisoners. Two-thirds of these losses fell to the share of Hooker's division, at the evening roll-call of which one thousand five hundred and seventy-five combatants were missing, one thousand two hundred and forty of whom had fallen by the fire of the enemy. These telling figures show that it had borne the whole brunt of that day's fight.

The Federals had lost six guns, but they picked up six others, which the enemy abandoned in the suburbs of Williamsburg. Everything bore evidence that the retreat of the Confederates had at first been precipitate and disorderly. The road was strewn for miles with canon, wagons, and equipment. In these trophies the army of the Potomac beheld the most substantial proof of its success; and on entering the forest and the town of Williamsburg the day after the important battle, it had no need to inquire whether the enemy intended to dispute any further the possession of those places. Consequently although the battle had, in reality, been undecided, its effect upon the morale of the two armies was entirely to the advantage of the Federals. Unfortunately for the army of the Potomac, it was unable to turn it immediately to account. The difficulty in obtaining supplies kept it for several days around Williamsburg. The only road from Yorktown, softened by the rain, obstructed by cavalry, by the reserve park, by a part of the artillery of the divisions which had been embarked, and by baggage of every kind which follows an army, did not suffice for the passage of the wagons containing the necessary rations for sixty thousand men who were assembled in Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th.

It was found necessary to establish a temporary victualling base near that town. In one day the wooded banks of Queen's Creek are cleared and rude wharves built, where transports come to deposit their cargoes of salt pork, biscuit, rice, and forage, which the army-wagons, lightened by several days' consumption, proceed to distribute among the various regiments. In exchange the vessels receive a sad but precious cargo, consisting of all the wounded able to bear transportation, who, after a first dressing of their wounds, are forwarded to the large Northern cities, where they will meet with the care, comfort, and pure air which will solace their sufferings.

We left four divisions at Yorktown the day after the evacuation of that place, ready to embark in order to reach the extremity of the long estuary of York River. If conducted with speed, this operation might be productive of brilliant results. It assures a new base of supplies in advance of the army, thus enabling it to march by longer stages; by taking Williamsburg in the rear, it rendered all resistance on the part of the Confederates useless; for if they had lingered there, it would have placed them in a most perilous position. In fact, while Johnston, with a portion of his army, was checking the progress of the Federals in the lines of defence at Williamsburg, the remainder was disposed en echelon on the Richmond road; the four divisions thrown on the flank of this road could either occupy it before the Confederates, or surprise them on the march, throw their columns into confusion by harassing them, or at least deprive them of all the advantage of the start which had cost them so dear by fighting the battle of Williamsburg.

Unfortunately, notwithstanding the presence of the general-in-chief, this opportunity was lost in consequence of delays not yet accounted for. Two days after the evacuation of Yorktown, on the evening of the battle of Williamsburg, these forces had not yet embarked, and Franklin's division, which had never left the transports, was waiting in vain for the signal of departure. The orders and counter-orders of which we have just spoken caused fresh delays

on the evening of the 5th of May; and leaving the rest of the troops behind, this division started alone during the night. It reached the mouth of the Pamunky River on the 6th, at a place called Eltham, not far from the little village of Barhamsville. Newton's brigade, together with some artillery, was landed before sunset on the right bank of the river, and the process of disembarkation was suspended until the following day.

On the morning of the 7th this operation had just been ended when Franklin's division was fiercely attacked by the Confederates. The whole of Johnston's army had started early on the 6th, just as Longstreet was leaving Williamsburg, and his heads of column had to bivouac that evening in the vicinity of Barhamsville. On learning that the Federals were landing troops in the neighborhood, the Confederate general sent Whiting's division to surprise them in the midst of that delicate operation, to prevent them from menacing his flank, and to try and drive them into the water. Franklin had landed in a vast field surrounded by woods on three sides. The pickets occupying these woods were suddenly attacked by Whiting and driven back, the combat extending to the very verge of the forest. The Federals, shut up within a narrow space of ground, and exposed to the fire of an enemy not yet visible, had some cause to dread a renewal of the Ball's Bluff disaster. But a battery that had been landed on the day previous, and the artillery of the gunboats which accompanied Franklin's expedition, opened their fire upon the skirts of the woods, where the enemy was beginning to show himself, and soon threw his ranks into confusion. In the meantime, a brigade of Sedgwick's division having been landed, the Federals resumed the offensive, and easily repulsed their adversary. They did not venture, however, to follow in pursuit. They had one hundred and ninety-four men disabled.

Hastily falling back upon Richmond after this action, the Confederates completely escaped all further attacks of the army of the Potomac. The Federal cavalry, despite its utmost endeavors, was hardly able to keep within sight of their rear-guard, so greatly is the character of that

country opposed to offensive warfare when large masses of men have to be moved. Three days after the battle of Williamsburg the first columns of the Federal infantry left that town, and on the 10th of May the whole army was receiving its supplies from the depot established near Eltham. A new phase of the campaign was about to begin. Notwithstanding many miscalculations and delays, General McClellan had succeeded in removing the seat of war from the vicinity of Washington to that of Richmond. He had left the peninsula for a richer and more open country, where he could have plenty of elbow-room, and nothing but a battle delivered in open field could prevent him from appearing before the works which had been erected during the winter around the Confederate capital.

Being free in his movements, how was he going to maneuver to attack it? For a few days his route lay entirely along the Pamunky, which for him was a prolongation of the York River line, through which he had up to that time received his supplies. The ships which the enemy had sunk on the bar were soon raised, and the whole fleet of transports entered that river, the slow and muddy waters of which pursue their winding course between banks of prodigious fertility. On their passage the silence of a still virgin nature was temporarily succeeded by a show of life, or, more properly speaking, of buoyant activity; at night all these vessels, like so many fantastic apparitions, threw a glare of light across the foliage of the tall trees whose feet were bathed by the waters. In this way the army reached the neighborhood of Cumberland, then that of the White House, where the Pamunky becomes difficult of navigation, and a small railway line leading from West Point to Richmond crosses from the left to the right side of the river. In order to continue the campaign, McClellan had only to follow this road by repairing it, so as to make it useful in victualling the army; he could thus march upon the enemy's capital while still preserving his base of operations on the Pamunky. But just as he was preparing to make this movement an unlooked-for opportunity offered for adopting another plan,

which, although apparently more hazardous, promised, nevertheless, to be surer and more decisive.

As we have said before, the Confederates had only deferred the evacuation of Yorktown in order to secure that of Norfolk. General Huger, who occupied that place with his division, had succeeded, like Magruder, in deceiving his adversaries in regard to his numerical weakness, and the Federal authorities had not dared to send Burnside's corps, then stationed at Roanoke Island, in North Carolina, against him. There is no doubt but that these troops would only have had to make a simple demonstration, without even going entirely through so difficult a country, to precipitate the evacuation of Norfolk, and thus deprive the Confederates of all the material which they had not yet been able to transfer to Richmond. As soon as Huger was informed of Johnston's retreat, he sent away all his troops, remaining almost alone in Norfolk, ready to destroy the docks, the work-shops, the hulks and all that was left of the navy-yard, as soon as the evacuations should be completed. This operation could have been speedily accomplished by water, thanks to the protection of the Virginia, which kept a watch at the entrance of the port. Her presence alone defended the Confederate transports ascending the James against the whole Union fleet.

By the 8th of May, Huger had completed his final preparations for the work of destruction. Some fugitives immediately carried the news to Fortress Monroe. As we have already stated, old General Wool, who was in command of that place, was no longer under the orders of General McClellan, and the first use he had made of his independence had been to retain upon the glacis of the fortress the whole division which had occupied the extremity of the peninsula during the winter. When he saw the two hostile armies penetrate into Virginia after the battle of Williamsburg, he was desirous to give employment to these troops, but was afraid at the same time, lest they should again be placed under the orders of McClellan, so that instead of leading them into action by the side of their comrades in arms, he conceived the idea of making them gather cheap laurels

among the ruins of the Norfolk navy yard. The occasion was the more favorable as the President, accompanied by the Secretary of War, had arrived at Fort Monroe on that very day; they had set out on hearing of the capture of Yorktown, and were coming to congratulate the army of the Potomac upon that success. Being apprised by the columns of smoke which rose in the horizon that the propitious moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the President to undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber's brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, Commodore Goldsborough's fleet was ordered to escort it. But the Confederate batteries, not having yet been abandoned, fired a few shots in reply, while the Virginia, which, since the wounding of the brave Buchanan, had been commanded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable shell (carapace), and the expedition was countermanded. Two days more were consumed in waiting. Finally, on the morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east of Sewall's Point. This time the enemy's artillery was silent. There was found an entrenched camp mounting a few guns, but absolutely deserted; General Wool reached the city of Norfolk, which had been given up to its peaceful inhabitants the day previous, and hastened to place a military governor there. The President, who had made his entrance into the newly conquered city with Wool, announced this cheaply-bought success to the American people in a special bulletin, while he forgot the words of encouragement so justly due to the soldiers who had just fought important battles.

Meantime, the evacuation of Norfolk was followed by an event destined to influence military operations to a considerable extent, of which the President was yet ignorant, and the merits of which General Wool could not appropriate to himself. The Virginia was no longer in existence. That formidable vessel had been abandoned and destroyed by her crew. On the 9th of May she was the last to come out of that port of Norfolk, whence, during two months, she had held the whole Federal fleet in check. Was she to make a desperate attempt to steam into Hampton Roads, and thence either to gain the open sea or run the risk of being sur-

rounded by the debris of that fleet and perish? Or was it not better to reascend the James River, so as to keep the Federal navy away from Richmond? Tatnall adopted the latter course. In order to get over the sand-banks of the river more easily, he lightened the ship, in pursuance of his pilot's advice, by landing the guns, ammunition, and all the war material he had on board. But when on the 11th, this operation completed he wished to go up the James, the same pilots declared that, in consequence of a westerly wind, the tide was not sufficiently high to enable the Virginia to get over the banks. The vessel was disarmed; her hull, rising higher than the water-line and the iron covering, was no longer proof against Goldsborough's cannon-balls. The latter might arrive at any moment. Tatnall was perplexed; and without attempting to remedy the error of the previous day, he set fire to his ship. The James River was open. The Federal gunboats hastened to steam into it, and ascending the stream with speed appeared on the 15th within less than twelve kilometres of Richmond.

There was great excitement in the Confederate capital. The excessive confidence inspired by the success of the Virginia two months before caused her loss to be severely felt. There were cries of treason. People expected every moment to see the broadside of the little Monitor bear upon the edifice where the delegates of all the Southern States were in session. The rich were preparing for flight and the poor for plunder. Courage and determination were displayed side by side with the most abject fears. The cannon spoke out at last, and the whole day was spent in listening to its solemn voice from a distance. It ceased to speak; evening came, and the gunboats did not make their appearance. Richmond was saved. The Federal flotilla had encountered a large battery known as Fort Darling, perched upon the summit of a steep acclivity called Drury's Bluff. A stockade rendered it impossible to pass this battery rapidly, which was manned with cannon of heavy calibre, while the angle in the river prevented the vessels from perceiving it afar off. On the 15th of May the Monitor, accompanied by the Galena, a lightly-sheathed gunboat

of which we have already spoken, and two wooden vessels, made an unsuccessful attack upon Fort Darling. The Monitor could not give sufficient elevation to her guns to reach the heights occupied by the enemy, and the two wooden vessels had not the requisite strength to sustain the conflict. The Galena commanded by the intrepid Rogers, persisted in her efforts for a considerable length of time; but she finally withdrew, after having experienced severe losses and without having done any damage to her adversaries. The advantage of elevated positions in defending a river, which had already been demonstrated at Fort Donelson, in this instance received a new and striking confirmation.

Thus the James River, which had been closed until then by the presence of the Virginia, as York River had been by the cannon of Yorktown, was opened by the destruction of that ship, just as York River had been by the evacuation of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open as far as Drury's Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, the support of the land-forces was necessary.

On the 19th of May, Commodore Goldsborough had a conference with General McClellan regarding the means to be employed for removing that obstacle. The headquarters were at Tunstall's station, on the railway from West Point and Richmond. The whole army was placed en echelon within reach of this road, between the Pamunky and the Chickahominy. The latter river had been struck at Bottom's Bridge, over which the old mail route from Williamsburg to Richmond passes. The enemy had not disputed its passage. Only a few cavalry pickets had been seen. He was evidently reserving his entire force for the defence of the immediate approaches to his capital. General McClellan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow the railway line, and preserved his depots at White House on the Pamunky, which would have led him to force the passage of the Chickahominy above Bottom's Bridge and attempt an attack upon Richmond on the north side; but he could also now go to reestablish his base of operations on James River, which the Virginia had hitherto prevented

him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, and at some of the fords situated lower down, between that bridge and the extreme point reached by the tide, he was sure of encountering no resistance. The army, by carrying in their wagons a sufficient quantity of provisions, could have reached the borders of the James in two or three days, where its transports would have preceded it. This flank march, effected at a sufficient distance from the enemy and covered by a few demonstrations along the upper Chickahominy, offered him great advantages without involving any risk. It enabled him to advance afterward as far as Richmond, by following the course of a navigable river, open at all times, instead of obtaining his supplies by railway, exposed to the attacks of the enemy; it avoided the formidable obstacles which the Chickahominy interposed on the north side, and by assaulting the city on the south side it threatened to separate it from the rest of the Confederacy.

But to adopt this plan McClellan should have been able to count upon the enlightened concurrence on the part of the government at Washington. Indeed, he could only have executed it by withdrawing the imaginary protection which his army was supposed to afford the capital of the United States from a distance. Instead of recognizing the fact that best way of defending the capital was to keep all the enemy's forces occupied elsewhere, the Federal authorities fancied that the safety of Washington depended on the position of the army of the Potomac before Richmond. Impressed with this idea, they offered McClellan important reinforcements, provided he would place himself to the north of the enemy's capital. The day before Goldsborough proposed to him to invest Richmond on the south, he had received a dispatch from Mr. Lincoln informing him that McDowell's corps, reinforced and numbering nearly forty-thousand men, was at last about to leave the banks of the Rappahannock to co-operate with him against Richmond. This corps, with a view to avoid enormous expenses, as well as for the purpose of covering Washington, instead of embarking, was to march directly southward, so as to form

the right of the army of the Potomac. It was placed under the orders of McClellan, although an absurd restriction revealed the old mistrusts and fears, as we know, and did not permit the general-in-chief to separate it from the direct road from Richmond to Washington. In thus imposing upon McClellan the necessity of operating by way of the north, the President did not appreciate the advantages of a march along the line of the James, which Grant's last campaign so clearly demonstrated four years later. If McClellan could have foreseen how deceptive were the promises of reinforcement made to him at the time, he would undoubtedly have declined the uncertain support of McDowell, to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best chances of success with the troops which were absolutely at his disposal. But the formal assurances he was receiving did not permit him to pursue such a course, and he subordinated his movements to those which the President directed in person. The project of marching upon the James was abandoned, and the army, penetrating into a country bristling with obstacles, commenced a series of operations which only brought doubtful and dearly bought successes. Resting its left on Bottom's Bridge, which it already occupied, and deploying its right, it took a position higher up along the north side of the Chickahominy, to join hands with McDowell, whose arrival was long waited for in vain, but who never made his appearance.

This army had passed through the first ordeals of the war. It had worked in the presence of the enemy; it had fought; it had marched; it had shown itself laborious, patient, intelligent. In battle the soldiers had displayed great personal bravery and tenacity. It was owing to these qualities that the mismanagement of those in command at Williamsburg had not been productive of the fatal results that might have been apprehended. The regiments which had suffered most in battle, if temporarily disorganized, had promptly recovered their equanimity. On the march they had been less successful. It is true that the roads were few, narrow and in a bad condition, but this difficulty did not quite justify the extreme slowness of their move-

ments and the confusion into which their columns were more than once thrown. The American soldier had yet much to learn in this respect; the history of the war will show that he became in the course of time, if not the equal of the best foot-soldiers in Europe, at least a sufficiently good marcher to undergo, when necessary, one of those long marches upon which the success of a battle frequently depends.

But before following the army of the Potomac any further, we must relate the events that are taking place in other parts of Virginia at the same time, and which were destined to exercise so great and so fatal an influence on its subsequent operations.

CHAPTER II

Fair Oaks

The departure of General McClellan had left a clear field for the strategic experiments of Mr. Lincoln and his military advisers. They had at once proceeded to alter all the arrangements that had been made by the commander of the army of the Potomac for the safety of Washington. Instead of confining themselves to such points as were of importance for the defence of the capital, and considering the rest as the enemy's country, given up to the guerrillas of both parties, they sought to extend the Federal rule over the whole region comprised between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and to make a political conquest of them before having achieved the victories which alone could secure it. With this object in view, the numerous troops they had kept back under the pretext of protecting Washington were scattered over so extended a line they possessed no power of resistance. McDowell's corps had been sent as far as the Rappahannock. Shield's division, detached from Banks' corps, had come to replace under McDowell's command that of Franklin, which had been sent to Yorktown. It had left the valley of Virginia in the second week of May to join its new corps commander, who already occupied Fredericksburg with the three divisions of Ord, McCall and King, and who was watching an enemy reduced in reality to a thin line of mounted scouts. Gerry, with a few regiments, equivalent to a small division, occupied Manassas. Banks, instead of remaining on the defensive, after having successfully repulsed Jackson at Winchester, had followed his adversary step by step into the great valley watered by the Shenandoah; and the President, encouraged by this easy success, had urged him to push on to Harrisonburg, one hundred and ten kilometres from Winchester, without troubling himself about the dangers which such an advanced position involved. Once there, he had suddenly withdrawn from him, as we have just stated, Shield's division, thereby reducing the

number of his forces to six or seven thousand men. More to the west, Fremont with the army of the Mountain, so called, occupied West Virginia, which the Confederates had entirely abandoned since the end of January. One of his brigades, commanded by Crook, was posted on the banks of Greenbrier River, while the remainder of his troops were encamped at Moorefield, and Franklin in some of the numerous valleys which stretch between the ridges of the Alleghanies. The President, after taking away Blenker's division from the army of the Potomac, in order to place it at Manassas, had sent it to Fremont, thus increasing the number of his forces to six brigades, amounting to thirteen or fourteen thousand men. These armies, being so scattered as to be unable to give each other mutual support, were all independent of one another; McDowell, Geary, Banks, and Fremont received their orders direct from Washington. The Secretary who directed the movements of these armies in the name of the President from the recesses of his office, was thus preparing an inevitable defeat for them. Jackson was not the man to neglect such an opportunity.

Yorktown had just been evacuated. All the Confederate forces which were in Virginia were assembling around Richmond to swell Johnston's army. It would have been easy for the several Federal armies to make a corresponding movement. McDowell could by a few days' march have joined McClellan on the borders of the Chickahominy. Fremont occupied the two slopes of the Alleghanies; the Confederates, who had contested their possession with so much fury the preceding autumn, had abandoned to him the sources of the Potomac and the Greenbrier; he could by pushing his outposts into the valley of the Shenandoah have connected with Banks, and combined, they would have menaced Staunton near the important passes which open into the valley of James River.

The Richmond authorities felt that it was necessary to prevent this concentration of troops at any price, and that the surest way was to rouse the fears of the government at Washington by a bold stroke. Nothing further would have been required but to wait with confidence for the errors

which those alarms would be sure to make the Federals commit. Jackson, who had never ceased to urge an invasion of the North, and had obeyed the order directing him to evacuate the valley of Virginia with great reluctance, was entrusted with this task. The Richmond government, shrewder than its adversary in the distribution of its forces, gave him at once the means he needed. General Edward Johnson, who had defended Camp Alleghany during the winter, joined him with one brigade, while Ewell brought him a fine division from Gordonsville. Jackson had thus twenty thousand men under his orders; he started at once. Leaving Staunton, where he had organized his army, he sent Ewell to watch and detain Banks, while, with the remainder of his forces, he went to attack Fremont in person, in order to prevent the junction of his two adversaries.

The commander of the Mountain army was at Franklin, and had detached Milroy's brigade to occupy the last ridges bordering on the Virginia valley on the west, known by the name of Shenandoah Mountains and Bull Pasture Mountains. Milroy had taken his position in the village of McDowell, situated at the foot of the western slope of the last line of heights. On the 7th of May, Jackson drove in his outposts, which had penetrated into valley of Virginia, and was crossing the Shenandoah Mountains with nearly ten thousand men. By a forced march he reached the second chain, Bull Pasture Mountains, on the 8th, and his heads of column, rapidly ascending those acclivities, took possession of them before the Federals were strong enough to defend them. Once master of these heights, he had the village of McDowell at his feet, where Milroy had allowed himself to be taken completely by surprise. The latter, discovering too late the error he had committed, made a vigorous effort to recapture a point called Sutlington's Hill, which was the key to this position. He failed in the attempt. He was soon joined by General Schenck's brigade, which had been sent to his assistance by Fremont as soon as he was informed of Jackson's appearance, and which had arrived after a march of fifty-five kilometres in twenty-three hours. Schenck, who assumed the command, had only three thou-

sand five hundred men to defend, against eight or nine thousand assailants, a place commanded on every side, and from which he could only extricate himself by passing through a narrow defile. To remain in such a place was to be captured. To leave it in the daytime was to run the risk of being routed. He determined to hold out until evening, and by means of well-directed attacks concealed his weakness from Jackson, who does not appear to have shown on this occasion his habitual coup d'oeil; or it might be that his soldiers were too much fatigued to attempt a serious attack. At nightfall Schenck fell back in good order with his small force upon Franklin. The engagement at McDowell had cost him two hundred and forty-six men, while Jackson lost four hundred and sixty-one; among the wounded were General Johnston and three colonels.

Jackson, after taking possession of Franklin, which Fremont had evacuated to wait for him in the rear of the town, did not go in search of his adversaries on this new position. He contented himself with the important result he had just obtained; for in fact, if the army of the Mountain had suffered but little, it had received such a repulse that it was no longer able to join hands with Banks. It was against the latter that Jackson was now about to turn; and for this purpose he resumed his march rapidly through the valley of Virginia in the direction of Staunton. There he found Ewell, but no longer Banks, who, on being informed of the fight at McDowell, had fallen back from Harrisonburg as far as Strasburg, eighty kilometres lower down the valley.

Before following the two adversaries thither, we must describe the configuration of this singular valley, which has been so often ravaged by the fluctuating fortunes of the war. It extends two hundred kilometres in a straight line from the sources of the Shenandoah, a little below Staunton, to the confluence of this river and the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. Its breadth, between the two chains of hills which enclose it, is everywhere from forty to fifty kilometres. Terminated at the north by the Potomac, which intersects it perpendicularly, it may be said that it is similarly terminated

at the south by the James, as this river flows a few kilometres from the sources of the Shenandoah, from which it is separated by only a slight undulation in the ground. A series of small parallel ridges follows the line of this valley in the direction of its length. The highest form a group called the Massanuten Mountains, extending from Harrisonburg to Strasburg. East of these mountains flows the South Fork, the principal branch of the Shenandoah, which runs past Staunton, descends into a narrow valley not far from Luray, where it drains the waters of the other branch, called North Fork, at Front Royal. This last stream waters the western slope of the same mountains, and, after flowing through a larger valley than that of South Fork as far as Strasburg, turns abruptly to the right. A little below Staunton it assumes already the proportions of a deep unfordable river, which is crossed by three bridges. The first, up stream, is that of Port Republic, over which passes the road leading from Harrisonburg to Richmond through Brown's Gap, the second is at Conrad's Store, on the road from Harrisonburg to Gordonsville through Swift Run Gap. The third is the White House bridge, constructed for a cross road, which, branching off from the main valley road at New Market, ascends the Massanuten Mountains, and runs in the direction of the important defile in the Blue Ridge called Thornton's Gap, by way of Luray. The principal road follows the larger valley of North Fork from Harrisonburg to Strasburg, through Woodstock, and thence down to Winchester direct. Below Strasburg and Front Royal the undulations in the ground disappear almost entirely, and the Shenandoah, hugging the base of the Blue Ridge, leaves to its left the magnificent plain watered by the small stream of the Opequan, in which lie the towns of Winchester, Martinsburg and Charlestown. There are but two small lines of railroad to be found in the valley. Oe connects Harper's Ferry with Winchester; the other is the one used by Johnston on the 21st of July, 1861, to take his troops to the battle-field of Bull Run. By following this unfinished track from east to west, starting from Manassas Junction,

we find that it crosses the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap, above Front Royal, descends into the valley, crosses the Shenandoah road, and, ascending the North Fork through Strasburg as far as Woodstock, terminates abruptly at Mount Jackson. It was to have been continued as far as Staunton.

This description will enable the reader to understand the importance of the villages of Strasburg and Front Royal, which close up the two outlets of the valley, communicating with Winchester on one side and with Washington on the other, by way of Manassas Gap and the railway. But these were not positions the defense of which could be entrusted to a small force; for Strasburg was approachable on every side, and Front Royal was too great a distance from the encampments of Manassas Junction to be within reach of help, being at the same time commanded by heights which were easy of access. Without taking into consideration the peculiarities of this position, a single regiment, the First Maryland, had been stationed at Front Royal for some time for the purpose of holding the partisans of the enemy in check, and Banks occupied Strasburg with the five thousand men composing his small army corps.

On the 20th of May, Jackson left New Market at the head of an army of twenty thousand men. Instead of bearing down directly upon Strasburg by the main road and the broad valley of North Fork, which Banks was carefully watching, he crossed the Massanuten Mountains and re-entered the narrow valley of South Fork, where he was protected both by that river and the mountains. He thus left Luray behind, while his advance-guard encamped unnoticed, on the 22d, only sixteen kilometres from Front Royal. On the 23d the small Federal garrison, consisting of about nine hundred men, with two pieces of artillery, was taken completely by surprise. By a strange coincidence the regiment placed at the head of Jackson's column bore the same name as the one he was about to attack, the First Maryland. This unfortunate State of Maryland, convulsed by conflicting passions, inflamed by its neighbors of the North on one side and by those of the South on the other, supplied combatants to

both armies. The encounter of these two namesake regiments—sad consequences of the civil war!—was fearful and sanguinary in the extreme, for mutual recognition took place at first sight. The people of the South regarded Northern soldiers as legitimate enemies; but Marylanders, belonging to a slave State, when found fighting under the Federal flag, were nothing but traitors in their eyes. The Federals of Maryland, on the contrary, regarded their fellow-citizens who had enlisted in the Southern army as two-fold rebels: first, against the Union, next, against their own State, which had never officially separated from the government at Washington.

The situation of the small band of Union troops had been desperate from the beginning of the fight. Overwhelmed by numbers, it tried to escape from the enemy by placing the two branches of the Shenandoah between them; but it had not time to destroy the bridges. Pursued through the open country, the Federals dispersed in groups, which were successively surrounded, with the exception of fifteen fugitives only. The remainder were either killed, wounded or captured; but the defence of this handful of men had been highly creditable, and their chief, Colonel Kenly, fully atoned by his courage for his want of vigilance in allowing himself to be surprised. He was only captured after being seriously wounded.

The fickle fortune of war decreed that on the same day a body of troops detached from Jackson's army should experience nearly as bloody a check in the mountains of West Virginia. On leaving these mountains, Edward Johnson had entrusted to General Heth the task of watching with three regiments the brigade of Colonel Crook, which occupied the beautiful valley of the Greenbrier, with its station at Lewisburg. Carried away by his zeal, Heth crossed the river to attack his adversary in that position. He was repulsed after a bloody struggle, in which he had more than one hundred men disabled, and left four hundred prisoners in the hands of the Federals. The remainder of his brigade, reduced by nearly one-half, was indebted for its safety solely to the Greenbrier River, the bridges of which it succeeded

in destroying in its rear. But this advantage was of no benefit whatever to the Federals; for Crook was not sufficiently strong to venture among the difficult mountain passes which separated him from Jackson's base of operations, and which it would have been necessary to traverse in order to menace the latter.

Meanwhile, Jackson had not lost a moment's time, after the combat of Front Royal, in following up his success; the very evening after the battle found him already on the left bank of the Shenandoah, above the point of confluence of the two branches. He thus menaced the line of retreat of Banks, who was at Strasburg in a state of dangerous security. In fact, less distant from Winchester than Banks, he could occupy that place before him, cut him off from the northern route, and thus compel him to take to the mountain after abandoning his supply train, his artillery and probably a portion of his troops. The news of the disaster at Front Royal reached Strasburg during the night of the 24th. Banks saw the danger, and as early as two o'clock in the morning his army was on the march in order to outstrip the enemy on the road to Winchester. The train of wagons was placed in front, for it was upon the rear of the column that the attack of Jackson was expected. The cavalry, which was to form the rear-guard, remained at Strasburg until the following day.

Jackson also resumed his march on the morning of the 24th, but the repose he was compelled to allow his worn-out soldiers that night was to make him lose the valuable prize he was so near seizing. The two roads converging upon Winchester from Strasburg and Front Royal form two sides of an equilateral triangle. Banks took the first, Ewell the second; Jackson, with his cavalry and the remainder of his infantry, separated from the latter, and followed cross-roads which enabled him to strike the flank of the enemy's column. Only a few mounted Confederates arrived in time to meet the head of the long train of wagons which led the march of the Federal army. Their appearance threw the train into inexpressible confusion, but they were easily dispersed, and order once more restored, the wagons continued

their march, accompanied by the main body of the army, which had been compelled by this panic to pass from the rear to the head of the column. When the whole Confederate cavalry, led by the fiery Ashby and closely followed by Jackson, finally struck the road, it was only able to seize a few of the wagons in the rear of Banks' train. Ashby's soldiers, inured to plunder as much as to fighting by their partisan life, allowed themselves to be detained by this meagre booty, instead of following their chief, who was urging them to the pursuit of the enemy. The instant when a panic, easily engendered, would have been fatal to Banks slipped rapidly by, and Jackson tried in vain to seize once more the lost opportunity by intercepting the Federal cavalry, which formed the rear-guard; the latter fell back toward Strasburg and precipitated itself among the mountain roads; it was thus enabled to overtake Banks' army on the banks of the Potomac.

Evening came on before Jackson had been able to come into serious contact with his adversary, and the latter, favored by the darkness, reached Winchester in the middle of the night. The Confederates had not yet made their appearance; from this moment his retreat was assured. But the rest which the Federals had found at last, after so painful a march, was not destined to be of long duration. At daybreak the firing of musketry made them aware that Jackson had arrived and was attacking the surrounding heights, which command Winchester from south-east to south-west. While he was driving off without trouble the Federal sharpshooters, General Ewell, following the road to the right from Front Royal, had reached the eastern approaches of Winchester, and was only waiting for the signal of his commander's cannon to engage the battle on that side. Banks' position had again become most critical. In danger of being surrounded with his five thousand men by eighteen or twenty thousand of the enemy, he could not follow the shortest line of retreat, that of Harper's Ferry, which would have exposed his flank to Ewell's attacks. Besides, it was not an easy matter to evacuate a town situated in an entirely open plain in the

presence of so numerous an enemy. Without intending to maintain himself there for any length of time, the most important thing for him to do was to retard as long as possible the threatening progress of his foe. The Federal soldiers went into the fight with a great deal of spirit for men who should have been exhausted or discouraged by such a retreat. Banks' small army, deploying outside of Winchester, rushed to the assault of the principal height, situated to the southwest, while his left made head against Ewell's division on the east side. For a moment the hill was swept by the fire of Colonel Gordon's sharpshooters, and the Confederate guns were silenced. But when the Federals attempted to occupy the ground, they were taken in flank and driven back. The same success attended them at first on the left, where they put one of Ewell's regiments to flight. But there also, overwhelmed by numbers, their whole line gave way, and they rushed pell-mell into the streets of Winchester. To increase the confusion, the inhabitants fired upon them from all the windows, and it seemed as if nothing could save them from complete disaster. Fortunately for them, Jackson, despite all his ardor, did not push his soldiers forward with sufficient alacrity to take advantage of this disorder; he believed the Federals to be much more numerous than they really were. His infantry was completely exhausted, while his cavalry had again failed him at the moment when it might have rendered him essential service. He had alienated the two generals who were in command of that arm. One of these, General Stuart, refused to obey him; the other, Ashby, hurt by the reproaches he had received from him the previous day concerning the plunder of the Federal wagons by his soldiers, held back at this moment. The Confederates came to a halt eight kilometres from Winchester, and the Federals, being no longer pursued except by small squads of cavalry, retired without difficulty to the banks of the Potomac, which they reached at Williamsport on the evening of the 25th of May. They had marched eighty-five kilometres in less than forty-eight hours, leaving only fifty-five wagons behind them out of five hundred, and saving all their cannon. The loss in supplies was considerable; that in men

on the 24th and 25th amounted to thirty-eight killed, one hundred and fifty-five wounded, and seven hundred and eleven prisoners. But if the losses were trifling, the moral effect of this reverse was great. In forcing Banks to recross the Potomac, Jackson had forced him back into the positions toward which he should have retired on the day on which his army was reduced by the departure of Shields. But if his whole corps had been annihilated, the excitement at Washington could not have been greater. The Confederate general, therefore, had dealt a telling blow; and if he made fewer prisoners than he had a right to expect from his successful maneuvers, he had nevertheless attained the principal object of his diversion. Confusion was at its height in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, and the army of the Potomac was deprived of all the reinforcements it had been promised.

Meantime, Jackson, in spite of his desire to invade the Northern States, and the ardor which seized him as soon as he drew near to Maryland, was preparing to slip away from his adversaries by a speedy retreat before the latter had time to concentrate a superior force and crush him in the hazardous position he had just taken. In fact, Mr. Lincoln, while fervently addressing an eloquent appeal to the Northern States for the protection of the capital, which he thought in danger, had at the same time conceived the idea of "catching Jackson in a trap," to use his own words, by shutting him up in the valley of Virginia. He personally directed by telegraph the movements of every division which was to cooperate in carrying out this chimerical project. His plan was to make three independent corps converge upon a point situated in the enemy's country, from which they were all three far more remote than the adversary whom it was intended to forestall.

Fremont was ordered to march from west to east, from Moorefield, where his quarters now were, to Strasburg; Banks to follow close upon the tracks of Jackson; Shields, who had only joined McDowell at Fredericksburg two days before, to retrace his steps from east to west, to join hands with Fremont at Front Royal, and thus cut off Jackson's

retreat. In vain did McDowell protest against this order, the fatal consequences of which he foresaw; in vain did he allege that his soldiers would reach the valley too late to overtake Jackson, and that the surest way to protect Washington against the dangers which seemed to menace the latter city was to press the enemy in front of Richmond. The fatal order was adhered to, and all the campaign plans agreed upon a few days before were upset.

Mr. Lincoln had visited McDowell at Fredericksburg on the 24th of May, when it was decided that this general should march upon Richmond. He was to start with his army corps, more than forty thousand strong, with one hundred pieces of artillery; and it may be asserted without exaggeration that his junction with McClellan would have proved the decisive blow of the campaign. The fate of Richmond trembled in the balance; Jackson's column, thrown at a lucky moment into the plateau, saved the Confederate capital. On the 25th, Shield's division, instead of moving forward, turned its back upon the real objective of the campaign, and regaining the valley road started on one of those fruitless expeditions which American soldiers call in trapper language a "wild-goose chase." The next day McDowell was ordered to send a second division, and finally to march himself with a third, upon Front Royal. He obeyed with great reluctance; for notwithstanding his unpleasant relations with McClellan, he had too much good sense and patriotism not to see and to deplore the irreparable mistake he was being forced to commit.

Jackson, concealing his preparations for a retreat, appeared determined to follow up his successes in the north without troubling himself about what might take place in his rear. His cavalry had followed Banks as far as Williamsport, where the latter had hastened to cross the Potomac. He at once turned against Harper's Ferry, and on the 28th appeared in front of that position. He could have had no serious intention of occupying it; for in order to do so, it would have been necessary for him to have control of the other bank of the Potomac; he simply wished to dislodge the Federals from it, and on the morning of the 29th he

took possession of the heights commanding that position south of the Shenandoah. By this bold movement he confirmed all the alarms and anxieties into which his opponents had been thrown by his late successes in menacing Maryland and Washington; he magnified the number of his forces in their imagination, thus relieving Richmond, and securing for his soldiers the repose they needed before undertaking a retrograde movement, which was becoming unavoidable; for on the 29th, while he was preparing to attack Harper's Ferry, he learned that the Federal armies were at last moving from every direction to cut off his retreat, and he set about at once the duty of excelling them in speed.

It was high time. His army had been reduced by marching and battles to fifteen thousand men.* The Washington authorities, being totally ignorant of the difficulties of the campaign, had fixed upon the 30th as the day when the trap which they had set for catching the imprudent Jackson was to be sprung. As we stated before, the Confederate general was to be intercepted by the simultaneous arrival of Fremont at Strasburg and of Shields at Front Royal. If their calculations had been correct, Jackson's small army was lost indeed. It only evacuated Winchester on the 31st, carrying off, in the midst of the inhabitants who were filled with consternation at this sudden departure, the valuable spoils of the Federal storehouses, which formed a train of nearly twenty kilometres in length. Despite the presumptuous incapacity of those who directed the operations against Jackson from Washington, this general might yet have found himself in great jeopardy. Shields, punctual to the rendezvous, had reached Front Royal on the 30th, with a brigade, before which the small Confederate garrison had retired. But the plan of the Federals was too complicated to succeed. It was Fremont who caused its failure by allowing Jackson to reach Strasburg before him by a forced march; finding himself thus placed between

*He had only lost four hundred men by the fire of the enemy. The five thousand that were missing must therefore have been stragglers, men on the sick-list, and probably a few deserters.

his two opponents, he prevented them from acting in concert and paralyzed all their movements. While McDowell was uniting two of his reduced divisions at Front Royal, Fremont, encamped on the neighboring heights of Strasburg, waited, without stirring, for Jackson to attack him, instead of coming down to bar his passage, or at least to dispute it. The Confederate chief found it easy to occupy his attention by means of a few demonstrations, and thus gave his long column time to escape. At last, on the 1st of June, he was rejoined by the whole of his rear-guard, and quietly resumed his march toward Harrisonburg by the turnpike. His adversaries had been so entirely separated that neither of them felt strong enough to attack him singly; and while each party was waiting for the support of the other, they suffered their prey to escape them. As soon as they became aware of the fact they tried to redeem their error by a vigorous pursuit. They might yet possibly intercept Jackson farther on, and, at all events turn his retreat into a positive rout. Fremont, who was ascending the valley of the North Fork, was sufficiently near him to retard his march, while Shields' vanguard, by following the parallel valley, had some chance of reaching the right bank of the South Fork in advance of him, and of burning the bridges of that deep river before they could be occupied by the Confederates. If the whole of Shields' division should arrive in time, it could even cross the river in its turn, so as to attack the Confederates in flank, and finally form a junction with Fremont. But Jackson was too active to be thus caught by an enemy whose designs he had already so many times frustrated. He took possession of the bridge at White House, and did not hesitate to destroy it in order to render the junction of Shields and Fremont impossible. Whilst one of his detachments was performing this operation, the remainder of his army continued its march up the valley of the South Fork; and although his progress was delayed by the heavy wagon-train he carried as a substantial token of his victory, he reached Harrisonburg on the 5th of June. He had not, however, yet entirely escaped from the Federals, who were pressing him on both flanks, and who, without

having been able to effect a junction, still menaced his line of retreat. Fremont's vanguard, consisting of Bayard's cavalry brigade and some infantry under Colonel Cluseret, had harassed him with great boldness since leaving Strasburg. These two officers made up by their activity for the want of alacrity on the part of their chief. The next day Jackson learned that they had succeeded in outflanking him with their right, and that, preceding him in the direction of Staunton, they had cut down the bridges along the road leading to this town. With a view of retarding their pursuit, he was obliged to engage all his cavalry in front of Harrisonburg. These brave troops dismounted and covered Jackson's retreat by an energetic resistance; but they lost in the action their commander, Turner Ashby, one of the best officers in the Confederate army. The Federals, on their side, left in the hands of the enemy Colonel Percy Wyndham, an Englishman, who had entered the volunteer service at the beginning of the war. Jackson, in the meantime, struck into a cross-road on the left for the purpose of gaining Port Republic, crossed the Shenandoah at that point to reach Brown's Gap, in the Blue Ridge, where he well knew his adversaries could no longer follow him. But at Port Republic his flank was exposed to the attacks of Shields, whose heads of column had already reached Conrad's Store, while Fremont, having resumed his march, was pressing him in the rear.

Jackson's situation was again full of peril. Leaving Ewell to keep Fremont in check, he reached the neighborhood of Port Republic with the remainder of his forces on the 7th of June. But before he had time to cross the river and occupy the town, Shields' first brigade, commanded by Colonel Carroll, comprising about one thousand men and a battery, appeared on the opposite side, repulsed his skirmishers, entered the town and took possession of the bridge. This bridge had played an important part in the campaign plans forwarded direct from Washington to the Union generals. They had been alternately directed to destroy and to save it. Colonel Carroll, having been ordered to preserve it, held it for nearly twenty minutes; adhering strictly to

the letter of his instructions, he suffered the opportunity to escape which presented itself for preventing the Confederates from crossing the Shenandoah; and when the enemy's cannon, whose fire had been quickly concentrated upon him, compelled him to abandon the bridge, he did not even attempt to destroy it. The result of his blind obedience was to leave Jackson in possession of a sure means of retreat at the moment when he was on the point of being thrown upon an impassable river. Once master of Port Republic, the Confederate general had nothing more to fear, and his only object in holding his adversaries in check was to intimate to them that all pursuit was at an end. He determined, however, to take advantage of their separation to deal them successively a last blow.

On the 8th, Ewell, with five thousand men, was waiting for Fremont at Cross Keys, a point of junction of several roads in the neighborhood. The six Federal brigades were prompt in attacking him. But Fremont, being under the impression that he had the whole of Jackson's army before him, allowed himself to be held back a long time by the resistance which the Confederates offered in a difficult country, where clearings alternate with woods. At last, after a brisk musketry engagement, which cost him many men without securing him any marked advantage, he had just ordered a general attack, when, seeing a German brigade borne back by the enemy, he suddenly abandoned his project and gave the signal for retreat. The battle of Cross Keys cost the Federals from six to seven hundred men, while the Confederates lost three hundred. The latter, by holding the enemy in check during an entire day, had accomplished the object they had in view.

In the meantime, Jackson, crossing the bridge which had been so wonderfully preserved, was emerging from Port Republic with the remainder of his army, and taking advantage of his vast numerical superiority was driving Carroll's brigade before him, which was the only one left of McDowell's army at that important point. But during the afternoon Tyler's brigade effected a junction with Carroll's; and although they had only three thousand men under their

orders, they prepared to make a stand against Jackson, if he should attack them. They had not long to wait for him; Jackson, encouraged by his success and the hesitation of his opponents, had conceived a bold plan. He proposed to crush the inferior forces he had found before him at Port Republic, recross the Shenandoah immediately after, and march with his whole army to meet Fremont, in order to give him battle in his turn, and finally to resume the Brown's Gap route, leaving nothing but vanquished foes behind him. To this effect he had brought back Ewell to Port Republic, leaving only Patton's small brigade, numbering scarcely eight hundred men, in front of Fremont. He had ordered Patton to deploy all his men as skirmishers in case of need, to retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible, promising to join him with his army at ten o'clock in the morning. Then he marched directly against Tyler.

The latter, posted three or four kilometers from Port Republic, rested his right upon the Shenandoah and his left upon a hill with uncovered slopes. The summit of this hill, crowned by a wood, was the key to the entire position. Jackson, leading his old brigade in person, made a vigorous attack upon the Federal right; but his soldiers were repulsed, and fled in disorder, abandoning a battery, one of whose guns fell into the hand of the Federals. He had more than twelve thousand men under his command, while only three thousand were arrayed against him; it was easy, therefore, for him to repair this check. But deceived by the valor of his opponents, and believing them to be stronger than himself, he abandoned the project he had conceived of marching against Fremont. He recalled Patton's brigade in great haste; and setting fire to the Shenandoah bridge immediately after he placed the river between himself and Fremont. Meanwhile, the combat, which was raging along the right wing of the Federals, had obliged the latter to weaken their positions on the left. Jackson pushed one of his brigades to the assault of these positions, and after a desperate struggle the Confederates took possession of them, together with three pieces of artillery which were found in them. Being turned on this side, Tyler was obliged to fight in retreat, and fell back in

good order toward the hamlet of Conrad's Store, occupied by the remainder of Shield's division. His soldiers, who had been recruited among the pioneers of the West, and especially in the State of Ohio, had fought with great determination; they had inflicted a loss of six hundred men upon an enemy three or four times their number.

The battle of Port Republic ended the pursuit of Jackson. Fremont had witnessed its termination from the other side of the Shenandoah without being able to cross the river in time to participate in it. He withdrew, and Jackson, being master of the battle-field, gave some rest to his troops before entering on a new campaign. This time his course lay in the direction of Richmond; turning his back upon the theatre of his easy successes, his opportune arrival enabled Lee to take advantage of the mistakes which his bold maneuvers in the valley of Virginia had caused the military authorities at Washington to commit.

In the meantime, his adversaries were dispersing. Fremont returned to his Mountain department and Banks to Strasburg, while McDowell with difficulty united his divisions at Fredericksburg, exhausted and discouraged by so many fruitless marches and countermarches; although they had seen the enemy but once, they sustained more losses than if they had fought a pitched battle.

Returning to the peninsula of Virginia, we find the army of the Potomac still without the reinforcements it had so long been expecting, and left to its own resources. We left General McClellan on the 19th of May master of the Chickahominy pass at Bottom's Bridge. Free to seek a new base of operations on James River, or to continue resting on York River, he had just chosen the latter alternative, notwithstanding its dangers, in the vain hope of being able to keep in communication with McDowell's corps. Before resuming his march he had introduced some changes in the composition of his army corps; for the experience acquired at the battle of Williamsburg had shaken whatever confidence he might have reposed in the capacity of the three commanders who had been forced upon him by the President at the opening of the campaign. The army corps had

been reduced to five in number, each with two divisions, and an effective force of from fifteen to nineteen thousand men. This subdivision rendered them more manageable, while the command of the new corps fell, by right of seniority, upon Generals Franklin and Fitz-John Porter, two officers for whom he entertained a particular regard.

The ground on which he was about to operate may be described in few words. It presents but a single obstacle, the Chickahominy—a serious one, it is true. This river, after passing within seven or eight kilometres of Richmond, turns off, continuing to flow in a south-easterly direction, so that Bottom's Bridge lies about eighteen or twenty kilometres from that city. Taking its rise to the north-east of the capital of Virginia, it winds through a valley regularly enclosed on both sides averaging eight or nine hundred metres in breadth. Following its downward course, we find Meadow Bridge first, over which passes a wagon-road and the Gordonsville railway; lower down, the bridge of Mechanicsville, commanded on the left bank by the hamlet of that name, is situated at the point where this river runs nearest to Richmond. Here the surrounding hills on each side are destitute of trees, and presently, on the road between Richmond and Cold Harbor, we come to New Bridge which connects the hamlet of Old Tavern with the Gaines' Mill heights. One kilometre below this bridge the forest again enfolds the banks of the Chickahominy, and does not leave it for ten kilometres lower down, at the bridge of the West Point railway, which is situated one kilometre above Bottom's Bridge. The only tributaries of the Chickahominy are, on the left bank, a small stream called Beaver-dam Creek, between Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, and on the right bank a vast wooded swamp, known as White Oak Swamp, the waters of which empty into the river a few kilometres below Bottom's Bridge. This swamp, which has its origin in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, is absolutely impassable, except at two or three points, where it becomes narrow, affording passage to a few crossroads.

The Confederate army was encamped around Richmond, where it was receiving reinforcements forwarded in

haste from every section of the country. Huger arrived with twelve thousand men from Norfolk; Branch, whose defeat at Newberne by Burnside we have noticed, brought nine thousand from North Carolina, and others were yet to follow. The reconnaissances of the Federal army had revealed the fact that the abandonment of Bottom's Bridge was the last step in Johnston's retreat. The latter was preparing for the defence of Meadow Bridge and New Bridge. The nature of the ground was perfectly adapted for this purpose, and the Federal general was the less likely to think of carrying this pass by main force because he could turn it by the lower course of the river, of which he had control. Everything, therefore, urged him to push his attacks by following the right bank between Bottom's Bridge to the clearing of Seven Pines, eleven kilometres from Richmond. The rest of the army remained on the left bank of the river. The centre, consisting of Sumner's corps, was encamped in the neighborhood of the railroad-bridge; the two corps commanded by Porter and Franklin, forming the right wing, were posted in the vicinity of Gaines' Mill and Mechanicsville. The army had occupied these positions without any difficulty, having only met some weak detachments of the enemy at Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, which were easily repulsed. But it found itself divided into two parts by the Chickahominy, without any other communication between its right and left wings than the railway-bridge at Despatch and Bottom's Bridge; these two passages were far remote from the extreme points of Seven Pines and Mechanicsville, which were the most exposed to an attack from the enemy. It would undoubtedly have been infinitely better, under every aspect of the case, to have transferred the entire army to the right bank of the Chickahominy; but McClellan had been obliged to occupy both sides of the river and to push his right wing to the vicinity of its source, as much for the purpose of keeping up communication with McDowell's vanguard, whose arrival he was still constantly promised, as to cover his depots at the White House, and the railroad through which he obtained his supplies. The faulty disposition of his army was therefore forced upon him by cir-

cumstances from the moment he had abandoned the idea of seeking a new base of operations on the James. We shall see presently how, in consequence of unforeseen accidents and too long delays, he remained in this dangerous position for more than a month.

It was on the 24th of May that McDowell had received an order from the President's own mouth to march upon Richmond. The next day being Sunday, his departure was fixed for the 26th. He had a march of seventy-two kilometres before him between Fredericksburg and Richmond, through a difficult country, as Grant was to find out two years later, but in which, owing to the position occupied by McClellan before Richmond, the Confederates could not have offered any serious resistance to the Federals. This region has two railroads. One, running north and south, leads from Aquia Creek to Richmond, through Fredericksburg and Bowling Green, and crosses to the south of the latter town the two branches of the Pamunky, called the North Anna and the South Anna, near Jericho Bridge and Ashland. The other railroad, from Gordonsville, intersects the first between these two branches, and passing the second near Hanover Court-house crosses the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge to enter Richmond more to the east than the Aquia Creek road.

The Confederates had placed Anderson at Bowling Green with twelve or fifteen thousand men for the purpose of holding McDowell in check, and Branch's division between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court-house, that it might be within reach of Richmond or Bowling Green, as circumstances should require. On announcing McDowell's departure, Mr. Lincoln requested General McClellan to make a movement on his right to cut the communications between Bowling Green and Richmond, and to seize the two railroad bridges on the South Anna, in order that he might the more easily assist the troops who were on their way from Fredericksburg. This order was promptly executed, and on the 25th, Stoneman's cavalry was at work destroying the Gordonsville railroad between Hanover Court House and the Chickahominy. But on this very day the mirage which had

attracted McClellan to the north side of Richmond was vanishing entirely away. McDowell had received fresh instructions; Shields was on his way to Front Royal; great excitement prevailed in Washington, and Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to the commander of the army of the Potomac that if he could not attack Richmond with the forces at his disposal, he had better give up the job and come to defend the capital.* The next day the President urged him to send out the proposed expedition on his right, but with a very different object from that which had at first been contemplated, and to destroy the bridges on the South Anna, which two days before he was desirous to preserve at any price. Jackson had thus succeeded beyond his expectations; for it was for the purpose of cutting off the pretended reinforcements which, according to the Washington authorities, were to be forwarded to him from Richmond, that the Federals sought to destroy with their own hands the road which would have enabled them to concentrate their forces in front of the enemy's capital.

Tired out by such constant vacillations, McClellan prepared to execute this fatal order without offering any comments; but he determined to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered to exercise his right wing by striking an unexpected blow at Branch's division, which might threaten his depot while he was engaged in a great battle before Richmond. On the morning of the 27th, Porter, with Morell's division, Warren's brigade and three regiments of cavalry, two of which were regulars, little less than ten thousand men in all, left Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor and proceeded toward Hanover Court-house. After a fatiguing march of twenty-two kilometres, his vanguard, consisting of the cavalry and two regiments of infantry, encountered Branch, who, on being apprised of this threatening movement, had taken position at the intersection of the Hanover and Ashland roads. The Confederates thus covered the two railroad-bridges on the South Anna; but they were vigorously attacked, and Butterfield's brigade,

*"Either attack Richmond, or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington."

arriving in time, put them completely to flight. Branch lost in this first engagement one cannon and a large number of prisoners. Continuing his route, Porter, after having joined Warren's brigade, sent the latter to destroy the bridge of the Gordonsville railroad, while that of Martindale proceeded to cut the other railroad line at Ashland. Warren had picked up whole companies of the enemy, which, deprived of all direction, surrendered without a struggle. After a slight skirmish, Martindale had also accomplished his task, and was on his way back to rejoin his chief at Hanover, when he suddenly fell in with the remainder of Branch's troops debouching by the same road which the Federals had followed in the morning. The Confederate chief, having, in fact, been surprised and forced into the preceding combat before he had time to collect all his forces, had been turned by the Federal detachment, which had passed on his right, and had thus been driven upon the banks of the Pamunky, near Hanover. In order to extricate himself from this difficult position, he described a large arc around the Federals, which would have brought him back to the Richmond and Ashland turnpike, when, just as he was about reaching the road, not far from the scene of the first fight, his heads of column fell in with Martindale's small brigade. The latter fought the superior forces of the enemy with great spirit, until Porter, informed by the noise of cannon, came back from Hanover with the remainder of his division, and attacking the Confederates both in front on the road, and by the flank through the woods, drove them in disorder toward the south.

The double combat of Hanover Court-house had cost the Federals fifty-three men killed and three hundred and forty-four wounded or taken prisoners. It was a brilliant and complete success. The enemy had left more than seven hundred prisoners and one gun in Porter's hands. Branch's division, dispersed among the woods, was entirely disorganized. The morale of the Federals was restored by so fortunate a result. But in Washington the tidings of this success afforded no compensation for the alarms caused by Jackson, which filled the minds of all men. Mr. Lincoln

replied to McClellan's despatches with complaints that the order for the destruction of all the bridges on the South Anna had not yet been executed. On the following day the general-in-chief was able to inform him that his instructions had been scrupulously carried out, and on the 29th Porter's troops, quitting the scene of their glorious but fruitless victory, returned to take position at Gaines' Mill. Everything indicated that the banks of the Chickahominy were soon to be ensanguined by a desperate struggle.

The Confederates were in fact collecting all their disposable forces for the protection of Richmond. The civil government as well as the personnel of the administration, who in that capital, as at Washington, fancied that all the interest of the war was centered in the defence of their bureaus, had passed from the utter discouragement caused by the loss of the Virginia to the most absolute confidence. On the 28th and 29th of May, considerable reinforcements came to join Johnston's army, Anderson's division among the rest; this officer, on seeing McDowell rushing in pursuit of Jackson, instead of following in his tracks, had quickly brought back his troops from Bowling Green to Richmond.

The position of the army of the Potomac seemed, on the other hand, to invite an attack. Its left, thrown over the unfriendly bank of the Chickahominy, and inactive for the last seven days, occupied a position which was at once menacing to the Confederates and dangerous to itself. Its front extended between the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp. This latter water-course is composed of a succession of swamps running in a parallel direction with the former for a considerable distance, but the unequal width of which at certain points reduces the space comprised between them to four or five kilometres; at the elevation of Bottom's Bridge, the swamp gives place to a stream which inclining to the left carries their muddy waters into the Chickahominy a few kilometres below. The Williamsburg road and the West Point railway, after crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge and at Dispatch, follow a parallel course in a direct line to Richmond. The bridge at Dispatch

could not be thoroughly repaired before the 30th of May; all the troops posted on the right bank of the Chickahominy obtained their supplies, therefore, by the turnpike; and to facilitate the distribution of rations most of these troops were encamped in the successive clearings through which this road passes. On the left, dense woods, traversed only by narrow paths, stretch out as far as the impenetrable thickets which cover the stagnant waters of White Oak Swamp with eternal verdure. The road forks within ten kilometres of Richmond, at a place called Seven Pines. One branch continues in the original direction, and approaches the capital by following the course of the James. The other, turning to the right, intersects the railroad at Fair Oaks station, emerging afterward into a large clearing, in the midst of which, at Old Tavern, it again connects with the Richmond road to New Bridge and Cold Harbor. This is the Nine Mile road. The railway, forming an almost straight line, runs along the summit of a slight undulation which separates the waters of White Oak Swamp from those of the Chickahominy. After rising upon the right bank of this water-course by passing through a deep cut, it crosses the woods without meeting with any work of importance to mark its course. There are three stations along the section of the line then occupied by the Federals—Dispatch, in the vicinity of the bridge; Fair Oaks, the nearest to Richmond; and between the two, Savage Station, situated in a large clearing at the intersection of several roads. These forest roads are very numerous; they form so many connecting links between isolated plantations, farms or country houses, each standing in the centre of a cleared space surrounded by woods on every side; most of them are perpendicular to the Williamsburg turnpike, and run as far as the Chickahominy; but among these dense copses they constitute an inextricable labyrinth for those who are not familiar with the locality in all its details.

In order to approach Richmond, General McClellan was desirous of gaining ground gradually on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and after each step taken on that side to connect his two wings by throwing new bridges over this

dangerous river. Sumner's corps, which occupied the left bank as far as the neighborhood of Gaines' Mill, had already constructed two bridges in conformity with this plan, one at three thousand five hundred metres, the other at six kilometres, above the railroad bridge. In executing this work he had been able to cross to the opposite bank without meeting the enemy, and had completed it in a few days, thanks to the skill and ingenuity of his soldiers. The river, by a multitude of sinuous turnings, formed a swamp three or four hundred metres wide, lying in the shadow of gigantic trees, whose trunks rose to a height of fifty metres above the waters, while the roots were buried in a muddy bottom impracticable for men and horses. It was found necessary to open a passage across this forest, and to lay the flooring of the bridge, formed of unhewn pieces of timber bound together by cords or bind-weed, sometimes on piles sunk into the bed of the river, sometimes on the stumps of the trees, which were cut down to a proper height. No survey had been made of the country beyond the shores of the river. Higher up still, in the neighborhood of New Bridge, two trestle-bridges had been constructed and almost entirely placed in position. It only remained to lay the flooring. But the open space in which they stood exposed them to the fire of the enemy, which had soon interrupted the work, and it could only be completed by the aid of an aggressive movement on the right bank.

The Federal left wing was composed of four divisions, each from six to eight thousand men strong. Casey, who commanded the newest regiments in the whole army, had very imprudently been placed at the most exposed point of the whole line, and occupied a clearing about one kilometre in advance of Seven Pines, where he had erected two small redoubts amounting a few field pieces. His pickets had been pushed only one thousand metres beyond that point. Couch, with his division, was at Seven Pines, near Fair Oaks Station, situated sixteen hundred metres to the north, and along that portion of the Nine Mile road which connects the two points. At a distance of two kilometres from Seven Pines, where the Williamsburg road emerges from a large

clearing to enter a wood, there was a line of breastworks and small redoubts occupied by Kearny's division. The fourth, Hooker's, had been sent a considerable distance south to watch the passes of White Oak Swamp.

The army of the Potomac was thus unfortunately scattered; the divisions, posted in front of Seven Pines, at White Oak Swamp and Mechanicsville, could not afford each other mutual support, and they formed a vast semi-circle of nearly forty kilometres in extent. General McClellan estimated that it would have taken two days' march for Franklin's division to reach Casey's encampments. The Confederates, on the contrary, occupying the chord of the arc, could as easily move to the front of one as of the other; and after having menaced the extreme right of the Federals at Meadow Bridge, they had only eleven or twelve kilometres to march to reach Fair Oaks and fall upon their extreme left. Johnston was not the man to leave his adversary in so perilous a situation without turning it to account. His army, assembled around Richmond, consisted of four large divisions, each comprising five or six brigades, under Generals Longstreet, G. Smith, D. H. Hill and Huger; it numbered about sixty thousand effective soldiers.

On the 30th he gave the necessary instructions for battle on the morrow. Huger, following a road called the Charles City road, was to pass to the right of White Oak Swamp, and then cross this marsh, so as to attack Keyes' positions in flank, on the Williamsburg road, whilst Hill, debouching by this road, was to charge them in front. Longstreet, following in Hill's rear, was to sustain his attack. Smith's orders were to proceed to Old Tavern, in order to cover the left wing of the army in case the Federals should attempt to cross the Chickahominy near New Bridge; otherwise, to come and take part in the battle by entering into line to the left of Fair Oaks station.

During the evening a tropical storm burst upon the two armies, and in the midst of profound darkness poured torrents of rain upon the ground on which they were to measure their strength. On the morning of the 31st this clayey soil was half submerged; the passage of a single

vehicle was sufficient to turn the roads into inextricable mud-holes; the smallest streams were swelling as one looked at them, while the Chickahominy, assuming a reddish tint, was beginning to overflow its banks and to spread over the plains adjoining, which were already very muddy. Far from allowing the obstacles which the condition of the ground was about to interpose to turn him from his purpose, Johnston only saw in it an additional motive for giving battle, being convinced that the mud and the overflow would be more fatal to the Federals, scattered along a line too extended, than to the army which was compactly gathered around him.

At break of day that army took up its line of march in the presence of the whole population of Richmond, which had come out of the city to encourage those to whom its defence was entrusted. It would have been difficult to find a single inhabitant of the Confederate capital who had not a relative or a friend in the ranks of the army. Curious persons and newspaper correspondents followed it as far as the battle-field. The three divisions of Hill, Longstreet and Smith, after some strenuous efforts, arrived in position toward eight o'clock; they had been obliged, however, to leave their artillery behind—a bold resolve, which the Federals were not wise enough to imitate. But Huger's troops, which had started at the same time as the former, did not make their appearance in the positions which had been assigned to them. It is probable that the latter general may have found the fords at White Oak Swamp utterly impassable. Be that as it may, he did not reach the field of battle during the whole of that day, nor did he even notify his chief of the cause of his delay; his absence, so fatal to the success of the Confederates, was made the subject of bitter reproaches on the part of those whose plans had thus been frustrated. Finally, about noon, Longstreet, who had been waiting for him up to that moment, gave Hill the order to attack. Without sending any skirmishers ahead, that they might take the enemy more completely by surprise, the Confederates advanced, some in line across the woods, others in deep columns along the road, sweeping before them

Casey's pickets, together with a regiment which had been sent to reinforce them. The foremost works of the Federals, which were as yet unfinished, being simply abatis or breastworks, whose profiles could afford no protection to soldiers, were occupied by Naglee's brigade. The latter made a vigorous resistance, while the division artillery, under Colonel Bailey, and old regular officer, caused great havoc in the ranks of the assailants. Meanwhile, the combat extended along the line. Hill had deployed all his troops and brought them into action; his left had reached Fair Oaks, where Couch was making a stand with a portion of his division. Casey's two other brigades had hastened to the assistance of Naglee, and, despite heavy losses, they held out against the Confederates, whose numbers were constantly increasing. Longstreet's division now entered into line and was supporting Hill's soldiers, who were becoming exhausted. Attacking the Federal position by the right, some of his regiments penetrated into the woods which separate White Oak Swamp from the clearing defended by Casey. The Federal works were attacked in the rear, and their defenders decimated by enfilading fire. These young soldiers, who had hitherto been sustained by the excitement which springs from danger and the very exhaustion of a fierce struggle, no longer possessed the requisite coolness to resist this unexpected attack. They were driven back in disorder upon Seven Pines. Besides, the number alone of their adversaries would have been sufficient to crush them. Some few, however, persisted in defending the redoubts, but soon disappeared among the ranks of Hill's troops, who, having returned to the charge, hemmed them in on every side. Bailey was killed by the side of the guns he had just spiked, and seven pieces fell into the hands of the assailants. It was three o'clock. Precisely at this moment Peck's brigade of Couch's division was arriving from Seven Pines, led by Keyes, who had been informed somewhat late of the serious character of the fight. The Lafayette Guards, which formed part of this brigade, having deployed into line among the debris of Casey's division, allowed the fugitives to pass without mov-

ing, then rallying around them this floating mass, among whom the bonds of discipline had disappeared, but not personal courage, they made a vigorous aggressive movement. Despite their efforts, they could recapture neither the redoubts nor the lost cannon; but the enemy was checked, the remainder of Casey's artillery saved, and the Federals had time to rally. Regiments after regiments from Couch's division were sent to sustain the fight; for if the Federals were losing ground, they now contested it foot to foot. On the right Couch commanded at Fair Oaks in person, where, with the rest of his division, he held in check the left wing of Longstreet, whose main efforts were still concentrated upon the position of Seven Pines.

The struggle lasted four hours, and yet, strange to say, only two divisions had taken part in it on either side. Keyes' corps alone, numbering about twelve thousand effective men, had been engaged on the Federal side, and while Longstreet and Hill's columns were being decimated by the enemy's artillery, Huger, on their right, was still lost in the White Oak Swamp; Smith, on their left, continued inactive around Old Tavern. In short, the two generals-in-chief were both unconscious of the battle in which their respective soldiers were engaged. McClellan, who was sick at his headquarters near Gaines' Mill, had heard nothing from Heintzelman, to whom the command of the entire left was entrusted. The telegraph which connected the various sections of the army was silent. Heintzelman himself, although posted at Savage Station, only a few kilometres from Seven Pines, had only heard of the enemy's attack several hours after the first musket-shot was fired. Johnston's ignorance was still more unaccountable, in as much as he was the assailant. Leisurely posted at Old Tavern, he was still waiting for the booming of cannon on the Williamsburg road to put Smith in motion. But the storm of rain and wind which followed the gale of the previous day carried the sound in a different direction, and the general-in-chief, who had ordered the attack to be made in the morning, remained until four o'clock listening in expectation of this signal, without sending a solitary aide-de-camp to ascertain what was pass-

ing on his right. He was, however, separated by less than four kilometres in a direct line from the Williamsburg road, and a man on horseback, leaving Old Tavern, would have had no more than ten kilometres to ride, without leaving the main road, to reach Longstreet in the midst of the soldiers whom he was bringing without delay into the thickest of the fight. Although taken by surprise, the Federals had not lost quite so much time. The booming of cannon, which Johnston did not hear, had reached McClellan's tent. The high wind made it impossible for the balloon, which had been brought there at great expense, to make an ascension to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy; it had met the fate of all complicated machines, which, although useful at times, should never be relied on in war. An order, however, was immediately sent to Sumner to hold himself in readiness to march. The latter, also hearing the cannon, was not satisfied with simply obeying the letter of his instructions; but putting his two divisions in motion without delay, he placed each of them near one of the bridges he had constructed, ready to cross the river at the first signal. On his side Heintzelman, on learning the state of affairs about two o'clock, at once recalled Hooker from White Oak Swamp, despatched Kearny to the support of Keyes, and notified McClellan, who immediately ordered Sumner to cross the Chickahominy and take part in the battle.

At half-past three o'clock Kearny, who, from the moment that he heard the sound of cannon, knew no obstacles, arrived at Seven Pines with two of his brigades, Berry's and Jamison's, and his timely presence retrieved for a moment the fortunes of the day. But at the same time Johnston was also roused from his inactivity. He sent at last an aide-de-camp to ascertain the movements of Longstreet; and learning from him that a fierce battle was raging on his right, he determined to bring Smith's corps into line. A portion of this corps, under Hood, marched directly upon Fair Oaks by way of Nine Mile road to support Longstreet's attack. The remainder, under the personal lead of the general-in-chief, bore to the left, and reached the large clearings extending from Fair Oaks to the Chicka-

hominy; by this movement Johnston hoped to strike the right flank and rear of the Federals who were defending Seven Pines. It was four 'clock. Hood arrived at Fair Oaks with his fresh troops, and swept everything before him. He cut the Federal line in two. Couch, with a few regiments, was driven back north of the railroad, while the remainder of his division, already scattered and mixed up with the debris of Casey's, was no longer able to defend Seven Pines, and was forced back on the Williamsburg road, while Kearny's brigades, which had resolutely defended their positions on the extreme left, finding themselves separated from the rest of the army, were obliged to make a large detour across the woods to rejoin their comrades.

It was a critical moment. The Federals, who had struggled vigorously against the ever-increasing numbers of their adversaries—for they were only eighteen or nineteen thousand against more than thirty thousand—were in a condition in which the least mischance might lead to an irreparable disaster. Brigades, regiments, and even companies, were mixed up. The relative commands no longer existed. In their efforts to restore order among the troops the officers gathered around them, by their words and their example, men from the regiments, and marshalled them in haste and almost at random behind the breastworks erected a few days before near the camp occupied by Kearny, two kilometres in the rear of Seven Pines. One moment more, and Smith, falling upon the extreme right of this weak line, would give the signal for a new attack, which would probably consummate the destruction of all the Federals south of the Chickahominy.

It was six o'clock in the evening, and the Confederates had more than two hours of daylight before them to complete their victory; but all of a sudden a brisk fire of musketry broke out in the wood to the right of the railroad. The hollow sound of howitzers loaded with grape was soon mingled with it. Smith had encountered a foe entirely unexpected. It was Sumner, who arrived in time to check his progress and resume on this side the game which had

been lost on the Williamsburg road. The warrior's instinct, which prompted him to push his divisions forward and mass them in the vicinity of the bridges when ordered to keep under arms, had enabled him to gain an hour, and that hour secured the safety of the army. The new order directing him to cross the Chickahominy to participate in the battle reached him about two o'clock. At that moment the river was already rising as far as the eye could see, seeming to conspire with the enemy to prevent him from going to the assistance of his comrades. The lower bridge had been carried away; the other was entirely submerged, while the unhewn timbers which constituted its flooring, being only held together by ropes, floated about amid the waters, whose impetuous current tossed them in their foam. Sumner himself, despite his inflexible will, was beginning to think that not a single company would ever be able to reach the other side of the river. Nevertheless, he pushed the head of column of Sedgwick's division over this bridge. The first soldiers who crossed found it difficult to keep steady on the moving platform, which was shaking under their feet. But the weight of those who followed soon restored its stability; it soon settled on the piles from which it had been wrenched. The whole of Sedgwick's division crossed it, the officers on horseback; the artillery followed, but most of the guns sunk in the mud in the marshy plains which extend beyond the bridge. Kirby's regular battery alone succeeded in getting safely over. Richardson, who, after having tried in vain to restore the lower bridge, had been compelled to cross at this same point, followed in rear of Sedgwick, but his troops only reached the opposite shore at nightfall. Sumner had not waited for his arrival to move forward with his first division. He had just overtaken Couch, who had been driven back on the right of Fair Oaks with a portion of his troops, and had barely time to deploy to receive the shock of Smith's corps, which was about to debouch in the large clearing. Kirby's battery enfiladed an open space leading to Nine Mile road; Sumner placed one brigade and a half on the right, fronting Old Tavern; on the left the remainder of Sedgwick's division was disposed en

potence parallel to the railroad, which the enemy had just occupied. Even before these dispositions were fully carried out, the battle was furiously engaged. Smith was in haste to make up for lost time, and believed himself sure of success; Whiting, who commanded three brigades of this corps, debouched on the salient angle formed by the Federal line; but being received by a terrible fire from Kirby's guns, he halted on the skirt of the wood. After a brisk fire of musketry, the Confederates made a new attempt to carry this battery, which occupied the key of the position, and had interrupted their turning movement. Johnston, rushing in person into the thickest of the fight, hurled Pettigrew's brigade against it. It advanced fearlessly up to the cannon's mouth; but the Federal gunners, anxious to avenge the memory of Bull Run, where this same Johnston had captured their pieces, coolly waited for the assault of the Confederate brigade, which they decimated at short range. It was driven back in disorder, leaving in the Federal hands its wounded commander, Pettigrew, and the ground strewed with dead bodies. Availing himself of this chance, Sumner assumed the offensive with his left, and drove the enemy back in the direction of Fair Oaks. Smith brought his reserve brigades into action in vain; he could barely hold the ground he occupied, and his forward movement was definitely checked. The Confederate army was, moreover, paralyzed at this moment by the loss of its commander-in-chief; Johnston had just been severely wounded and carried into Richmond. It was seven o'clock in the evening. Along the whole line the battle had degenerated into a musketry fire, which was continued pretty well into the night, but each party remained on the defensive. The check of Smith had, in fact, crippled the success of Longstreet on the Williamsburg road. The latter, arriving in front of the small works where the Federal forces were massed, was afraid of attempting to carry them by assault with worn-out troops whose ranks were fearfully thinned. His opponent, reinforced by a few fresh regiments, made a bold stand while the fugitives were rapidly coming back into line. Longstreet was waiting for assistance, either from Huger

on his right or from Smith on his left, before making the attack, and thus allowed the last hours of daylight to pass away.

A dark and rainy night came on at last to put an end to the slaughter, but not to the sufferings, the fatigue and the anxieties, of the two armies. The losses had been equally heavy on both sides. During the whole of that night long wagon-trains of wounded men, carrying into Richmond the unfortunate victims of a fratricidal war, told the inhabitants of the capital how dearly bought was the success which had been prematurely announced to them. All the vehicles in the city, omnibuses and carts, were despatched to the field of battle to find the wounded and the dying, whom they brought back in the midst of a dense and silent crowd. As for the dead, there was no time as yet to think of them. On the side of the Federals the ambulances, camps and railway-stations were not less encumbered.

On both sides the generals were filled with anxiety. Smith had assumed the command, but in succeeding Johnston he could not replace that experienced chieftain. The Federals had undoubtedly sustained a severe check; but if their left wing had been defeated, it was not destroyed, as was hoped in Richmond. The attack had been wanting in unison; the absence of Huger together with the prolonged inaction of Smith, had thrown all the burden of the battle upon one-half of the army. Finally the encounter with Sumner had not only roughly interrupted the success of the operation, but had revealed the existence of communications which the Confederates had not suspected. It gave them to understand that, notwithstanding the rise in the Chickahominy, they might on the following day have to measure themselves with the whole Federal army. Consequently, they determined upon a retreat.

On the side of the Federals the anxiety was not less. They had always wished during this aggressive campaign for an opportunity to fight a defensive battle, thinking that this kind of fighting was better adapted to the character of their soldiers; they had been attacked, and, so far from

coming off victorious, their left wing had been so crushed that Sumner's success afforded no compensation for the reverse. The Chickahominy was constantly rising, and it way easy to foresee that on the following morning all the new communications established by Sumner between the two wings of the army would be interrupted by the freshet. It was known that the enemy had not brought all his forces into action. There were more than sixty thousand men around Richmond and within reach of Fair Oaks. General McClellan thought there were eighty thousand. The Federal troops who were about to find themselves almost isolated on the right bank of the Chickahominy did not amount to forty-five thousand men, while one-third of them at least, disorganized by the great struggle of the 31st of May, would have found it difficult to come into line the day following.

This numerical inferiority should not have existed; and if the Confederates had cause to complain that some of their generals had compromised the success of their operations by not appearing on the field of battle or by arriving too late, the Federals had an equal right to say that the inaction of half their army had prevented them from turning the battle of Fair Oaks into a great victory. Sumner's success was sufficient proof of this. At the time when the latter was ordered to cross the Chickahominy, General McClellan, from his headquarters at Gaines' Mill, could see the smoke, which rose above the tree-tops, tracing the undulations of the line of battle and marking the steady progress of the enemy. He had in hand two army corps of his right wing; before him the Chickahominy, which, although swollen, was still passable; two bridges already in an advanced state of construction could be completed in a few hours; on the opposite hill, commanding the approaches to the river, no work had been erected by the enemy; only one or two regiments were seen moving about with suspicious ostentation along the most conspicuous points of the plateau. By leaving one division to guard the large park of artillery, and the depots, McClellan could have crossed the river with three others in the vicinity of New Bridge, and

fallen upon the flank of the Confederates; such an attack would have made them pay dear for their first success. Several brigades had been stationed in front of two bridges —the construction of which had been commenced several days previous—so as to be ready to cross them the moment they should be finished. But General McClellan, seeing that it would be impossible, before evening, for the artillery to cross those bridges, and not wishing to risk a detachment of his army in an unknown region, with a numerous and apparently victorious enemy in its front and a swollen river in its rear, merely gave directions for the completion of the bridges during the night, hoping, no doubt, that he would be able to accomplish the passage the following morning. But even while abandoning the idea of forcing the passage of the Chickahominy at New Bridge, he might perhaps have been able to bring back his right wing to the rear, in order to cross the river over the same bridge as Sumner. This bridge was situated only about four miles and a half from the encampments of the right wing; and if the troops had been put in motion at the time Sumner received the order to cross, they would have arrived in time to follow him over the bridge, which withstood the flood until noon the next day. In this case, five fresh divisions, instead of two, could have resumed the offensive in the morning. But General McClellan, knowing that a single defeat might involve the loss of his whole army, isolated as it was in the enemy's country, and ruin the Federal cause for ever, was not willing to weaken his right wing. Fearing lest the enemy might debouch by way of Meadow Bridge and cross the Chickahominy, he did not dare to entrust to a thin line of troops the guard of his communications and the immense park of artillery, which the condition of the roads prevented from being removed; and he left nearly fifty thousand men inactive on the plateau of Cold Harbor. We cannot blame his prudence, but it may be asserted that if he had known what was passing among the Confederate bivouacs, and at the camp-fires around which the generals in command of the enemy's troops were trying to find shelter from the penetrating dampness of that night, he would

have acted very differently. Indeed, their new commander-in-chief had no idea of throwing himself on both banks of the Chickahominy, in the position which had so nearly proved fatal to the Federals. He did not believe it possible to complete the maneuver which had been interrupted by Sumner against their left wing. It must be acknowledged, however, that the chances were greatly in his favor. Huger had made his appearance after the battle, and Generals Holmes and Ripley had just arrived in Richmond from North Carolina with eight thousand men. This timely reinforcement would perhaps permit them to resume the attack with greater hope of success, as the rise in the river rendered the position of the Federals more difficult. But in the absence of Johnston, who had alone conceived the plan of battle, prudence prevailed, and Smith would have given the signal for retreat that very night, if he had not been obliged to give his soldiers a few hours' rest, and his officers time to rally and reorganize their troops. Consequently, when day dawned upon the two armies no sound disturbed at first the silence which reigned over the battle-field; and it was the Federals who renewed the conflict on the morning of the 1st of June. During the evening Hooker had again struck into the Williamsburg road, while Richardson had joined Sedgwick near Fair Oaks. These two divisions, advancing to the front line, attacked the Confederates, who were already in full retreat. Notwithstanding this reinforcement, the troops composing the left wing of the Federals were not in a condition to push into a woody and unknown region, in pursuit of an enemy whose prowess they had just experienced. A movement of this kind could not have been seriously undertaken unless Franklin and Porter had been able to join them on the field of battle. General McClellan as we have said, had ordered the completion of the bridges that were in course of construction in front of their camps. The corps of engineers, by extraordinary exertions, had succeeded for a while in controlling the swollen waters of the Chickahominy, and on the 1st of June, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the bridge of boats at New Bridge was passable for the artillery; the trestle-bridge,

situated higher up, might, in spite of the condition of the surrounding country, which was overflowed, allow the infantry to cross. The rise in the river, it is true, seemed to preclude all hope of long preserving these bridges; for, as early as noon that day, they were under water. Still, even here was to be found an opportunity for transforming the battle into a decisive victory and the general-in-chief would doubtless have seized this opportunity if, at that moment, he had been with his right wing, and if he had known how little able the Confederates were, at that time to oppose the crossing of the river at New Bridge, if that crossing had been supported by Sumner on the other bank, and by a demonstration on the extreme right, near Mechanicsville. But McClellan was called, by the grave aspect of the fight, to the left wing; he could not take advantage of this critical moment, while it was out of his power, at that distance, to order his lieutenants to undertake a movement so hazardous, and which he himself, but a few hours before, had deemed impossible; and thus his right wing remained inactive, and the Confederate army was saved from imminent disaster. Indeed, it has been asserted by eye-witnesses that its retreat was not made without disorder, and that if the Federals had pressed with a sufficient force, even without artillery, the three brigades of Huger's corps, which, under Pickett, Pryor and Mahone, were defending every inch of ground, they might probably have been able to enter Richmond with them.

The combat of the 1st of June, in which but a few thousand men were engaged on either side, had notwithstanding the proportions of a great battle. On the left it was marked by a brilliant charge of Sickles' brigade along the railway track; on the right by a sharp encounter between an Irish brigade in the Federal service, commanded by General Meagher, and Pickett's troops. Before noon the Federal outposts took possession without a blow of the works whose capture had cost so dear to the Confederate army, and suffered it to disappear among the dense woods without molestation. This brilliant army, which had gone out the day before almost in triumph for the purpose of delivering

Richmond from the grasp of the invader, returned to its cantonments on that same evening, with only four flags, ten cannon and twelve hundred prisoners, more as an evidence of its valor than as a token of success.

The undecided battle, which had drenched the vicinity of Fair Oaks with blood during two entire days, was attended with a loss of nearly four thousand five hundred men to the Confederates, and five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven on the part of the Federals. The heaviest losses on both sides were sustained around Seven Pines; those of Longstreet and Hill amounted to more than three thousand, and those of Keyes to three thousand one hundred and twenty men.* After such a struggle the two armies of war, were equally in need of rest.†

A very remarkable work just published by General Johnston explains how McClellan is mistaken in attributing a loss of two thousand five hundred men more than they really sustained, to his opponents. In this work Johnston severely blames the generals who succeeded him in command for not having followed up on the 1st of June their success of May 31st. He complains, moreover, of not having been informed beforehand of the approach of Holmes and Ripley, whose arrival he would have waited for before giving battle, if he had known of their being so near. As General Johnston's official report, addressed to the Confederate government, contains none of these reproaches, now embodied in a book which has appeared since the close of the war, we may infer that President Davis is chiefly responsible in the estimation of General Johnston, for the mistakes he refers to in his later publication.

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*The official reports give the following figures for the army of the Potomac: Sumner, one hundred and eighty-three killed, eight hundred and ninety-four wounded, one hundred and forty-six prisoners; Heintzelman, two hundred and fifty-nine killed, nine hundred and eighty wounded, one hundred and fifty-five prisoners; Keyes, four hundred and forty-eight killed, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three wounded, nine hundred and twenty-one prisoners; total eight hundred and ninety killed, three thousand six hundred and twenty-seven wounded, and one thousand two hundred and twenty-two prisoners. For the army of Northern Virginia: Longstreet and Hill, a little over three thousand; Smith, one thousand two hundred and thirty-three men disabled.

†See Note A in the Appendix to this volume.

CHAPTER III

Gaines' Mill

The alarms occasioned by Jackson's success did not prevent the battle of Fair Oaks from producing a great sensation in the North. The army of the Potomac was essentially national in its character, and there was not a village in the free States that had not furnished to it some young men; consequently, a greater interest was everywhere manifested in its labors than in the pretended dangers of the Federal capital. The government, still cherishing a secret jealousy against General McClellan, seldom communicated to the public the tidings it received from him, but after such a battle it was no longer possible to keep silent; accordingly, a despatch from the commander-in-chief was for the first time published. The latter, unfortunately deceived by Heintzelman's report, threw undue blame upon Casey's division. This despatch was corrected in Washington, but in such a manner as to aggravate the painful effect of the error it contained. The unmerited censure was allowed to stand, while the eulogies which McClellan bestowed upon Sumner were suppressed. The general-in-chief soon set forth the truth, and it became known that the army had been saved by the stubborn resistance of Naglee and Bailey, the ardor which Kearny had infused into Jamison's and Berry's brigades, and, finally, by the indomitable energy of old Sumner.

Mr. Lincoln learned at last that he could no longer delay sending the reinforcements which the army of the Potomac needed in order to continue the task, which threatened to be difficult. The garrison of Fort Monroe and a few other regiments, eight or nine thousand men in all, were assigned to General McClellan, who distributed them among the different brigades of the army. He was again promised the co-operation of McDowell as soon as the latter could gather together the detachments he had sent forward in pursuit of Jackson. This promise, no less vain than of the preceding year, was to exercise on the opera-

tions of the Federals against Richmond even a more baneful influence than the first breach of promise. Still afraid of exposing the capital, the President refused to send more than one division of McDowell's corps by water. In notifying McClellan that the other three divisions would proceed from Fredericksburg to rejoin him by land, he again requested him to be ready to communicate with them on the South Anna, and thus caused him to miss the opportunity to repair his delays and the mistakes he had been led to commit. He could, in fact, have taken advantage of the confusion into which the Confederates had been thrown by the battle of Fair Oaks, to seek the new base of operations on the James River, the advantage of which we have pointed out elsewhere. This movement, to which, three weeks later, it was necessary to resort for the purpose of saving the army, would have given very different results if it had been executed then with an offensive aim.

The enforced rest which followed the battle of Fair Oaks was prolonged by the bad weather for two distressing weeks. The Chickahominy, the overflow of which exceeded anything ever witnessed by the oldest inhabitants, carried away all the bridges, and for several days the six divisions, encamped on the right side of the river, only obtained their supplies by the railroad and the viaduct, whose frail scaffolding trembled above the flood. The ground, which consists of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, was nothing more than a vast swamp, and the guns which had been ranged in battery near the camps gradually sunk into the earth, from which they could not be extricated. Every morning a scorching sun, shining upon this damp soil, and decomposing the dead bodies of men and horses, which the rain had again brought to the surface, filled the hot air with poisonous exhalations. Every evening thick clouds gathered, the lightning flashed, the heat became suffocating, and all night long rain fell in abundance, which still further increased the inundation.

The inactivity to which the two armies were thus condemned, however, did not partake of the qualities of refreshing rest. The Federals, as we have stated, would probably

have achieved an important success on the 1st of June, if they had put in motion the troops encamped at Gaines' Mill, on the evening of the 31st, or during the night, so as to find themselves on the right banks of the Chickahominy at daybreak, with all the disposable portion of their army. This opportunity had been allowed to pass; but they were yet in time to change their base of operations, and mass all their forces between the Chickahominy and the James. General McClellan having given up this project in order to remain within reach of Fredericksburg, nothing was left for him to do but to carry out the plan which has been temporarily interrupted by the battle of Fair Oaks. This plan consisted in gaining ground gradually by capturing, one day a wood, another day a clearing, and thus advancing step by step until, by a succession of battles more or less fierce, Richmond should be so closely hemmed in that the enemy's army would either abandon it, or renew, under less favorable circumstances, the dangerous experiment of Fair Oaks. But even a slow operation of this kind required fine weather. It was necessary before joining battle to have facilities—in fact, to be able to move and victual the troops with ease; it was necessary before joining battle to conquer the treacherous waters of the Chickahominy, and to connect both banks by bridges numerous and always passable; it was necessary, finally, to be able to take to the battle-field that powerful artillery, without which the generals of the army of the Potomac were unwilling to lead their soldiers to the attack. These two weeks, therefore, were employed on the part of the Federals in repairing the roads which connected their several camps, in constructing new ones, in extricating from the mud the large supply-trains, which scarcely sufficed for the distribution of daily rations, in strengthening the bridges and increasing their number, and finally in covering the whole battle-field and increasing their number, and finally in covering the whole battle-field of the 31st of May with vast works.

About the middle of June the ground was once more practicable, and the Chickahominy, having again become

a modest stream, did not appear inclined to renew its fatal freaks of violence. The army of the Potomac was at length firmly established, provided with excellent communications, and surrounded by strong entrenchments, which enabled it to concentrate without danger a large portion of its forces at any given point along its front. But these results had been dearly bought. The soldiers, obliged to work in the mud and in an unhealthy climate, had suffered severely. The camps, too long seated on a marshy soil, had become the foci of swamp fevers and typhoid fevers. To the painful monotony of throwing up earthworks were added continual watches and picket duty, which deprived the men of that rest which is necessary to health, without offering them in exchange the stimulants of an active campaign. In short, fatigue and disgust multiplied the number of deserters into the interior, whose crime was encouraged by a vicious system of recruiting, and especially by the bait of bounties, which they hoped to receive by re-enlisting in new regiments. Consequently, notwithstanding the reinforcements which had come from Fortress Monroe, and the arrival of McCall's division, detached from McDowell's corps and landed on the 11th and 12th at White House, the effective force of the army was reduced to a little more than one hundred thousand men for duty. Its official morning reports acknowledged thirty thousand absentees, nine-tenths of whom were on the sick list, or quartered in the hospitals, or sent to their respective homes on leave as convalescents.* The Confederates, on their side, had also made good use of the respite which circumstances had granted them. They had naturally opposed a line of entrenchments to those of the

*The following was the morning report of the army of the Potomac on the 20th of June: Present, one hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two; sick, detached, under arrest, twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-five; absent, twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eleven; total, one hundred and fifty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight. The garrisons of Fort Monroe and Yorktown should be deducted from the first figure. Sumner's and Franklin's corps had the least number of men unfit for service. On the 10th of July, out of thirty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty absentees, thirty-four thousand four hundred and seventy-two were on regular leave of absence, three thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight had deserted to the interior.

Federals. As McClellan's task was to capture Richmond, and not to defend the swamps of the Chickahominy, these delays all accrued to the benefit of his adversaries; and the more he fortified his position, the more the difficulties of the task he had to accomplish increased. The Confederate army was also receiving reinforcements; and thanks to the plans which the Southern generals had caused the Richmond government to adopt, the moment was approaching when it would be in a condition to venture upon a decisive struggle, with better chances than at Fair Oaks. General Lee had assumed the command made vacant by Johnston's wound. His first efforts in the war had not been more brilliant than those of Grant, his future opponent, and he was personally but little known to the troops he was about to lead into battle. But his companions in the Mexican expedition had not forgotten the eminent services he had then rendered notwithstanding his inferior rank. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the Confederate authorities had had occasion to appreciate his wisdom and clearness of judgment in matters connected with military affairs. His fellow-citizens of Virginia respected him as the representative of one of the first families of the most aristocratic of the American colonies. He was looked upon by all as a true type of soldier and man of honor. The regrets even he had experienced in forsaking the Federal flag no longer injured him in the eyes of the public, for the moment of the first ebullitions had passed. Once upon the scenes, he will no more leave it, and he will always play, if not the first, at least one of the first, parts. We shall always find him a patient, persevering and prudent calculator, yet ready to risk much at the opportune moment; handling a large army with great dexterity in the midst of the thickest forests; understanding men, selecting them carefully, and securing their attachment by his equity, worshipped by his soldiers, obtaining from them what no other chief could have thought of asking them; respected and obeyed by all his lieutenants, humane, of a conciliatory disposition, one whose only fault as a general was an excess of deference to the opinion of his subordinates, which at times caused

him to lose a little of that firmness which is so indispensable in the midst of a battle. Such was the new adversary of General McClellan.

Since he had assumed command he had reorganized his army and gathered new combatants from every part of the Confederacy. The conscription law, which was in force, had filled up his cadres, mixing young soldiers with those whom the war had already trained. The scattering system, which had prevailed at first, was abandoned; the garrisons along the coast were reduced to their minimum or entirely suppressed, and most of the troops composing them were sent on to Richmond. A few regiments had been brought from the West, where the operations had lost something of their importance since Beauregard had retired into the interior, leaving Corinth in the hands of Halleck.

But it was the co-operation of Jackson that Lee was expecting, in order to change the course of the campaign, and execute the offensive movement for which he was preparing. He counted upon his arrival, just as McClellan relied upon that of McDowell. He was not, however, destined to be the victim of the same deceptions which the commander of the army of the Potomac had to experience. Jackson's return to Richmond was the brilliant conclusion of the operations which the latter had so successfully conducted in the valley of Virginia. After having carried trouble into the councils of the enemy, after having thrown the latter on the wrong scent, and drawn a portion of the forces destined for the reduction of Richmond into the mountains, he had to effect his escape and double in his tracks, in order to go to the rescue of those who were making a stand against the large Federal army. No precaution was neglected to secure the success of this plan. Jackson, who had at first thought of invading Pennsylvania, eagerly accepted the new part assigned to him by Lee, the importance of which he understood.

The battle of Port Republic had terminated the campaign in the valley of Virginia on the 9th of June, and arrested the pursuit of the Federals. Jackson gave some rest to his troops at Weyer's Cave, not far from the field

of battle, and made ostensible preparations to undertake a new offensive movement on the same ground. On the 11th, Whiting's division, nearly ten thousand strong, was detached from Smith's old corps, which had fought at Fair Oaks, and being placed on board a train of cars, which had been made ready with affected secrecy, proceeded from Richmond by the right bank of the James to the Lynchburg and Burkesville junction, so celebrated since. At a short distance from Richmond some apparently unaccountable reason caused the cars to be detained for several hours in front of Belle Isle prison, where were shut up a large number of Federal soldiers about to be exchanged in a few days. The passers-by expressed much indignation at the carelessness of the railroad employees in allowing the Federals to take note of the powerful reinforcements which were being sent to Jackson, thus revealing to the enemy such important movements of troops. This was precisely what General Lee desired. On the 15th, Whiting left Lynchburg for Charlottesville, reaching Staunton on the 18th, where he landed his material, and seemed to be preparing to proceed down the valley to fall upon Fremont conjointly with Jackson; but on the 20th he speedily got on board the same cars which had brought him over, and returned to Charlottesville, where Jackson was awaiting him with the army that had fought at Cross Keys and Port Republic. By the movements of his cavalry, by his own words, and by means of letters written with the intention that they should fall into the hands of the Federals, he had confirmed all the fears which the movements of Whiting's division had excited in Washington. General McClellan had, in fact, notified the President on the 18th of the departure of these troops and the intelligence received from Fredericksburg fully corroborated this information. On receipt of this news, General Fremont hastily fell back upon Strasburg, while McDowell, who had at last witnessed the return of Shield's division to his encampments, and who had already sent that of McCall to join McClellan by water, was waiting in vain for the order to set off on the three or four days' march which separated him from the army of the Potomac.

The desire to form a new army which was to achieve easy successes under the personal direction of the Secretary of War, had decided the government to detain this general on the Rappahannock. The safety of Washington, which Jackson could not seriously menace, had only been, it must be acknowledged, a false pretext for conferring the command of an army, which absorbed all the reinforcements promised to McClellan, upon General Pope, an officer as brave as he was inexperienced, who had become the favorite of the hour. McDowell's corps was designed to swell its numbers uselessly, at the moment when every interest called it to the borders of the Chickahominy.

Meanwhile, a bold reconnaissance had revealed to General Lee the weak points of his adversary. On the morning of the 13th a brigade of cavalry, about one thousand two hundred strong, and accompanied by a few pieces of artillery left Richmond under command of General Stuart. Its destination was a profound secret. Following the road to Louisa Court-house, as if on his way to reinforce Jackson, Stuart encamped in the evening at the railway-bridge of Quai Creek, on the South Anna. Before daylight on the 14th, he turned suddenly to the right in the direction of Hanover Court-house, where two squadrons of the Fifth regular cavalry were performing picket duty. The first squadron, surprised by the appearance of the Confederates, was quickly dispersed. The second, taking advantage of the narrowness of the road, which compelled the enemy's troopers to march by fours, charged them vigorously without concern as to their numerical superiority. Being closely packed within this narrow defile, the two detachments were mingled, and fought with sabres. The Federal commander, Captain Royall, killed the commander of the first squadron of the enemy with his own hand, and was himself seriously wounded a moment after.* The weight of the Confederate column soon swept before it the handful of regulars who had attempted to check its progress. The Fifth regiment of cavalry, which before the war was numbered the Second,

*Captain Royall was severely wounded in several places, but recovered, and is still in the United States Army.—*Editor.*

had long been commanded by General Lee and his nephew Colonel Lee, who led one of the Virginia regiments under Stuart, had also served in it. He thus found himself called upon, as a sad result of the civil war, to draw his sword against officers who had been his comrades the preceding year—perhaps even against some of the soldiers whom he had commanded in the garrisons of the far West. Far from feeling any secret remorse in their presence, and carried away by the passion which inspired him for the cause of the South, he solicited of his chief the privilege of measuring swords with his late companions in arms. But there were no longer any enemies to fight; the two squadrons which alone had guarded the flank of the Federal army on that side were dispersed; and proceeding down the Pamunky, Stuart led his brigade as far as Old Church, at an unbroken trot. The task assigned to him by his chief was accomplished; he had turned the right wing of the Federals, he made a survey, before reaching Old Church, of the course of a swampy stream called the Tolopotamoi, a tributary of the Pamunky, which could easily have been covered with defensive works, and thus marked out the route which Jackson was to follow a few days after with his army.

The Confederate column was about sixteen miles from Hanover Court-house. It seemed natural that it should retrace its steps and go back to Richmond; but Stuart, who possessed all the instincts of a light cavalry general, determined to carry out a plan much more hazardous in appearance, but less dangerous in reality—to make the complete circuit of the Federal army, so as to enter Richmond on the south, which he had left by the north. By this movement he expected to throw the rear of his enemy into great confusion, so that amid the contradictory rumors which such a bold march would spread he would have a good chance to baffle the pursuit of his adversaries. None of the officers to whom he communicated his plan dared to approve of it; but he knew that all would obey him with courage and intelligence. After giving his brigade a moment of rest, and making careful inquiries regarding the Hanover Court-house road, which he pretended to wish to

follow, Stuart ordered the bugles to sound "boots and saddles," silently placed himself at the head of his column, and directed his horse toward New Kent Court-house. The soldiers followed with astonishment, but without hesitation, a chief who inspired them with a blind confidence. Yet every step they took seemed to interpose an additional barrier against all chances of return. On the right lay the whole army of the Potomac; on the left the immense depot of White House; in front of them the railway and the turnpike, along which the enemy's troops were incessantly passing to and fro. The small band drew closer together, for there was danger on every side; this danger, however, was considerably lessened through the connivance of all the inhabitants. At each house Stuart received the minutest information regarding the Federal corps to be avoided, and the magazines which might be destroyed. Two boats on the Pamunky were burned, but Stuart dared not go as far as the White House, notwithstanding the temptation which so rich a prize offered him. He struck the railroad at Tunstall's station; and after putting a small Federal outpost to flight, he went into ambuscade in order to capture the first train which might happen to pass by. An instant after, a train of cars loaded with sick and wounded, bound for the White House, arrived at full speed, but instead of stopping to water as usual, continued right on, while the pieces of timber placed across the track for the purpose of throwing off the cars were scattered right and left by the locomotive. The surprised Confederates merely fired a volley into the train, which wounded many of the sick and frightened the passengers some of whom jumped out of the cars; the danger, however, was of short duration, and the train, disappearing among the woods, spread the alarm along the whole line. Stuart, thus disappointed; had not even time to destroy the railway track, for he learned that McCall's division, on its way to join McClellan, was encamped in the neighborhood, that it was under arms and would soon make its appearance. He drew off, still pursuing his onward course, after having burned a few cars loaded with provisions and several camps, and

after feeding his soldiers at the expense of the frightened sutlers whom he had stopped on the road. But night had come, and the fires kindled by his hand, flashing above the forest, were so many signals which drew the Federals upon his tracks. Fortunately for Stuart, his soldiers were well acquainted with the faintest path in the country through which they were passing; they were at home. Consequently, they reached the hamlet of Talleysville without difficulty, where the column was allowed a few hours' rest and time to rally. Then, turning to the right, it proceeded rapidly toward the Chickahominy.

At daybreak the Confederate cavalry reached the borders of this river, considerably below Bottom's Bridge, at a place called Forge; or Jones' Bridge. But the ford on which they had depended was not passable; the bridge had been destroyed, and the Federal cavalry, which, under Averill, had been sent by McClellan to intercept these passes, was only a few miles distant from the place. Two hours more of delay, and Stuart would have lost his only chance of retreat; it was a critical moment. Efforts were made to repair the old bridge, every man set to work to cut down trees for that purpose. A foot-bridge was soon constructed, which the men crossed on foot, swimming their horses alongside. Once on the other side of the river, the Confederates proceeded to enlarge the dimensions of the flying bridge, and, by dint of labor, succeeded in getting their artillery over this fragile structure. Stuart had thus baffled all pursuit, and resumed his march on the Richmond road, having lost but one man killed and one caisson stuck in the mud, during this adventurous expedition.

The whole Federal cavalry had been started in pursuit of Stuart. As soon as he was known to be at Tunstall, McClellan had divined his purpose, and, as we have said before, despatched Averill with one brigade to intercept him at Jones' Bridge. But his orders, tardily transmitted, only reached the rest of his cavalry two hours after the passage of the Confederates. The latter arrived in Richmond that very evening. They had, in point of fact, committed but few depredations, but had caused a great

commotion, shaken the confidence of the North in McClellan, and made the first experiment in those great cavalry expeditions which subsequently played so novel and so important a part during the war.

During the ten days which followed this alarm the Federals always fancied themselves on the eve of making a general attack upon the enemy; but each day, after having determined upon it, and made preparations for it, they would meet with some new and unforeseen difficulty, which caused them to defer its execution. Lee, knowing how important it was to gain time, so as to allow Jackson to join him, neglected nothing which could make him appear much stronger in the eyes of his adversary than he really was. By multiplying his pickets, by disputing every inch of ground and constantly provoking skirmishes, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, he finally succeeded in his design. The Federal spies, the fugitive negroes and deserters, all aided him, through their exaggeration, in deceiving McClellan. On the 26th of June the latter believed that the arrival of Jackson would swell Lee's forces to one hundred and sixty thousand men, and that the fortifications around Richmond were bristling with two hundred guns of heavy calibre. The army he was about to face, the strength of which Lee had been constantly increasing during the last three weeks, did not, however, number more than one hundred thousand men, while the fortifications surrounding the Confederate capital were in reality slight breastworks, mounting only a few guns. The Confederates were undoubtedly working to increase their strength; but this work was chiefly carried on in those localities where they knew the Federals to be watching them with their spyglasses, and anxiously following their slightest movements. The opportunity for attacking Lee, while he was weakened by the absence of Whiting, thus passed by, and by degrees people became familiarized with the idea that siege operations might be advantageously substituted for a pitched battle. Many officers in the army of the Potomac imagined that by turning up large quantities of earth, and burning a great deal of powder, they would be able to escape

that ordeal of terrible suspense when skill and prudence are equally powerless to decide the fate of the battle, and when torrents of blood must be shed to wrest victory from the hands of the enemy. This kind of tactics had just been applied in the West, where it had resulted in the evacuation of Corinth by the Confederates, and the general question now was whether, when the final charge was made, they should step upon the top of a parapet defended with the energy of despair or upon the ruins of a deserted city. Consequently, while wishing for a more decided success, the latter alternative was but too readily acquiesced in; and the desire to spare the army a fearful sacrifice of life having made such an alternative appear probable, everybody felt disposed to wait patiently for this issue.

A movement, however, took place on the 25th of June which, although of no great importance, interrupted at last this long inaction. In order to make himself master of the approaches to the plateau of Old Tavern, McClellan, still maneuvering as if conducting the operation of a siege, became desirous of extending his left wing. To this effect, he dispatched Hooker's division on the road from Williamsburg to Richmond, beyond the positions occupied by Casey on the morning of the 31st of May. Hooker had just dislodged the Confederates from a small wood called Oak Grove, lying across the road, after a desperate engagement, when an order, wrongly construed, rendered it necessary for him to fall back. This error, however, was soon detected and rectified. McClellan, hastening to the scene of action, personally assumed the direction of the battle, pushing forward the divisions of Kearny and Couch, with a portion of those of Casey and Richardson. Hooker, being thus sustained, re-entered Oak Grove and planted himself firmly in it; he extended his lines as far as the extreme edge of this wood, whence he commanded an immense open space, in which were seen some small works, with a few abandoned tents. This battle, known by the name of Oak Grove cost the Federals fifty-one killed, four hundred and one wounded and sixty-four prisoners.

Gaines' Mill

They were not more than about four miles from Richmond, and yet the enemy, hitherto so stubborn, had exhibited too great a want of persistency in the defense of the wood not to have been the result of calculation. The fact is that the movement of the army of the Potomac lost all its importance in view of the great operations which were in preparation, and which it could no longer prevent. When McClellan decided at last to feel the enemy with his left, a terrible storm was gathering on his right.

On that very day, the 25th of June, a single horseman, without companions and without followers, had ridden through the deserted streets of Richmond at an early hour in the morning, had dismounted at Lee's headquarters, and had shortly after quickly resumed his journey in the direction of the north. Some passers-by asserted that they had recognized the famous Jackson in this mysterious personage, but no credence was given to their statement, for everybody knew that he was fighting on the borders of the Shenandoah, and that he was not the man to abandon his soldiers before the enemy. It was he, nevertheless, but he had left his army, whose every movement was wrapt in profound secrecy, at a few leagues only from that place, and, after having received his chief's instructions, was returning to meet his heads of column, then within a short distance of Ashland. A short conference had sufficed the two generals to determine all their plans, and they were going to join in striking a heavy blow against the right wing of the Federals. This wing was in fact the most exposed, since McClellan had massed the best part of his troops between Richmond and the Chickahominy. To cover the long line of railway which supplied his army as far as White House, he had been obliged to leave the three divisions of Morell, Sykes and McCall, which formed his right wing under Porter, north of the Chickahominy. They faced south, ranged parallel with the river. McCall occupied the extreme right at Mechanicsville and Beaverdam Creek; Sykes and Morell were posted on the neighboring heights of Gaines' Mill, resting their left on the swamps of the Chickahominy just where it begins to become wooded. With the

exception of some small breastworks and a few abatis on the left bank of the Beaver-dam, no works had been erected to protect these positions. General McClellan had always intended to abandon them as soon as the time had arrived for transferring his base of operations to the James River. He had never given up the idea of this change of base, so often projected and always postponed; he had even begun making preparations for it within the last few days, by sending a certain number of vessels loaded with provisions into the waters of the James. Such, therefore, being his intention, he had deemed it useless to cover his right wing with defensive works like those extending along the rest of his front; he soon had cause bitterly to regret this.

Two principal passages, each composed of two bridges thrown alongside of each other across the Chickahominy, connected the right wing with the rest of the army. The lower passage was formed by the bridge on which Sumner had crossed on the day of the battle of Fair Oaks, and by another constructed under the direction of Colonel Alexander, whose name it bore. They gave access to the extremity of the vast clearing, named after Doctor Trent, on the right side of the river, where the headquarters were. The other passage, situated two thousand five hundred metres higher up, and composed of the Duane and Woodbury bridges, named after two engineer officers, connected the positions occupied by Porter's left with Golding's clearing, which stretches beyond the former on the same side of the Chickahominy.

The Federal line extended from Golding to the border of White Oak Swamp forming the arc of a circle, of which Bottom's bridge was the centre. It was covered throughout by considerable works; redoubts placed at intervals were connected by breastworks built of wood and earth, and by vast abatis; and numerous clearings, which afforded a considerable field of fire to the artillery along the whole front, prevented the enemy from approaching under cover. Franklin's corps occupied the position adjoining the Golding clearing. Sumner, on his left, in front of the Courtenay farm, rested on Fair Oaks. Heintzelman's line, thrown

across the Williamsburg turnpike, extended from the railway to White Oak swamp. Keyes, who had been held in reserve since the battle of Fair Oaks, occupied the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge and the road which crosses the swamp near its entrance.

The Confederate army had opposed to these works a line of entrenchments which, although of no great importance, would enable it on the day of battle to reduce the defenders of Richmond to a simple cordon of sharpshooters. Being reinforced by a large number of soldiers drawn from the South, and, it is said, even from the armies of the West, it had been arranged into five divisions. Longstreet and A. P. Hill commanded two of them. Huger, despite his conduct of the 31st of May, as he possessed great influence at Richmond, had preserved his own. Magruder, who had distinguished himself by his energy at Yorktown, had command of another, and the fifth had been given to D. H. Hill. This army numbered nearly sixty thousand men; Jackson had brought it about thirty thousand. Huger and Magruder were opposed, the first to Heintzelman, the second to Sumner. To the left of Magruder, A. P. Hill, whose right was in front of Golding, extended along the river opposite Porter's position, and one of his brigades, under Branch, detached on the upper Chickahominy, held a bridge situated above Meadow Bridge. Longstreet and D. H. Hill, placed in reserve, were encamped near Richmond, on the Williamsburg and New Bridge roads.

On the evening of the 25th, Jackson's heads of column arrived at Ashland. But notwithstanding the secrecy which attended his march, General McClellan was already informed of it. On the morning of the 24th he had learnt, through a deserter, that Jackson had left Gordonsville, and would probably attack him on the 28th. He could not believe, however, that the latter would thus be able to escape the three Federal armies which were exclusively engaged in pursuing him. But the next day, even while the battle of Oak Grove was being fought, he received positive information of Jackson's approach, the advanced cavalry of the latter having appeared at Hanover Court-house. There

was no further room for doubt. The sixty or seventy thousand men assembled at Washington and in the valley of Virginia had neither been able to detain Jackson's army nor to follow it. They had not even perceived its departure; and while McDowell, Banks and Fremont remained motionless, all the Confederate forces were massing in order to crush the army of the Potomac. In a few more hours the cannon would announce the commencement of the great struggle. As Mr. Lincoln candidly wrote to McClellan a few days after, even if they had had a million of men to send him they would have arrived too late. The commander of the army of the Potomac had no alternative but to fight with the resources at his command. He set himself immediately to work. Those only who have felt the weight of a heavy responsibility, who have long predicted the dangers incurred through the mistakes of others, and who, after having pointed them out in vain, find themselves suddenly obliged to face them, can form a conception of what was then passing in the mind of the Federal commander. But far from faltering, this ordeal suggested to him the finest inspiration of his entire career—to abandon his communications with York River, in order to establish a new base of operations on the James immediately after the battle which was now pending. Such was the bold and masterly plan conceived by McClellan, in response to the movement of his opponent, which he had divined even before it had commenced. Jackson's presence at Hanover Court-house had convinced him that Lee designed to fall upon his right wing, and oblige him to hastily evacuate the works which menaced Richmond, in order to save his communications with York River. This movement of retreat on his right was such as would most naturally suggest itself to the mind of the commander-in-chief of the army of the Potomac in the position he occupied; but it was also precisely the movement which his adversary expected him to make, and it thus afforded excellent chances of success to the Confederates, who must have made every preparation for turning, during this flank march, his retreat into an irreparable rout. In relinquishing the idea of cover-

ing the York River road, he deceived all the calculations of the enemy. The more the latter extended his lines on the right, the easier it became for McClellan to establish, by his left, new communications with the James. This done, he could concentrate the whole of his army on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and, if forced by circumstances, proceed in the direction of the James by crossing White Oak Swamp, or, if a favorable opportunity offered, even take advantage of Lee's eccentric movement to march direct upon Richmond, and enter that city before him. Once established on the James, he was free to reascend this river in order to attack the Confederate capital, or to cross it to undertake a new campaign on the south side with greater chances of success. He could thus thrust after parring; and if overwhelmed by numbers, he would at least have frustrated the combinations upon which his opponent seemed to rely for crushing him. It was necessary above all to secure to the army the means for subsisting and fighting, during the time it would be deprived of communications with its stores. The wagons of the several corps were loaded with eight days' rations and a large quantity of ammunition. A drove of two thousand five hundred head of cattle was collected together and parked under the shade of the beautiful foliage which gives the borders of the Chickahominy the appearance of an English garden. At the same time, the wounded, the sick, the lame and all the non-combatants (bouches inutiles) were sent to White House. The vast stores which had accumulated there were hastily reshipped, and several vessels loaded with provisions were already proceeding down York River, with directions to await further instructions at the entrance of the James. The execution of these measures, which had begun amid the silence of the night of the 25th-26th, was continued during the succeeding days, despite the noise and turmoil of conflicts. From that moment the army of the Potomac, able to depend upon its own resources for a whole week, resembled a ship which, with its cargo and ballast on board, is only fastened to her mooring by a slender rope. It was destined to encounter many storms

before casting anchor on the banks of the James River. To venture thus with an army of more than one hundred thousand volunteers into a series of operations, in the midst of which, whether victorious or vanquished, it was destined for some time to see its communications cut by the enemy, was certainly one of the boldest resolutions which can be adopted by a general in war. It was in singular contrast with the circumspection which had hitherto characterized all the movements of the Federals; but despite appearances, it was the less dangerous course to pursue, and this contrast was in perfect harmony with the American character, which can at times combine a temporizing prudence with the strangest rashness.

On the morning of the 26th the Confederate army was in motion. Jackson left Ashland with his three divisions, marching toward the west. He was to take in rear all the positions which the Federals might attempt to defend along the Chickahominy. Branch's brigade, which was encamped higher up the river, came down by the left bank, while A. P. Hill crossed it at Meadowville Bridge, in order to appear before the strong positions of Mechanicsville, and attack them in front, as soon as Jackson's cannon should announce that they were turned on the left. D. H. Hill and Longstreet were waiting for the bridge at Mechanicsville to be freed by this movement, in order to cross it immediately in succession. The first, bearing to the left, was to join hands with Jackson, and thus unite for the battle all the Confederate forces into a single army. The second was to take position on the right of A. P. Hill, and follow the course of the Chickahominy, while the left wing, formed now by Jackson, and the centre by the two Hills, would continue to advance in order to attack the right wing of the Federals, which was expected to deploy beyond the White House railway. Magruder, with his own division and that of Huger, numbering altogether about twenty-five thousand men, was left to cover Richmond and watch McClellan's left wing.

The movements of the Confederate army were not punctually executed. Jackson and his principal lieutenants

were not so well acquainted as the defenders of Richmond with the country in which they were about to operate; they found it difficult to move their troops through that region, covered with woods and traversed by sinuous roads, so unlike the wide open spaces in the valley of Virginia. These unavoidable delays which Jackson had to encounter, however, did not prevent him from following Lee's instructions. After having communicated, through his scouts in the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, with the army which was coming out of Richmond, and having assured himself that he was supported in the bold movement he had undertaken, he took the White House railway for his objective point, and following as straight a line as possible, preceded by the whole of Stuart's cavalry, he started on his march; he expected to meet the enemy on the borders of the Tolopotamoi.

While Jackson was approachng this water-course, the banks of which he was to find deserted, Lee had also put his army in motion. General A. P. Hill had massed his division in front of Meadow Bridge for the purpose of forcing the passage of that bridge as soon as Jackson had turned it by extending his left beyond Mechanicsville. Having advanced at the appointed time, he had met with no resistance around the bridge itself, of which he took possession without striking a blow; but a serious engagement took place shortly after between his troops and those of McCall, forming the extremity of the Federal line on that side.

McCall had only left one regiment and a battery at Mechanicsville and this detachment had fallen back upon the rest of the division, after having checked for a moment by its fire the columns which were climbing the bare slopes of the hill on the summit of which the village stands. It was on Beaver-dam Creek, in fact that the Federal general was awaiting the enemy. This marshy stream, which runs into the Chickahominy through a ravine with precipitous sides, is only accessible by two roads, one, to the north, leading to Bethesda church and the Pamunky; the other, to the south, communicates with Cold Harbor junction by

way of Ellyson's Mills. McCall had entrusted Reynold's brigade with the defence of the first pass, while Seymour was directed to guard the second. His third brigade, commanded by Meade, was held in reserve. A. P. Hill, having reached the Mechanicsville heights, deployed his division, nearly fourteen thousand men strong, in front of the formidable positions occupied by the Federals. His namesake, D. H. Hill, followed in his rear for the purpose of extending to the left, with Ripley's brigade in advance. Lee directed in person all the movements which were to place his army in line. President Davis had come out of Richmond to witness the first act of this great conflict. The Confederates knew that it was easy to turn the position of the Federals by attacking it from the north. If McCall was supported on that side—that is to say, on his right—by considerable forces, Jackson could not fail to meet it on his route, and the noise of cannon would soon apprise his chief of such an encounter. It was natural to infer, therefore, from the prolonged silence, that McCall was isolated, and that the army of the Shenandoah was about to take his position in rear without striking a blow; consequently, there was nothing to be done but to wait for the issue of this movement. But Lee, rendered impatient at the slowness with which his orders were executed, and stimulated, it may be, by the presence of the President, could not resist the temptation to hurl against the Federal positions the fine troops he was leading into battle for the first time. It is true that time was precious, and that no one among the Confederates who saw those magnificent regiments and witnessed the fervent zeal which animated them was doubtful of success. Pender's brigade, of A. P. Hill's division, reinforced by that of Ripley, attempted to cross the Beaver-dam at Ellyson's Mills, while a strong demonstration was made on the left upon the Bethesda road. But the Federals, being completely sheltered, received with a terrific fire of musketry and artillery the assailants, who were utterly unprotected against their shot. On the left a Georgia regiment advanced alone close to the Union lines; but a final volley drove it back in disorder

upon the rest of the column engaged in this demonstration. At Ellyson's Mills, Pender and Ripley, after witnessing the destruction of one-half of their brigades, without being even able to reach the enemy, were obliged to recross the stream with the remnant of their troops. Meanwhile, the Confederate chief, exasperated by this check, still persisted in attacking the Federal positions in front. Their whole line advanced, and was exposed to the fire of the enemy's cannon, while a new attack was attempted against the batteries which commanded Ellyson's Mills. Vain was the bloody effort. The assaulting columns were checked and driven back, the Federal shells striking the long lines of the Confederates fairly in the centre, and after four hours of fighting night put an end to the conflict, without a solitary inch of ground having been gained by the assailants. This imprudent attack had cost them nearly three thousand men, while the Federals had only two hundred and fifty wounded and eighty killed.

The battle of Beaver-dam Creek, where so many men had been sacrificed fruitlessly, was an unfortunate beginning for the great operation of Lee. The number of victims was concealed from the army, and the Confederate generals waited to hear from Jackson, whose cannon had not once been heard during the whole of that day.

The latter, however, had executed the movement which had been prescribed to him. Crossing the Tolopotamoi, he had continually pushed forward, leaving the Chickahominy gradually behind him, but without meeting any of the enemy's forces, except Stoneman's cavalry, and night where he had bivouacked. Impressed with the purpose of his chief, in haste to outflank the right wing of the Federals and to seize the White House railway, the noise of cannon along the Beaver-dam, on which he had turned his back, had only the effect of hastening his march. McClellan, on his side, had been informed of Jackson's movement, both through Stoneman, who had been watching the march of the Confederate general since morning with several regiments of cavalry, and by the few words which had fallen from prisoners captured by McCall. As the latter all be-

longed to Lee's army, it was evident that Jackson was maneuvering on the extreme Federal right, and that his approaching arrival would be sufficient to cause the defences of Beaver-dam Creek to fall. McClellan was expecting this, and had instructed General Barnard, chief of engineers of his army, to select a new position, which covered the bridges of the Chickahominy, upon which the whole right wing was ordered to fall back on the 27th at daybreak.

This position was not very strong; the hills adjoining the Chickahominy, although quite steep on the river side upon which the Federals were resting, sloped down in slight undulations on the side where the enemy was expected, and presented no natural line of defence. Between Mechanicsville and the Alexander bridge, where the forest sweeps down to the edge of the Chickahominy swamps, the hills commanding the left bank of this water-course are for the most part under cultivation, and their crest alone is crowned with isolated clusters of trees. This open space stretches thus a distance of from five to six miles in length, while its width gradually increases from one and a half to three miles on a line with the Alexander bridge. At the point where this breadth is greatest stands the building which gives its name to the important cross-roads of Cold Harbor. Among the roads crossing at this point, one connects at Bethesda with that from Mechanicsville by way of the houses of New Cold Harbor and Doctor Gaines'; a third, passing by McGee's farm, at a distance of three or four hundred feet from Cold Harbor, descends toward the Chickahominy, to continue its course through the woods as far as Dispatch station. The causeway constructed by Colonel Alexander, leading to the bridge which bears his name, struck this road a little above the point where it penetrated into the marshy forest bordering the large clearing; and finally, a cross-road branched off from this same point, connecting it directly with New Cold Harbor, and running beside a long narrow wood belonging to this plantation.

The line of defence selected by General Barnard rested its left on the Chickahominy below the Gaines house. This

portion of the line could have been effectively protected by the small stream called Powhite Creek, which runs at right angles to the course of the river, and on which Gaines' Mill is situated; but it had been laid two or three hundred feet in rear, through a long strip of wood rather narrow and easy of access, which descended nearly to the river. It fronted westward. The centre of the line, placed at right angles and facing north, followed the New Cold Harbor road, resting upon the woods; thence it stretched over a considerable space of decidedly undulating ground, and crossed an open field, terminating on the other side of the same wood, the extremity of which it intersected. The right of the line, still more drawn back, was traced across McGee's farm on the road from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, resting upon the impassable swamps which border the large clearing on this side.

A little before daylight McCall left the position of Beaver-dam, which he had so well defended the day before. The brigades of Martindale and Griffin of Morell's division, which had come the previous evening to take position alongside of him, but had not been in action, remained to cover his retreat. The Confederates soon attacked them with as much fierceness, but with as little success, as on the preceding day. Taking advantage of a moment's pause, while his adversaries were resting, Morell quickly abandoned the works he occupied, and hastened to join the rest of Porter's corps at Gaines' Mill without being pursued.

At noon on the 27th the twenty-five thousand men composing this corps awaited the enemy in the position we have described. All their baggage, all their material, their park of siege guns and their reserve artillery, had been transferred, during the night or early in the morning to the other side of the Chickahominy; the difficult task entrusted to the right wing of the army of the Potomac was not to throw any obstacle in the way of the enemy to prevent him from extending his lines and cutting the railroad, but simply to bar his approach to the river. General McClellan, as we have before remarked, had no other object in view but to prevent his opponent from crossing this stream dur-

ing the movement he was obliged to make in order to reach the James. But he was of opinion that to defend the right bank it was necessary to wait with firm attitude for the Confederates on the left bank; otherwise, they could have rapidly descended as far as Bottom's Bridge, or even Long's Bridge, and there finding crossings which the Federals could not guard, they could fall upon the seemingly less exposed flank of the long columns which were about to march in toward the James.

Porter placed Morell in the narrow wood which extends back of Powhite Creek. The three brigades belonging to this division were thus disposed: Butterfield on the left, in the flat banks adjoining the river; Martindale in the centre, occupying the edge of the Powhite wood; Griffin on the right, deployed across the forest of which this wood is only the extremity, and resting upon New Cold Harbor. The position of the last was a difficult one, for his line was not fortified by any depression in the ground, while the thickness of the surrounding foliage exposed it to all surprises of the enemy. Sykes' division formed the centre and the right of Porter's corps. The brigades were deployed in two lines each consisting of two regiments. McCall's division was placed in reserve; one of his brigades under Meade on the left, in rear of Morell's troops; the rest under Reynolds and Seymour, on the extreme right, observing the road to Dispatch station. Twelve batteries, half of which were regular artillery, supported the Federal infantry, but the undulations of the ground and the proximity of the woods destroyed much of their efficiency. A few squadrons of the Fifth regular cavalry, and two regiments of mounted volunteers, completed this force.

Master of the Beaver-dam passes, Lee had followed the Federals step by step, pressing them close, but being careful not to bring on an engagement. Indeed, he was far from having fathomed the designs of his adversary. Believing him still bent upon preserving his communications with the White House, he expected every moment to hear that Jackson had met the right wing of the Federals, and wanted to give his lieutenant time to feel the enemy before going

into battle. Meanwhile, the whole of his army had been deployed as soon as he had obtained control of the Beaver-dam passes. Longstreet had come by Ellyson's Mills to take position on the right and rear of A. P. Hill; D. H. Hill, resting upon the left, had struck into the road leading from Mechanicsville to the Pamunky, upon which he was to join Jackson.

About one o'clock the heads of column of A. P. Hill, who was following the Cold Harbor road, encountered the first line of Griffin's brigade at the entrance of the wood occupied by the Federals, whose fire, supported by numerous cannon, brought them to a full stop. Hill's artillery planted itself in vain within short range to support the attack; the Federal shells which swept the plateau soon reduced it to silence. In vain did Hill bring back his division to the charge several times. Fatigued and probably discouraged by the combat of the previous day, and the fruitless losses they had sustained, his soldiers were unable to break the Federal line. Three regiments, which for an instant struck it, were immediately repulsed, and the rest fell back in disorder. Hill's main attack had been directed upon the wood of New Cold Harbor, between that place on the left and a point on the right where this wood becomes narrower as it stretches down into the valley. This attack had been repulsed by the right of Morell's division and Sykes' left brigade, commanded by the young and valiant Warren; before the end of the first engagement these troops had been reinforced by Meade's and Seymour's brigades.

Lee had arrived on the field of battle; the unexpected resistance that Hill had met with showed that he had a considerable portion of the enemy's army before him, and that, instead of extending his lines to defend his communications with the White House, the Federal commander had concentrated his entire force in the neighborhood of the Chickahominy. It was necessary, therefore, that Jackson, who was proceeding toward the left of Tunstall station, should return to the right and attack the flank of the Federals in the positions they had selected, and cut them off entirely from York River, which was the object of all the

maneuvers executed during these three days. Cold Harbor was indicated to Jackson as the point of direction.

While waiting for the arrival of this powerful reinforcement, Lee made a new attempt between three and four o'clock to carry the Federal position. In pursuance of his instructions, Hill returned to the charge near New Cold Harbor, and Longstreet, who had deployed on his right, made a strong diversion against Morrell's and McCall's troops, posted in the narrow section of the woods, while this movement was supported by all the available artillery. But Hill was not more successful this time than before, and Longstreet soon perceived that he would have to bear the whole brunt of the battle. Instead of making a simple demonstration, he determined to charge the Federal troops opposed to him, with his whole division.

Those troops received at the same instant an important reinforcement. Porter's three divisions, numbering about twenty-five thousand men, which until then had held out against the equal forces of Hill and Longstreet, had been engaged to the last man; at the solicitation of their chief, who felt himself pressed on every side, General McClellan had just sent Slocum's division of Franklin's corps to their assistance. It arrived just the moment when Longstreet was charging the left wing of the Federal army with the greatest vigor. The latter resisted with difficulty. Porter always showed himself where the danger was greatest, encouraged his soldiers and reformed their ranks in the midst of a shower of balls. The battle raged with equal violence along the whole line from New Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy. The brigades and regiments successively brought forward from the reserve, to fill the gaps caused by the enemy's fire, or to replace the troops who had exhausted their ammunition, had become divided and scattered; McCall's soldiers had become mixed with those of Morell in the woods, so that the generals, having no longer their troops in hand, could not direct them, and were reduced to giving the combatants examples of personal bravery wherever the chances of the conflict led them. Besides, it was impossible, amid the dust and smoke and the intervening clusters of

trees which intercepted the view, to form a clear idea of the whole field. At this juncture Slocum made his appearance. His division was immediately parcelled out like the others; Bartlett went to the right to support Sykes; Newton got into line on the left to oppose Longstreet, by the side of Morell's and McCall's soldiers. If, in thus sharing his division, Slocum had deprived himself of the means of uniting it again for a new effort, he had at least supplied with fresh troops all the points menaced by the enemy; he arrested the assailants, and inflicted upon them, for the moment, a bloody check. It was nearly five o'clock in the evening; Lee had not been able to effect a breach in a single one of the positions which since four o'clock he had attacked with so much vigor. The soldiers of Hill and Longstreet were exhausted.

Meanwhile, Porter, seeing that the enemy would not grant him a moment's rest except for the purpose of returning to the charge, called for immediate reinforcements. General McClellan, informed by the occurrences of the preceding day, of the presence of Jackson, and of the crossing to the left bank of the Chickahominy by a portion of the Confederate army, knew that the enemy must have more than sixty thousand men on that side of the river. He had opposed to this force up to that time only thirty-three thousand or thirty-five thousand, under Porter at Gaines' Mill; he had yet a few hours of daylight before him to finish the battle, and could have availed himself of them to bring the largest portion of his army to the succor of his lieutenant, and face the Confederates with a force at least equal to their own. But convinced that Lee commanded an army of one hundred and sixty thousand men, he believed that nearly one hundred thousand of them had been left in front of his lines, from White Oak Swamp to Golding; he was unwilling to weaken his left wing in their presence, to strengthen his right. His corps commanders, being consulted by him fully endorsed his views, saying that they needed all their troops to defend their positions. Old Sumner alone had offered two brigades, which were forwarded to the battle-field at the close of the evening.

While a decisive struggle was taking place on the left bank, and all the available forces of the enemy were being brought together, to attack the thirty-five thousand men forming the right wing of the army of the Potomac, seventy or eighty thousand Federals were thus kept back on the right bank by twenty-five thousand Confederates. Magruder, who was in command of the latter, succeeded, as he had done at Warwick Creek, in deceiving his adversary as to his real strength. He kept him constantly on the alert during the entire day; and just when the fire slackened on the other bank, he even made a vigorous attack upon Smith's division at Golding. He was repulsed with loss, leaving the greatest portion of a Georgia regiment, with its commander, Colonel Lamar, formerly a member of Congress, in the hands of the Federals. But he had thereby accomplished his object and prevented new reinforcements from being sent to the aid of the Federal right wing.

In the meantime, Lee was impatiently waiting for the arrival of Jackson, who had been delayed on his march, and who alone could henceforth secure him the victory. The commander of the army of the Shenandoah had joined D. H. Hill's division at Bethesda, and was approaching the field of battle with an army of forty thousand men, fresh and full of ardor. The firing of musketry, the repeated volleys of which burst forth on the side of Cold Harbor, on the extreme left of the Confederate line, soon proclaimed that he had at last met the enemy, and that the battle was about to assume a new aspect. Lee rushed to the sound, and meeting Jackson concerted with him a general attack. Whiting and a brigade of Jackson's old division proceeded to the right to support Longstreet and take position between him and the debris of A. P. Hill's division. The attack on the wood of New Cold Harbor on the left was entrusted to the remainder of Jackson's division; in the vicinity of Cold Harbor were deployed Ewell's forces first, then those of D. H. Hill, while Stuart's cavalry was drawn up still further to the left, as far as the forest.

Toward six o'clock this new army renewed the attack upon Porter's troops, already exhausted by five hours' fight-

ing. D. H. Hill gave the signal of attack to the extreme left, and in less than a quarter of an hour the battle raged along the whole line from the borders of the Chickahominy to the front of Cold Harbor. The Federal artillery was reinforced, and concentrated its fire upon every point where the enemy's battalions could be seen. Nor was it made to falter by the advance of the enemy on its right, near McGee's farm, but poured grape-shot into the ranks of D. H. Hill, almost at the cannon's mouth. The latter captured a few pieces of cannon, only to lose them again an instant after. They had, however, gained some ground on this side, but in the meanwhile Ewell, who was posted between McGee's farm and New Cold Harbor, had seen all his efforts fail before the well-sustained fire of his adversaries. He nevertheless led to the attack soldiers proved by all the marches and victories in the valley of Virginia, but he found before him the brigade of regulars, who make it a point of honor never to yield before volunteers, whatever may be their number. To support Ewell, Jackson ordered three brigades of his old division to advance successively against the wood of New Cold Harbor. This was the weakest point of the Federal line; for lying across the densest part of the forest, it was exposed to constant surprises, and could not be supported by artillery, as elsewhere. The brigades of Meade and Taylor of Slocum's division made a stubborn defence in this difficult position, but they were slowly driven back by the superior forces which attacked them. This advantage which the Confederates had gained in the centre exposed the angle of the wood at the point where it becomes narrow as it stretches down toward the Chickahominy. The Federal left had hitherto made an obstinate stand in this narrow section of the wood, against the assaults of Longstreet at first, and of Whiting after him. The latter finally availed himself of the confusion into which his adversaries had been thrown by the loss of the wood at New Cold Harbor, to take possession of it; but every time that his soldiers ventured beyond the curtain of trees the enemy's cannon compelled them to run back for shelter behind this protecting screen. Meanwhile, the Federal in-

fantry, which had again formed into line near its guns, was becoming exhausted by so unequal a struggle; the ammunition was giving out, no reinforcements arrived, and the moment approached when excessive fatigue would overcome the energy of the steadiest men. The regiments, of which more than one were reduced to a handful of men, drew together in isolated groups; the combat continued, but was carried on individually by soldiers among whom all systematic connection had ceased to exist. Precisely at this moment Jackson came forward with his last reserves and ordered a general attack. The attenuated lines of the Federals were everywhere shattered. Whiting sent forward one of his brigades, composed of Texan soldiers, into the re-entering angle formed by the thick wood of Cold Harbor and the clusters of trees which extend its line toward the river. General Hood, who was then one of the most brilliant officers in the Confederate army, although he subsequently became a most indifferent commander-in-chief, was in command of this brigade, to which he imparted his own martial ardor. In vain did the Federal artillery concentrate its fire to check him like the others as he emerged from the wood. The four Texan regiments advanced without faltering, under a shower of shells. As they closed up their ranks, which the Federal missiles were thinning more and more, their long line scarcely wavered. They paused for a moment to fire, but Hood instantly pushed them forward; they rushed onward with loud yells to the very mouth of the guns which had so mercilessly poured grape into them. The artillery horses hitched to the limbers either ran away with their drivers, or were driven off by them. The Federal soldiers, who up to this time had stood by those guns to support them, grew weak at last; not daring yet to take to flight openly, they began to desert the post of danger under pretence of carrying to ambulances the wounded, whose number was constantly increasing. The most determined among them were soon hurried along in the retreat, which was accelerated more and more, and the few gunners who had persisted in remaining at their post to

the last, also disappeared in the tide of Texans, which overwhelmed them in an instant, leaving nothing behind but corpses lying on the ground.

Longstreet had imitated this movement on the extreme left of the Federal line, and the greater part of Butterfield's brigade, being cut off from the rest of the army, barely escaped through the Upper Duane Bridge. And there, too, a few batteries left to their fate by the infantry, still keep up the fight, alone and unaided. General Cooke, posted at the bottom of the valley, throws out the 5th regiment, consisting only of three squadrons, against the enemy's lines, that are already crowning a part of the heights on his right. The Federal cavalry obliquely scale the steep and loamy acclivities, and on reaching the summit on their panting horses they find that the enemy, on issuing from the wood, have formed ranks, and, with a firm foot, are waiting for them to come on. Finding it impossible to break their line, the cavalry disperse in the manner of foragers, and keep up the fight with their revolvers, according to the custom they have contracted in the Far West. A fight of this kind cannot last more than a few minutes. One-half their number either lie stretched on the ground or have fallen into the enemy's hands; the others fall back in disorder upon the Union battalions, now in full retreat. But they have succeeded in saving most of the guns, which the enemy was preparing to capture on the left; and the remainder of Cooke's cavalry, formed in good order, arrest, by their steady bearing, Longstreet's movement in the direction of Alexander bridge. Meanwhile, the Confederates are carrying everything before them along the whole line. Two Federal regiments, which have bravely kept up the fight in the wood of New Cold Harbor when all was giving way around them, find themselves surrounded, decimated and compelled to surrender. Ewell and D. H. Hill also take advantage in their turn of the successes achieved by the right wing of the army. Their artillery succeeds at last in planting itself on the summit of the hill so long occupied by Sykes' division, and crushes that division with its fire. Being thus attacked in front and menaced in flank

by the enemy, who has taken possession of the wood of New Cold Harbor, Sykes falls back, defending the ground foot by foot. But a portion of his artillery, the teams of which have been killed, remains on the field of battle. The regulars do not allow Hill to push his success along the road leading from Cold Harbor to Dispatch, by which he could have cut off the retreat of the enemy. Fearfully reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volunteers.

Meanwhile, the retreat of the Federals on the left and centre threatens to become a rout. The crowd of fugitives, with which are mingled artillery teams, followed at a distance by groups of brave soldiers who have rallied around their chiefs, has rapidly descended into a small ravine, beyond which rises another hill. On the summit of this hill the two Cold Harbor roads form a junction to gain the Alexander bridge beyond, at the bottom of the valley, the only passage by which the Federals may yet be able to cross the Chickahominy. If the enemy succeeds in seizing this position, his two wings will unite for the purpose of driving the debris of the right wing of the army of the Potomac into the swamp, and crush them before they have been able to cross the narrow defile of the bridge. But at this critical moment fortune does not employ her final rigors against the Federals. The Confederates, fatigued by the effort they have just made, halt to re-form their lines. Hood's brigade alone has lost over one thousand men in the last charge. Stuart, near Cold Harbor, does not know how to make his excellent troops play the part which appertain to cavalry on the eve of a victory; he allows himself to be held back by the resolute stand of the regulars, and some few hundred men bearing the flags of Warren's brigade.

The retreat of the Federals, which was hastened by the declivity which they were descending into the ravine, is, on the contrary, slackened when they climb the other side. The battle has suddenly ceased; an effort is made to ascertain the condition of things; they halt. Twenty-two pieces of can-

non have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but there yet remain forty or fifty. Most of these are again placed in battery, and open from a distance upon the lines of the assailants a fire which restores courage to the Union soldiers. The latter listen once more to the voices of their chiefs. Porter, Morell, Slocum, Meade and Butterfield see increasing the groups gathering around them from every regiment. On the right the Federals have lost less ground and preserved better order in their retreat. At this instant French and Meagher arrive on the ground with two brigades sent by Sumner. The second is composed exclusively of Irishmen, the green flag, ornamented with a golden harp, floating in their midst. They arrive, shouting vociferously and displaying all that vivacity and dash for which the children of this ancient warlike race are noted when marching to battle. Their comrades, on finding themselves thus supported, respond with loud hurrahs, by which they seek to gain fresh courage. In the meantime, the enemy has re-formed his ranks, and is again in motion; but instead of a routed crowd he beholds a body of resolute troops, who seem to be calmly waiting for him on the slopes situated on the other side of the ravine. At this sight he hesitates, and approaching night puts an end to the sanguinary struggle.

The losses were heavy on both sides. Out of thirty-five thousand men engaged, the Federals had nearly seven thousand killed or wounded. The assailants suffered even more, but they had achieved a signal victory. Twenty-two guns, a large number of prisoners, and most of the wounded, abandoned by the enemy on the field of battle afforded substantial proof of their success. Their opponents had fought with great vigor, and it was no disgrace to Porter's soldiers that they had to succumb in such an unequal struggle. Besides, the success of the Confederates was not so decisive as they at first imagined. The resistance made by the Federals at Gaines' Mill, and their inaction on the other side of the Chickahominy, had led Lee and his generals to believe that they had just beaten the largest portion of the army of the Potomac, and that by driving it back to the river they had completely turned it by their maneuvers. Con-

vinced that they had cut off the Federals from their only line of retreat, they already fancied that McClellan, hemmed in among the marshes of the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp, was about to capitulate with all his forces, or that the great army of invasion, harassed on every side, exhausted by fatigue and hunger, would dissolve before them like a storm-cloud after thunder.

While they were preparing to gather the fruits of their victory, the Federals were collecting together and counting their numbers. Generals and colonels were trying to rally the scattered fragments of their brigades and regiments. Then, when order was completely restored, battalion after battalion passed over the Alexander bridge, occupied by a squadron of cavalry, which, during the evening, had prevented the fugitives from approaching it. In the midst of the obscurity, the Union general Reynolds had been separated from his men by the enemy's pickets. But despite a few incidents of this nature, the retreat was ably conducted, and at daybreak not a single straggler, wounded man or cannon remained on the ground which had been occupied during the night by Porter's troops. The regulars were the last to cross, after which they entirely destroyed the magnificent bridge which had cost so much trouble to construct.

The Federals had not succeeded in preventing the Confederates from occupying the left bank of the Chickahominy, but they had made them pay so dear for its possession that the latter did not feel disposed to make an immediate attempt to force a passage, for the purpose of disputing with them the opposite side of the river.

While the darkness of a short summer night was covering the mournful and silent march of the Federal soldiers who had just fought the battle of Gaines' Mill, a blazing pine-wood fire was crackling under the tall acacias which commanded the south entrance of the Alexander bridge. It was on this spot that the headquarters of the army had been situated during the preceding days. This camp had been broken up like all the rest, for the entire army was ready to march; but the tall flitting shadows, projected here and

there by the flame upon the dark background of the surrounding trees, showed that its occupants had not yet deserted it.

In fact, General McClellan had assembled several of his generals around this fire, and was consulting with them regarding the dispositions to be made for the following day, upon which the very existence of the army of the Potomac seemed to depend. The idea was for a moment entertained of playing double or quits on the right bank of the Chickahominy the game which had just been lost on the other side. It was McClellan himself who, forgetting his habitual circumspection, and emboldened by the imminence of the danger, thought of taking advantage of the enemy's movement against his right wing to throw himself upon unprotected Richmond with all the forces that were left him. The Confederates, being separated from their capital by the Chickahominy, would not be able to arrive in time to succor it, so that the defeat of the previous day might turn out to be only the prelude to a brilliant success. His lieutenants, however, Heintzelman especially, opposed this project, and found no difficulty in diverting his attention from it. It must be acknowledged that it would have been a desperate undertaking; for the condition of the army was such that, so far from justifying any rash movement, it imposed upon its chief the duty of sacrificing the most tempting combinations to the dictates of prudence. The day before, while Porter was keeping the largest portion of Lee's army engaged at Gaines' Mill, it might have been possible to concentrate the rest of the Federal army, and thus penetrate into Richmond. But the propitious hour had passed. That portion of the army which had just fought at Gaines' Mill had suffered too severely to be able to resume hostilities on the following day. All that Lee would have had to do in order to oppose this bold movement would have been to recross the Chickahominy near the field of battle, and fall upon the flank of the Federals, if they had come out of their entrenchments. Moreover, as usual, the Confederate forces were exaggerated in the councils of McClellan. But let us ask, Did this plan, the failure of

which would have involved the destruction of the whole army, offer any tangible and lasting advantages in the event of success? Once master of Richmond, McClellan would soon have been besieged in turn by the conquerors of Gaines' Mill; he would thereby have sacrificed his communications by way of the White House, without having been able to secure a new base of operations on the James, the navigation of which above City Point could easily have been closed by the enemy's batteries placed on the right bank.

In these circumstances, even the capture of the enemy's capital would only have aggravated, by retarding for a few days, the dangers which threatened the army of the Potomac.

The retreat was decided on; the first siege of Richmond was raised.

CHAPTER IV

Glendale and Malvern

We have stated that the army of the Potomac, by changing its base of operations a few weeks sooner, might have accomplished important results. But even if it had been entirely free to execute this movement, the configuration of the James would have compelled it to move away from Richmond, to rest upon that part of the river which the navy could reach without danger. This maneuver, which had been in preparation by McClellan for several days, would not have assumed the character of a retreat if it had not been undertaken the day after a bloody defeat.

But on the evening of the 27th of June it had become a necessity. It alone, in fact, afforded the Federals the means of escaping a serious disaster. A few words, regarding the situation of the two armies, will enable the reader to appreciate the difficult position in which they found themselves, the resources they still possessed for getting out of it, and the rare ability with which General McClellan knew how to use them.

The Chickahominy, after running parallel to the James River and the Pamunky, at nearly an equal distance from these two streams, empties into the former about fifty kilometres below Richmond. The James in its numerous windings alternately approaches and recedes from this watercourse. In the elbow called Turkey Bend, which lies twenty-three kilometres in a direct line from Richmond, the river, which is both wide and deep, waters the base of a large hillock, that rises on the left bank in a succession of bare slopes above the forest. From this eminence, named Malvern Hill by the early English settlers, to the confluence of White Oak Swamp and the Chickahominy below Bottom's Bridge, there is only a distance of twelve kilometres, but the tract which separates them is singularly difficult. The White Oak Swamp, which we have described as covering the Federal left, and forming by its course an

acute angle with the Chickahominy, was the first obstacle which the Federals had to encounter if they proceeded toward the James. There was but one road crossing it, which, connecting with the Williamsburg turnpike near Bottom's Bridge, ran due south for a distance of five kilometres, crossing the waters of the swamp, which, being shut in between two unwooded hills, presented only the appearance of a small stream, and reascended on the other side the cultivated slopes called Frazier's Farm. One or two kilometres beyond, this road joins that coming from New Kent Court-house—that is to say, from the east—which crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge. Thence it inclined to south-west, and at the end of a mile and a half, it entered a group of connected clearings known by the name of Glendale, the centre of which was occupied by the large farm of Mr. Nelson. Farther yet, the road took a southerly direction, under the name of Quaker road, and struck the northern slopes of Malvern Hill, five kilometres farther on, ascending them directly, and finally descending in an oblique line on the other side, to join the elbow of Turkey Bend at Haxall's Landing. A great number of smaller roads coming from Richmond debouched perpendicularly into the Quaker road, like so many radii connecting the arc of a circle with its centre. To the north of White Oak Swamp there was only one of these roads, the Williamsburg turnpike, the old line of attack of the Federals, while south of it there were three principal ones—the Charles City road, following the right bank of White Oak Swamp, the New Market road, near the left bank of the James, and the Central road, between the two. Before approaching Malvern Hill, however, the New Market road turned abruptly to the left, intersecting the Central road and emerging into the Charles City road, to connect with the Quaker road in the Glendale clearings. Several smaller roads, less practicable for an army, wound about these three principal roads, connecting the New Market and Central road directly with Haxall's Landing and the Quaker road. Their numerous zigzags turned them into perfect labyrinths, calculated to lead a solitary traveller astray, or to

misdirect the heads of column of an army on the march. With the exception of the clearings of Frazier's Farm and Glendale, and the cultivated slopes of Malvern Hill, the whole of this region was only a dense forest of oaks and magnolias, but the soil was generally sandy and solid. There was but one small water-course to be met with, the Western Run, which, skirting Malvern Hill, slopes north and east, and empties into the James below this hill.

All these topographical details were unknown at McClellan's headquarters, and, what is yet more extraordinary, they were no better known to the Confederate Staff, who had never expected to make a campaign on that side. The information possessed by the Federals, regarding the country into which their army was about to be launched with its accompanying heavy trains, was extremely vague, and it may be truly said, that in making Turkey Bend the objective point of his march, General McClellan was combining a journey of discovery with the retreat of his army. He was therefore obliged, throughout the whole of this dangerous expedition, to assure himself personally of the direction indicated to each of his corps, and was thereby prevented from commanding in person at all the battles that were fought on the route, which subsequently drew upon him the most violent and undeserved reproaches.

During the night of the 27th-28th, Porter's corps, after crossing the Chickahominy, occupied the line of heights which command the course of this river on the right bank. Turned toward the north, these troops faced the hills where their adversaries of the day previous were posted. Slocum's division had taken post on their left, adjoining that of Smith, which with it formed Franklin's corps, and which was posted among the earthworks of Golding. The rest of the line of entrenchments facing Richmond was occupied by four divisions, disposed as follows from right to left: Richardson, who had just been joined by the two brigades sent to Gaine's Mill; then Sedgwick, both under the orders of Sumner; farther on, Hooker and Kearny, composing Heintzelman's corps; at the extreme left, Keyes, with the divi-

sions of Couch and Peck, guarding the passes of White Oak Swamp.

On the other side, the conquerors of Gaines' Mill had slept on the field of battle, while Magruder kept a watch around Richmond, very uneasy when he thought of the small number of troops he had at his command.

The retreat upon the James afforded McClellan the important advantage of releasing him from the defence of his line of communications with the White House, against which it was evident the Confederates at first intended to direct all their efforts. In the condition in which his army found itself after the battle, a retreat begun across a difficult country for the purpose of covering the White House would probably have only terminated under the walls of Yorktown. By abandoning his depots on York River he avoided this danger; but it then became necessary for him to carry along all that was needed to subsist his troops, until he could find new supplies on the James—that is to say, for five, or perhaps six, days. The foresight of the general-in-chief had fortunately provided beforehand all the resources which such an enterprise required. But while these indispensable resources rendered the march of the army practicable, they could not fail to impede and retard its movements. The soldiers received two or three days' cooked rations, additional provisions for three more days being placed in the wagons. A drove of two thousand five hundred head of cattle had been also on its way to White Oak Swamp since the evening of the 27th. This long line of bellowing cattle was in singular contrast with the warlike scenes through which it had to pass. At times these thousands of animals, utterly indifferent to their surroundings, would stop, despite the cries of the drivers, who escorted them on horseback, and persistently browse on the grass silvered by the full moon; again, they would precipitate themselves with blind fury across the bivouacs, where everything contributed to increase their fright.

Three days' rations for one hundred thousand soldiers and twenty thousand non-combatants, five days' forage for forty thousand horses, three hundred and fifty pieces of

artillery—in short, the munitions of such an army—constituted a formidable train. It was the task of the army of the Potomac to protect this train as far as the borders of the James. Consequently, however urgent may have been the march of the army itself, it was compelled to remain motionless, until this interminable ribbon should be unwound along the only and narrow road which was open to it. Keyes' corps alone received orders to march on the evening of the 27th. Being placed at White Oak Swamp, it was directed to take the advance, with injunctions to cover continually the right flank of the train. The other corps, unable to move out of their positions in consequence of the crowded condition of the roads, were not even able to put their division-trains in motion before the evening of the 28th, so long was the line of wagons belonging to the general administration.

Meanwhile, the work of destruction, the inevitable consequence of every threat, was rapidly progressing. No portion of the enemy's cavalry having reached the railroad during the night, that line remained open, and advantage was taken of it to send back upon York River the greatest possible number of sick, wounded, non-combatants of every description, as well as a large quantity of materiel. The last train of cars was then loaded with powder and shell, and the locomotive was despatched, under a full head of steam, in the direction of the Chickahominy bridge, which had been burning for some few minutes. A terrible explosion announced the arrival of this dangerous cargo amid the flames, and the simultaneous destruction of the bridge, cars and ammunition. The telegraph, however, had not ceased to perform its functions, but still continued to be the connecting link between the soldiers of the army of the Potomac and all that was dear to them now left behind. General McClellan was thus enabled to send a last despatch to the government at Washington, giving an account of the dangerous situation of his army. As he said himself, in words full of sadness and dignity, if so many brave soldiers were to perish in vain, the fault rested with those who had so imprudently haggled about reinforcements at the critical

moment. This was a responsibility which the Federal authorities were unwilling to accept at any price. In order to get rid of it they resorted to a culpable strategem. Far from letting the public know the truth regarding what was taking place around Richmond, the Secretary of War, forgetting that he had to deal with a few people who would not tolerate deception, gave out that the army of the Potomac had undertaken a strategic movement which would result in the capture of Richmond. Consequently, when, after waiting four days, it became known that this army had reached Turkey Bend with considerable difficulty, the excitement was all the greater, because the people had been kept in ignorance of its dangers, and had anticipated a very different issue. McClellan's enemies, instead of rendering justice to the manner in which he had conceived and executed this strategic movement, censured him for it as being nothing but a rout, and sought to turn it into ridicule. It would be perhaps going too far to interpret this announcement of an impending victory, made by the Federal government at the very time when McClellan was informing them of the difficulties of his position, as a perfidious scheme, designed to excite public opinion against the commander of the army of the Potomac; it is certain, however, that the government sought to conceal the facts which made the chief responsibility for the defeat fall upon itself. It persistently refused to give the text of McClellan's despatches to the newspapers; and, what is worse, when the whole series of official documents was laid before the committee on the conduct of the war, the government permitted itself to mutilate the text of its correspondence with the general, without making any mention whatever of the omissions.*

On the other bank of the Chickahominy, as soon as the sun of the 28th began to shine over the battle-field so pain-

*Thus the despatch of which we have spoken above, addressed to Mr. Stanton on the 28th of June, twenty minutes after midnight, closed with these words: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army." This phrase was suppressed at the War Department, as any one may ascertain by comparing two official documents, McClellan's Report, p. 132, and that of the committee, first part, first volume, p. 340.

fully conquered the day before, Lee and his lieutenants bethought themselves of gathering the fruits of their recent victory. Their army had suffered cruelly. It required time to reorganize the corps, to collect together their elements, which had been scattered during the conflict, to attend for the first time to the ten thousand or eleven thousand wounded who were lying on the heights of Gaines' Mill, and finally to see to the distribution of rations and ammunition. Nevertheless, the Confederate army, still full of ardor, despite the heavy losses it had sustained, was able to put part of its battalions in motion by midday. Moments were precious, for it was important to forestall McClellan on his line of retreat, and turn into a rout the retrograde march which his check of the preceding day would no doubt compel him to undertake. Jackson's soldiers were not in the habit of resting the day after a battle; therefore they were soon in motion. Lee, however, had not understood the maneuver of his opponent. From the moment he crossed the Chickahominy to join Jackson, we have seen him actuated by the desire of flanking McClellan's right wing, so as to separate him from York River. In order to accomplish this object, he had already caused the army of the Shenandoah to follow the eccentric direction which came near preventing it from reaching the battlefield of Gaines' Mill in time. In delivering this battle, he had proposed to cut off McClellan entirely from the road leading to White House. Consequently, after having won this battle, all the movements of his army during the 28th were intended to prevent the army of the Potomac from putting itself again in communication with York River. If McClellan had the design naturally attributed to him by his adversary, he had but two ways of carrying it into effect; he could have crossed the Chickahominy with his whole army between Gaines' Mill and Bottom's Bridge, and tried to force a passage through the position occupied by the Confederates; otherwise, he should have endeavored to outstrip them in speed by pushing his way back of the river, to cross it at some point lower down, so as to fall back upon Williamsburg. But, as we have seen, these two alternatives had

been both discarded by McClellan, and his sagacity had inspired him with a determination, the merit of which consisted in its not having been fathomed by his adversaries. Consequently, the Confederate generals, after having vigorously executed a well-conceived plan, were deceived by their own wishes; they too readily imagined that the Federal general would fall into the trap which they had been preparing for him.

A division of cavalry, cleverly directed by Stoneman, contributed to confirm them in their error. The latter, in fact, by slowly retiring toward New Kent Court-house, seemed as if intending to cover the lower passes of the Chickahominy, as well as the Williamsburg turnpike, and he thus drew a portion of the enemy's forces on his side. Whilst Longstreet and Hill, who had suffered most the day before, continued to occupy the heights of Gaines' Mill, three of Jackson's divisions deployed along the Chickahominy, as if to defend the left bank against the Federals, who were massed on the other side; the fourth, Ewell's, was despatched to Bottom's Bridge, when it became evident that McClellan had no intention of forcing a passage near the battle-field for the preceding day. Magruder, on his side, retaining his position in front of the Federal lines, could easily perceive that the number of troops occupying them had not diminished. For an instant only toward noon he thought these positions were about to be abandoned. Smith's division evacuated a few breastworks which had been erected in front of the fortifications at Golding. Magruder at once launched the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments of Toombs' brigade against these works; but being received by the fire of Hancock's brigade, they were repulsed, leaving two hundred wounded and prisoners on the ground, one of whom was a colonel. This brisk discharge of musketry was the only thing that occurred to disturb the silence of that long day, the 28th.

Every hour that elapsed amid this silence afforded an additional chance to the Federals for reaching the James without serious interruption. Consequently, in the midst of the apparent quiet among the troops, the work of push-

ing forward the train, and opening a way for its passage, was carried on with the utmost activity, while at the headquarters astonishment was manifested at the inaction of an adversary hitherto so vigilant and enterprising.

The dust raised above the forest by Ewell's march toward Bottom's Bridge soon explained the error committed by the enemy. Although a yet thicker cloud of dust betrayed the movement of the Federal train on the opposite bank, its appearance failed to undeceive the Confederates. They persisted in believing that McClellan was proceeding in the direction of Williamsburg. It was only when Stuart, who had followed Stoneman step by step with his cavalry, had reached the last fords of the Chickahominy, without finding even a Federal vidette to guard them, that Lee understood at last the bold maneuver by which McClellan was about to rob him of a success which he had considered certain.

It was too late to remedy his mistake; the whole precious day had been wasted. Stuart's cavalry, which might so effectually have harassed the Federal vanguard, and preceded it to the borders of the James, either through White Oak Swamp or the lower Chickahominy, had advanced so far into the peninsula that it did not again make its appearance during the whole of the campaign. Ewell's soldiers, who were brought back during the night and posted near the remainder of Jackson's troops, had been exhausted by a fruitless march, and it was necessary to grant them at least a few hours' rest.

During the whole of this same night, the trains of the army of the Potomac were on their way toward White Oak Swamp. The bridge situated in front of Frazier's Farm had been reopened toward noon, and Keyes with his two divisions had encamped at Glendale, in the neighborhood of Nelson's Farm. The topographical officers had, moreover, discovered another passage through the swamp above this bridge, leading directly from Savage station to Glendale—a precious discovery, although this road was too much exposed in flank to the enemy, to venture over it with the train. The moment had arrived for evacuating the

works which had hitherto concealed the preparations for the movement. This was a most delicate operation. It would have been desirable to effect it during the night, but the length of the train had not permitted this. Fortunately, when day broke, instead of shedding a glaring light over the two armies as on the preceding mornings, it was darkened by a thick fog, which for several hours completely concealed the movements of the Federals from the enemy. Their retreat had commenced. Henceforth, until the friendly gun-boats floating on the waters of the James should greet their sight, they would have to fight by day, and march during the night, almost without rest. Nor was the train, which resembled an immense reptile, allowed to make any stop. When wagons were drawn aside to give the horses time to feed, other wagons took their places. This column, formed of four or five teams abreast, moved along quite regularly in the midst of whirlwinds of dust and a stifling heat. The troops marched on the sides of the road. Between the heavy vehicles of the commissary department there were light ambulances overloaded with wounded men; around the train crept along a large number of other wounded and sick men, who had left the hospital to follow the army, falling at every step and presenting a lamentable spectacle. It had been found impossible to take along all those who had been wounded in the recent battles, and nearly two thousand five hundred of them had been left at Savage station, with some surgeons, and recommended to the humanity, already experienced, of the Confederates. Near them a small mountain of coffee, rice, biscuit and hams was burning as a sort of holocaust offered to the god of war.

The troops who had suffered so severely at Gaines' Mill were immediately to follow Keyes' corps toward the James. The task of covering the retreat was entrusted to the yet untouched corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and to Smith's division. As between White Oak Swamp and Turkey Bend the army was to be exposed to flank attacks of the enemy, who could not fail to come down from Richmond by the three roads we have mentioned, the troops

covering this march were ordered to remain stationary during the day, and to move on again at night; in this way they were to relieve each other successively, each gaining one stage in the journey before the sun allowed the enemy to renew the fighting. On the morning of the 29th, Porter's corps and the divisions of McCall and Slocum took position beyond White Oak Swamp, so as to support Keyes at Glendale, and occupy the difficult pass of the swamp in force.

During this time the works in which the army had passed three long weeks were quietly evacuated. General McClellan had indicated to Sumner the positions which the troops forming the rear were to occupy, and had gone to superintend in person the march of the remainder of the army; for it was by the right border of the swamp that the enemy could strike the most dangerous blows. The rear-guard, on the contrary, had its two flanks protected against all attack from Richmond, before reaching the bridge—on the left by the swamp, on the right by the Chickahominy; and these two obstacles, drawing gradually nearer to each other, narrowed the space of ground it had to defend, in proportion as it fell back.

The main portion of the Confederate army was therefore separated from the enemy by a river difficult to cross, and had an immense circuit to make to overtake him on the new line of retreat he had chosen. Huger, with a single division, numbering from eight to ten thousand men, had been ordered several days before to occupy the right bank of the White Oak Swamp. It would certainly have been impossible for him to impede McClellan's march with such a small force, but he could easily watch his movements, and ought to have noticed the direction in which Keyes had been marching since the 28th. He did not, however, display more activity on this occasion than at the battle of Fair Oaks. Allowing some of his squadrons to be borne down by Averill's Federal cavalry, without affording them any assistance, he remained inactive on the Charles City road, while the Federals continued their march unmolested during the whole of the 29th, without having to fire a musket-

shot south of White Oak Swamp. Longstreet and Hill returned on the 29th, crossing by New Bridge to take position in his rear in the vicinity of Richmond, ready to operate, as circumstances might require, on either side of the swamp. Jackson, with his four divisions, remained north of the Chickahominy.

Finally, toward eight o'clock in the evening, Magruder, perceiving the abandonment of the Federal works, pushed forward McLaws' division, which had been placed under his orders, together with Griffith's brigade of his own division. The Federals steadily awaited their approach.

Heintzelman's corps, posted across the Williamsburg turnpike, occupied the works before which the Confederates had stopped on the day of Fair Oaks, his lines extending as far as the railroad. On his right was deployed Sumner's corps, skirting the edge of a wood situated about two kilometres in advance of Savage station. Of the two divisions composing this corps, that of Sedgwick was placed between Heintzelman and the railroad, and that of Richardson on the other side of this line. Still more to the right and in the rear, Smith's division occupied the heights which overlook the Chickahominy, where Porter had encamped the day before.

Toward nine o'clock the Confederates began the attack on a point called Allen's Farm, where Sedgwick's right formed a junction with Richardson's left. The latter first, and then Sedgwick, had to sustain the whole brunt of the fight. But the enemy was repulsed along the whole line; and seeing the fruitlessness of their assaults, the Confederates soon retired. The darkness, in the midst of which this engagement ended, which had commenced too late to lead to any serious results, was against the aggressors, who, not being able to combine their movements, unnecessarily lost many men, and among others General Griffith.

Meanwhile, Jackson had been ordered to cross the Chickahominy on the morning of the 29th, and to throw himself with all his forces upon the troops posted on the other side of the river, which he had thus far believed to be held in check by his mere presence. He at once set

himself to work to reconstruct the Alexander bridge, designated in his reports by the name of Grape-vine bridge. This bridge opened at the foot of the hill where Doctor Trent's house stands. The Federals no longer occupied this position, Franklin having placed Smith's division lower down, so as to cover the approaches to Savage station, on the side of the Chickahominy.

As to Sumner, he was ordered to fall back until he should join Smith's left. He nevertheless remained for some time before Allen's Farm, thus leaving his right entirely unprotected (en l'air), and opening a vast space in the Federal line in front of the Trent house, precisely at the point upon which Jackson's heads of column could not fail to emerge. The Union generals, however, had quickly perceived this danger. Franklin had brought Smith back near to Savage station, in order to close up the Federal line. On being informed of this movement, Sumner finally determined to fall back likewise upon the position, of which Savage is the centre; and assuming command of the five divisions which were about to assemble at this point, he resolved to defend it to the utmost, agreeably to McClellan's orders.

Heintzelman, who with his army corps formed the Federal left, had received formal orders to halt at a short distance from the station and not to continue the retreat until dark; but instead of complying with these instructions, he proceeded with his two divisions in the direction of White Oak Swamp. McClellan had designated to him a road which, after following the line of this swamp for some distance, crossed it at Brackett's Ford, above the bridge, over which the remainder of the army was passing. He entered this road at noon, thus uncovering the entire flank of Sumner, who had not been apprised of his sudden departure.

The Confederates were not slow in taking advantage of such a blunder. They advanced by the Williamsburg road and along the railroad track, preceded by an engine, to which was attached an iron-plated car carrying a heavy gun. This strange machine, which was called the Land

Merrimac, stopped from time to time to fire a random shot; but it does not appear that anybody was hurt by it. As we have before stated, Sumner's two divisions were deployed in the vicinity of Savage station; that of Sedgwick occupied the clearing between the railroad and the Williamsburg road; that of Richardson had fallen back so as to form a right angle with the line of the first, along the railway tracks, facing north. Sumner, believing his left to be covered by Heintzelman, had not occupied in force the wood bordering the Williamsburg road, and Franklin, finding no enemy in sight, had sent Smith's division to the rear. That of McCall was posted at Bottom's Bridge, guarding the passage of the Chickahominy.

Toward four o'clock in the afternoon the officers of the signal corps announced the approach of the enemy. Smith, being hastily recalled by his chief, has barely time to throw Hancock's brigade on Richardson's right, to extend his line by resting it upon a thicket, which the enemy will presently take from him, and at the same time to send Brooks' brigade to the extreme left. The latter general arrives just in time to occupy the wood stretching along the road, and to reinforce Burns' troops, of Sedgwick's division, who are keeping up an unequal fight from their position across this road. Magruder, in fact, taking advantage of the gap made by Heintzelman's unhoped-for departure, has with his wonted vigor hurled his own and McLaws' division against the weakest point of the Federal line. He almost breaks it, when the opportune arrival of the reserve of Sumner, who had soon recovered from his surprise, checks him. Brooks re-establishes the battle on that side; but the struggle continues with fierceness along the whole line until after sunset. The Confederates, encouraged by their victory of Gaines' Mill, and finding that their adversary is about to escape them, are determined at all hazards to inflict another reverse upon him before night comes on to protect his retreat. The Federal lines give way more than once under their repeated efforts, but each time they are speedily reformed; and despite all his fire and the ardor of his soldiers, Magruder cannot effect a serious breach. Jackson, whose

arrival on the field of battle might have proved fatal to the Federals, as it had done two days before, did not make his appearance. The construction of the bridge detained him the whole day, and it was only after sunset that his troops were at last able to cross the Chickahominy. Thus, although only two regiments had been engaged during the whole of the 28th, Lee was only able to bring two divisions at most into line on the 29th. Disconcerted by McClellan's unlooked-for maneuver, the Confederate generals seemed to have lost that capacity for the initiative which had succeeded so well on former occasions. On the evening of the 29th, the brave Sumner was unwilling to abandon the ground he had so gallantly defended. Nevertheless, the safety of the army required that its lines should be extended as little as possible, and that in proportion as the heads of column drew near to the James the rear-guard should follow their movements. It required a positive order from General McClellan to determine Sumner to cross the White Oak Swamp; finally, on the 30th, at five o'clock in the morning, French's brigade, being the last to pass, destroyed the bridge which had been thrown over the stream near Frazier's Farm.

This day's operations were a great success for McClellan. The first and most difficult step in his retreat movement was taken, and with fortunate results. He had succeeded in placing White Oak Swamp between his army and the main body of his adversaries, and in surmounting this serious obstacle without losing either a cannon or a vehicle. All the efforts of the enemy to effect a rout in his rear-guard had been repulsed with loss. The following movement of troops took place on the right bank of the swamp during the afternoon of the 29th; Slocum, having crossed in the morning, had taken the position previously occupied by Keyes' corps at Glendale. The latter had started for Turkey Bend, on the banks of the James, with instructions not to stop until he had reached that place. Porter had passed Slocum, who was facing north, for the purpose of covering the road from Frazier's Farm to Nelson's Farm; and taking post at the other extremity of the Glendale clearings, he

guarded their approaches to the west on the side of the New Market road. He was ordered to remain there until evening, and to resume his march in the track of Keyes immediately after nightfall.

At daybreak on the 30th the approaches to White Oak Bridge and Frazier's Farm were occupied by Franklin, with the division of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade. On the left was deployed Slocum's division, his right resting on the Charles City road. Heintzelman, who had crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford the previous evening without being molested, had come during the night to take the position occupied by Porter a few hours before, beyond Glendale. McCall had left Frazier's Farm, and his troops were making coffee in the neighborhood of Nelson's Farm. Sumner soon joined him there with Sedgwick's division. Keyes, followed close by Porter, continued to lead the advance of the army, reaching Haxall's Landing, on the James, in the course of the morning. But both had been delayed on their march, and they had not informed the general-in-chief of their movements. The latter was utterly ignorant of their fate, merely presuming that, as he had not heard the sound of cannon, his two lieutenants had not had any serious engagement. The impossibility of exactly tracing in advance the movements of his troops, of knowing the country through which they had to pass, and of obtaining timely information regarding the positions they had occupied, rendered McClellan's task singularly difficult. The topographical officers who had been detached on the 28th to make a reconnaissance of the roads leading to the James had not yet returned, nor even sent a solitary guide to headquarters. Fortunately, in the midst of these uncertainties it became known that Keyes had accidentally discovered a road running parallel to the Quaker road, which had been abandoned for a number of years, half buried under the grass, wild vines and the trunks of fallen trees, but nevertheless easily reopened. It was a valuable discovery; for this road, lying to the left of the Quaker road for troops marching toward the James, offered a safe way for the train, the right flank of which would thus be covered by

the whole army. The long file of vehicles, ambulances and baggage-wagons at once entered it.

In the course of the morning, when Keyes, followed by Porter, reached the James, the line of the army of the Potomac extended from White Oak Bridge to Haxall's Landing, a distance of thirteen kilometres. This line was too long to be everywhere defended by the Federals against a vigorous attack, nor could they shorten it; for in order to protect the train and prevent the enemy from placing himself on the left flank of the troops in the march, it was necessary to bar the passage of White Oak Swamp against him. The three principal points of this line had, therefore, to be occupied in force. The first was that portion of the bank of the James toward which the army was directing its course. At Haxall's Landing the river borders an immense clearing occupied by a few huts situated to the south, and consequently beyond Malvern Hill, for those approaching that position either by way of the Quaker road or New Market road. All the roads leading to this landing pass either along the side or at the foot of the hill which thus commands the approaches. It overlooks the whole surrounding country; wooded at the east, it is entirely bare on all the other sides. A cluster of acacias surrounds the old house of Mr. Crewe, situated on the highest point above the rather abrupt acclivities which stretch down to the James. These slopes are less precipitous to the west on the side facing Richmond, and become still gentler to the north toward the Quaker road. A point equally important to defend was that of Frazier's Farm, at the other extremity of the line, for it commands the passage of White Oak Swamp. The intermediate position was that of Glendale. At this point all the roads through which the enemy, coming from Richmond, might try to throw himself upon the flank of the Federal column, emerge into the Quaker road. Omitting a few irregularities and one or two cross-roads of no importance, the intersection of these different roads at Glendale may be represented by a square, the four angles of which, each facing a cardinal point, would mark the entrance of the four principal roads into the clearing. The

Confederates, who had crossed the White Oak Swamp by following the tracks of Heintzelman, or those who had followed the right bank, were to debouch by the Charles City road into the northern angle; those who had come down by the Central or New Market road were to unite in order to penetrate together into the clearing by the western angle. The Federals, coming from White Oak Bridge, entered the road by the eastern angle, in order to strike at the southern angle the Quaker road, which led to the margin of the James.

These were the only three points in which the line formed by the Federals to cover their movement was vulnerable. In fact, the line occupied by the Federals between Glendale and Frazier's Farm was covered by the White Oak Swamp on the Richmond side. Between Glendale and Malvern Hill small swamps, forming the source of the Western Run, and rendered impassable by a dense forest, extended to the right of the Quaker road, so that the roads coming from the Central or New Market road, being compelled to avoid them, all converged upon the slopes themselves or in full view of Malvern Hill. This was the line that all the forces of Lee intended to attack on the 30th of June, and that McClellan had to defend for a sufficient length of time to enable his train to reach Haxall's Landing without impediment. On this occasion he could no longer count upon the inaction of the enemy for Lee had had ample time to concentrate his army. Visiting all the points which were menaced, General McClellan speedily made his dispositions for battle. Keyes left Haxall's and proceeded to occupy the space comprised between the James at Turkey Bend on one side and Malvern Hill on the other. Porter, who had arrived by the Quaker road, took a strong position on this hill. At Frazier's Farm, Franklin was ordered to defend to the last the pass of White Oak Swamp, as the troops against whom Sumner had fought the day previous at Savage station were sure to come and dispute it. Finally, McClellan's attention having been called to the Glendale junction by the Prince de Joinville, whose suggestions he always willingly listened to, he saw at once all the im-

portance of this point. It was evidently here that Lee was preparing to strike the decisive blow. In order to cover the march of the army it was necessary to hold and preserve at all hazards the western and southern angles. Accordingly, all the disposable forces yet remaining were sent to defend this position. The moments were precious, the forest thick, the roads intricate, and it was essential to spare the worn-out troops all unnecessary counter-marches; they were consequently drawn up somewhat at random, but finally succeeded in forming a large arc of a circle, covering the greater part of the Glendale junction, the convexity of which was turned toward Richmond. Slocum was deployed on the right of the Charles City road, his left resting upon this road and facing north; Kearny, who remained where he had bivouacked during the night, joined him, his lines being deployed on the left of this road a little above the New Market road and looking toward the north-west. McCall had come about noon to take position on his left en potence; he rested his right on the New Market road, across the cross-road which connected the former with the Quaker road, and awaiting the enemy from the west. In rear, on McCall's left, Hooker had deployed his division, his right extending as far as the cross-road which forms an angle toward the south; he thus found himself facing south-west and resting upon the edge of a wood before a large clearing intersected by the New Market road. A space of several hundred metres separated Hooker's right from McCall's left, but at a short distance in rear of this gap was posted Sumner with a portion of the Sedgwick's division, which was half concealed by the other two. The remainder of this division had not yet left Frazier's Farm. There was hardly any connection between the different parts of the line which had thus been formed at Glendale; the generals of division were all ignorant of the positions of their neighbors, and found it difficult to maintain communications between them in the midst of the forest. Nor does it appear that any person had assumed the superior command of the troops assembled in the vicinity of this clearing; but they were in sufficient proximity to each other for mutual sup-

port, should the din of battle reveal the presence of the enemy at any given point.

On the part of the Confederates, their whole army was preparing to make a desperate effort before McClellan could have time to reach the James. Jackson with his four divisions had only halted for a moment at Savage, and had entered the road which Sumner had taken during the night for the purpose of forcing the passage of White Oak Swamp, in front of Frazier's Farm. Hill and Longstreet, who had left Richmond, were proceeding along the New Market and the Central roads, having sent a few detachments forward on the Charles City road. They were therefore to debouch directly upon Glendale. Magruder, having returned to the rear after his reverse at Savage station, had joined Huger, and following them closely with his united forces was to form the Confederate right in the general attack. Wise's legion, with other troops hitherto posted on the right bank of the James, crossed the river at Drury's Bluff; they were ordered to take position on the extreme right, so as to forestall the Federals if possible in the occupation of Malvern Hill.

Jackson had reached the pass of White Oak Swamp at eleven o'clock in the morning, where he found Franklin firmly posted. The latter, having eight or nine batteries at his command, covered the passage with the fire of his guns. His infantry, just reinforced by a portion of Sedgwick's division, thus consisting of nine brigades, was drawn up a little in the rear. Jackson's forces were far superior in number to those of the Federals; he brought with him his four large divisions, and the eighteen or twenty batteries which he had commanded since the 26th. But the approaches to White Oak Bridge, encompassed on both sides by wooded swamps, rendered it impossible for him to avail himself of this superiority and to bring all his troops into line at once, so that, in spite of his great daring, in spite of the interest he had in acting promptly, he was afraid of venturing with his soldiers into this formidable defile. Seven Confederate batteries were placed in position above the pass with a view of silencing the fire of the Federals

seemed at first to have the worst of it; the two batteries of Hazzard and Mott, which were in the first line, were silenced, nearly all their guns being shattered by the enemy's projectiles. The combat, however, was soon renewed with rifled ten-pounders, which, being able to keep farther back, and almost beyond range of the Confederate artillery in consequence of their light calibre, inflicted upon the latter considerable losses in their turn. Meanwhile, the battalions of infantry of both parties continued under arms, one side ready to commence the attack, the other to repulse it, and both alike exposed to the enemy's projectiles, which were causing cruel ravages in their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Confederates were unable to silence the fire of Franklin's artillery; the cannonading was thus continued during the whole day; and when night came, Jackson had not even made an attempt to force the passage. The losses had been severe on both sides.

The battle of Frazier's Farm was an important success for the Federals; Franklin had succeeded in holding nearly one-half of the Confederate army in check the entire day. In contenting himself with extending his line in a manner which might appear excessive, rather than abandon the passage of White Oak Swamp, McClellan had prevented Lee from uniting his two wings, which were separated by this marsh. He had thus paralyzed Jackson's four divisions at a moment when their presence on another battlefield might have been decisive. In fact, a fierce and sanguinary conflict was taking place on that very day around the Glendale junction, a few kilometres from that spot.

Toward two o'clock in the afternoon a few Confederate detachments, coming by way of the Charles City road, had attacked Slocum, but were easily repulsed. They preceded the troops of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, amounting in all to about eighteen or twenty thousand men, then under command of the latter. A little before three o'clock these two corps debouched upon the Glendale clearings by way of the New Market road, the first on the right, the second on the left of that road, and fell directly upon McCall's division, which, placed in the centre, occupied the most salient point

of the Federal front. McCall had ranged his troops in two lines, Meade on the right, Seymour on the left, with Reynolds' brigade in reserve, while five batteries covered his front. After having prefaced the attack with a shower of shell, the Confederate columns charged their adversaries with great vigor. McCall's small division was reduced to six thousand men by his losses of the preceding days, and for the last four days it had fought more and marched more than any other division in the army of the Potomac; nevertheless, it succeeded in thoroughly repulsing the first onset; Seymour and Meade being each attacked in succession by the enemy, who was endeavoring to find the weak point in the line, defended themselves most energetically, and even took several hundred prisoners.

But at each new attack, the Confederates bring forward fresh troops, and McCall's Pennsylvanians become exhausted. Hill has at length found the open breach between this division and that of Hooker, and availing himself of this discovery endeavors to turn both of them in succession. On the left of the Federal line, Hooker, fiercely attacked, is obliged to bring all his reserves, and a regiment detached from Sumner's corps, to the assistance of Grover, who commands his first brigade. More to the right another charge is made by the Confederates against Seymour's brigade, forming McCall's left wing, and against two German batteries borrowed from the reserve artillery, which cover it. The gunners are put to flight; a great portion of this brigade is thus placed between two fires; it at once becomes disintegrated, and the fugitives are driven back upon Hooker. The latter allows them to pass through his ranks, and receives the pursuing Confederates with a murderous fire. Longstreet's soldiers have not been able to preserve their ranks during the charge, and thus they arrive in disorder. They are stopped short, and two of Hooker's regiments, the First Massachusetts and Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, resuming the offensive, drive them at the point of the bayonet upon McCall's two other brigades, which, having firmly kept their ground, receive them with a well-sustained fire. Sedgwick, in the meantime, has received rein-

forcements; the two brigades which had been detached in the morning to support Franklin at Frazier's Farm have been sent back to that general, as soon as he has found himself strong enough to defend the pass without them. These troops, still fresh, arrive at Glendale, and proceed to occupy the space left open in the Federal line by Seymour's brigade, which is entirely disorganized. The battle is re-established, although some little ground has been lost. The enemy, however, constantly renews his attacks, and he turns from the line occupied by Hooker and Sedgwick, to direct his main efforts against McCall's right and Kearny's left, at the other extremity of the Federal positions. Kearney is supported by Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division, which had long been under his own command. The sight of their old chief infuses additional ardor into the four New Jersey regiments comprising it, and this timely reinforcement enables him to hold his position. But McCall's right, consisting of Meade's brigade, is again engaged in an unequal and murderous struggle. Many are the attacks it has already repulsed, when, toward six o'clock, the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Virginia make a desperate charge upon Randol's regular battery, posted alongside of Meade, which, up to this time, has resisted every assault. The Virginians, carrying the musket in one hand, and drawn up in the form of a wedge, rush forward at a run across the open space of six hundred metres which separates them from the Federal guns. Nothing can withstand them; although decimated by grape and musketry, they are not staggered. They reach the goal at last; the gunners are killed, the cannon captured, and Meade's brigade is obliged to fall back. It however continues to fight with uncommon obstinacy; at seven o'clock a new charge results in the capture of Cooper's battery, in the centre of McCall's line. But the Ninth Pennsylvania charges back in return, and, after a fierce engagement, recaptures the guns. The enemy at the same time abandons those taken from Randol, which he has not been able to carry off.

It is near sunset, and the contest becomes less animated. The two magnificent divisions of Hill and Longstreet have

been lavish of their efforts; there is not a man left in reserve. Magruder, who should long since have been on the field of battle, has not yet made his appearance. Jackson's cannon is still thundering in the direction of White Oak Swamp, but he has made no progress since morning—a bad sign for the Confederates. No intelligence can be obtained of him, because in order to reach him it would be necessary to go round the whole swamp and through the suburbs of Richmond, a distance of from forty to fifty kilometres. The Confederate army, divided into two parts by this obstacle, is rendered powerless. The Federals have had but fifteen or eighteen thousand men engaged at Glendale against the twenty thousand who have attacked them; but the remainder of the divisions of Hooker, Sedgwick and Slocum are within reach, ready to sustain them, and the Confederates have not failed to perceive, toward the close of the battle, that they have been dealing with troops who felt sure of support. They relinquished the attack; and believing these troops to be even more numerous than they really are, they abandon the greater portion of the ground they have just conquered, in order to disengage themselves. General Lee was on the field of battle, and had brought with him President Davis; for it was hoped in Richmond that this day, the 30th, would complete the destruction of the army of the Potomac. How grieved Lee must have felt at having lost so much time on the 28th, when he saw two of these divisions struggling alone in fruitless efforts against the vital point of the enemy's line; how bitterly he must have regretted having caused Jackson to waste the whole of the 29th, by uselessly detaining him in front of the ruined bridges of the Chickahominy, and by having finally placed him with four divisions, on the 30th, between two swamps, before a defile which a few guns had prevented him from crossing! His mistake as to McClellan's real design had compromised the most brilliant results of his victory at Gaines' Mill. Far from rectifying this error, he had made matters worse when, on being informed of the march of the Federals toward the James, he had directed one-half of his army into the blind alley of Frazier's Farm.

It is difficult to account for this blunder on the part of so skillfull a general, except by attributing it to his ignorance of the country occupied by his adversary. If he had brought back Jackson to Richmond on the 29th, leaving Magruder to follow Sumner alone, he would have been able on the 30th to place three-fourths of his army in line between White Oak Swamp and the James.

An engagement of secondary importance had taken place on the banks of this river, while the battles of Frazier's Farm and Glendale were being fought. Wise's legion had come down the James for the purpose of forestalling if possible the Federals at Turkey Bend. In order to do this it had to go completely round the foot of Malvern Hill. Before reaching this point it ran against Porter's corps, which, as we have said, was posted upon the slopes of the hill extending to the flat wooded lands which separate it from the James. The Confederates attacked it from that side, but with the lack of spirit felt by troops who do not anticipate meeting the enemy; and despite the protection afforded them by the thick underwood, they were easily repulsed by Warren's brigade. At the same time they engaged in an artillery fight with Porter's batteries posted on the summit of the hill, and for a moment threw the march of the Federal train into confusion. A few gun-boats, under Commodore Rodgers, were waiting for the army at Haxall's Landing; one of them, the Galena, had just taken General McClellan on board, who desired to make a reconnaissance up the river, when Wise's attack commenced. Rodgers immediately threw a few of Parrott's hundred-pound shells in the direction in which the enemy's reserves were supposed to be. These missiles, fired at random, could not do much harm to troops scattered about the forest; but the strange noise which announced their passage, and finally the violence of their explosion produced a deep impression upon the Confederates. The Federals, on the contrary, who heard from a distance the heavy and powerful voice of the naval guns, hailed it as that of an auxiliary impatiently expected.

It was time for them to reach the banks of the James.

During the whole of the 30th, notwithstanding the oppor tune discovery of a new road, as above mentioned, the train had proceeded very slowly and with much difficulty. The booming of cannon, resounding along so many points of the line, had more than once spread senseless alarms among the drivers of this long column. The larger part of reserve and siege artillery, and the batteries detached from the several corps which McClellan had ordered to Malvern Hill to fortify that position, found great difficulty in advancing. All the farmhouses, all the huts, were converted into hospitals, where the victims of the battles of Savage station, Frazier's Farm and Glendale were huddled. There was scarcely a sufficient number of surgeons to attend to their most pressing wants; and most of the wounded felt the painful certainty of being left at night in the hands of the enemy. The stifling heat of a Virginia summer, the want of sleep, the long marches, the combats incessantly renewed, the excitements and the anxieties of every description, triumphed over the most robust constitutions, and prostrated those whom the terrible swamp-fever had yet spared. Night marches had also singularly contributed to diminish the effective force of the several corps, and to increase the number of stragglers. Many soldiers became lost in the obscurity, and, being unable to find their regiments, at daylight rejoined the invalid column, which extended the whole length of the train. Frequently without haversacks, but always armed and well provided with ammunition, they moved along in groups of from three to twenty; and finding themselves freed from all official authority, they soon resumed the independence natural to their character. The sick, the lame and the crippled increased in a frightful proportion. Finally, what was a still greater cause of the privations of the soldier in the midst of these incessant engagements, the distribution of rations could not be made with any regularity. In proportion as this crowd, composed of so many different elements, perceived from afar across the verdure the waters of the James, the smooth surface of which sparkled under a burning sun, but one idea pervaded it, one common ardor gave strength to these worn-

out men. They rushed toward the river to refresh themselves, to make sure that they were not the sport of some delusive mirage, to take a nearer view, and to touch, if they could have done so, those gunboats whose assistance was to put an end to their dangers and sufferings; and finally, to hail the national flag, which, floating gently in the breeze, reflected its constellated azure in the waters. To witness their eagerness one would have said that the James was to them the river of oblivion, to which, the poet tells us, the shades repair in crowds in search of sovereign remedy against all their sufferings.

The sight of their comrades under arms, however, military honor, the exhortations of the officers who had been detailed to reorganize them, soon restored strength to the most disheartened, and in a short time improvised companies and battalions, inspired with fresh ardor; might be seen falling into line behind the well-trained soldiers of Porter.

To sum up the account, the operations of the 30th had secured to the Federals all the advantages which those of the 29th had led them to expect. Placed as it were back to back and able to support each other mutual, their rear-guard on one side, and their centre on the other, had repulsed all the attacks of the enemy. Franklin, resting his left upon impracticable swamps, had held in check with eighteen thousand men an army of more than thirty-six thousand, commanded by the redoubtable Jackson, whilst Slocum, extending his right as far as these same swamps, occupied the extremity of the other line, which at Glendale covered the roads followed by the entire army. These two lines formed thus an acute angle, the vertex of which, posted on the southern bank of White Oak Swamp, was protected by this insurmountable obstacle, and entirely separated the two wings of the assailants. If Jackson had succeeded in pushing his way beyond Frazier's Farm, he would have taken the Federal combatants at Glendale in rear and crushed them between two fires. If, on the other hand, Hill had been able to penetrate as far as the Quaker road, he would

have cut the Federal army in two and secured the destruction of one-half that army.

The battle of Glendale, therefore, was remarkable for its fierceness among all those that have drenched the American forests in blood. Nothing could have been more serious than the game which was played in the clearing only the day before, unknown to the staffs of both armies. If the number of trophies had constituted the only evidence of success, although the Confederates left a few in the hands of their opponents, all the advantage would have been on their side. They had made many more prisoners than they had lost, and in the course of the evening their outposts had picked up General McCall, who had lost his way in the woods. They had captured eight or ten guns from the Federals, while the latter only carried off four flags, to which must be added two pieces of artillery which Wise had left at Malvern in Porter's hands. But the Federals had reason to consider themselves fortunate in not having paid dearer for the results they had obtained by their tenacity in that battle; their retreat was thereby assured, and the delicate operation of a change of base might be considered an accomplished fact. Indeed, by four o'clock in the afternoon on the 30th, the last wagons had reached Malvern Hill. Before sunset the entire train was encamped in the vast clearing at Haxall's doubled upon itself, and protected against all attacks by the position of Malvern Hill, while the numerous field and siege guns which had accompanied the train were painfully climbing the height which they were about to render impregnable.

All the ambulances were in safety; only about one hundred wagons failed to appear at the muster, to which trifling number must be added one cannon abandoned in a quagmire, four or five guns lost by McCall at Glendale, and as many dismounted pieces which Franklin was obliged to leave at Frazier's Farm. Four thousand wagons, four or five hundred ambulances, three hundred and fifty field-pieces, fifty siege guns and two thousand five hundred head of cattle had thus followed a single road, a mere woodland path, constantly occupied by troops on the march, or obstructed

either by infantry or cavalry, amid the din of battle, which was heard simultaneously in front, in the rear and on the flank, and had travelled a distance of more than thirty kilometres in forty-eight hours. General McClellan had good cause to consider such a march as an almost unlooked-for success, and the manner in which it was conducted was highly creditable to the administrative departments of the Federal army.

Nevertheless, although this army had fortunately escaped from a perilous situation, it could not remain in the positions which it occupied from Frazier's Farm to Haxall's Landing. Not only was it necessary that it should be concentrated for purposes of defence, provisions and rest, but it was also compelled by the configuration of the course of the James to leave Haxall's Landing, and look for a more favorable point for revictualling lower down. In fact, the James River becomes so narrow above its confluence with the Appomattox at City Point, that vessels going up to Haxall's would have been constantly exposed to the fire of batteries erected by the enemy on the right bank of the river; consequently, Commodore Rodgers, at his first interview with McClellan, had recommended Harrison's Landing as the most favorable point to establish depots for the army. It was here, therefore, that its march was to terminate, for it could not think of remaining on White Oak Swamp, or even at Malvern, receiving its supplies by land from Harrison's Landing; it would have been starved in a very few days.

Malvern Hill first, then Harrison's Landing, were therefore the two stages in the journey naturally appointed for the army of the Potomac. General McClellan had no intention of defending Frazier's Farm and Glendale, and was waiting for the reports of the generals who had just fought in those positions, to send them the order to fall back. An immediate retreat, however, had become so necessary that they took upon themselves to carry it into effect. Franklin, the most distant, began his movement about ten o'clock in the evening, having previously notified the headquarters of his intention. His neighbors were only apprised of this movement by General Seymour, who, while wandering about

in search of his brigade, from which he had become separated at the time of his rout at Glendale, accidentlly fell in with Franklin's heads of column. There was no longer time to ask for instructions from headquarters at Malvern Hill. Franklin's retreat opened the way for Jackson. Heintzelman and Sumner prepared at once to carry their troops to the borders of the James. In this they only anticipated the orders which McClellan was about to send them. The general-in-chief had no reason to blame his lieutenants for this great eagerness to fall back, for the ignorance in which he remained till evening in regard to their situation, and which occasioned the delay in forwarding the orders for retreat, could only be attributed to the very imperfect organization of the Federal staffs. The necessity of providing for the ulterior movements of his troops justified his remaining on the gun-boats of Rodgers; but his momentary absence had been noticed by soldiers who needed encouragement in the midst of a bloody strife, and also by lieutenants who were already too much inclined to criticism. By not waiting for his tardy instruction, his corps commanders rendered the retreat which had become inevitable more easy of accomplishment. The night march was performed in the best order, and before daybreak the Federal army was concentrated around the approaches of Malvern Hill.

This hill afforded an admirable position. Its summit, two thousand five hundred metres in length by one thousand two hundred in width, formed a level and open plateau. Rising gradually from north to south to the ridge of the acclivity overlooking the James, it presented great facilities for the maneuvering of troops. From north-east to south, at the foot of the barren slopes which terminated the descent, its base was enveloped by the Western Run and thick underwood. To the west wound one of the tributaries of this stream, also surrounded by swampy forests, and quite difficult for artillery to cross. The approaches to Malvern Hill were only easy between these two water-courses. On this side, below the principal hillock, the slopes extended gradually across an open country. The Quaker road, after

joining a crossroad coming from the New Market road, took advantage of these slopes to ascend Malvern Hill, leaving a small wood and the West house on the left, then forked before reaching the summit. The west branch followed the western ridge, passing by the Crewe house, thence descending upon the steep acclivities which look to the south to cross the Western Run at Turkey Bridge. Finally, not far from this bridge it again connected with the direct road from Richmond to Haxall's, which is a continuation of the New Market road, running close to the banks of the James. The east branch skirted the eastern side of Malvern Hill, and after passing the Binford house descended into the woods which overshadow the Western Run, to merge at last into the other branch at Haxall's.

The last Federal troops reached Malvern on the 1st of July at ten o'clock in the morning. Before going on board the Galena to make a reconnaissance, McClellan himself posted these troops upon the ground, which he had examined the day before, giving to their line the form of a vast semi-circle, which extended from the Crewe house to the Binford house, through the wood adjoining the West house. Refusing his extreme right, he had deployed it to the east along the Western Run as far as in front of Haxall's while the extreme left was effectively protected by the impassable mouth of this stream and by the gun-boats presenting their broadside in the James. The army thus guarded all the approaches to Malvern, bringing its two wings close to the banks of the river. It was disposed in the following order, reckoning from left to right: At the extreme left, Sykes guarded the approaches of the direct road from Richmond to Haxall's, having one brigade posted at the foot of Malvern, near Turkey Bridge, and the other two on the slopes of the hill; Morell was on his right, beyond the Crewe house; together they formed Porter's corps. Couch's division, which had been detached from this corps, was placed by McClellan immediately after it. It was deployed midway between the summit of Malvern Hill and the woods bordering its base, its right resting upon a deep and wooded ravine. This ravine, which extended almost as far as the West

house, marked the boundary of what was properly called Malvern Hill, separating the Federal left from the centre. This centre was formed by Heintzelman's corps, extending from the ravine to the wood of West, the skirt of which he occupied; his forces lay across the Quaker road, Kearny on the left and Hooker on the right. Between Hooker and the Binford house the line was prolonged by Sumner's corps—first Sedgwick, then Richardson, on his right. Farther on, the course of Western Run was guarded by the divisions of Smith and Slocum, composing Franklin's corps. Finally, the bridge of Carter's Mill spanning this stream and the approaches to Haxall's, where a large number of roads converged, were entrusted to Keyes, with Peck's division, who thus found himself facing eastward, with his back turned toward that of Sykes. There was every indication that the efforts of the Confederates would be directed against the Federal left. In fact, they could only approach the army of the Potomac by two roads—that from Richmond to Haxall's and the Quaker road, which, fortunately for the Federals, led to that part of their positions easiest to defend. It was this side, therefore, that McClellan took particular care to fortify. The division of Pennsylvania Reserves, which McCall had commanded till the battle of Glendale, where he was taken prisoner, was placed in rear of Porter. Although this small band had been terribly decimated, it was yet ready to make a gallant fight. The general-in-chief gave, moreover, a powerful reinforcement of artillery to his left wing. For the first time since the beginning of the campaign, the ground was admirably adapted to the employment of this army; and the foresight with which McClellan had organized a reserve of more than one hundred cannon, the constant care he had shown in attending to its requirements, and the energy he had displayed in preserving it intact during the retreat, in spite of its weight and the many dangers to which it had been exposed, were at last to be abundantly rewarded on this evening of July 1st. The reserve batteries were massed on the left and centre of the Federal lines under the direction of Colonel Hunt, an officer of the highest merit. They were placed wherever a favor-

able position could be found, and more than sixty pieces were so disposed as to cover with their converging fire every point of Porter's line. Finally the heavy siege guns having reached Haxall's, thanks to the unremitting zeal of Colonel Tyler, who had left but one behind during the retreat, ten of them were hauled up to near the Crewe house, whence they could, by firing over the friendly lines, reach the assailants if they should venture upon the slopes of Malvern Hill.

It was evident that the Confederates intended to try a last attack upon the army of the Potomac. On the evening of the 30th their situation was much less favorable than it had been three days before. The army which they thought, after the battle of Gaines' Mill, they held shut up within a network of iron, had escaped them with all its materiel, leaving in their hands only some wounded men, a few thousand prisoners and broken cannon. All their efforts to crush it had failed, and it had finally found a position on the James whence it could, at the first opportunity, undertake operations much more dangerous to Richmond than those which had been prevented at so great a sacrifice. On the other hand, the Confederate army was at the end of its resources. Forced marches and counter-marches, only interrupted by frequent and bloody combats, had greatly attenuated its ranks, and the number of men it was able to bring into line before Malvern Hill on the 1st of July was much inferior to the force with which it had commenced its movement six days before. The woods were filled with its wounded, sick and stragglers. The two corps of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had suffered so severely at Glendale, that a day's rest was absolutely indispensable to them, and they had to be relieved during the night by those of Huger and Magruder.

The retreat of the Federals, however, had at last enabled Lee to bring the two wings of his army together. Although this concentration was effected somewhat tardily, he could not fail to take advantage of it to attack his adversary, who was equally exhausted, before the latter should have time to establish himself in an entrenched position.

At break of day Jackson crossed the White Oak Swamp, and soon reached the battle-field of Glendale. He received an order to continue to follow the enemy by the Quaker road, while Magruder and Huger were to file to his right by forest paths, to gain the road to Haxall's and come up to attack McClellan's left wing. Longstreet and Hill, being held in reserve, followed in the rear of Jackson, and came to take position on his left, at a considerable distance from the field of battle, which they did not leave during the whole day. Before crossing the Western Run at the Quaker road fork, and appearing in front of the first slopes of Malvern, Jackson left his old division, with two of Ewell's brigades, in the woods near Willis' Church, and moved forward with the remainder, Ewell's third brigade in the centre, Whiting's division on the left, and D. H. Hill on the right. The latter, deploying between the road and the tributary of the Western Run, followed the course of this stream by partly extending his line into the adjoining woods. Having reached the point where this stream connects with the ravine which separated McClellan's centre from his left, the Confederate general sent, beyond the ravine, Anderson's brigade, which thus debouched upon the right of Couch's division, formed by Howe's brigade. It was three o'clock. Whilst the artillery of Whiting and Ewell was cannonading the Federal centre, Anderson, supported by the fire of two batteries, vigorously attacked the Federals, but in vain. Howe had been waiting for the Confederates at a short distance. The latter, being received by a terrific fire, halted, when a charge of the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania completed their repulse on one side, while on the other the Thirty-sixth New York carried off the flags of the Fourteenth North Carolina. The Lafayette Guards, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thouret, fully sustained the reputation they had already acquired at Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, and Couch took advantage of this success to rectify his line by advancing about eight hundred metres. The attack of the Confederates was not renewed. Lee had sent an order to his generals to wait until the whole army had got into line before resuming the offensive. Armistead's brigade of Huger's division was,

by rushing forward with loud yells, to give the signal for a general assault upon the enemy's positions.

Meantime, the march of Magruder and Hooker was impeded by the woods and swamps they had to cross before reaching the position which had been assigned them. Their artillery especially could scarcely be dragged along. Through some unaccountable neglect on the part of the Confederate staff, no map of this region existed in the army; as we have already stated, no one had foreseen the possibility that the tide of war would flow in that direction. The column therefore proceeded somewhat at random. At last two of Huger's brigades emerged from the woods on Anderson's right. The third, Armistead's, which was to have commenced the attack, followed Magruder. The latter, pushing his heads of column forward as fast as the thick underwood which he had to clear right and left from his path permitted, arrived about four o'clock in front of Porter's positions, and immediately placed Purcell's guns in battery, the only field-pieces that had been able to follow him. But the Confederate artillerists have scarcely shown themselves when they are crushed by the fire from Porter's powerful guns. Despite their stubbornness, their pieces are speedily dismounted or reduced to silence. Another battery, called the Letcher Artillery, which has come up to their assistance, has also most of its cannoneers killed or wounded in a short space of time. Magruder, whom no obstacle can dismay, thinks he can rescue this battery by making his soldiers charge some of the Federal guns posted nearest to his point of attack. This task is entrusted to one regiment, which rushes up bravely to the assault within one hundred and fifty metres of the enemy's guns; but the latter reply by such a shower of grape that the Confederates recoil in disorder, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded. A second and a third charge, also made by a single regiment at a time, are followed by the same result. The fire of the artillery is supported by the volleys of musketry from Porter's troops. No direct orders, no general command, control the movements of the Confederate army. Stuart, carried away first toward the White House by the greed for plunder, then into the

peninsula in the vain hope of overtaking Stoneman, has not yet rejoined Lee, and it may be said that with him the eyes of the Confederate army are absent. Whiting on the left, D. H. Hill in the centre, Magruder and Huger on the right, afford each other no mutual support, there being no communication between them, nor any instructions from Lee to enable them to act in concert. After having given to the different corps, as a signal of attack, an indication entirely insufficient, the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army seems to have ceased to preside over the movements of these corps, which are, as it were, lost in the midst of the forest. The Federals, on the contrary, from the heights of Malvern Hill, can perceive all these movements at a glance, and their central position enables them at all times rapidly to mass men and cannon upon the point most menaced. Their view extends even so far that McClellan can see the columns of Longstreet and A. P. Hill as they proceed to take position in the rear of the left of Jackson; and being anxious about his right flank, which is not so well protected by nature, he retains a considerable force there for a considerable time. We have seen that Magruder, not having all his troops in line, was unwilling to push the battle to the extreme; but he had sustained useless losses by risking a few batteries first, then three regiments one after the other. This valiant soldier had been exasperated by reproaches which had been cast upon him the day before for not having reached Glendale in time, so that he had sworn, it is said, to lead his soldiers directly up to the enemy the first time he should encounter him, and it is to this motive that his bloody attacks, so imprudently renewed, must be attributed.

Meanwhile, the sound of the battle, which was being fought on the extreme right of the Confederates, did not reach the rest of their line, being intercepted by the density of the forest, and undoubtedly also by the wind, which had suddenly changed—an unreliable messenger, upon which Lee had reposed too much confidence. As we have said, Armistead's brigade, which was to have given the signal for the attack, having followed Magruder instead of pro-

ceeding with the remainder of Huger's division, found itself placed in a portion of the line where it could not longer play the important part which had been assigned to it. But toward six o'clock D. H. Hill, who had been patiently waiting for the signal agreed upon, thought that he had heard it at last. He distinctly recognized the sound of sharp musketry mingled with hurrahs, and did not wait for anything more to put his division in motion. He was probably deceived by the distant echo of one of the last partial charges attempted by Magruder, the first having been made an hour before. Such was the utter want of communications between the different generals that Hill remained in ignorance of the fact, not only during the whole battle, but even for some days after, then he wrote his report, that Magruder had really attacked the enemy before himself, and sustained a combat much longer than his own. When he put his division in motion, believing the whole army to be engaged, his neighbors on the right and left, having heard nothing, remained motionless in their turn; and even after the battle had commenced they do not appear to have received any order to support him. If we make this assertion with some reservation, it is because the Confederate reports, from that of the general-in-chief to those of simple colonels, are so vague, so confused and contradictory in all that concerns the hour, that it is almost impossible to arrive at any positive conclusion as to the share of responsibility for the check resting upon each. However that may be, Hill advanced alone against the Federal positions. After Anderson's first attack he had borne toward his right, Lee having indicated the enemy's left as the point upon which all the efforts of his army were to be concentrated. He had therefore before him Morell's right, Couch's division, reinforced by Caldwell's brigade, which had been temporarily detached from Richardson, and finally the left of Kearny. The woods skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the Confederates; but as soon as they passed beyond the edge of the forest they were received by a fire from all the batteries at once, some posted on the summit of the hill, others ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry. The latter

joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill's first line had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on the reserves. While it was re-forming new battalions marched up to the assault in their turn. The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill's soldiers.

They try to pierce the line sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny's left first, and Couch's right, formed by Caldwell's and Howe's brigades, and afterward throwing themselves upon the left of Couch's division. But here also, after having nearly reached the Federal positions, they are repulsed. The conflict is carried on with great fierceness on both sides, and for a moment it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very centre of their adversaries, and of the formidable artillery which but now was dealing destruction in their ranks. But Sumner, who commands on the right, seeing no likelihood of any attack on that side, detaches Sickles' and Meagher's brigades successively to Couch's assistance. During this time Whiting on the left, and Huger on the right, suffer Hill's soldiers to become exhausted, without supporting them. Neither Lee nor Jackson has sent the slightest order, and the din of the battle which is going on in their immediate vicinity has not sufficed to make them march against the enemy. Jackson, however, feels at last the necessity of reinforcing Hill and aiding him in the desperate attack he has undertaken. Taking upon himself the management of the battle on this side, and directing in person those bloody but fruitless assaults, he calls up in great haste from Willis' church his reserve, consisting of his old division and that of Ewell. But these troops are far off; and notwithstanding their alacrity, they cannot arrive until after sunset. At seven o'clock Hill reorganized the debris of his troops in the woods. He had no longer the means for essaying a new attack; his tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses.

He complained bitterly of having been sacrificed and abandoned by his colleagues; yet he had not been so entirely isolated as he imagined, for more to the right Ma-

gruder had been engaged at the same time as himself, and under circumstances equally unfavorable, in a struggle which was to have an issue not less fatal. Recognizing the uselessness of his former attacks, he has ceased fighting in order to wait for the arrival of his artillery, which he left behind during his march a few hours before, and to which he sends orders to sacrifice everything in order to join him in time. He depends upon the fire of his rifled guns, about thirty in number, to silence the batteries which protect Porter's line, and to enable him to charge at the point of the bayonet. But it is near six o'clock. Day declines, and the artillery does not arrive. Perhaps the fiery Magruder has also heard the distant sound of the battle in which Hill was then engaged. Without waiting for his cannon any longer, he orders his fine division to attack the formidable positions occupied by the Federals. He points out to them as the aim of their efforts the Crewe house, around which a large portion of McClellan's reserve artillery is concentrated. This is, in fact, the key to the whole position. Before they can reach the Federal lines which cover it, the assailants have to cross six hundred metres of a rather steep slope, which does not afford the least shelter. Magruder's first brigade has scarcely appeared in sight when it is exposed to a terrible artillery fire. Still the Confederates continue to advance; but the Federal infantry, which has been waiting for them within a short distance without firing, receives them with a murderous discharge, and taking advantage of the confusion thrown into their ranks to assume the offensive, drives them back upon the slopes which they have ascended with so much difficulty. Magruder, not considering himself beaten, brings all his brigades successively into action, and Huger rouses himself at last from his long inaction to participate in the battle. But the Confederate generals, by dividing their efforts, have lost all chances of success. A charge en masse of one or two entire divisions could alone have compensated for their inferior artillery, and while it would have involved the sacrifice of fewer men than they had lost in detail, they might perhaps have thus succeeded in reaching and surrounding

the Federal batteries. As soon as Porter understands the tactics of his opponent he husbands his resources. His infantry and artillery consume an enormous quantity of ammunition, but their losses are insignificant, for the enemy has never been able to make a stand sufficiently near them to engage in a regular musketry fight. Each time that an attacking column stops to fire it is immediately driven back. Whenever one of his regiments or one of his batteries has exhausted its ammunition, Porter replaces them with others, sending the former to the second line to fill their cartridge-boxes or their caissons. In this manner he keeps up the fight, exposing only a portion of his troops, and keeping the remainder massed in case the enemy should attempt a general assault with all his forces.

It is already near seven o'clock. Magruder, Huger, and D. H. Hill—that is to say, the whole Confederate right—have successively taken part in the struggle. But Whiting remains inactive, and limits himself to the exchange of a few cannon-shots with the enemy from a distance; Ewell and Jackson's old division cannot arrive on time; Magruder's artillery has not made its appearance, nor have Longstreet and A. P. Hill been brought forward. Even where the battle is raging with the greatest violence, Lee, as we have seen, has not succeeded in preserving concert of action. The attacks are made by each general individually, without any understanding with his neighbors; consequently, they have all the same issue. More than once the Federal lines seemed on the point of being charged and broken, so great is the impetuosity of the assailants; but at the last moment, the latter are always checked and compelled to redescend those fatal slopes, already covered with the dead bodies of their comrades. The last rays of the setting sun, gilding the tree-tops and the smoky heights of Malvern light up this bloody scene. In the centre D. H. Hill has given up the contest, but Magruder, loth to resign himself to this cruel reverse, persists in continuing the fight. It is only toward nine o'clock that the booming of cannon gradually dies away along the entire line, and the

silence of the night succeeds at last, unbroken, to the noise of battle.

This time the Confederates had experienced a defeat unmitigated by any compensation. The great effort they have made to repair the errors committed on the preceding days had signally failed. Their divisions, exhausted and diminished by six days' marching and fighting, had been led to the assault of formidable positions without order or unity of action, and had paid dearly for the confidence of their generals—a confidence which, since the victory of Gaines' Mill, had become positive presumption. Their losses were enormous and out of all proportion to those they had inflicted upon their adversaries. So useless a sacrifice of life troubled and discouraged them. Magruder's corps was partially destroyed; those of D. H. Hill and Huger had suffered cruelly; those of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had not yet recovered from the effects of the battle of Glendale. The troops of Whiting, Ewell and Jackson would no doubt have been in a condition to renew the contest on the following day, but the struggle was virtually at an end. It was one of those facts which impress themselves upon the strongest minds. Up to this time the Confederate army had labored under the conviction that the capitulation of McClellan and all his troops would be the inevitable result of the campaign. The soldier, unable to judge of the combined movements of the Federals, had seen nothing but success in all his encounters with them, and believed that as great advantages had been obtained at Frazier's Farm and Glendale as at Gaines' Mill; consequently, when on the evening of the 1st of July he found himself repulsed at all points by those very men whom he had supposed to be in full flight, discouragement took the place of the assurance which until then had imparted so much strength. The men still fit for service set themselves to numbering those present and those that were absent—the killed, the wounded, the sick and the stragglers; the latter were in frightful numbers. If Lee had desired at this moment to lead his army once more to the charge, he would not have been followed. He had to remain contented with the results obtained—re-

sults, indeed, of sufficient importance to satisfy any rational mind that had not been lulled into illusions. Lee could show, as substantial evidences of his success, fifty pieces of cannon—most of them damaged, it is true—which his soldiers had captured at the point of the bayonet or picked up on the field of battle, a considerable number of wagons, a large number of muskets, accoutrements of every description, provisions, tents, ammunition, together with six thousand prisoners, one-half of them wounded, and among them several generals. In a strategic point of view, the results were still more considerable. McClellan, who may be said to have been laying siege to Richmond, had been violently interrupted in that siege, conquered in open field, and compelled to undertake a perilous retreat in order to find a new base of operations at a much greater distance from the aim of all his efforts. He had sustained considerable losses, for the material which the enemy had taken from him was nothing compared with what he himself had been obliged to destroy. The wounded who had followed the army were far more numerous than those who had remained behind. No one as yet counted the dead, who might be reckoned at many thousands. Finally, the thought that a campaign, undertaken with so much perseverance had ended in a disaster, depressed the courage of every one, from the general-in-chief to the simple soldier.

The Federals, however, had achieved on the borders of the James the victory which had been denied them on the Chickahominy. If the first part of this short but sanguinary campaign was illustrated by the battle of Gaines' Mill, the second was by that of Malvern Hill. The enemy, therefore, could not compel them to fall back farther. But the motives which had decided McClellan to select a position below City Point for his army still existed; the vicinity of the right bank would always have rendered it difficult to provision Malvern Hill. The general-in-chief, therefore, adhered to the order issued before the battle, directing the evacuation of this position during the night of the 1st and 2d of July. The place he had designated as the quarters for the army near his new base was Harrison's Landing,

formerly the property of President Harrison, situated twelve kilometres lower down in a direct line. Whilst the convoy, which had resumed its march since the evening of the 30th, was approaching the Harrison plantation by roads which, at times, had to be cleared with the axe, and was fast covering all the spaces surrounding the improvised wharves along the river, the greater part of the army was slowly falling back by way of Haxall's. Porter, who was the last to leave, covering its march with a regiment of cavalry and the brigade of regulars, only reached this point on the morning of the 2d. At Haxall's he passed Peck's division, which, after having prepared the road to Harrison, formed the rear-guard of the whole army, under the chief command of General Keyes, who had several regiments of cavalry to protect this march. The heat of the preceding days had been followed by torrents of rain; and if it proved an obstacle to the pursuit which the Confederates might have wished to attempt, it also impeded the movement of the wagons. Nevertheless, they continued their course over two roads without any difficulty, before the enemy was able to disturb them; and when he finally made his appearance, he no longer found anything to pick up on the track of the Federals. He did not venture to attack them, while Stuart, who had followed Keyes with several batteries of horse artillery, contented himself with sending after him a few harmless cannon-shots.

The army of the Potomac was to find at Harrison's Landing the repose it absolutely needed. The retreat from Malvern Hill was effected without any trouble; but precisely, perhaps, because they were no longer stimulated by the presence of the enemy, the soldiers gave way more rapidly to physical exhaustion than before. This last night march, following so many other fatigues, transcended the powers of endurance of most of them; when the columns, more and more stretched out and reduced, reached the encampments which had been assigned to them, Nature asserted her rights, and the need of rest overcame every other consideration. Fortunately, but few troops were required to cover the position which was naturally very strong. The army was

massed between the James and a deep marshy water-course called Herring Creek. The approaches to the peninsula, thus formed by the river and the stream, were speedily protected by a considerable abatis and field-works. A fleet of transports soon came to cast anchor in front of the army, and a few hours later the wagons were carrying rations to all the divisions of the army. The functions of the quartermaster's department, under the superintendence of Colonel Ingalls, were admirably performed. The army was soon rested and organized; the sight of a few reinforcements sent from Fortress Monroe had produced the best effect upon the spirits of the soldiers, whose imagination magnified their number. The stragglers had all rejoined their regiments, so that an estimate could be formed of the number present. The army of the Potomac, reunited before Richmond June 20th, had an effective force of one hundred and four thousand seven hundred and twenty-four men fit for service, and eleven thousand two hundred and eighty-nine sick or unable to perform any kind of service. On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely fifty thousand men in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps commanders made their reports, it was found that the net losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to fifteen thousand two hundred and forty-nine men, of whom one thousand five hundred and eighty-two had been killed, seven thousand seven hundred wounded, and five thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all the soldiers who had been left behind on the field of battle, whose fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to this number may be added, without exaggeration, six thousand sick or lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore found himself with about eighty-four thousand men under arms, not counting those who had just joined him.

The losses of Lee's army during the seven days amounted to twenty thousand men, to which number must be added at least five thousand rendered unfit for active service by the same causes which had operated with his

adversaries; this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of twenty-five thousand men.* This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on the 26th of June.

An interlude was to follow this great struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the environs of Richmond. Both sides were gathering their troops together while waiting for a favorable opportunity to renew the contest. In the estimation of those who did not allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far from bad. The material losses he had sustained could be easily repaired. The great danger the army had incurred had excited an extraordinary sensation in the North, which resulted in numerous enlistments; the government felt at last that it could no longer haggle about reinforcements; the soldiers had been trained by their trials, and their chief had displayed qualities which justified the confidence reposed in him. Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across the Chickahominy, far from any water communication.

Such was the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners, did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to be adopted under those grave circumstances.

But before we begin the narrative of the new campaign which was preparing in Virginia, we must retrace our steps to relate the events of which the valley of the Mississippi had been the theatre during the spring of 1862.

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*See the tabular figures of effective strength in Note B, Appendix to this volume. [Omitted—*Ed.*]

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EXTRACTS

FROM

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

VOLUME II

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I

The Peninsular Campaign

By George B. McClellan,
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In the following pages I purpose to give a brief sketch of the Peninsular Campaign of 1862. As it is impossible, within the limits available, to describe even the most important battles, I shall confine myself to strategical considerations. But even this requires a rapid review of the circumstances under which, from a small assemblage of unorganized citizens, utterly ignorant of war and almost of the use of arms, was evolved that mightly Army of the Potomac, which, unshaken alike in victory and defeat, during a long series of arduous campaigns against an army most ably commanded and the equal in heroism of any that ever met the shock of battle, proved itself worthy to bear on its bayonets the honor and fate of the nation.

* * * * * * *

On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisions of infantry, Sykes' brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively few wagons had come. On the same day came a telegram stating that the Department of Virginia was withdrawn from my control, and forbidding me to form the division of ten thousand men without General Wool's sanction. I was thus deprived of the command of the base operations, and the ultimate strength of the army was reduced to 135,000—another serious departure from the plan of campaign. Of the troops disembarked, only four divisions, the regulars, the majority of the reserve artillery, and a part of the cavalry, could be moved, in consequence of the lack of transportation. Casey's division was unable to leave Newport News until the 16th, from the impossibility of supplying it with wagons.

The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least fifteen thousand, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula. It was represented that Yorktown was surrounded by strong earth-works, and that the Warwick River, instead of stretching across the Peninsula to Yorktown,—as proved to be the case,—came down to Lee's Mills from the North, running parallel with and not crossing the road from Newport to Williamsburg. It was also known that there were intrenched positions of more or less strength at Young's Mills, on the Newport News road, and at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, and Ship's Point, on or near the Hampton and Yorktown road, and at Williamsburg (see map, p. 188).

On my arrival at Fort Monroe, I learned, in an interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentially silenced their fire.

I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received that Yorktown was already being reenforced from Norfolk and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival of reenforcements. The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the two roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the unfordable

line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault. Thus all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corps was withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000, including several cavalry regiments withheld from me, diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of of the campaign had been founded, and with which it was intended to operate. The number of men left behind, sick and from other causes incident to such a movement, reduced the total for duty to some 85,000, from which must be deducted all camp, depot, and train guards, escorts, and non-combatants, such as cooks, servants, orderlies, and extra-duty men in the various staff-departments, which reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000.

The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, the latter including Washington. I thus lost all control of the depots at Washington, as I had already been deprived of the control of the base at Fort Monroe and of the ground subsequently occupied by the depot at White House. The only territory remaining under my command was the paltry triangle between the departments of the Rappahannock and Virginia; even that was yet to be won from the enemy. I was thus relieved from the duty of providing for the safety of Washington, and deprived of all control over the troops in that vicinity. Instead of one directing head controlling operations which should have been inseparable, the region from the Alleghanies to the sea was parceled out among four independent commanders.

On the 3d of April, at the very moment of all others when it was most necessary to push recruiting most vigorously, to make good the inevitable losses in battle and by

disease, an order was issued from the War Department discontinuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking up all their recruiting stations. Instead of a regular and permanent system of recruiting, whether by voluntary enlistment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts was thereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the system of forming new regiments. The results were wasteful and pernicious. There were enough, or nearly enough, organizations in the field, and these should have been constantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and constant influx of recruits, who, by association with their veteran comrades, would soon have become efficient. The new regiments required much time to become useful, and endured very heavy and unnecessary losses from disease and in battle owing to the inexperience of the officers and men. A course more in accordance with the best-established military principles and the uniform experience of war would have saved the country millions of treasure and thousands of valuable lives.

Then, on the 5th of April, I found myself with 53,000 men in hand, giving less than 42,000 for battle, after deducting extra-duty men and other non-combatants. In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. I now learned that 85,000 would be the maximum force at my disposal giving only some 67,000 for battle. Of the three divisions yet to join, Casey's reached the front only on the 17th, Richardson's on the 16th, and Hooker's commenced arriving at Ship Point on the 10th. Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time—so far as my knowledge extended—thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege operations. At all events, my personal experience in this kind of work was greater than that of any officer under my command; and after personal reconnaissances more appropriate to a lieutenant of engineers than to the commanding general, I could neither discover nor hear of any point where an assault promised any chance of success. We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's ar-

tillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May, and it was determined to assault at various points the moment the heavy batteries had performed their allotted task; the navy was prepared to participate in the attack as soon as the main batteries were silenced; the Galena, under that most gallant and able officer, John Rodgers, was to take part in the attack, and would undoubtedly have run the batteries at the earliest possible moment; but during the night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions, regarding them as untenable under the impending storm of heavy projectiles.

Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had joined me by water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reenforcements.

The moment the evacuation of Yorktown was known, the order was given for the advance of all the disposable cavalry and horse batteries, supported by infantry divisions, and every possible effort was made to expedite the movement of a column by water upon West Point, to force the evacuation of the lines at Williamsburg, and, if possible, cut off a portion of the enemy's force and trains.

The heavy storms which had prevailed recommenced on the afternoon of the 4th, and not only impeded the advance of troops by land, but delayed the movement by water so much that it was not until the morning of the 7th that the leading division—Franklin's—disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reenforcements. This division was attacked not long after it landed, but easily repulsed the enemy.

Meanwhile the enemy's rear-guard held the Williamsburg lines against our advance, except where Hancock broke through, until the night of the 5th, when they retired.

The army was now divided: a part at the mouth of the Pamunkey, a part at Williamsburg, and a part at Yorktown prepared to ascend the York River. The problem was to reunite them without giving the enemy the opportunity of striking either fraction with his whole force. This was ac-

complished on the 10th, when all the divisions were in communication, and the movement of concentration continued as rapidly as circumstances permitted, so that on the 15th the headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland Landing; Couch and Casey being near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearny near Roper's Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. On the 15th and 16th, in the face of dreadful weather and terrible roads, the divisions of Franklin, Porter, and Smith were advanced to White House, and a depot established. On the 18th the Fifth and Sixth Corps were formed, so that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was now as follows: Second Corps, Sumner—Divisions, Sedgwick and Richardson; Third Corps, Heintzelman—Divisions, Kearny and Hooker; Fourth Corps, Keyes—Divisions, Couch and Casey; Fifth Corps, F. J. Porter—Divisions, Morell and Sykes and the Reserve Artillery; Sixth Corps, Franklin—Divisions, Smith and Slocum.

The cavalry organization remained unchanged, and we were sadly deficient in that important arm, as many of the regiments belonging to the Army of the Potomac were among those which had been retained near Washington.

The question now arose as to the line of operations to be followed: that of the James on the one hand, and, on the other, the line from White House as a base, crossing the upper Chickahominy.

The army was admirably placed for adopting either, and my decision was to take that of the James, operating on either bank as might prove advisable, but always preferring the southern. I had urgently asked for reenforcements to come by water, as they would thus be equally available for either line of operations. The destruction of the Merrimac on the 11th of May had opened the James River to us, and it was only after that date that it became available. My plan, however, was changed by orders from Washington. A telegram of the 18th from the Secretary of War informed me that McDowell would advance from Fredericksburg, and directed me to extend the right of the Army of the Potomac to the north of Richmond, in order to establish communications

with him. The same order required me to supply his troops from our depots at White House. Herein lay the failure of the campaign, as it necessitated the division of the army by the Chickahominy, and caused great delay in constructing practicable bridges across that stream; while if I had been able to cross to the James, reenforcements would have reached me by water rapidly and safely, the army would have been united and in no danger of having its flank turned, or its line of supply interrupted, and the attack could have been much more rapidly pushed.

I now proceeded to do all in my power to insure success on the new line of operations thus imposed upon me. On the 20th of May our light troops reached Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, which they found destroyed. I at once ordered Casey's division to ford the stream and occupy the heights beyond, thus securing a lodgment on the right bank. Heintzelman was moved up in support of Keyes. By the 24th, Mechanicsville was carried, so that the enemy was now all together on the other side of the river. Sumner was near the railroad, on the left bank of the stream; Porter and Franklin were on the same bank near Mechanicsville.

It is now time to give a brief description of the Chickahominy. This river rises some fifteen miles north-westward of Richmond, and unites with the James about forty miles below that city. Our operations were on the part between Meadow and Bottom's bridges, covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. Here the river at its ordinary stage is some forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Within the limits above mentioned the firm ground, above high-water mark, seldom approached the river on either bank, and in no place did the high ground come near the stream on both banks. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of brief duration sufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom-lands for many days rendering the river absolutely impassable without long and strong bridges. When we reached the river it was found that all the bridges, except that at

Mechanicsville, and Meadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, affording the enemy commanding positions for his batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing the rebuilding of important bridges. We were thus obliged to select other less exposed points for our crossings. Should Dowell effect the promised junction, we could turn the headwaters of the Chickahominy, and attack Richmond from the north and north-west, still preserving our line of supply from White House. But with the force actually available such an attempt would expose the army to the loss of its communications and to destruction in detail; for we had an able and savage antagonist, prompt to take advantage of any error on our part. The country furnished no supplies, so that we could not afford a separation from our depots. All the information obtained showed that Richmond was intrenched, that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches from the east, that he intended to dispute every step of our advance, and that his army was numerically superior. Early on the 24th of May I received a telegram from the President, informing me that McDowell would certainly march on the 26th, suggesting that I should detach a force to the right to cut off the retreat of the Confederate force in front of Fredericksburg, and desiring me to march cautiously and safely. On the same day another dispatch came, informing me that, in consequence of Stonewall Jackson's advance down the Shenandoah, the movement of McDowell was suspended. Next day the President again telegraphed that the movement against General Banks seemed so general and connected as to show that the enemy could not intend a very desperate defense of Richmond; that he thought the time was near when I "must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington." I replied that all my information agreed that the mass of the enemy was still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it, and that the object of Jackson's movement was probably to prevent reenforcements being sent to me. On the 26th General Stoneman, with my advanced guard, cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places. On the same day I learned that a very considerable force

of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, to our right and rear, threatening our communications, and in position to reenforce Jackson or oppose McDowell, whose advance was then eight miles south of Fredericksburg. I ordered General F. J. Porter to move next morning to dislodge them. He took with him his own old division, Warren's provisional brigade and Emory's cavalry brigade. His operations in the vicinity of Hanover Court House were entirely successful, and resulted in completely clearing our flank, cutting the railroads in several places, destroying bridges, inflicting a severe loss upon the enemy, and fully opening the way for the advance of McDowell's corps. As there was no indication of its immediate approach, and the position at Hanover Court House was too much exposed to be permanently held, General Porter's command was withdrawn on the evening of the 29th, and returned to its old position with the main army. The campaign had taken its present position in consequence of the assurance that I should be joined by McDowell's corps. As it was now clear that I could not count with certainty upon that force, I had to do the best I could with the means at hand.

The first necessity was to establish secure communications between the two parts of the army, necessarily separated by the Chickahominy. Richmond could be attacked only by troops on the right bank. As the expectation of the advance of McDowell was still held out, and that only by the land route, I could not yet transfer the base to the James, but was obliged to retain it on the Pamunkey, and therefore to keep on the left bank a force sufficient to protect our communications and cover the junction of McDowell. It was still permissible to believe that sufficient attention would be paid to the simplest principle of war to push McDowell rapidly on Jackson's heels, when he made his inevitable return march to join the main Confederate army and attack our right flank. The failure of McDowell to reach me at or before the critical moment was due to the orders he received from Washington. The bridges over the Chickahominy first built were swept away by the floods, and it became necessary to construct others more solid and with

long log approaches, a slow and difficult task, generally carried on by men working in the water and under fire. The work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and on the 30th of May the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes were on the right bank of the Chickahominy, the most advanced positions being somewhat strengthened by intrenchments; Sumner's corps was on the left bank, some six miles above Bottom's Bridge; Porter's and Franklin's corps were on the left bank opposite the enemy's left. During the day and night of the 30th torrents of rain fell, inundating the whole country and threatening the destruction of our bridges.

Well aware of our difficulties, our active enemy, on the 31st of May, made a violent attack upon Casey's division, followed by an equally formidable one on Couch, thus commencing the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. Heintzelman came up in support, and during the afternoon Sumner crossed the river with great difficulty, and rendered such efficient service that the enemy was checked. In the morning his renewed attacks were easily repulsed, and the ground occupied at the beginning of the battle was more than recovered; he had failed in the purpose of the attack. The ground was now so thoroughly soaked by the rain, and the bridges were so much injured, that it was impracticable to pursue the enemy or to move either Porter or Franklin to the support of the other corps on the south bank. Our efforts were at once concentrated upon the restoration of the old and the building of new bridges.

On the 1st of June the Department of Virginia, including Fort Monroe, was placed under my command. On the 2d the Secretary telegraphed that as soon as Jackson was disposed of in the Shenandoah, another large body of troops would be at my service; on the 5th, that he intended sending a part of General McDowell's force as soon as it could return from Front Royal (in the Shenandoah Valley, near Manassas Gap, and about one hundred and fifteen miles north-west of Richmond), probably as many as I wanted; on the 11th, that McCall's force had embarked to join me on the day preceding, and that it was intended to send the residue of General McDowell's force to join me as speedily

as possible, and that it was clear that a strong force was operating with Jackson for the purpose of preventing the forces there from joining me.

On the 26th the Secretary telegraphed that the forces of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont would be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and would operate promptly in my aid by land.

Fortunately for the Army of the Potomac, however, I entertained serious doubts of the aid promised by the land route, so that, on the 18th, I ordered a number of transports with supplies of all kinds, to be sent up the James, under convoy of the gun-boats, so that I might be free to cut loose from the Pamunkey and move over to the James, should circumstances enable me or render it desirable to do so.

The battle of Fair Oaks was followed by storms of great severity, continuing until the 20th of June, and adding vastly to the difficulties of our position, greatly retarding the construction of the bridges and of the defensive works regarded as necessary to cover us in the event of a repulse, and making the ground too difficult for the free movements of troops.

On the 19th Franklin's corps was transferred to the south side of the Chickahominy, Porter's corps, reenforced by McCall's division (which with a few additional regiments, had arrived on the 12th and 13th), being left alone on the north side.

This dangerous distribution was necessary in order to concentrate sufficient force on the south side to attack Richmond with any hope of success; and, as I was still told that McDowell would arrive by the overland route, I could not yet change the base to the James.

It was not until the 25th that the condition of the ground and the completion of the bridges and intrenchments left me free to attack. On that day the first step was taken, in throwing forward the left of our picket-line in face of a strong opposition, to gain ground enough to enable Sumner and Heintzelman to support the attack to be made next day by Franklin on the rear of Old Tavern. The successful issue of this attack would, it was supposed, drive the enemy

from his positions on the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and probably enable us to force him back into his main line of works. We would then be in position to reconnoiter the lines carefully, determine the points of attack, and take up a new base and line of supply if expedient.

During the night of the 24th, information arrived confirming the anticipation that Jackson was moving to attack our right and rear, but I persisted in the operation intended for the 25th, partly to develop the strength of the enemy opposite our left and center, and with the design of attacking Old Tavern on the 26th, if Jackson's advance was so much delayed that Porter's corps would not be endangered.

Late in the afternoon of the 25th, Jackson's advance was confirmed, and it was rendered probable that he would attack next day. All hope of the advance of McDowell's corps in season to be of any service had disappeared; the dangerous position of the army had been faithfully held to the last moment. After deducting the garrisons in rear, the railroad guards, non-combatants, and extra-duty men, there were not more than 75,000 men for battle. The enemy, with a force larger than this, the strong defenses of Richmond close at hand in his rear, was free to strike on either flank. I decided then to carry into effect the long-considered plan of abandoning the Pamunkey and taking up the line of the James.

The necessary orders were given for the defense of the depots at the White House to the last moment and its final destruction and abandonment; it was also ordered that all possible stores should be pushed to the front while communications were open.

The ground to the James had already been reconnoitered with reference to this movement.

During the night of the 26th Porter's siege-guns and wagon-trains were brought over to the south side of the Chickahominy. During the afternoon of that day his corps had been attacked in its position on Beaver Dam Creek, near Mechanicsville, and the enemy repulsed with heavy losses on their part. It was now clear that Jackson's corps had taken little or no part in this attack, and that his blow would

fall farther to the rear. I therefore ordered the Fifth Corps to fall back and take position nearer the bridges, where the flanks would be more secure. This was skillfully effected early on the 27th, and it was decided that this corps should hold its position until night. All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions.*

Shortly after noon on the 27th the attack commenced upon Porter's corps, in his new position near Gaines's Mill, and the contest continued all day with great vigor.

The movements of the enemy were so threatening at many points on our center and left as to indicate the presence of large numbers of troops, and for a long time created great uncertainty as to the real point of his main attack. General Porter's first call for reenforcement and a supply of axes failed to reach me; but, upon receiving a second call, I ordered Slocum's division to cross to his support. The head of the division reached the field at 3:30 and immediately went into action. At about 5 P.M. General Porter reported his position as critical, and the brigades of French

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*Soon after the appearance of General McClellan's article the following letter was received from the daughter of General Heintzelman:

"In '*The Century*' for May, 1885, General McClellan has an article, 'The Peninsular Campaign,' in which there are one or two misstatements in regards to the Third Corps, commanded by General Heintzelman. Fortunately my father's papers, which are in my possession, contain replies to both allegations,—one in the handwriting of General Heintzelman's adjutant-general, and the other the rough draft of a letter addressed to General Lorenzo Thomas, then Adjutant-General of the Army. General McClellan says (see above):

"'All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions.'

"Upon the demand for troops General Heintzelman replied as follows:

"'HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,
"'4 P.M., June 26, 1862.

"'*General Marcy, Chief of Staff*: I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours; that would leave

and Meagher—of Richardson's division—were ordered to reenforce him, although the fearless commander of the Second Corps, General Sumner, thought it hazardous to remove them from his own threatened front. I then ordered the reserve of Heintzelman to move in support of Sumner, and a brigade of Keyes' corps to headquarters for such as might be required. Smith's division, left alone when Slocum crossed to the aid of Porter, was so seriously threatened that I called on Sumner's corps to send a brigade to its support.

French and Meagher reached the field before dusk, just after Porter's corps had been forced by superior numbers to fall back to an interior position nearer the bridges, and, by their steady attitude, checked all further progress of the enemy and completed the attainment of the purpose in view, which was to hold the left bank of the river until dark, so that the movement to the James might be safely commenced. The siege-guns, material, and trains on the left bank were all safe, and the right wing was in close connection with the rest of the army. The losses were heavy, but the object justified them, or rather made them necessary. At about 6 o'clock next morning the rear-guard of

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two (2) brigades available for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance . . .

"'S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
"'*Brigadier-General.*'

"This is far from being a statement that all his forces were required to hold his own lines.

"General McClellan says (see p. 183):

"'Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett's ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P.M.'

"When the same statement was first made in 1863, General Heintzelman wrote the following letter:

"'HEADQUARTERS, DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON,
"'April 11th, 1863.

"'*General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, U.S.A., Washington.*

"'GENERAL: I find in the "*New York Tribune*" of the 8th of April a "Preliminary Report of the Operations of the Army of the

regulars crossed to the south side and the bridges were destroyed.

I now bent all my energies to the transfer of the army to the James, fully realizing the very delicate nature of a flank march, with heavy trains, by a single road, in face of an active enemy, but confident that I had the army well in hand and that it would not fail me in the emergency. I thought that the enemy would not anticipate that movement, but would assume that all my efforts would be directed to cover and regain the old depots; and the event proved the correctness of this supposition. It seemed certain that I could gain one or two days for the movement of the trains, while he remained uncertain as to my intentions, and that was all I required with such troops as those of the Army of the Potomac.

During the night of the 27th, I assembled the corps commanders at headquarters, informed them of my intentions, and gave them their orders. Keyes' corps was ordered to move at once, with its trains, across White Oak Swamp, and occupy positions on the farther side, to cover the passage of the remainder of the army. By noon of the 28th this first step was accomplished. During the 28th Sumner,

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Potomac, since June 25th, 1862," made by General G. B. McClellan . . .

"'In a paragraph commencing "On the 28th Porter's corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp," etc., is the following:

> "'They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned.'

"'I was furnished with a map marked in red with the positions we should occupy.

"'As I had the fortified lines thrown up some time before by the troops in my command, I had no difficulty in knowing where to go, and I did occupy these lines. General Sumner's were more indefinite, and he occupied a position in advance of the one designated. This left a space of half a mile unoccupied between his right and Franklin's left. In the morning I was informed that some rebels were already at or near Dr. Trent's house, where General McClellan's headquarters had been; I sent and found this to be the case. General Franklin had also called at my headquarters and told me that the enemy were repairing the bridges of the Chickahominy, and would soon cross in force. About 1 P.M. I saw some of our troops filing into the fields between Dr. Trent's house and Savage's Station, and a few moments later Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith came to me and reported the enemy approaching, and urged me to ride to

Heintzelman, and Franklin held essentially their old positions; the trains converged steadily to the White Oak Swamp and crossed as rapidly as possible, and during this day and the succeeding night Porter followed the movement of Keyes' corps and took position to support it.

Early on the 28th, when Franklin's corps was drawing in its right to take a more concentrated position, the enemy opened a sharp artillery fire and made at one point a spirited attack with two Georgia regiments, which were repulsed by the two regiments on picket.

Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's were now ordered to abandon their intrenchments, so as to occupy, on the morning of the 29th, a new position in rear, shorter than the old and covering the crossing of the swamp. This new line could easily be held during the day, and these troops were ordered to remain there until dark, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the trains, and then cross the swamp and occupy the positions about to be abandoned by Keyes' and Porter's corps. Meanwhile Slocum's division had been ordered to Savage's Station in reserve, and, during the morning, was ordered across the swamp to relieve Keyes' corps. This was a critical

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General Sumner and get him to fall back and close this gap. I rode briskly to the front, and on the Williamsburg road, where it passed between my two divisions, met General Sumner's troops falling back. He wished me to turn back with him to arrange for ulterior operations, but as my right flank was entirely uncovered by these movements, I declined until after I had seen my division commanders and given them orders how to fall back. On my return there was some difficulty in finding General Sumner, and when found he informed me he had made his arrangements. I returned to my command, and on the way found the ground filled with troops, more than could be used to any advantage, and if the enemy planted a few batteries of artillery on the opposite side of the railroad, they would have been cut in pieces.

"'An aide to General McClellan having reported to me the day before to point out to me a road across the White Oak Swamp, opening from the left flank of my position of the fortified lines, I did not hesitate to retreat by that road, and left at 3 P.M. General Smith, of Franklin's corps, having sent to the rear all his batteries earlier in the day, I, at his request, let him have two of mine (Osborn's and Bramhall's), and they did good service that afternoon in checking and defeating the rebel attack.

"'My remaining would have been no aid to General Sumner, as he already had more troops than he could defile through the narrow road in his rear, and the road I took covered his left flank.

day; for the crossing of the swamp by the trains must be accomplished before its close, and their protection against attack from Richmond must be assured, as well as communication with the gun-boats.

A sharp cavalry skirmish on the Quaker road indicated that the enemy was alive to our movement, and might at any moment strike in force to intercept the march to the James. The difficulty was not at all with the movement of the troops, but with the immense trains that were to be moved virtually by a single road, and required the whole army for their protection. With the exception of the cavalry affair on the Quaker road, we were not troubled during this day south of the swamp, but there was severe fighting north of it. Sumner's corps evacuated their works at daylight and fell back to Allen's farm, nearly two miles west of Savage's Station, Heintzelman being on their left. Here Sumner was furiously attacked three times, but each time drove the enemy back with much loss.

Soon afterward Franklin, having only one division with him, ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the Chickahominy bridges and was advancing on Savage's Station, whereupon he posted his division at that point and informed Sumner, who moved his corps to the same place, arriving a little after noon. About 4 P.M. Sumner and Frank-

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"'Before dark the advance of my corps was across the swamp, and by 10 P.M. the rear was over, with but little molestation from the enemy. I immediately sought General McClellan, and reported to him what I had done, and this is the first intimation I have had that my conduct was not entirely satisfactory.

"'To hold my position till dark, by which time I was to receive orders, would have been impossible. After Generals Franklin and Sumner had fallen back, my right flank and rear were uncovered and by a road which passed entirely in my rear; and beyond my right flank my only line of retreat would have been cut off, and I would have lost my entire corps. I did not know where General McClellan was, and it was, therefore, impossible to report to him for orders.

"'When General Birney reached Fisher's Ford, the enemy were there, but not in force; they soon arrived in force, and he had to take another road more to our left. Had we been a little later they would have been in possession, and our retreat by this road cut off.

"'S. P. HEINTZELMAN.'

"I trust that you will be able to find space for these letters.—MARY L. HEINTZELMAN."

—*Editors.*

lin—three divisions in all—were sharply attacked, mainly by the Williamsburg road; the fighting continued until between 8 and 9 P.M., the enemy being at all times thoroughly repulsed, and finally driven from the field.

Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett's ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M.

Slocum reached the position of Keyes' corps early in the afternoon, and, as soon as the latter was thus relieved, it was ordered forward to the James, near Malvern Hill, which it reached with all its artillery and trains early on the 30th. Porter was ordered to follow this movement and prolong the line of Keyes' corps to our right. The trains were pushed on in rear of these corps and massed under cover of the gun-boats as fast as they reached the James, at Haxall's plantation. As soon as the fighting ceased with the final repulse of the enemy, Sumner and Franklin were ordered to cross the swamp; this was effected during the night, the rear-guard crossing and destroying the bridge at 5 A.M. on the 30th. All the troops and trains were now between the swamp and the James, and the first critical episode of the movement was successfully accomplished.

The various corps were next pushed forward to establish connection with Keyes and Porter, and hold the different roads by which the enemy could advance from Richmond and strike our line of march. I determined to hold the positions now taken until the trains had all reached a place of safety, and then concentrate the army near the James, where it could enjoy a brief rest after the fatiguing battles and marches through which it was passing, and then renew the advance on Richmond.

General Franklin, with Smith's division of his own corps, Richardson's of the Second, and Naglee's brigade were charged with the defense of the White Oak Swamp crossing. Slocum held the ground thence to the Charles City road; Kearny from that road to the Long Bridge

road; McCall on his left; Hooker thence to the Quaker road; Sedgwick at Nelson's farm, in rear of McCall and Kearny. The Fifth Corps was at Malvern Hill, the Fourth at Turkey Bridge. The trains moved on during this day, and at 4 P.M. the last reached Malvern Hill and kept on to Haxall's, so that the most difficult part of the task was accomplished, and it only remained for the troops to hold their ground until nightfall, and then continue the march to the positions selected near Malvern Hill.

The fighting on this day (June 30th) was very severe, and extended along the whole line. It first broke out between 12 and 1, on General Franklin's command, in the shape of a fierce artillery fire, which was kept up through the day and inflicted serious losses. The enemy's infantry made several attempts to cross near the old bridge and below, but was in every case thrown back. Franklin held his position until after dark, and during the night fell back to Malvern. At half-past 2 Slocum's left was attacked in vain on the Charles City road. At about 3 McCall was attacked, and, after 5 o'clock, under the pressure of heavy masses, he was forced back; but Hooker came up from the left, and Sedgwick from the rear, and the two together not only stopped the enemy, but drove him off the field.

At about 4 P.M. heavy attacks commenced on Kearny's left, and three ineffectual assaults were made. The firing continued until after dark. About midnight Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and McCall's division withdrew from the positions they had so gallantly held, and commenced their march to Malvern, which they reached unmolested soon after daybreak. Just after the rear of the trains reached Malvern, about 4 P. M., the enemy attacked Porter's troops, but were promptly shaken off.

Thus, on the morning of July 1st, the army was concentrated at Malvern, with the trains at Haxall's, in rear. The supplies which had been sent from White House on the 18th were at hand in the James.

After consultation with Commodore Rodgers, I decided that Harrison's Landing was a better position for the resting-place of the army, because the channel passed so close

to City Point as to enable the enemy to prevent the passage of transports if we remained at Malvern. It was, however, necessary to accept battle where we were, in order to give ample time for the trains to reach Harrison's, as well as to give the enemy a blow that would check his further pursuit.

Accordingly, the army was carefully posted on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with the right thrown back below Haxall's. The left was the natural point of attack, and there the troops were massed and the reserve artillery placed, while full preparations were made to frustrate any attempt to turn our right. Early in the forenoon the army was concentrated and ready for battle, in a position of unusual strength—one which, with such troops as held it, could justly be regarded as impregnable. It was, then, with perfect confidence that I awaited the impending battle.

The enemy began feeling the position between 9 and 10 A.M., and at 3 P.M. made a sharp attack upon Couch's division, which remained lying on the ground until the enemy were within close range, when they rose and delivered a volley which shattered and drove back their assailants in disorder. At 4 P.M. the firing ceased for a while, and the lull was availed of to rectify the position and make every preparation for the approaching renewal of the attack. It came at 6 P.M., opened by the fire of all their artillery and followed by desperate charges of infantry advancing at a run. They were always repulsed with the infliction of fearful loss, and in several instances our infantry awaited their approach within a few yards, poured in a single volley, and then dashed forward with the bayonet. At 7 P.M. the enemy was accumulating fresh troops, and the brigades of Meagher and Sickles were sent from Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps to reenforce Porter and Couch; fresh batteries were moved forward from the reserve artillery and the ammunition was replenished.

The enemy then repeated his attacks in the most desperate style until dark, but the battle ended with his complete repulse, with very heavy losses, and without his even

for one moment gaining a foothold in our position. His frightful losses were in vain. I doubt whether, in the annals of war, there was ever a more persistent and gallant attack, or a more cool and effective resistance.

Although the result of this bloody battle was a complete victory on our part, it was necessary, for the reasons already given, to continue the movement to Harrison's, whither the trains had been pushed during the night of the 30th of June and the day of the 1st of July. Immediately after the final repulse the orders were given for the withdrawal of the army. The movement was covered by Keyes' corps. So complete was the enemy's discomfiture, and so excellent the conduct of the rear-guard, that the last of the trains reached Harrison's after dark on the 3d, without loss and unmolested by the enemy.

This movement was now successfully accomplished, and the Army of the Potomac was at last in a position on its true line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save those taken in battle, when the artillerists had proved their heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the enemy's infantry were in the midst of them.

During the "Seven Days" the Army of the Potomac consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less than 8 regiments of cavalry, all told. The opposing Confederate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two armies from June 25th to July 2d were:*

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*Tables (to follow) of the "Opposing Forces" of the "Seven Days," made from the fullest revised data of the War Records office, will show that the Army of the Potomac consisted of 150 regiments of infantry; 2 regiments and 1 battalion of engineers; 1 regiment of heavy or siege artillery; 58 batteries; and 10 regiments of cavalry. The Confederate forces consisted of 173 regiments and 12 battalions of infantry; 71 batteries; and 12 regiments of cavalry. General McClellan correctly estimates the Union loss, but the Confederate loss, according to the revised returns, was: killed, 3286; wounded, 15,909; missing, 940, Total, 20,135.—*Editors.*

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Confederate Army	2,823	13,703	3,223	19,749
Army of the Potomac	1,734	8,062	6,053	15,849

The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing.

No praise can be too great for the officers and men who passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every attack made upon them, always in the right place at the right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disciplined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of ammunition and supplies, and reenforcements to fill the gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the banks of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.

ARTILLERY DATA—WAR OF THE REBELLION

Prepared by
COLONEL CONRAD H. LANZA,
Field Artillery

Type of Piece Rifled (Parrott) (wrought iron).	Corresponding Smooth Bore	Length of gun. Inches.	Weight of gun and carriage lbs. approx.	Powder charge lbs. approx.	Caliber inches	Weight of Projectile average lbs.	Maximum range yards.
10 pounder	3 pounder (bronze)	70	890	1	2.90	10	5000
20 pounder	6 pounder (bronze)	70	1750	2	3.67	19	4400
30 pounder (Army)	9 pounder (bronze)	120	4200	3.25	4.20	29	6700
30 pounder (Navy)	9 pounder (bronze)	97	3550	3.25	4.20	29	5000
32 pounder	12 pounder Napoleon (bronze)		4000		4.62	40	4500
100 pounder	32 pounder (cast iron)	130	9700	10	6.40	80	8453
200 pounder	8 inch (cast iron)	136	16500	16	8.00	150	4272
300 pounder	10 inch (cast iron)	?	26000	25	10.00	250	1950
	13 inch (cast iron)	30(?)	22500	15	13.00	300	2000
	20 inch (cast iron)					1080	?

II

Yorktown and Williamsburg

Recollections of a Private—III

By Warren Lee Goss

It was with open-eyed wonder that, as part of McClellan's army, we arrived at Old Point Comfort and gazed upon Fort Monroe, huge and frowning. Negroes were everywhere, and went about their work with an air of importance born of their new-found freedom. These were the "contrabands" for whom General Butler had recently invented that sobriquet. We pitched our tents amid the charred and blackened ruins of what had been the beautiful and aristocratic village of Hampton. The first thing I noticed about the ruins, unaccustomed as I was to Southern architecture was the absence of cellars. The only building left standing of all the village was the massive old Episcopal church. Here Washington had worshipped, and its broad aisles had echoed to the footsteps of armed men during the Revolution. In the church-yard the tombs had been broken open. Many tombstones showed that some one with a greater desire for possessing curiosities than reverence for ancient landmarks had been digging for the corner-stone and its buried mementos.

Along the shore which looks toward Fort Monroe were landed artillery, baggage-wagons, pontoon trains and boats, and the level land back of this was crowded with the tents of the soldiers. Here and there were groups of men frying hard-tack and bacon. Near at hand was the irrepressible army mule, hitched to and eating out of pontoon boats; those who had eaten their ration of grain and hay were trying with their teeth, with promise of success, in eating the boats. An army mule was hungrier than a soldier, and would eat anything, especially a pontoon boat or a rubber blanket. The scene was a busy one. The red cap, white

leggins, and baggy trousers of the Zouaves mingled with the blue uniforms and dark trimmings of the regular infantry-men, the short jackets and yellow trimmings of the cavalry, the red stripes of the artillery, and the dark blue with orange trimmings of the engineers; together with the ragged, many-colored costumes of the black laborers and teamsters, all busy at something.

One morning we broke camp and went marching up the peninsula. The roads were very poor and muddy with recent rains, and were crowded with the indescribable material of the vast army which was slowly creeping through the mud over the flat, wooded country. It was a bright day in April—a perfect Virginia day; the grass was green beneath our feet, the buds of the trees were just unrolling into leaves under the warming sun of spring, and in the woods the birds were singing. The march was at first orderly, but under the unaccustomed burden of heavy equipments and knapsacks, and the warmth of the weather, the men straggled along the roads mingling with the baggage-wagons, ambulances, and pontoon trains, in seeming confusion.

During our second day's march, it rained, and the muddy roads, cut up and kneaded, as it were, by the teams preceding us, left them in a state of semi-liquid filth hardly possible to describe or imagine. When we arrived at Big Bethel the rain was coming down in sheets. A dozen houses of very ordinary character, scattered over an area of a third of a mile, constituted what was called the village. Just outside and west of the town was an insignificant building from which the place takes its name. It did not seem large enough or of sufficient consequence to give name to a hamlet, as small as Big Bethel. Before our arrival it had evidently been occupied as officers' barracks for the enemy, and looked very little like a church.

After leaving Big Bethel we began to feel the weight of our knapsacks. Castaway overcoats, blankets, parade-coats, and shoes were scattered along the route in reckless profusion, being dropped by the overloaded soldiers, as if after plowing the roads with heavy teams they were sowing them for a harvest. I lightened my knapsack without much

regret, for I could not see the wisdom of carrying a blanket or overcoat when I could pick one up almost anywhere along the march. Very likely, the same philosophy actuated those who preceded me or came after. The colored people along our route occupied themselves in picking up this scattered property. They had on their faces a distrustful look, as if uncertain of the tenure of their harvest. The march up the peninsula seemed very slow yet it was impossible to increase our speed, owing to the bad condition of the roads. I learned in time that marching on paper and the actual march made two very different impressions. I can easily understand and excuse our fireside heroes, who fought their or our battles at home over comfortable breakfast-tables, without impediments of any kind to circumscribe their fancied operations; it is so much easier to maneuver and fight large armies around the corner grocery, than to fight, march, and maneuver, in mud and rain, in the face of a brave and vigilant enemy.

The baggage-trains were a notable spectacle. To each baggage wagon were attached four or six mules, driven usually by a colored man, with only one rein, or line, and that line attached to the bit of the near leading mule, while the driver rode in a saddle upon the near wheel mule. Each train was accompanied by a guard, and while the guard urged the drivers the drivers urged the mules. The drivers were usually expert, and understood well the wayward, sportive natures of the creatures over whose destinies they presided. On our way to Yorktown our pontoon and baggage trains were sometimes blocked for miles, and the heaviest trains were often unloaded by the guard to facilitate their removal from the mud. It did seem at times as if there were needless delays with the trains, partly due, no doubt, to fear of danger ahead.

On the afternoon of April 5th, 1862, the advance of our column was brought to a standstill, with the right in front of Yorktown, and the left by the enemy's works at Lee's mille (see page 188). We pitched our camp on Wormley Creek, near the Moore house, on the York River, in sight of the enemy's water-battery and their defensive

works at Gloucester Point. One of the impediments in an immediate attack on Yorktown was the difficulty of using light artillery in the muddy fields in our front, and at that time the topography of the country ahead was but little understood, and had to be learned by reconnaissance in force. We had settled down to the siege of Yorktown; began bridging the streams between us and the enemy, constructing and improving the roads for the rapid transit of supplies, and for the advance. The first parallel was opened about a mile from the enemy's fortifications, extending along the entire front of their works, which reached from the York River on the left to Warwick Creek on the right, along a line about four miles in length. Fourteen batteries and three redoubts were planted, heavily armed with ordnance.

We were near Battery No. 1, not far from the York River. On it were mounted several 200-pounder guns, which commanded the enemy's water-batteries. One day I was in a redoubt on the left, and saw General McClellan with the Prince de Joinville, examining the enemy's works through their field-glasses. They very soon drew the fire of the observant enemy, who opened with one of their heavy guns on the group, sending the first shot howling and hissing over and very close to their heads; another, quickly following, it, struck in the parapet of the redoubt. The French prince, seemingly quite startled, jumped and glanced nervously around, while McClellan quietly knocked the ashes from his cigar.

Several of our war-vessels made their appearance in the York River, and occasionly threw a shot at the enemy's works; but most of them were kept busy at Hampton Roads, watching for the iron-clad Merrimac, which was still afloat. The firing from the enemy's lines was of little consequence, not amounting to over ten or twelve shots each day, a number of these being directed at the huge balloon which went up daily on a tour of inspection, from near General Fitz John Porter's headquarters. One day the balloon broke from its mooring of ropes and sailed majestically over the enemy's works; but fortunately for its occupants it soon met a

counter-current of air which returned it safe to our lines. The month of April was a dreary one, much of the time rainy and uncomfortable. It was a common expectation among us that we were about to end the rebellion. One of my comrades wrote home to his father that we should probably finish up the war in season for him to be at home to teach the village school the following winter; in fact, I believe he partly engaged to teach it. Another wrote to his mother: "We have got them hemmed in on every side, and the only reason they don't run is because they can't." We had at last corduroyed every road and bridged every creek; our guns and mortars were in position; Battery No. 1 had actually opened on the enemy's works, Saturday, May 3d, 1862, and it was expected that our whole line would open on them in the morning. About 2 o'clock of Saturday night, or rather of Sunday morning, while on guard duty, I observed a bright illumination, as if a fire had broken out within the enemy's lines. Several guns were fired from their works during the early morning hours, but soon after daylight of May 6th, it was reported that they had abandoned their works in our front, and we very quickly found the report to be true. As soon as I was relieved from guard duty, I went over on "French leave" to view our enemy's fortifications. They were prodigiously strong. A few tumble-down tents and houses and seventy pieces of heavy ordnance had been abandoned as the price of the enemy's safe retreat.

As soon as it was known that the Confederates had abandoned the works at Yorktown, the commanding general sent the cavalry and horse artillery under Stoneman in pursuit to harass the retreating column. The infantry divisions of Smith (Fourth Corps) and Hooker (Third Corps) were sent forward by two roads to support the right column. General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the Army of the Potomac) was directed to proceed to the front and assume command until McClellan's arrival. Stoneman overtook Johnston's rear-guard about noon, six miles from Williamsburg, and skirmished with the cavalry of Stuart, following sharply until 4 o'clock, when he was confronted

by a line of redoubts before Williamsburg. The works consisted of a large fort (Magruder) at the junction of two roads running from Yorktown to Williamsburg, and small redoubts on each side of this, making an irregular chain of fortifications extending, with the creeks upon which they rested on either flank, across the peninsula. The Confederate brigades of Kershaw and Semmes, of Magruder's command, occupied the works when Stoneman came in front of them, and, on finding his advance stubbornly opposed, Stoneman sent his cavalry upon reconnaissances over the field, and waited for the infantry under Hooker and Smith to come to his support. These divisions marched from Yorktown on parallel roads until Smith's column was halted by a burning bridge, and compelled to turn into the road by which Hooker was advancing. Sumner accompanied Smith's column, and, immediately on the arrival before Williamsburg, formed the brigades of Hancock and Brooks for an advance through a piece of woods which screened the Confederate rifle-pits. The result is given in Sumner's official report as follows:

"After entering the woods I found the underbrush much thicker than I expected, and the lines became entangled, and shortly afterward it became so dark it was impossible to advance, and I ordered the troops to halt and lie on their arms."

General Hooker was delayed on the road so long that he did not reach the field until early on the morning of May 5th, when he found himself on the left of Smith's division, and in front of Fort Magruder. The position of the Union troops then was: Smith on the right, Hooker on the left, confronting the enemy's works, the latter having the heaviest obstacle before him, and the divisions of Kearney, Casey and Couch struggling on toward the front, over crowded, muddy roads. General Sumner says in his report:

"I had a careful reconnaissance made on the left of the enemy's works on the morning of the 5th, and found two of their forts unoccupied. I immediately ordered General Hancock to advance with a brigade and ten pieces of

artillery, and hold those works, it being my intention to force their left."

This was about 11 A.M. Meantime, at 7:30 A.M., General Hooker, on his own responsibility, had advanced his lines. In his official report he says:

"Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition to attack, regardless of their number and position, except to accomplish the result with the least possible sacrifice of life."

Hooker sent forward Grover's brigade, and Bramhall's and Webber's batteries, and very soon all opposition on his front was silenced for a time, Longstreet, however, ordered up reinforcements, and soon had a section of Pelham's battery, and the three fresh brigades of Wilcox, Pickett, and A. P. Hill on the ground, driving Hooker back, with the loss of all his cannon, and heavy casualties. During his desperate engagement, Hooker reported his situation to Sumner, and Kearney was promptly ordered up with his division, while Heintzelman, the proper commander of the Third Corps, was sent to the spot to take charge. (See "Opposing Forces," page 200.)

A comrade in Hooker's division gave me an account of his experiences about as follows: "Marching over the muddy road later in the afternoon, we found our farther advance prevented by a force which had preceded us, and we halted in the mud by the roadside just as it began to rain. About 5 o'clock we resumed our march by crossing over to the Hampton road, and did not halt till 11 in the evening, when we lay down in our blankets, bedraggled, wet, and tired, chewing hard-tack and the end of reflection the tenor of which was, 'Why did we come for a soldier?' Before daylight we were on the march, plodding in the rain through the mire. By daybreak we came out on the edge of the dense woods in front of Fort Magruder. The main fort was a strong earth-works with a bastioned front and a wide ditch. In front of this muddy-looking heap of dirt was a level plain, sprinkled plentifully with smaller earth-works; while between us and the level plain the dense forest, for a distance of a quarter of a mile, had been felled, thus

forming a labyrinth of tangled abatis difficult to penetrate. A mile away lay the village of Williamsburg.

"We were soon sent out as skirmishers, with orders to advance as near the enemy's rifle-pits as possible. They immediately opened fire upon us with heavy guns from the fort, while from their rifle pits came a hum of bullets and crackle of musketry. Their heavy shot came crashing among the tangled abatis of fallen timber, and plowed up the dirt in our front, rebounding and tearing through the branches of the woods in our rear. The constant hissing of the bullets, with their sharp ping or bizz whispering around and sometimes into us, gave me a sickening feeling and a cold perspiration. I felt weak around my knees—a sort of faintness and lack of strength in my legs, as if they would sink from under me. These symptons did not decrease when several of my comrades were hit. The little rifle-pits in our front fairly blazed with musketry, and the continuous snap, snap, crack, crack was murderous. Seeing I was not killed at once, in spite of all the noise my knees recovered from their unpleasant limpness, and my mind gradually regained its balance and composure. I never afterward felt these disturbing influences to the same degree.

"We slowly retired from stump to stump and from log to log, finally regaining the edge of the wood, and took our position near Webber's and Bramhall's batteries, which had just got into position on the right of the road, not over seven hundred yards from the hostile fort. While getting into position several of the battery men were killed, as they immediately drew the artillery fire of the enemy, which opened with a noise and violence that astonished me. Our two batteries were admirably handled, throwing a number of shot and shell into the enemy's works, speedily silencing them, and by 9 o'clock the field in our front, including the rifle pits, was completely 'cleaned out' of artillery and infantry. Shortly afterwards we advanced along the edge of the wood to the left of Fort Magruder, and about 11 o'clock we saw emerging from the little ravine to the left of the fort a swarm of Confederates, who opened on us with a terrible and deadly fire. Then they charged upon us with

their peculiar yell. We took all the advantage possible of the stumps and trees as we were pushed back, until we reached the edge of the wood again, where we halted and fired upon the enemy from behind all the cover the situation afforded. We were none of us too proud, not even those who had the dignity of shoulder-straps to support, to dodge behind a tree or stump. I called out to a comrade, 'Why don't you get behind a tree?' 'Confound it,' said he, 'There ain't enough for the officers.' I don't mean to accuse officers of cowardice, but we had suddenly found out that they showed the same general inclination not to get shot as privates did, and were anxious to avail themselves of the privilege of their rank by getting in our rear. I have always thought that pride was a good substitute for courage, if well backed by a conscientious sense of duty; and most of our men, officers as well as privates, were too proud to show the fear which I have no doubt they felt in common with myself. Occasionally, a soldier would show symptoms which pride could not overcome. One of our men, Spinney, ran into the woods and was not seen until after the engagement. Some time afterward, when he had proved a good soldier, I asked him why he ran, and he replied that every bullet which went by his head said "Spinney," and he thought they were calling for him. In all the pictures of battles I had seen before I ever saw a battle, the officers were at the front on prancing steeds, or with uplifted swords were leading their followers to the charge. Of course, I was surprised to find that in a real battle the officer gets in the rear of his men, as is his right and duty—that is, if his ideas of duty do not carry him so far to the rear as to make his sword useless.

"The 'rebs' forced us back by their charge, and our central lines were almost broken. The forces withdrawn from our right had taken the infantry support from our batteries, one of which, consisting of four guns, was captured. We were tired, wet, and exhausted when supports came up, and we were allowed to fall back from under the enemy's fire, but still in easy reach of the battle. I asked one of my comrades how he felt, and his reply was charac-

teristic of the prevailing sentiment: 'I should feel like a hero if I wasn't so blank wet.' The bullets had cut queer antics among our men. A private, who had a canteen of whiskey when he went into the engagement on endeavoring to take a drink found the canteen quite empty, a bullet having tapped it for him. Another had a part of his thumbnail taken off. Another had a bullet pass into the toe of his shoe, down between two toes, and out along side of his feet without much injury. Another had a scalp-wound from a bullet which took off a strip of hair about three inches in length from the top of his head. Two of my regiment were killed outright and fourteen badly wounded, besides quite a number slightly injured. Thus I have chronicled my first day's fight, and I don't believe any of my regiment were ambitious to 'chase' the enemy any farther just at present. Refreshed with hot coffee and hardtack, we rested from the fight, well satisfied that we had done our duty."

On the Confederate side, according to Longstreet's account, the march of the rear column northward in retreat from the town was being delayed all day on the 5th day by impassable roads, and he ordered fresh troops from time to time to countermarch to the field at Williamsburg, relieving those whose ammunition was exhausted in this unexpected engagement. After Hooker had been forced back from Fort Magruder, the threatening position of Hancock on the Confederate left was noted by the enemy, and D. H. Hill went forward with Early's brigade, Early and Hill in person leading, toward the crest where Hancock's infantry was posted.

The Confederates were met by a severe musketry fire, and at length by a counter charge, led by Hancock in which the bayonet was used in open field. Generals Sumner, Keyes, and Smith all mentioned Hancock's victory, which was brilliant and decisive. General Smith said in his report, "The brilliancy of the plan of battle, the coolness of its execution, the seizing of the proper instant for changing from the defensive to the offensive, the steadiness of the troops engaged, and the completeness of the victory, are subjects to which I earnestly call the attention of the General-in-

Chief for just praise." General Keyes wrote, "If Hancock had failed, the enemy would not have retreated."*

The division of Kearny, that was coming to Hooker's aid, was delayed by crowded roads, and reached the field by brigades between 2:30 and 4 o'clock, and, taking position on Hooker's field, became engaged in a somewhat irregular fight to the extent of five regiments of the brigades of Berry and Birney. Berry's brigade made a desperate charge, recovering some of the ground yielded by Hooker earlier in the day. The heavy losses at Williamsburg fell upon Hooker and Kearny, the division of the former sustaining nearly three-fourths of the total Union loss.

After the engagement I went over the field in front of the enemy's fort. Advancing through the tangled mass of logs and stumps, I saw one of our men aiming over the branch of a fallen tree which lay among the tangled abatis. I called to him, but he did not turn or move. Advancing nearer I put my hand on his shoulder, looked in his face and started back. He was dead. Shot through the brain; and so suddenly had the end come that his rigid hand grasped his musket, and he still preserved the attitude of watchfulness, literally occupying his post after death. At another place we came upon one of our men who had evidently died from wounds. Near one of his hands was a Testament, and on his breast lay an ambrotype picture of a group of children and another of a young woman.

The 6th of May was a beautiful morning, with birds singing among the thickets in which lay the dead. The next morning we marched through quaint, old-fashioned Williamsburg. The most substantial buildings of the town were those of William and Mary College, which were of brick. We kindled fires from that almost inexhaustible source of supply, the Virginia fences, cooked our coffee, sang, and smoked, thoughtless of the morrow.

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*It was of this action that McClellan telegraphed to his wife: "Hancock was superb."—*Editors.*

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III

Manassas to Seven Pines

By Joseph E. Johnston
General, C. S. A.

Already in this work (Vol. I, page 240) I have discussed Mr. Davis's statements in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," so far as they bore upon the responsibilities of the First Bull Run. I will now consider his remarks upon the operations following the withdrawal from Manassas and including the battle of Seven Pines.

As to the question of the forces on the Peninsula, Mr. Davis says: "Early in April General McClellan had landed about 100,000 men at or near Fortress Monroe" ("Rise and Fall," II, 84). According to John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, 121,000 Federal troops landed before the 5th of April. Mr. Davis further says: "At this time General Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force of seven or eight thousand men" (II, 84). General Magruder reported that he had eleven thousand men. Mr. Davis also says:

> "After the first advance of the enemy, General Magruder was reenforced by some troops from the south side of James River, and General Wilcox's brigade, which had been previously detached from the army under General Johnston."

These reenforcements, together, made about five thousand men (II., p. 85). He says on the same page:

> "On the 9th of April, General Magruder's command, thus reenforced amounted to about 12,000. On that day General Early joined with his division from the Army of Northern Virginia. . . . This division had about 8,000 officers and men for duty. General Magruder's force was thus increased to about 20,000.

The same order detached Early's, D. R. Jones's, and D. H. Hill's divisions from the Army of northern Virginia, and they were transported as fast as the railroad trains could carry them. The two latter divisions had together

about 10,000 men, so that Magruder's army was raised to about 33,000 men, instead of 20,000, as Mr. Davis said.

Coming to the plan of withdrawal, Mr. Davis says:

"As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, with his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston was assigned* to the command of the Department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condition of affairs there.

"After spending a day on General Magruder's defensive lines he returned to Richmond and recommended the abandonment of the Peninsula, and that we should take up a defensive position nearer to Richmond."

The President has forgotten my recommendation, or misunderstood it at the time. I represented to him that General McClellan's design was, almost certainly, to demolish our batteries with his greatly superior artillery, and turn us by the river, either landing in our rear or moving directly to Richmond; so that our attempting to hold Yorktown could only delay the enemy two or three weeks. Instead of that, I proposed that all our available forces should be united near Richmond; Magruder's troops to be among the last to arrive; the great army thus formed about Richmond not to be in a defensive position, as Mr. Davis supposes, but to fall with its whole force upon McClellan when the Federal army was expecting to besiege only the troops it had followed from Yorktown. If the Federal army should be defeated a hundred miles away from its place of refuge, Fort Monroe, it could not escape destruction. This was undoubtedly our best hope (see maps, pp. 167 and 188).

In the conference that followed the President took no part, but the Secretary of War, G. W. Randolph, once a naval officer, opposed the abandonment of the valuable property in the Norfolk Navy Yard; and General Lee opposed the plan proposed, because it would expose Charleston and Savannah to capture. I maintained that if those places should be captured, the defeat of the principal Federal army would enable us to recover them; and that, unless that army should be defeated, we should lose those sea-ports in spite of their garrisons. Mr. Davis says:

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*That assignment was made after the conference at Richmond mentioned on page 203.—*Editors.*

"After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula. . . . Though General J. E. Johnston did not agree with this decision, he did not ask to be relieved."

Not being in command, I could not be relieved. My assignment was included in the order to oppose McClellan at Yorktown; that order added to my then command the departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. It is not easy to reconcile this increase of my command by the President, with his very numerous disparaging notices of me.

General Keyes, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, confirmed my opinion in saying that "Gloucester must have fallen upon our (McClellan's) getting possession of Yorktown, and the York River would then have been open."

Mr. Davis expresses the opinion that "General McClellan certainly might have sent a detachment from his army, which, after crossing York River, could have turned the position at Gloucester Point" (II, 90). That would have been needless; the driving us from Yorktown would have compelled us to abandon Gloucester Point. Then (Vol. II., p. 91) he says:

"Whether General McClellan . . . would have made an early assault . . . or have waited to batter our earth-works in breach . . . is questionable." (II., 91.)

We did not apprehend "battering in breach," but believed that the heavy sea-coast rifles to be mounted in the batteries, about completed, would demolish our water-batteries, drive us from the intrenchments at Yorktown, and enable the enemy to turn us by the river. Mr. Davis quotes from one of his dispatches to me:

"Your announcement today (May 1st) that you would withdraw tomorrow night takes us by surprise and must involve enormous losses, including unfinished gun-boats. Will the safety of your army allow more time?" (II, 92.)

My own announcement was made April 27th, not May 1st, and reached Richmond in ten hours; so the President had abundant time to prevent the withdrawal. The appearance of the enemy's works indicated that fire from them might open upon us the next morning. The withdrawal

just then was to avoid waste of life. With regard to the property abandoned, he says:

"The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I make the following extract: 'A very valuable part of the property so lost . . . consisted of a very large number of picks and spades . . . All of our heavy guns, including some recently arrived and not mounted, together with a good deal of ammunition piled upon the wharf, had to be left behind.'" (II, 94.)

The steamboats he mentions were controlled in Richmond. As to the loss of very valuable picks and spades, Colonel Henry T. Douglas, chief-engineer at Yorktown, wrote to me, May 12th, 1883:

"I was at Yorktown the evening before the evacuation commenced. I did not see any quantity of picks and shovels there, and cannot understand how they could have accumulated there when they were needed so much from Redoubt Number Five to Lee's Mills—that is, on the extreme right of our line."

General D. H. Hill, who commanded in and near Yorktown, said, in his official report: "We lost very little by the retreat, save some medical stores which Surgeon Coffin deserted in his flight, May 1st. The heavy guns were all of the old navy pattern." We had very little ammunition on hand at the time. The heavy guns could have been saved only by holding the place, which was impossible.

Mr. Davis says that General Magruder's "absence at this moment was the more to be regretted, as it appears that the positions of the redoubts he had constructed (before Williamsburg) were not all known to the commanding general." (II, 94.) The positions of the redoubts were "all known." But to a body of troops serving merely as a rear-guard, it was necessary to occupy only those nearest the road. A rear-guard distributed in all the redoubts intended for an army could have held none of them. The events showed that the proper redoubts were occupied. It is singular that Mr. Davis's only notice of the conflict at Williamsburg, in which our troops behaved admirably, relates to a detached affair, unimportant, because it had, and could have, no influence upon the rear event. Mr. Davis says of General Early's account of his attack upon Hancock at Williamsburg:

"He (Early) confidently expresses the opinion that had his attack been supported promptly and vigorously, the enemy's forces there engaged must have been captured." (II, 96.)

General Early sent an officer to report that there was a battery in front of him which he could take, and asked authority to do so. The message was delivered to General Longstreet, who referred the messenger to me, we being together. I authorized the attempt, but desired the general to look carefully first. Under the circumstances he could not have expected support, for he moved out of reach of it.

Mr. Davis speaks of the employment of sub-terra shells to check a marching column, and quotes from General Rains as follows:

"Fortunately we found in a mud-hole a broken ammunition wagon containing five loaded shells. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra shells, and they exploded with terrific effect." (II., 97.)

This event was not mentioned in General D. H. Hill's report, although General Rains belonged to his division, nor was it mentioned by our cavalry which followed Hill's division. Such an occurrence would have been known to the whole army, but it was not; so it must have been a dream of the writer. (But see p. 201.—*Editors.*)

Mr. Davis says: "The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg, Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions being those there engaged" (II, 98). But one regiment of Hill's division was engaged.

In the Federal reports of this action, it is treated as a battle in which the whole Confederate army was engaged. It was an affair with our rear-guard, the object of which was to secure our baggage trains. For that it was necessary to detain the Federal army a day, which was accomplished by the rear-guard. In those Federal reports a victory is claimed.* The proofs are: (1) that what de-

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*General McClellan's statement was as follows:

"Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman during the night (of the 5th), that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day, and that Kearny's could not do more than hold its own without reenforce-

serves to be called fighting ceased at least two hours before dark, yet the Confederates held the ground until the next morning, having slept on the field, and then resumed their march; (2) that they fought only to protect their trains, and accomplished the object; (3) that although they marched but twelve miles the day after the affair, they saw no indications of pursuit, unless the seeing a scout party once can be so called; (4) that they inflicted a loss much greater than they had suffered; (5) and that in the ten days following the fight they marched but thirty-seven miles. They left four hundred wounded in Williamsburg, because they had no means of transporting them. But they captured five cannon and destroyed the carriages of five more, and took four hundred prisoners and several colors.

Mr. Davis says:

"In the meantime, Franklin's division had gone up the York River and landed a short distance below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. (McClellan wrote that the divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, near West Point.—*J. E. F.*) Two brigades by water of General G. W. Smith's division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driving him through the wood to the protection of his gun-boats in York river." (II, 98.)

The Federal force engaged was very much less than a division.

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ments, being satisfied that the result of Hancock's engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battlefield. During the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson and directed them to return to Yorktown. . . . On the next morning we found the enemy's position abandoned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded. . . Colonel Averell was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry force to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned and picked up a large number of stragglers, but the condition of the roads and the state of his supplies forced him to return after advancing a few miles. The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state, after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate pursuit was impossible.—*Editors.*

Mr. Davis says, lower down: "The loss of the enemy (in the battle of Williamsburg) greatly exceeded our own, which was about 1,200." He means exclusive of General Early's loss. According to General McClellan's report his loss was 2,228. General Hooker stated under oath that his was 1,700.* But Kearny's, Couch's, and two-thirds of Smith's division, and Peck's brigade were engaged also; a loss of 528 is very small among so many men.†

Mr. Davis says:

"Soon after General Johnston took position on the north of the Chickahominy, accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his headquarters. A long conversation followed, which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to Richmond, . . . General Lee confessed himself, as I was unable to draw from it any more definite purpose that the policy was to . . . improve his (Johnston's) position as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gunboats, so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on land." (II., 101.)

I explained that I had fallen back that far to clear my left flank of the navigable water, and so avoid having it turned; that as we were too weak to assume the offensive, and as the position I then held was an excellent one, I intended to await the Federal attack there. These explanations covered the whole ground, so that the President had no cause to complain, especially as he suggested nothing better. And he was satisfied then; for, three days later, he wrote to me by Colonel G. W. C. Lee: " . . . If the enemy proceed as heretofore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it in our last interview, seems to me to require no modification." This is the interview called "inconclusive." Mr. Davis says:

"After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drewry's bluffs (May 15th, 1862) I wrote to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee . . . I soon thereafter rode

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*The total Union loss was 2,283 and Hooker's loss 1,575. See tables 200.—*Editors.*

†Peck's brigade (5 regiments) belonged to Couch's division and was the only brigade of that division which took part in the battle. Six regiments of Kearney's division (2 of Birney's brigade and 3 of Berry's) and 6 of Smith's division (4 of Hancock's and 2 of Davidson's) were engaged so the loss (exclusive of Hooker's) of 528 belonged, in fact, to only 16 regiments.

out to visit General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised, in the suburbs of Richmond, . . . to meet a portion of the light artillery, and to learn that the whole army had crossed the Chickahominy." (II, 103.)

The army crossed the Chickahominy immediately after the affair of Drewery's Bluff. So that if Colonel Lee delivered a letter to me then, he of course reported to the President that I had crossed the River. And as the army's nearest approach to Richmond was on the 17th, his meeting with the light artillery must have occurred that day. So one cannot understand his surprise.

He says on the same page:

"General Johnston's explanation of this (to me) unexpected movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy . . . He also alluded to the advantage of having the river in front rather than in the rear of him."

The army crossed the Chickahominy because the possession of James River by the enemy suggested the probability of a change of base to that river. And it was necessary that we should be so placed as to be able to meet the United States army approaching either from York River or along the James. Water was not considered, for we did not use that of the Chickahominy; nor the position of the little stream behind us, for we had four bridges over it. The position of Seven Pines was chosen for the center, the right somewhat thrown back. But the scarcity of water induced me to draw nearer to Richmond, which was done on the 17th.

Mr. Davis makes statements (II., 106), regarding the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 21st and 31st of May; but as he treats the subject more minutely further on, we will examine what he says (p. 153):

"In the Archives Offices of the War Department in Washington, there are on file some of the field and monthly returns of the Army of Northern Virginia . . . The following statements have been taken from those papers by Major Walter H. Taylor, of the staff of General Lee. . . .

"A statement of the strength of the troops under General Johnston shows that on May 21st, 1862, he had present for duty, as follows: Smith's division, . . 10,592; Longstreet's division. . . . 13,816; Magruder's division, . . . 16,680 (240 too little) *J.E.J.;* D. H. Hill's

division, . . . 11,151; cavalry brigade, 1289; reserve artillery, 1160; *total effective men, 53,688."

The above is from Major Taylor's memorandum given the President, made from estimates of brigades, not from returns. Without being accurate, it is not far from the truth; corrected as above, Magruder should be given 15,920 men. Mr. Davis continues:

"Major Taylor in his work ('Four Years with General Lee') states, 'In addition to the troops above enumerated, . . . there were two brigades subject to his orders, then stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction, one under the command of General J. R. Anderson, and the other under the command of General Branch. They were subsequently incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill.' (Mr. Davis continues): He estimates the strength of the two at 4000 effective.

". . . Previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General Johnston was reenforced by General Huger's division of three brigades. The total strength of these three brigades, according to the 'Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia,' was 5008 effectives. Taylor says: 'If the strength of these five be added to the return of May 21st, we shall have 62,696 as the effective strength of the army under General Johnston on May 31st, 1862.'"

But according to General Huger's report to me, there were 7000 men (instead of 5008) in his three brigades, which does not exceed the ordinary strength of brigades (that is to say, three average brigades would have had not less than 7000 men); and what Mr. Davis calls two brigades of "4000 effective," were, in fact, Anderson's division sent to observe McDowell's corps at Fredericksburg, and so large that General Lee called it the army of the North, and estimated it as 10,000 men;† and the second, Branch's brigade, greatly strengthened to protect the railroad at Gordonsville, and estimated by General Lee as 5000 men.‡ When these troops were united on the Chicka-

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*According to General Johnston's memorandum of May 21st, 1862, "Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III, p. 531, the reserve artillery numbered 920.—*Editors.*

†"I advised you, April 23d, of certain troops ordered to report to General Field, via: two regiments from Richmond, two light batteries, a brigade from South Carolina, and one from North Carolina (Anderson's), in all 8000, in addition to those (2500.—*J. E. J.*) previously there."—General Lee's letter, May 8th—"Official Records," Vol. XI, Part III, pp. 500-1.—*J. E. J.*

‡"Two brigades, one from North Carolina (Branch's) and one from Norfolk, have been ordered to Gordonsville, to reenforce that line." General Lee's letter, as above.—*J. E. J.*

hominy, General Anderson's estimate of their numbers was, of the first, 9000, and of the other, 4000; 20,000 then, and not 9008, is the number to be added to the return of May 21st, 1862, to show the effective strength of that army May 31st, viz., 73,928, including the correction of the number in Magruder's division.

Referring to our withdrawal from the north side of the Chickahominy to the vicinity of Richmond, Mr. Davis says:

"Remembering a remark of General Johnston's that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold fortified towns, I had written to him that he knew the defense of Richmond must be made at a distance from it." (II, 120.)

Mr. Davis is mistaken. No such letter was sent to me then. We communicated with each other only orally, excepting a note he sent me to point out that I had been absent from a skirmish the day before. He knew that the fact that the enemy was then able to approach Richmond either from York River or by the James compelled me to prepare for either event, by placing the army near the city. A short time before, he wrote: "To you it is needless to say that the defense must be made outside of the city." His next sentence, approving the course I was pursuing has been quoted in connection with what the President said of an "inconclusive" conversation with me.

Mr. Davis continues, a little farther down (II., 120):

"It had not occurred to me that he (Johnston) meditated a retreat which would uncover the capital, nor was it ever suspected, until in reading General Hood's book, published in 1880, the evidence was found that General Johnston, when retreating from Yorktown, told his volunteer aide, Mr. McFarland, that 'he (Johnston) expected or intended to give up Richmond.'"

This story of Mr. McFarland is incredible. He, a very rich, fat old man, could not have been an aide-de-camp. As I did not know him at all until four years later, and then barely, he could not have been my aide-de-camp. And lastly, I had no volunteer aide. Besides, the Confederate President had abundant evidence that I had no such expectation, in the fact, that so far from giving up Richmond, I stood between it and the Federal army for three weeks, until I

was disabled by desperate wounds received in its defense. Under such circumstances his accusation is, to say the least, very discreditable. E. F. Harvie, late Colonel and Assistant Inspector-General, C. S. A., now in the "War Records" Office, Washington, in answer to my question, "Had I ever a volunteer aide-de-camp named McFarland, or any volunteer aide-de-camp after leaving Manassas, while serving in Virginia?" wrote me, under date of January 28th, 1885, as follows: "To my knowledge, you certainly had not. My position as your staff officer justifies me in saying that Mr. McFarland was not with you in any capacity."

Surgeon A. M. Fauntleroy, in answer to my question, "Had I a volunteer aide-de-camp in May, 1862, especially when the army was moving from Yorktown toward Richmond; or did you ever in that time see an old gentleman of Richmond, named McFarland, about my headquarters?" writes:

"I never did, I cannot well see how such a person could have escaped my observation, if he was there at any time."

And J. B. Washington, president of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Railway, writes me as follows:

"You had not on your staff after leaving Manassas a volunteer aide-de-camp, especially during May, 1862, when the army was between Yorktown and Richmond. I was personally acquainted with Mr. McFarland of Richmond, but never saw him at our headquarters, nor heard of his ever having been there. Having served as aide-de-camp on your staff from May, 1861, to February, 1864, I was in the position to know of the circumstances of which I have written."

Mr. Davis says:

"Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance . . . I sent for General Lee . . . and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought it was proper to do . . . I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy, before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented . . . He then said: 'General Johnston should, of course, advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him' . . . When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy, as follows: General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and, by the conjuction of the two,

it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both of us." (II, 120.)

It is certain that General Lee could have had no such hopes from this plan, nor have been a party to it; for it would not only have sent our army where there was no enemy, but left open the way to Richmond. For the Meadow Bridge is 2½ miles from Mechanicsville and that place about 6 miles above the Federal right. So after two-thirds of our troops had crossed the Chickahominy, the Federal army could have marched straight to Richmond opposed by not more than one-fifth of its number in Magruder's and D. H. Hill's divisions. This plan is probably the wildest on record.

As to what is described (II, 121) G. W. Smith's division was never in the place indicated, and General Longstreet's was never on the Mechanicsville road near the bridge, before General Lee crossed the Chickahominy to fight at Gaines's Mills.

A glance at the map will show how singularly incorrect is Mr. Davis's description (II, 122-3) of the vicinity of Seven Pines and of the disposition of the Federal troops.

On the 23d of May, Keyes's Federal corps crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, and a detachment attacked Hatton's Confederate brigade, which was in observation near Savage's Station. The detachment was driven back, and Hatton's object having been accomplished (to learn whether the enemy had crossed the stream), he was recalled. I was advised to hold that position with the army, but preferred to let the enemy advance, which would increase the interval between his left and the right, which was beyond the Chickahominy. McDowell's corps of 40,000 men* was then at Fredericksburg, observed by a division under Brigadier-General J. R. Anderson; and a large Confederate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was at Gordonsville.

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*McDowell says, May 22d, 1862, "Official Records," Vol. XII, Part III., p. 214, that he would require subsistence for 38,000 men. This included both effectives and non-effectives. A fair deduction would leave McDowell about 35,000 combatants, to compute by the basis on which the Confederate generals always estimated their strength.—*Editors.*

On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chickahominy, principally at Mechanicsville. This extension of the right wing of the enemy to the west made me apprehend that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch) above mentioned might be cut off. They were therefore ordered to fall back to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court House the brigade was attacked by Porter's corps and driven off, escaping with a loss of 66 killed and 177 wounded, as General Branch reported.*

A division was formed of Anderson's and Branch's troops to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill was assigned.

That evening General Anderson sent word that his scouts left near Fredericksburg reported that McDowell's troops were marching southward. As the object of this march was evidently the junction of this corps with the main army, I determined to attack McClellan before McDowell could join him; and the major-generals were desired to hold their troops ready to move. But at night, when those officers were with me, to receive instructions for the expected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who also had a detachment of cavalry observing McDowell's corps, reported that it had returned to Fredericksburg. As my object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan should receive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this intelligence made me return to my first design—that of attacking McClellan's left wing on the Williamsburg road as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased its distance from his right, north of the Chickahominy.

The morning of the 30th, armed reconnaissances were made under General D. H. Hill's direction on the Charles City road by Brigadier-General Rodes, and on the Williamsburg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The latter found Federal outposts five miles from Richmond, or two miles west of Seven Pines, in such strength as indicated that a corps was near. On receiving this information from

*Exclusive of the loss of the 28th North Carolina, of Lane's command, which as far as reported was 7 killed and 15 wounded.—*Editors.*

General Hill, I informed him that he would lead an attack on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the concentration of twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades against McClellan's left wing, about two-fifths of his army. Our six other brigades were guarding the river from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill's position on the Williamsburg road, and G. W. Smith to march with his to the junction of the Nine-mile road with the New Bridge road, where Magruder was with four brigades.

Longstreet, as ranking officer of the troops on the Williamsburg road, was instructed verbally to form D. H. Hill's division, as first line, and his own as second, across the road at right angles, and to advance in that order to attack the enemy; while Huger's division should march by the right flank along the Charles City road, to fall upon the enemy's flank when our troops were engaged with him in front. Federal earth-works and abatis that might be found were to be turned. G. W. Smith was to protect the troops under Longstreet from attack by those of the Federal right wing across the Chickahominy; and, if such transfer should not be threatened, he was to fall upon the enemy on the Williamsburg road. Those troops were formed in four lines, each being a division. Casey's was a mile west of Seven Pines, with a line of skirmishers a half mile in advance; Couch's was at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks—the two forming Keyes's corps. Kearny's division was near Savage's Station and Hooker's two miles west of Bottom's Bridge—the two forming Heintzelman's corps.

Longstreet's command of the right was to end when the troops approached Seven Pines and I should be present to direct the movements, after which each major-general would command his own division. The rain began to fall violently in the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all night. In the morning the little streams near our camps were so much swollen as to make it probable that the Chickahominy was overflowing its banks and cutting the communication between the wings of the Federal army.

Being confident that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with their forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action against adversaries formed in several lines, with wide intervals between them, I left the immediate control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest learn of the approach of Federal reenforcements from their right. For this scouts were sent forward to discover all movements that might be made by the enemy.*

The condition of the ground and little streams delayed the troops in marching; yet those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill were in position quite early enough. But the soldiers from Norfolk, who had seen garrison service only, was unnecessarily stopped in their march by a swollen rivulet. This unexpected delay led to interchange of messages for several hours between General Longstreet and myself, I urging Longstreet to begin the fight, he replying. But, near 2 o'clock that officer was requested to go forward to the attack; the hands of my watch marked 3 o'clock at the report of the first field piece.† The Federal advanced line—a long line of skirmishers, supported by several regiments, was encountered at 3 o'clock. The greatly superior numbers of the Confederates soon drove them back to the main position of Casey's division. It occupied a line of rifle pits, strengthened by a redoubt and abatis. Here the resistance was very obstinate; for the Federals, commanded by an officer of skill and tried courage, fought as soldiers generally do under good leaders; and time and vigorous efforts of superior numbers were required to drive them from their ground. But the resolution of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades, that pressed forward on our left through an open field, under a destructive fire, the

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*The map of Seven Pines, printed with this paper in "*The Century Magazine*" for May, 1885, was prepared by the editors, and has been canceled because of incorrectness as to the positions of the opposing forces on the night of May 31st, as well as on the morning of June 1st.—*Editors.*

†General D. H. Hill, who directed the onset, says in his report: "At 1 o'clock the signal guns were fired, and my division moved off in fine style." In their reports, the Union commanders name 12:30 and 1 o'clock as the time of the Confederate attack.—*Editors.*

admirable service of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, and a skillfully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill's direction, by Rodes's brigade in front and that by Raines in flank, were at last successful, and the enemy abandoned their entrenchments. Just then reenforcements from Couch's division same up, and an effort was made to recover the position. But it was to no purpose; for two regiments of R. H. Anderson's brigade, reenforced Hill's troops, and the Federals were driven back to Seven Pines.

Keyes's Corps (Casey's and Couch's divisions) was united at Seven Pines and reenforced by Kearny's division, coming from Savage's Station. But the three divisions were so vigorously attacked by Hill that they were broken and driven from their intrenchments, the greater part along the Williamsburg road to the intrenched line west of Savage's Station. Two brigades of their left, however, fled to White Oak Swamp.

General Hill pursued the enemy a mile; then, night being near, he reformed his troops, facing toward the Federals. Longstreet's and Huger's divisions coming up, were formed between Hill's line and Fair Oaks.

For some cause the disposition on the Charles City road was modified. Two of General Huger's brigades were ordered to advance along that road, with three of Longstreet's under Brigadier-General Wilcox. After following that road some miles, General Wilcox received orders to conduct his troops to the Williamsburg road. On entering it, he was ordered to the front, and two of his regiments joined Hill's troops near and approaching Seven Pines.

When the action just described began, the musketry was not heard at my position on the Nine-mile road, from the unfavorable condition of the air; and I supposed for some time that we were hearing only an artillery duel. But a staff officer was sent to ascertain the facts. He returned at 4 o'clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as artillery had been engaged an hour, and all were pressing vigorously. As no approach of troops from beyond the Chickahominy had been discovered, I hoped that the enemy's

bridges were impassable, and therefore desired General Smith to move toward Seven Pines, to be ready to co-operate with our right. He moved promptly along the Nine mile road, and his leading regiment soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off.

On my way to Longstreet's left, to combine the action of the two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General Smith's column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camps of about a brigade in the angle between the Nine mile road and the York River Railroad, and the rear of a column of infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine ford. A few minutes after this, a battery near the point where this infantry had disappeared commenced firing upon the head of the Confederates' column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that General Smith brought his other brigades into action on the left of Law's. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on equal terms, although we engaged superior numbers on ground of their own choosing.

I passed the railroad a few hundred yards with Hood's brigade when the firing commenced, and stopped to see it terminated. But being confident that the enemy opposing us were those whose camp I had just seen, and therefore only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was more than strong enough to cope with them. Therefore, General Hood was directed to go in such a direction as to connect with his right with Longstreet's left and take his antagonists in flank. The direction of that firing was then nearly southwest from Fair Oaks. It was then about 5 o'clock.

In that position my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff officers, who were assisted by General Stuart of the cavalry, which was then unemployed; their reports were all of steady progress.

At Fair Oaks, however, no advantage was gained on either side, and the contest was continued with unflagging courage. It was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division; but I thought that it would be injudicious to engage Magruder's division, our only reserve, so late in the day.

The firing was then violent at Seven Pines, and within a half hour the three Federal divisions were broken and driven from their position in confusion. It was then evident, however, from the obstinacy of our adversaries at Fair Oaks, that the battle would not be decided that day. I said so to the staff officers near me, and told them that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the firing ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning.

About half past 7 o'clock, I received a musket shot in the shoulder, and was unhorsed soon after by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my breast. I was borne from the field, first to a house on the roadside, thence to Richmond. The firing ceased before I had been carried a mile from it. The conflict at Fair Oaks was terminated by darkness only.

Mr. Davis's account of what he saw and did at Fair Oaks (II, 123) indicates singular ignorance of the topography of the vicinity, as well as of what was occurring. He says that the enemy's line was on the bank of the river. It was at right angles to and some three miles from it. He says that soon after his arrival I was brought from the right wounded. This proves that his "arrival" was near sunset. He also describes the moving of reenforcements from the left to the right. This was not being done. The right was abundantly strong. He says that he made a reconnaissance, then sent three couriers, one after the other, with an order to Magruder "to send a force" by the wooded path under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. If the first courier had been dispatched before the reconnaissance, and delivered the order to Magruder promptly his "force" marching little more than a mile by

the straight Nine mile road, could scarcely have come up before dark. The routes described would have been (if found) five or six miles long.

The only thing he ought to have done, or had time to do, was to have postponed almost twenty hours—the putting General Lee, who was near, in command of the army.

The operations of the Confederate troops in this battle were very much retarded by the broad ponds of rain-water, in many places more than knee-deep, by the deep mud, and by the dense woods and thickets that covered the ground.

Brigadier-General Hatton was among the killed, and Brigadier-General Pettigrew and Hampton were severely wounded. The latter kept his saddle and served to the end of the action. Among the killed on the Williamsburg road were Colonels Moore, of Alabama, Jones and Lomax. In the two days' battle, the Confederate loss, so far as the reports indicate, was 6134 (including the loss in G. W. Smith's division, which was 1283) ; and the Federal loss, according to the revised returns, was 5031.

Prisoners to the number of 350, 10 pieces of artillery, 6700 muskets and rifles in excellent condition, a garrison flag and 4 regimental colors, medical, commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores, tents and sutler's property, were captured and secured.

The troops on the ground at nightfall were: on the Confederate side, 22 brigades, more than half of which had not been in action, and on the Federal side 6 divisions in 3 corps, two-thirds of which had fought, and half of which had been totally defeated. Two Federal divisions at Fair Oaks, and three and a half at Savage's, three miles off, and half a one two miles nearer Bottom's Bridge. The Southern troops were united, and in a position to overwhelm either fraction of the Northern army, while holding the other in check.

Officers of the Federal army have claimed a victory at Seven Pines. The Confederates had such evidences of victory as cannon, captured intrenchments, and not only sleeping on the field, but passing the following day there, so little disturbed by the Federal troops as to gather, in woods,

thickets, mud, and water, 6700 muskets and rifles.* Besides the Federal army had been advancing steadily until the day of this battle; after it they made not another step forward, but employed themselves industriously in intrenching.

In a publication of mine ("Johnston's Narrative") made in 1874, I attempted to show that General Lee did not attack the enemy until June 26th, because he was engaged from June 1st until then in forming a great army, bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from North Carolina under General Holmes, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia, and above 16,000 in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell. My authority for the 15,000 was General Holmes's statement May 31st, that he had that number waiting the President's order to join me. When their arrival was announced, I supposed the number was as stated.

General Ripley, their best-informed and senior officer, was my authority for the 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia. I thought, as a matter of course, that all of these troops had been brought up for the crisis. Mr. Davis is eager to prove that but 2 of the 4 bodies of them came to Richmond in time. One who, like me, had opportunity to observe that Mr. Davis was almost invariably too late in reenforcing threatened from unthreatened points, has no apology for the assumtion that this was an exception. General Ripley reported officially that he brought 5000 from Charleston, and explained in writing that, arriving before them, he was assigned to the command of the brigade of 2366, his 5000 being distributed as they arrived in detachments. General Lawton stated in writing that he brought

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*The Union position at Fair Oaks was, in general, maintained on both days of the battle. Part of the field at Seven Pines was regained on the second day (June 1st) by the troops of General Heintzelman, who reported that "our troops pushed as far forward as the battlefield of the previous day, where they found many of our wounded and those of the enemy." General Daniel E. Sickles, who led the advance on Seven Pines on the 1st, states in his report that "the fields were strewn with Enfield rifles, marked 'Tower, 1862,' and muskets marked 'Virginia,' thrown away by the enemy in his hurried retreat. In the camp occupied by General Casey and General Couch Saturday, before the battle of Seven Pines, we found rebel caissons filled with ammunition, a large number of small arms and several baggage wagons."—*Editors.*

about 6000 men from Georgia to the Valley; but as they had never marched before, they were incapable of moving at Jackson's rate, and he estimated that 2500 had been unable to keep their places when they arived at Gaines's Mill, where, as he states, he had 3500. But the laggards rejoined him in two or three days.

I estimated Jackson's and Ewell's forces at 16,000 because Ewell told me that his was 8000 and Jackson's had been usually about twenty-five per cent larger. Mr. Davis puts the joint force at 8000. His authority has stated it also at 12,000 (see "Personal Reminiscences of General Lee," p. 6), and this is far below the fact. My object in this is to show that I consulted respectable authorities. Mr. Davis proves that his forces were not well employed.

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IV

Two Days' Battle of Seven Pines* (Fair Oaks)

By Gustavus W. Smith,
Major General, C.S.A.

Where the Williamsburg "old stage" road is intersected by the Nine-mile road, at a point seven miles east of Richmond was fought the first great contest between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Federal Army of the Potomac. The junction of these two roads is called Seven Pines. About one mile from Seven Pines, where the Nine-mile road crosses the Richmond and the York River Railroad, there is a station called Fair Oaks. Before the action ended there was a good deal of fighting near the latter place. The Federals called the action of May 31st and June 1st the battle of Fair Oaks.

Before describing this contest, a sketch will be given of the movements of the two armies from the time the Confederates withdrew from Williamsburg. It is well, however, to say here that, in preparing an account of the battle, I have felt constrained to refer to some important matters in more detail than would have been considered essential, if there was not such direct conflict of "high authorities" in regard to them. For instance, nearly all the descriptions of this action heretofore published give as the intention of the Confederate commander that Longstreet's division was to move to the Williamsburg road and support D. H. Hill's division on that road. In "asserting" that this is an error, I have felt that, under the circumstances, it is incumbent on me to prove what I say on that subject.

It is broadly stated by many authorities, that General Johnston intended Huger's division should attack the Fed-

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*In the Confederate attack, in the irregular and desperate fighting, and in the duration and changing success of this first great battle in the East, there are striking resemblances to (as well as wide divergences from) the two days' battle at Shiloh, the first great clash of arms in the West.—*Editors.*

eral left flank and rear, Huger's attack to be followed by D. H. Hill's division falling on the Federal front; and it is claimed by many that the slowness of Huger's division caused the failure of complete Confederate success the first day. In refutation of these statements and claims, I have felt constrained to give proofs, and not leave the questions to be decided by mere "assertion."

The position of the Confederate troops at dark, May 31st, has been erroneously stated by General Johnston, and in such particularity of detail as at the time to satisfy me that, in the main, he was correct. But the "Official Records," recently published, show beyond question that General Johnston is in error on this point. It had, therefore, been considered necessary in this article to give definite proof in regard to the position of the Confederate forces when the command of the army devolved upon me, by reason of General Johnston's being wounded. His statement of the reasons for my not having ordered the attack to be renewed the next morning (June 1st) calls for specific proof that I did order the attack to be renewed, and for a detailed exhibit of General Longstreet's battlefield notes to me on that day.

Without specifying further, at this time, in regard to the "misunderstanding," misapprehension, and other causes that have led to erroneous published accounts of important events in this battle—to some extent on the Federal but more on the Confederate side,—it may be added that the recent publication of the "Official Records," when carefully studied, throws a great deal of light upon these events, the accounts of which have heretofore been nearly as dark and confusing as were the dense, tangled wood and swamps in which most of the close and desperate fighting took place. The Federal accounts, as now officially published, are full; they embrace the reports of nearly every regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander engaged; but many of the Confederate reports are missing, those in D. H. Hill's division being the only ones that are complete in regard even to brigade commanders. There are, however, enough others, when taken in connection with

the full Federal reports, to give quite a clear understanding of the main facts on both sides.

The affair at Williamsburg, May 5th, was an incident in the withdrawal of the Confederate army from its fortified lines near Yorktown, to the open country between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy Rivers, where General Johnston intended to halt, near the Richmond and York River Railroad, and contest the farther advance of General McClellan's army. From Williamsburg, Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, both under General Longstreet, moved on the Charles City road, which crosses the Chickahominy at Long Bridge; the division of G. W. Smith and Magruder's forces—commanded by him before Johnston's army arrived at the Yorktown lines,—moved on the road that passes through Barhamsville and New Kent Court House and crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. All the Confederate troops on the latter road were under my command, and they were followed by the Federal army. Excepting occasional collisions between our rearguard and the Federal advance-guard, nothing of special interest occurred after we left Barhamsville, near which place, below West Point, the Federals landed quite a large force, and seemed disposed to move out against us, General Johnston ordered nearly the whole of his army to Barhamsville, and came there in person. The next day, May 7th, the Federal skirmishers advanced but cut them off from their gun boats. At this point there was a good deal of sharp fighting for several hours.* From this time the Confederates were

*Reference is had here to the York River expedition, under General W. B. Franklin, which McClellan dispatched from Yorktown on the 5th with instructions to seize and hold a landing near West Point, situated at the confluence of the York and Pamunkey rivers, and the terminus of the Richmond and York River railroad. This movement on West Point, if successful, would secure the so-called Urbana route of communications, the advantages of which are explained in McClellan's letter to the War Department of March 19th, 1862.

Franklin moved up the York River on the 6th, his troops in transports and under convoy of a number of gunboats, and made a landing the same day. General Franklin in a letter on this subject, dated Nov. 25th, 1881, says:

"My instructions were to await orders after landing, and not to advance. We were attacked on the 7th, the object of the enemy being

more worried by the deep mud through which they were patiently trudging than they were by any movements of the Federals. In a letter to me from Palo Alto, on the Charles City road, dated Headquarters, Second Corps, May 8th, General Longstreet says:

"If your road can beat this for mud, I don't want to see it." "If you see the General (Johnston) say to him that we are as happy as larks over here, till we get 126 wagons (the total number) up to the hub at one time." "I don't fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom."

When my command had passed the Baltimore Cross-roads, four and a half miles west of New Kent Court House, and had reached the position about halfway between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers, on good ground, they were halted. Longstreet's corps was again within easy supporting distance of mine, and General Johnston intended in that vicinity to contest the further advance of McClellan's army. We remained there about five days. The troops, having rested from the tiresome service in the trenches near Yorktown, and the fatiguing march, were now furnished with abundant supplies from Richmond, and were elated at the prospect of meeting the enemy on an open field of battle.

General Johnston then supposed that something effective had been done by the Government for the local defense of Richmond, during the month that had elapsed since his army moved from there to the peninsula. On the

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to drive us into the river. We had not made any attempt to advance, as such an attempt would have been in conflict with my orders."

General John Newton, commander of the Federal Brigade most heavily engaged, states:

"The enemy was not only repelled in his attempt upon our position but at the end of the day we occupied with our troops a position in advance of that held at the commencement of the action."

General Gustavus W. Smith, who commanded the Confederate troops engaged, says:

"On the morning of the 7th, after becoming satisfied that the enemy did not intend to advance in force from under the protection of their guns boats, I directed General Whiting to drive their skirmishers from the dense woods, and endeavor to get position in the open ground between the woods and the river, from which he could reach their place of landing and their transports with his artillery fire."

In this action the Union losses were 48 killed, 110 wounded, 28 missing; total, 186. The Confederate losses were 8 killed and 40 wounded; total 48.—*Editors.*

14th of May he learned, through his chief engineer, that little or nothing—either in the way of fortifications or of troops—had been provided; and that the enemy, on the James River, were above City Point, and threatening Drewry's Bluff, as well as the obstruction in the Appomattox, four and a half miles below Petersburg. This report closed with the remark: "The danger is on the south side of James River."

On the same day General Johnston received intelligence of the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad Virginia —called by the Federals the Merrimac. The next day news was received of the attack on Drewry's Bluff (see p. 271), and of the confusion and fright in Richmond. In this state of affairs, General Johnston decided that it was expedient to cross the Chickahominy and take position nearer the city, rather than continue to wait, north of that stream, for the advance of McClellan from the Pamunkey. Accordingly, orders were issued that night for Longstreet's "corps" to cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and for my command to cross at Bottom's Bridge. A regiment of riflemen was sent direct to aid in the defense of Drewry's Bluff. On the 17th, the James River defenses, D. H. Hill's division, on Longstreet's left, guarded the Charles City road, and was about three miles from Richmond; G. W. Smith's division was on the Williamsburg road, and north of it, two or three miles from the city, with one brigade in observation at Bottom's Bridge; whilst Magruder's troops extended from Old Tavern, on the Nine-mile road, to New Bridge, thence along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs to the Mechanicsville road.

McClellan's army approached the Chickahominy slowly. On the 23d Keyes's corps crossed at Bottom's Bridge; on the 25th he reached the position known later as the "third line of defense," at which point, as well as at Bottom's Bridge, strong earth-works were constructed; on the 27th the leading division of Keyes's corps occupied and commenced to fortify a position across the Williamsburg road at Seven Pines. In the meantime Heintzelman's corps had crossed at Bottom's Bridge; one division remained near that

place, and the other division was posted at White Oak Bridge. Three corps of McClellan's army were still on the north side of the Chickahominy, their left near the railroad, their right, thrown back in a naturally strong position, on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, with an intrenched outpost at Mechanicsville. All the bridges and fords along the Chickahominy in their front were in possession of the Federals; and they were rapidly constructing new bridges.

In the meantime there had been no material change in the position of the Confederate forces. General Johnston was closely watching the movements of the Federals approaching on the Williamsburg road; but in his opinion, the proper time to strike McClellan's left wing had not come. On the morning of the 27th our pickets were closely pressed just east of Old Tavern. This was some indication that the enemy were probably coming nearer in large force, and would soon be within our effective reach, on the Williamsburg or Nine-mile road, or on both. Our attention was, however, almost immediately diverted to McClellan's right flank, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy.

At 1 P.M. that day I received a note from General Johnston, stating he had just been informed that McDowell was advancing from Fredericksburg in force. This put a new phase on Confederate affairs around Richmond. It was well understood by us that McDowell was advancing and had an army of about 40,000 men;* McClellan's forces were known to be about 100,000 and we could not afford to wait until McDowell reached him.

General Johnston determined to attack the Federal right before McDowell could come up. I was ordered to move my division to the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, bring up A. P. Hill's division from the vicinity of Ashland, and make preparations as soon as possible to attack at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek. Longstreet's division was ordered to take position north and east of Richmond, and D. H. Hill's division was ordered to the ground vacated by

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*About 35,000, effectives. McDowell asked for subsistence for 38,000 men, including, of course, the non-effectives.—*Editors.*

mine on the Williamsburg road. Magruder's troops were not moved; but, at my request, I was relieved from longer commanding General Magruder, and he was ordered to report, in future, direct to General Johnston. At the same time D. R. Jones's division, two brigades, of Magruder's proper command, posted on our extreme left, remained temporarily under my control, for service in the proposed attack. Brigadier General Whiting was regularly assigned, temporarily, to the command of my division.

About sunset, May 28th, I reported to General Johnston that A. P. Hill's division would be close in front of Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, before midnight, with orders to attack that place at dawn on the 29th. As soon as A. P. Hill's attack commenced my division and D. R. Jones's division would cross the Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, and the three divisions, constituting the new left wing of Johnston's army under my command would make a prompt and combined attack on the right of the Federals, strongly posted at Beaver Dam Creek. I was satisfied that the three divisions could carry the works at that place by open assault, but it would be a bloody business—called for, however, by the necessity for prompt action before McDowell could join McClellan. I did not know, in any detail, what General Johnston intended to do with the rest of his forces during the contest I was ordered to initiate, but I was perfectly satisfied that he would use the whole strength of his army against McClellan and, if possible, defeat him before McDowell could arrive.

On receiving my report General Johnston stated that his latest information showed McDowell's army had returned to Fredericksburg; and it was believed he was moving north from that place. In this state of affairs, there was no longer any necessity for crossing the Chickahominy, attacking the three Federal corps on the north side of that stream, and moving against the very strong position at Beaver Dam Creek; while there were but two Federal corps on our side, gradually coming within striking distance where the natural features of the ground were not against us. General Johnston ordered the contemplated attack on the

Federal right to be suspended, and directed me to withdraw A. P. Hill's division, bring it to the south side of the Chickahominy, and place it on our extreme left.

General Longstreet, who was present, then proposed that an attack be made early next morning, the 29th, in the direction of Seven Pines. General Johnston said that it was not quite certain that McDowell had moved north; the disposition made of our troops whilst it was supposed McDowell was coming was too strong on the left to admit of immediate and advantageous attack being made in the direction of Seven Pines; that Huger's division from Norfolk was expected to join us very soon; and that the enemy, east of us, had not yet approached near enough, in force worth crushing, to justify the engagement of the mass of our army in the swamps around Seven Pines, whilst the Federals were threatening the city on the north side. No orders were given to attack on the 29th, but it was distinctly understood that, in case McDowell did not promptly come on, General Johnston would revert to his former intention, and endeavor to strike a sudden, and, if possible, crushing blow, in full force, against the Federals in the vicinity of Seven Pines, and destroy them before they could be reenforced either from the troops in their rear, now on our side of the Chickahominy or by forces sent across from the opposite side. When I was assigned to the command of the left wing of the army, General Longstreet became the ranking officer on the right and was anxious to attack in that direction on the 29th. These matters are mentioned in General Johnston's letter of that date to General Whiting.

On the 30th my division, under Whiting, was drawn back to ground about midway between Meadow Bridge and Richmond; and A. P. Hill's division was brought nearer the bridges. The other commands were still in the positions to which they were assigned when it was first heard that McDowell was moving to join McClellan. In the meantime Huger's division had arrived and was encamped east of the city, north of the Williamsburg road, on Gillis's Creek.

About noon on the 30th General D. H. Hill reported to General Johnston that reconnaissances satisfied him that

the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road and fortified about Seven Pines. General Johnston promptly determined to attack. His intention was that General Longstreet's division should move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg stage road, and General Huger's by the Charles City road. In his order for my division to move, a copy of which was sent by him direct to Whiting, General Johnston says:

"Please be ready to move by the Nine-mile road, coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off (at Old Tavern). Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reenforce General Longstreet."

In written instructions, May 30th, to Huger, General Johnston says:

"I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the Charles City road . . . Be ready if an action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy's left flank."

On May 31st General Johnston wrote to General Huger:

"I fear that in my note of last evening of which there is no copy, I was too positive on the subject of your attacking the enemy's left flank . . . It will be necessary for your progress to the front to conform at first to that of General Hill. If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right."

There seem to have been no written instructions given either to General Longstreet or to General D. H. Hill; but, in his official report, General Johnston says the divisions of G. W. Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Huger were ordered to move at daybreak. At sunrise, General Johnston confidentialy expected that Keyes's corps would be crushed or routed before 8 A.M. At that season daybreak was at about 4 A.M. Magruder's command and A. P. Hill's division were not moved.

In order to form a proper conception of Johnston's plan it will be well to glance at the position of the Federal forces on the morning of May 31st. One division of Keyes's corps was across the Williamsburg road, a little more than a half mile west of Seven Pines; the other divi-

sion was across the road at Seven Pines. . Both lines were strengthened by rifle-pits extending a short distance on each side of the road, with abatis or felled timber in front. In the first line there was a small unfinished pentangular redoubt; and the abatis of the second line extended in a curve to the rear, across the Nine-mile road. The left of the position was protected by the almost impracticable White Oak Swamp. But the ground on the right offered no strong features for defense and was not fortified. About one thousand yards in front of the first line of rifle-pits, and nearly at right angles to the Williamsburg road, a skirmish line, extended from the White Oak Swamp to the Chickahominy River. Two regiments were detached to support the skirmish line—one near the railroad, the other to the right on the Nine-mile road; whilst two regiments and a battery were detached and posted near Fair Oaks Station, to guard the depot of supplies at that place, where there were no artificial defenses. Keyes's lines were provided with ample artillery. On the morning of the 31st the two divisions were in camp just in rear of the earthworks; whilst strong working parties were engaged upon the unfinished trenches and other artificial defenses.

The "third line of defense," across the Williamsburg road, two miles in rear of the first line, was unoccupied, Heintzelman's corps was five miles in rear of Seven Pines; and Sumner's corps was three or four miles from Keyes, with the Chickahominy between them. The two other Federal corps on the north side of that stream were still farther off. In this part of its course the Chickahominy, at ordinary stages of water, is a sluggish stream, from thirty to sixty feet in width, from three to four feet deep, with low, muddy banks. It is bordered by flat bottom-lands for some distance, to the foot of rather abrupt bluffs about one hundred feet high. In times of freshet it raises rapidly, extends over the bottom-lands in depth of two or three feet to the bluffs; and at this stage the stream becomes a very serious military obstacle.

The ground upon which Keyes's corps fought that day is level, or very slightly undulating, and most of it, except the small open spaces at the earth-works, was densely wooded and swampy. The soil in all that region, when wet, is very soft and spongy, making passage over it difficult even for infantry. In the dense woods the thick undergrowth is matter with tangled vines, and the luxuriant foliage, in the full bloom of spring, rendered it in many places impossible to distinguish objects ten paces distant. A violent rain-storm set in about 5 P.M. on the 30th, a few hours after General Johnston had determined to attack next morning. The heavy rain continued all night and the face of the country was literally flooded. At daylight on the 31st the Chickahominy was booming, passable only at the bridges, and continued to rise during the day, although it had ceased to rain.

General Keyes gives a still closer view of his condition at that time. On the morning of the 31st he reported to General McClellan's chief-of-staff:

"Everything on the part of the Confederates indicates an attack on my position, which is only tolerably strong, and my forces are too weak to defend it properly. Brigadier-General Sumner told me yesterday he should probably cross the Chickahominy last night. If he did so, and takes post nigh Old Tavern and this side, I should feel more secure than I do now."


Sumner did not cross at that time referred to, and there is no other indication that he had orders or authority to do so. But General Keyes's report, made that morning, develops the fact that there was a dangerous gap between these two corps, and shows that there was a strong probability that it would soon be filled by Sumner's corps. In his "Fifty-Years' Observations," General Keyes says:

"The left of my lines was all protected by the White Oak Swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had attacked there an hour or two earlier than he did, I could have made but a feeble defense comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before assistance could have reached us."

Isolated as Keyes's corps was, every effort should have been made to strongly fortify the ground it occupied.

The defenses in front were weak and incomplete. The vulnerable and easy accessible right flank, the point at which attack ought to have been expected, because Confederate success at that place would have cut the Federal army in two, and would have exposed its left wing to destruction—ought to have been strongly fortified instead of being left entirely open. All this would have been practically illustrated if General Johnston's intentions had been carried into effect—that is, if Longstreet's division in full force had struck Keyes's right flank near Fair Oaks, when D. H. Hill's division moved against Keyes's front. But, through a "misunderstanding," General Longstreet transferred his

MAP SHOWING POSITIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES



own division to the Williamsburg road, instead of moving to the attack by the Nine-mile road, and he caused that division to take precedence of Huger's division at the crossing of Gilliss Creek, which at daylight was a raging torrent. General Huger, in a report, says: "Longstreet's division got to the road at the crossing first;" and adds that his own troops "had to wait until they (Longstreet's division) had passed. The delay after that was the time necessary to cross."*

Captain B. Sloan, of Huger's staff, says in a letter dated August 17th, 1885:

"Longstreet's brigades as they successively reached the plain above the creek halted and remained for an hour or two resting on their arms. This plain (in front of General Huger's headquarters) was perhaps between three and four miles in rear of the battle-field. Here at a farm-house, Huger met Longstreet and Hill, and a discussion was had as to the movements of the divisions, and as to the relative rank of the division commanders. Longstreet claimed (by instructions from General Johnston) to be in command of that portion of the army. After protest Huger acquiesced."

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*On the 20th of September, 1862, General Huger wrote to General Johnston:

"I beg to refer you to my letter of the 20th ultimo. I have waited one month, and no reply has been received from General Longstreet. As you have indorsed his erroneous statements, to my injury, I must hold you responsible, and desire to know from you if you have any reason to believe an answer will be made by General Longstreet. You must perceive that by postponing an answer your published report is allowed to go down in history as true. I cannot conceive that you desire to perpetrate such an injustice, for, though it may ruin me, I cannot redound to your credit . . . I send you herewith an abstract of such parts of your reports as refer to my division, with my remarks annexed, to which I invite your attention."

In Huger's abstract of Johnston's report we find:

"Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack . . . . . waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. Had Major-General Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes's corps would have been destroyed instead of merely defeated . . . Had it gone into action at 4 o'clock, the victory would have been much more complete."

In his remarks on these abstracts, Huger says:

"When General Longstreet's troops moved to support General Hill's attack, General Huger's division moved down the Charles City road at the same time with three brigades of Longstreet's division. . to the last paragraph I have only to say that if (Huger's division) did not go into action by 4 o'clock, it was because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in position and awaiting his orders."—*G. W. S.*

It was "then possibly 10 A.M. or 11 A.M." After that time "Huger's movements were directed by Longstreet."

Governor William E. Cameron, who was then adjutant of the 12th Virginia, of Mahone's brigade, Huger's division, says:

"Longstreet (three brigades) moved that morning from Fairfield race-course, and arrived at the crossing of the (Gilliss) creek in front of the command. We waited till Longstreet cleared the way—crossed the creek about 10:30 A.M.—moved as far as the Tudor House—rested there until 1 P.M." (Mahone's brigade then moved out on the Charles City road); "the men were fresh, eager, and in light marching-trim. The roads were bad, but there was no physical obstruction of any moment, and we met no enemy."

The following is from a letter by General R. E. Coleton, commander of one of the three brigades of Longstreet's division that moved at 6:30 A.M., from a point three miles out on the Nine-mile road:

"A little brook (Gilliss Creek) near Richmond was greatly swollen, and a long time was wasted crossing it on an improvised bridge made of planks, a wagon mid-stream serving as a trestle. Over this the division passed in single file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division commander had given orders for the men to sling their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and wade without breaking formation, they could have crossed by fours at least, with water up to their waists . . . . and hours would have been saved . . . When we got across we received orders to halt on the roadside until Huger's division passed us. There we waited for five or six hours."

These movements of Longstreet's division are in very marked contrast with General Johnston's intention that this division should start at daylight, move on the Nine-mile road and attack the enemy on D. H. Hill's left, as early as possible that morning.

At 6:30 A.M. General D. H. Hill wrote to General Rodes:

"I am ordered to attack the enemy this morning . . . Have your men ready to start at a moment's notice."

Rodes's brigade was in observation, three and a half miles out, on the Charles City Road, and had to cross an almost impracticable swamp in order to reach the position on the Williamsburg road from which Hill's division was

to advance to the attack. General Rodes says that the order to move reached him between 10 and 11 A.M. and adds:

"The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the head of White Oak Swamp . . At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution, to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life."

When the signal for attack was given, only two regiments of Rodes's brigade had reached Hill's position on the Williamsburg road, about one thousand yards in front of the Federal picket-line. But the other regiments of this brigade came up soon after. At 1 o'clock the signal guns were fired, and Hill's division at once moved forward.

The foregoing details in reference to the movements of these three divisions could not well be omitted, because General Johnston "asserts" that the divisions of Hill and Longstreet were in position early enough "to be ready to commence operations by 8 A.M.," and that General Longstreet "waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division." Having thus seen D. H. Hill's division start out alone at 1 P.M. to attack the Federals, it will be well to glance at the preparations made to receive him.

Whilst his troops were coming into position, their movements had been reported to General Silas Casey, who commanded the Federal first line of defense. He at once ordered one regiment to go forward about eight hundred yards on the Williamsburg road, and support the picket line; the working parties were called in, batteries harnessed up and the troops formed, ready to take their assigned places. In a short time the Confederate signal guns were heard, and the division was ordered into position to resist attack. The camps of these troops were immediately in rear of the earth-works. Palmer's brigade on the left, Wessells's in the center, and Naglee's on the right. Two regiments of Naglee's brigade were detached, supporting the picket-line, as already stated. About one-half of this division was placed in the rifle-pits on the right and left of the redoubt; the others were put in front, with

orders to contest the advance of the Confederates against the first abatis, and Spratt's battery was placed four hundred yards in advance of the earthworks, on the north side of the road, closely supported by three regiments of Naglee's brigade and one of Palmer's.

In moving to attack, Rodes's brigade was on the south side of the road, supported by Raines; Garland's brigade, on the north side of the road, was supported by G. B. Anderson. All were in the dense and marshy woods, wading through water occasionally from two to three feet deep, the whole way obstructed by undergrowth, which often prevented commanders from seeing more than one company of their men at a time. General Hill had taken the precaution to order every man to wear in action a white strip of cloth around his hat as a battle-badge. Garland moved a few minutes before Rodes was ready. His skirmishers soon struck the Federal picket-line, and the shock of Garland's brigade fell upon the small regiment of raw troops that had been ordered into the woods to support the Federal pickets. That regiment fell back to the abatis just in time to prevent being enveloped and destroyed. And it was soon driven through the abatis in great disorder. It had lost about one-fourth its numbers in a few minutes, and was broken to pieces in crossing the abatis under close and deadly fire. This regiment could not again be rallied. General Keyes says that it "retreated, joined by a great many sick. The numbers, as they passed down the road as stragglers, conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise and defeat."

The field hospitals of the division were in the camps at the front; there was a large number of sick; some men of the working parties did not resume their arms and join their regiments; these, with the teamsters and army followers, suddenly finding themselves under the fire of a large Confederate force rapidly emerging from the dark woods, fled in wild disorder.

But Garland, who encountered Spratt's battery and its support at the first abatis, says:

"We had now reached the edge of the wood where the abatis impeded our farther advance, and the troops were under heavy fire. . . . The regimental commanders, who had received my orders to move by the left flank, were unable to effect the movement in good order under the galling fire. The alternative was adopted—to push the regiments forward through the abatis."

General Garland soon found that his brigade unaided could not accomplish the work in hand. His losses were very heavy. But he adds: "G. B. Anderson's brigade arrived upon the field just at the proper time."

The latter officer, having put in three regiments to aid Garland, moved to the left with the 27th Georgia and endeavored to turn the right of the Federals. He encountered one of Naglee's detached regiments and drove it back; but the other detached regiment of Naglee's brigade came on the ground, and one regiment sent by General Keyes came up. G. B. Anderson then withdrew from the advanced position he had gained, but continued the fighting on the ground where it had been commenced on this part of the field.

In the meantime the contest around the battery at the abatis was close and desperate. Rodes's brigade was hotly engaged on the south side of the road, and General Hill had ordered Carter's battery to the front. The Federals stubbornly held their ground, and Hill now detached General Rains to make a wide flank movement through the woods to the right in order to turn the left of Casey's earth-works. From the edge of the wood, south of the Williamsburg road, Rain's brigade commenced firing on the flank and rear of the troops posted in Casey's rifle-pits. General Hill says:

"I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubt and indications of evacuating the position. Rodes took skillful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and took possession of the redoubt and rifle-pits."

Pending this contest for Casey's earth-works, General Keyes had sent two regiments from the second line direct to Casey's assistance, and a short time before those works were caried he sent General Couch, with two regiments, to attack the Confederate left, and thus relieve the pressure

on Casey's front. Before Couch could get into position Casey's line was carried, and General Keyes made immediate preparations for the defense of the line at Seven Pines, held by Couch's division. Peck's brigade was on the left, Deven's in the center, and the regiments of Abercrombie's brigade that had not been detached were on the right. Casey's troops, in falling back from their earth-works, endeavored to make a stand at the abatis in front of Couch's line and General Keyes sent forward one regiment of Devens's brigade to assist in checking the advance of the Confederates. Casey's men were driven through the abatis, and the regiment of Devens's brigade was hurled back in disorder, and could not be rallied until they had retreated beyond the earth-works from which they had advanced. A large proportion of the men of Palmer's and Wessells's brigades having been thrown into great disorder whilst retiring through the second abatis, and finding the earth-works of the second line already crowded, continued to retreat; but some of them, with nearly the whole of Naglee's brigade, remained upon the field. The Confederates in the immediate front of Seven Pines were now pressing into the second abatis, and there seemed to be strong probability that they would soon break through it and carry the earth-works of Keyes's second line. Thus, after more than two hours' close and bloody fighting, Hill's division unaided had captured the Federal first line of defense, and was closely pressing upon their second line. Hill then sent to Longstreet for another brigade. In a few minutes "the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson" came to Hill's support. The latter says:

> "A portion of this force, under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of the Palmetto Sharp-shooters and the 6th South Carolina, was sent on the extreme left to scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy."

These two regiments were conducted by General (then Colonel) G. B. Anderson to the position in which he had left the 27th Georgia. The three regiments soon became engaged with the two regiments under General Couch. previously referred to. The latter says:

"I advanced with Neill's and Ripper's regiments through a close wood, moving by the flank. . . . We at once came upon a large column of the enemy in reserve, but apparently moving toward Fair Oaks. . . Immediately engaged. . . . Here Colonel Rippey and all his field officers fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy had passed over the (Nine-mile) road leading to my center, cutting off the advance at Fair Oaks."

In reference to this affair General Keyes says:

"Both regiments were badly cut up . . . Casualties in Rippey's amount to 263, and are heavier than in any other regiment in Couch's division."

He adds that, after Couch was thrown back, Neill's regiment "took part in the hard fighting which closed the day near the Seven Pines," but Rippey's regiment "withdrew in detachments, some of which came again into action near my headquarters."

So far, the fighting done by the Federal troops for the safety of their second line of defense was not so effective as the resistance made by Casey's division at the first line. After the three Confederate regiments had fought their way across the Nine-mile road, not far south of Fair Oaks Station, they changed direction and moved toward Seven Pines. Leaving them for the present, attention will be called to the state of affairs in the vicinity of the redoubt in Casey's captured line.

When General Hill ordered the two South Carolina regiments to join the 27th Georgia and "scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy," he directed General R. H. Anderson, with the other portion of his brigade, to attack the Federals in a wood north, and within cannon-range of the redoubt. This wood was then occupied by two regiments and some companies of Naglee's brigade that had been, previous to the commencement of the action, supporting the picket line. In reference to the fighting at this point, General Naglee says in his official report:

"The Confederates opened a most destructive cross fire upon them from the pieces near the redoubt that had not been spiked, and this, with the (musketry) fire from their immediate front, was no longer to be endured, and they (his men) were withdrawn and marched down to Nine-mile road and placed in position in rear of this road, about three hundred yards from the Seven Pines."

Whilst these operations were in progress on Hill's left, the state of affairs at the second abatis, just in front of Seven Pines, and in the woods south and east of the redoubt had materially changed against the Confederates, who were first checked at the second abatis, and on the right were forced back to the redoubt. Previous to this the brigades of Rodes, Garland, and G. B. Anderson were engaged at the second abatis, and General Hill, having "resolved to drive" the Federals out of the woods, on the south of the road, where they now appeared in strong force, ordered General Rains, who was near them, "to move farther to the right," and adds:

"I regret that that gallant and meritorius officer did not advance farther in that direction. He would have taken the Yankee in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes in front would have been less bloody. The magnificent brigade of Rodes moved over the open ground to assault the Yankees, strongly posted in the woods. He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. A portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemper's brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, and directed by me to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade however, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes's men were badly cut up."

General Rodes was severely wounded, but did not turn over the command of his brigade to the senior colonel, John B. Gordon, until the firing had ceased. The latter says:

"Notified that I was placed in command, I reported to Major General Hill for orders. Under his direction I moved the brigade about half a mile to the rear, and ordered them to encamp on either side of the Williamsburg road."

General G. B. Anderson says: "After night we were ordered by the major-general commanding the division to take position in the woods in rear of the clearing." That is, in the edge of the wood on the Richmond side of Casey's line. General Garland says that his brigade bivouacked that night with G. B. Anderson's. General Rains says that his brigade "ultimately passed the night in line of battle, without fire or light, in another part of the woods ready to receive and check the enemy, should he advance." He makes no mention of any fighting done by his brigade after Casey's camp was captured.

Attention will now be called to the Federal movements that caused the right of D. H. Hill's division to fall back from the second abatis.

At 12 M. Berry's brigade of Kearny's division, from Bottom's Bridge, arrived at the third line of defense; and about the same time Birney's brigade, of the same division, reached the same line, but was near the railroad. At 3 P.M. the latter brigade was ordered to move along the railroad and support Keyes's right; but owing to subsequent conflicting orders, it did not go into action that day. About 3:30 P.M. Berry's brigade, now at the third line of defense, was ordered to Seven Pines to support Keyes; and at the same time, General Kearny "sent written orders for Jameson's brigade, camped at tote-de-pont, near Bottom's Bridge (three miles in rear), to come up without delay." It was about 4 P.M. when the advance of Berry's brigade reached Seven Pines. At that time one regiment of Devene's brigade had just been routed in the second abatis. General Kearny says: "On arriving at the field of battle, we found certain zigzag rifle-pits sheltering crowds of men, and the enemy firing from abatis and timber in their front." Berry's brigade was moved forward in the woods on the south side of the Williamsburg road. That officer says: "We steadily drove the enemy so far that I had serious fears of being flanked by the enemy, as they were driving our troops down the (Nine-mile) road." He evidently refers to the effect being produced by the advance of the three regiments under Colonel Jenkins. General Berry adds:

> "We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge of the slashings up the woods and on the left (south) of the camping-ground of General Casey's division, completely commanding his old camp and the earth-works with our rifles."

In the meantime the head of Jameson's brigade had reached the field. Two regiments were sent in advance of Seven Pines, in the abatis and woods on the south side of the road, supporting Berry's brigade; one regiment was posted in the earth-works of the second line, and the other regiment of Jameson's brigade had not yet come up.

General Kearny says:

"It was perhaps near 6 o'clock, when our center and right (the forces in the earth-works at Seven Pines, and those that had been sent to resist the Confederates advancing in rear of the Nine-mile road) defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right central flank attacks, pushed on with determined discipline and with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken, our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy pursuing rapidly, yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road, . . . and, penetrating deep into the woods on either side, soon interposed between my division and my line of retreat. He says that he checked the enemy in his intent of cutting us off against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advance regiments to retire by a remaining wood path, known to our scouts (the Saw-mill road), until they once more arrived at and remained in the impregnable position (the third line of defense)."

Besides Kearny's troops on the south side of the Williamsburg road, a large portion of those in the earth-works at Seven Pines retreated by the Saw-mill road; but some of the regiments from the earth-works, and others, that had been contesting Colonel Jenkins's advance along the Nine-mile road, fell back on the Williamsburg road. The latter were re-formed, and again contested Colonel Jenkins's advance. It does not appear that any of D. H. Hill's division, except the regiment that was with Colonel Jenkins, succeeded in getting beyond the second abatis; but it is very certain that the effective fire, across that abatis, from Hill's musketry and artillery, materially aided Colonel Jenkins in "bursting across the Williamsburg road."

Having given the Federal account of the manner in which the two South Carolina regiments and the 27th Georgia forced their way to and crossed the Nine-mile road a little south of Fair Oaks, it is now proposed to give extracts from Colonel Jenkins's report, showing the advance of these three regiments to and across the Williamsburg road, and then along the latter road to a point within about one mile of the Federal third line of defense. Colonel Jenkins says:

"I advanced my regiment through the abatis under a very heavy fire. . . . I instructed Colonel Bratton (6th South Carolina) to keep his left touching my right; and the enemy's line, after a stubborn resistance, having given way to our attack, . . . I executed, under fire from the right front, a change of front obliquely

forward. . . We drove the enemy to the front and right, passing over their second camp . . . The enemy, heavily reinforced, made a desperate stand, and our fighting was within seventy-five yards . . . Our advance continued . . . the enemy steadily giving back . . . I halted the lines, dressed them, and then changed front obliquely forward . . . Our steady advance was not to be resisted . . . The enemy gave back to our left and right across the Williamsburg road, about a mile or more from General Casey's headquarters. Following the latter and heavier body, they were again reenforced and took position in a wood parallel (to) and about three hundred yards on the right (south) of the Williamsburg road."

In describing his progress thus far, Colonel Jenkins speaks repeatedly of the obstinate resistance he met with, the terrible slaughter of the enemy, and his own severe losses. Bearing in mind the movement of Kearny's troops in the meanwhile against D. H. Hill's right, and the effect of Kearny's fire on Rodes's brigade, the Federals have good cause to regret the conflicting orders that prevented Birney's brigade, on the railroad, from closely supporting Keyes's right. It should be also borne in mind that, whilst Colonel Jenkins was fighting his way to the Williamsburg road, that there were four Federal regiments and a battery at Fair Oaks that had not been in action that day. Two of these regiments were the regular guards of the depot of supplies, and the other two had been ordered from Seven Pines to support Couch, but, missing their way, reached Fair Oaks just before the two regiments under Couch were cut up. It was very fortunate for the Confederates that Birney's brigade and the force at Fair Oaks Station were not thrown against the rear of Colonel Jenkins's three regiments, that were so gallantly fighting, and were also determinedly resisted in their brilliant movement to the Williamsburg road, in rear of the Federal second line of defense, and far in rear of Kearny's successful advance.

Resuming Colonel Jenkins's account, it appears that five companies of his regiment pushed after that portion of the Federals which fell back along the Williamsburg road. With the rest of his force Colonel Jenkins was preparing to move against the enemy in the woods south of that road, when it was reported to him that a heavy column of Federals was advancing upon the five companies. Learning

just then that the 5th South Carolina was not far to the rear, Colonel Jenkins sent for it to come up as soon as possible; ordered the commander of the five companies to advance upon the approaching Federal column, and determined to break the enemy south of the road before the column advancing on the road could reach him. He says:

"Having to pass across an open field on this advance, I lost heavily, but succeeded in routing and dispersing the enemy in my front, driving them at least a quarter of a mile; then, gathering my men promptly . . . I moved by the flank . . . and took up line of battle oblique to the (Williamsburg) road and to the left, so as to present front at once to the enemy's advance by the road and to any rallied party that might recover from my last attack. . . We had evidence of the near approach of the enemy by hearing their words of command and their cheers. . . . I advanced my line toward them. . . . The enemy poured in a heavy fire . . . The supporting regiment (27th Georgia), under a terrible fire, gave back . . . The enemy, encouraged, redoubled his fire . . . and advanced, and I determined to meet him. In prompt obedience, the two regiments . . . resumed their old, steady advance, firing full in the face of the foe.

The two lines neared each other to 30 or 40 yards . . . Losing heavily I pressed on, and the enemy suddenly and slowly gave way. . . .. We had advanced some 200 or 300 yards. . . . By this time . . . the 5th South Carolina . . . came up at a double-quick . . . The 27th Georgia . . . rallied and came forward . . . Jackson (5th South Carolina) came up on their right, sweeping before him the rallied fragments, who had collected and resumed fire from the woods to the right, and thus, at 7:40 P.M. we closed our busy day."

Out of thirteen brigades composing the right wing of the Confederate army, but five were put in close action that day. General Pickett says:

"On the afternoon of May 31st, and just as the battle of Seven Pines was being opened by General Longstreet, I was directed by that officer to move with my brigade to the York River Railroad, cover the same, (and) repel any advance of the enemy up that road."

General Longstreet held Pickett's brigade back in that position until daybreak, June 1st. From this it would seem that Longstreet was not in need of help on that side from troops not under his command. Attention will now be called to the five brigades under Longstreet's control on the Charles City road.

General Wilcox, in his official report, says that the three brigades under his command were in camp near the "Mechanicsville" road. He tells me, however, that he had

no map of the country, knew very little about the names of of the roads, but distinctly remembers that the road his troops were on passed close to General Johnston's headquarters near the northeast suburb of Richmond and led to New Bridge—that is, the Nine-mile road. Whatever may have been the name of the road on which the troops were in camp, he says that they were three and a half miles from the city, and moved, at 6:30 A.M., "by paths across to the junction of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads, and remained at this point till 3:30 P.M., I was then ordered to move with three brigades—my own, Colston's and Pryor's—on the Charles City Road, in rear of a part of Huger's division (Blanchard's and Armistead's brigades) as a support to these troops."

The Charles City road is south of the White Oak Swamp; it bears rapidly away from the point where the battle had been raging for more than two hours; and there was no enemy on that road. General Wilcox adds:

> "This order was soon modified, and my three brigades ordered to precede Huger's two. Having passed Huger's brigades, the march was continued but for a short time, when orders were again received, and this time to countermarch to the Williamsburg road and follow on in rear of the troops then advancing. The brigades had retraced their steps near one mile, and orders were given to face about and march down the Charles City road . . . Again orders were received in writing to move across to the Williamsburg road, following country roads and paths through woods and fields . . . in many places covered with water, and at one point waist deep. . . It was about 5 P.M. when the head of the column reached the Williamsburg road."

The plain words of General Wilcox, written at the time and addressed to his immediate commander, are more significant of the real truth than any skillfully formed sentences, framed now, could possibly be. With Wilcox's report before him, General Longstreet says:

> "I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles City road to support the one of Major-General Huger's which had been ordered to protect my right flank."

Three brigades of Huger's division were then on that road.

In order to form a proper conception of the folly exhibited by the marching and counter-marching of five Con-

federate brigades up and down the Charles City road between 3 and 5 P.M., it is necessary to glance at the movements then being made by the Federals from the north side of the Chickahominy. At 1 P.M., when the firing of Hill's attack was first heard, General McClellan ordered General Sumner to form the two divisions of his corps, and be ready to move across the Chickahominy, at a moment's notice, to aid Keyes. Sumner at once put his two divisions under arms, marched them to their respective bridges, and, with the heads of the columns on the bridges, awaited further orders. General Sumner says: "At 2:30 o'clock P. M. I received the order to cross the river." And he adds: "The columns immediately moved over the river and marched rapidly to the field of battle by two roads." It is now proposed, just now, to describe the earnest haste with which Sumner's troops pressed forward, through the deep mud, to the assistance of their friends. The head of Sumner's leading column reached the immediate vicinity of Fair Oaks before the head of the column of five brigades of Longstreet's command, from the Charles City road, reached the Williamsburg road, far in rear of the fighting.

The leading brigade of Wilcox's command arrived at Casey's captured redoubt a little before the firing of Kearny's rear guard, iin the woods south of the Williamsburg road, ceased. Three companies of the leading regiment of Wilcox's troops were sent to dislodge a party of the enemy—Kearny's detached rear guard—whose fire was still annoying the Confederates in the open between Casey's earth-works and the second abatis. In this contest these three companies lost 66 men in a few minutes. The five brigades with Wilcox went into bivouac between the first and the second abatis. Hill's division* was after-

*On the Confederate side the losses May 31st, in D. H. Hill's division were 2915, being more than one-third of his effective strength. The losses in R. H. Anderson's brigade (of Longstreet's division) are not reported; but it is known that the 6th South Carolina Regiment lost 269 out of 521 in action. The losses in this brigade may fairly be estimated to have been more than 600, and the total losses in Longstreet's division that day may be placed at 700. These figures

ward withdrawn and bivouacked in the woods west of Casey's redoubt and rifle-pits.

In his "Narrative," p. 132, General Johnston says:

"An hour or two later (than noon, May 30th) orders were given for the concentration of 23 of our 27 brigades against McClellan's left wing."

The result of that alleged "concentration" has been described. McClellan's left wing was attacked by five brigades; and General Johnston, who was wounded on another part of the field about sunset that day, says, in his official report:

"The skill, vigor, and decision with which these operations were conducted by General Longstreet are worthy of the highest praise."

Without discussion here General Johnston's opinion in regard to the manner in which General Longstreet conducted the operations of the three divisions on the right, reference will now be made to the movements of the division on the Nine-mile road, directed by General Johnston in person.

In addition to the action already described, there was a sharp contest north of Fair Oaks Station late in the afternoon, May 31st, between reenforcements, under Gen-

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whilst showing that the losses in the six brigades of Longstreet's division were not one-fourth as great as the losses in the four brigades of D. H. Hill's division, indicate clearly enough that Hill's division did the greater part of the fighting; but all honor is due to the brilliant, successful, and bloody work done that day by the two South Carolina regiments of Longstreet's division under Colonel Jenkins.

On the Federal side the losses in the operations described were: Kearny's division, less 1 brigade, 873; Couch's division, less 4 regiments, 1049; Casey's division, 1426. It is not amiss to give here the following from General Casey's official report. After stating that of the 13 regiments that composed his division were raw troops, and had suffered from the inclemency of the weather, at times without tents or blankets, and poorly supplied with rations and medical stores, he adds:

"Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, and the fact that there were not five thousand men in line of battle, they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy . . . It is true that the division, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy and lossing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer."—*G.W.S.*

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS

MAY 31ST & JUNE 1ST 1862

SCALE

1/4 1/2 3/4 1 MILE

500 1000 1500 YARDS

- *Dispositions made by Union Troops to resist attack 1 o'clock May 31st*
- *Positions of Confederate Troops going into Action*
- *Positions of Union Troops at dark May 31st*
- *" " Confederate " " " "*
- *" " Union Troops morning of June 1st*
- *" " Confederate " " " "*
- *" " Union Troops in Action June 1st*
- *" " Confederate " " " "*

RICHMOND & YORK RIVER R.R.

WILLIAMSBURG STAGE ROAD

NINE MILE ROAD

RIFLE PITS

HATTON'S

HAMPTON'S

WHITING'S

PETTIGREW'S

NAGLEE'S

COUCH

GORMAN

BURNS

KIRBY'S BATTERY 6 GUNS

Adams House

2 GUNS BRADY

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION AT 5 P.M.

SUMNER

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION

MEAGHER'S BRIGADE

HOWARD'S BRIGADE

DANA

Dr Trent

FAIR OAKS

ABERCROMBIE

WHITING'S BRIGADE 5 P.M.

HOOD

JENKINS

MAHONE

COLSTON

HOKE

FRENCH'S BRIGADE

HANCOCK

HANCOCK'S DIVISION

BIRNEY

PICKETT

PETTIGREW 5 P.M.

HAMPTON 5 P.M.

HOOD 5 P.M.

Hyer

Allen

RICHMOND & YORK RIVER

RAIL ROAD

BIRNEY'S BRIGADE

BERRY JAMESON 2 BRIGADES OF KEARNY

BERRY'S BRIGADE

KEYES CORPS

HOOKER 1 BRIG & 2 REGTS

3D LINE

1 REGT WILCOX

WILCOX

COLEMAN'S

SICKLES of HOOKER

PRYOR

R.H. ANDERSONS BRIGADE

2 N.J. REGTS

DEVENS

SEVEN PINES

REDOUBT 6 GUNS

2 REGTS PALMER

1 REGT

TWIN HOUSES

4 BRIGADES LONGSTREET

2 BRIGADES

PALMER'S CAMP

WESSEL'S CAMP

NAGLEE'S CAMP

2 BRIGADES HUGER'S DIVISION

R.H. ANDERSON'S BRIGADE

WESSELS 3 REGTS

SPRATT'S 4 REGTS NAGLEE

G.B. ANDERSON

GARLAND

RODES

CARTER

RAINS

KEARNY AT 6 P.M.

DHILL

SEVEN PINES

FAIR OAKS STATION

WILLIAMSBURG

WHITE OAK SWAMP

eral Sumner, sent from the north side of the Chickahominy to aid Keyes at Seven Pines, and my division under General Whiting. It will be borne in mind that when three Confederate regiments, under Colonel Jenkins, crossed the Nine-mile road just south of Fair Oaks, a little after 4 P.M., four regiments and a battery of Couch's division were cut off from the Federals opposed to D. H. Hill. Immediately after being thus cut off, General Couch communicated with Birney's brigade on the railroad, a mile or more east of Fair Oaks and endeavored to make arrangements by which the cut-off forces could rejoin Keyes.

Just then it was reported to General Couch that a large Confederate force on the Nine-mile road was rapidly advancing on Fair Oaks and the four regiments and battery retreated in the direction of Sumner's bridges. On reaching a point about one thousand yards north of Fair Oaks, General Couch was informed that the leading troops of Sumner's corps were closely approaching. Couch halted his forces, formed a line of battle, facing nearly south, placed two guns on each side of the road, and prepared to defend the position until Sumner's troops could come up.

It is now proposed to give in some detail an account of the movements that day of my division under Whiting which prevented Sumner's forces from reaching Keyes at Seven Pines and incidentally deprived Keyes and Heintzelman of the services of two brigades and a battery of their own troops.

In my official report (as originally submitted to General Johnston), it is stated that:

"On ariving at the headquarters of General Johnston about sunrise (May 31st), I learned from him that his intention was that General Longstreet's division should move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg road, and General Huger's by the Charles City road. The enemy, it was understood, had already upon this side of the Chickahominy a force variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000 men. The recent rains had materially increased the difficulty of crossing that stream, and, notwithstanding the very bad condition of the roads over which we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy condition of the fields and woods through which our troops would have to operate, it was believed that an energetic attack early in the morning, properly

supported and followed up, would result in defeat to that portion of the enemy already upon this side before the other portion of their army could cross the swollen stream either to reenforce their troops or to attack the city in our rear . . . General Johnston's intentions, as then explained to me, were, that whilst General D. H. Hill's division was attacking the enemy's advance position, on the Williamsburg stage road, General Longstreet's division would engage the enemy on Hill's left."

About 6 A.M. the head of the division under Whiting reached the vicinity of General Johnston's headquarters. There its way, to a point on the Nine-mile road near the suburb, was blocked by troops of Longstreet's division. General Whiting wrote to General Johnston asking that the route should be cleared. In reply, a staff officer wrote: "General Johnston directs me to say, in answer to yours of this date, that Longstreet will precede you." This quieted Whiting for a time, but, as the delay continued, he became impatient, and having heard that I was at General Johnston's headquarters he came there to see if I could not have his line of march cleared of Longstreet's troops. About 8 A.M., I sent my aide-de-camp, Captain Beckham, to see General Longstreet in regard to this matter. Captain Beckham asked me where General Longstreet was to be found. I referred him to General Johnston who, with several others, was present. General Johnston said General Longstreet's division was on the Nine-mile road and he was probably with it; if not, he might be found on the Williamsburg road with that part of his command.

I now quote again from the suppressed portion of my official report:

"In about an hour I learned by note from Captain Beckham that neither General Longstreet nor any portion of his command was on the Nine-mile road. This note was immediately shown to General Johnston, who dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Washington, to General Longstreet with directions to turn his division into the Nine-mile road, provided it could be done without material loss of time. This message did not reach General Longstreet."

It was about 9 A.M. when I handed Captain Beckham's note to General Johnston, who was amazed at the information and for a time strongly inclined to discredit it, thinking that my aide had not gone far enough on the Nine-mile road to come up with Longstreet's troops. Johnston then

sent one of his aides, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, to Longstreet with orders for the latter "to send three brigades by the Nine-mile road." Washington rode at full speed along the Nine-mile road and soon found himself within the Federal picket-line—captured.* As I first wrote in my report:

> "An hour later Captain Beckham reported that he had found Longstreet's division on the Williamsburg road, halted, for the purpose of allowing General D. H. Hill's troops to file by."

In a letter to me dated February 7th, 1863, Captain Beckham says it was about 10 A.M. when he reached General Longstreet. He adds:

> "Kemper's brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet's division, was at a halt when I got to General Longstreet's headquarters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied by wagons loaded with baggage and camp-equipage."

During these delays the firing of cannon across the Chickahominy and reports from our troops guarding the river between New Bridge and Mechanicsville, indicated threatening movements of the Federals on that side. About 11 A.M. General Johnston directed me to take Hampton's and Hatton's brigades, proceed to the Chickahominy bluffs, and assume command of all the forces on that side, in case the Federals made any attempt to cross the river. At the same time, the other three brigades, after about five hours' delay near the suburbs of the city, accompanied by General Johnston, proceeded on the Nine-mile road, and halted near the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Finding nothing that required my presence on the banks of the river, I placed Hampton's and Hatton's brigades in position from which they could promptly resist the passage of the river at New Bridge or above, and could support the other three brigades when needed, and then joined Generals Johnston and Whiting near Old Tavern. About 2:30 P.M., nothing having been heard from General Longstreet since my aide returned from the Williamsburg road, the chief of my staff, Major Whiting, requested to be allowed

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*General Casey says this incident helped to put him on his guard.—*Editors.*

to go over to that road and find out the state of affairs there. I tendered his services in this matter to General Johnston.

In my official report it is stated:

"Between 4 and 5 o'clock a note was received (by General Johnston) from General Longstreet, stating that he had attacked and beaten the enemy after several hours' severe fighting; that he had been disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his left; and, although it was now nearly too late, that an attack, by the Nine-mile road, upon the right flank and rear of the enemy would probably enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy before night."

All the foregoing quotations from my report were omitted from the copy that was put on file, in compliance with General Johnston's request, contained in his letter to me, June 28th, 1862, in which he said:

"I herewith inclose the three first sheets of your report, to ask a modification or omission rather. They contain two subjects which I never intended to make generally known, and which I have mentioned to no one but yourself, and mentioned to you as I have been in the habit of doing everything of interest in the military way. I refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of his division, and that of his note to me, received about 4 o'clock, complaining of my slowness, which note I showed you. As it seems to me that both of these matters concern Longstreet and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking you to strike them out of your report, as they in no manner concern your operations. I received information of L.'s misunderstandings (which may be my fault, as I told you at the time) while his troops were moving to the Williamsburg road, and sent to L. to send three brigades by the Nine-mile road, if they had not marched so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time; this, after telling you of the misunderstanding. Your march from General Semmes's headquarters (he means the advance made by the division, under Whiting, from the point where it was halted, near Old Tavern. G.W.S.) was not in consequence of the letter from L. Whiting (Major) had gone at my request, with our permission, to ascertain the state of things with Longstreet. Just before 4 o'clock we heard musketry for the first time, and Whiting (General) was ordered to advance. Just then Major W. rode up and reported from L., and a moment after the note was brought me which, after reading it, I showed it to you."

In his official report General Johnston says that General Longstreet received verbal instructions, and that the division of General Longstreet was to support the attack made by D. H. Hill's division. General Longstreet, in his official report, makes no mention of the preliminary movements of his own division, except that he was obliged to send three of his small brigades on the Charles City road

to support the brigade of Huger's division, which had been ordered to protect his (Longstreet's) right flank. Indefinite as these reports are in reference to the direction in which Longstreet's division was to move, it may, on the preceding evidence, be now considered established that General Johnston intended Longstreet's division should move into action on the Nine-mile road, and support Hill by attacking Keyes's right flank. It is noticeable that General Johnston, in his official report, makes no mention of the information he received in regard to the transfer of Longstreet's division to the Williamsburg road, or of the attempt made to have at least three brigades sent back to the Nine-mile road. No allusion is made, in either of their official reports, to the note from Longstreet, received by Johnston about 4 P.M.

The anxiety felt by those near Old Tavern was extreme in the hours of suspense previous to 4 P.M. during which all were expecting to hear that the fighting on the Williamsburg road had commenced. In my official report it is stated that "as the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard from General Longstreet's attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for some two or three hours, but little musketry it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made that day." Previous to 4 P.M., it was believed by all on the Nine-mile road that no attack had yet been made; the division on that road could not be advanced beyond McLaw's picket-line without bringing on the battle which General Johnston intended should be initiated by the divisions of Hill and Longstreet. The division under Whiting was there for the purpose of holding in check reenforcements from the north side of the river that would surely be sent to Keyes as soon as he was attacked in force; and Whiting was only to reenforce Longstreet "should there be cause of haste." The information finally received not only warned General Johnston that the battle had been raging for several hours, but the character of Longstreet's note conveyed the distinct expression that the delay from 8 A.M. to the afternoon had enabled the Federals to reenforce Keyes to such

an extent that Longstreet had met with more opposition than the whole of his command could well overcome. In this state of affairs General Johnston ordered the division under Whiting to move forward as rapidly as possible, and himself urged and led the division against "the right flank of Longstreet's adversaries" without further regard to reenforcements from the north side of the Chickahominy. This advance was so rapid that no artillery was carried forward, on account of the almost impracticable condition of the ground. Very soon after this movement commenced, General Johnston directed Hood's brigade to bear strongly to the right, and go direct to the assistance of Longstreet's, who was supposed to be in front of the enemy, near Seven Pines. But it has already been seen that Colonel Jenkins's command had then burst across the Nine-mile road a little south of Fair Oaks, and was "scouring" the rear of that road, and that 8 of the 13 brigades under Longstreet's control had not been put in action. Nothing of this, however, was then known to General Johnston. When the head of the column on the Nine-mile road, in the hurried movement to aid Longstreet, reached the vicinity of Fair Oaks Station, General Johnston censured General Whiting for hesitating to cross the railroad before disposing of a Federal force, north of that station in position to threaten the left flank and rear of Whiting's command in case he moved farther. I was not present, but the following extracts from a letter to me, written in 1868 by Colonel B. W. Frobel, of the Confederate States Engineer Corps, gives an account of what occurred on that occasion: Colonel Frobel was then a major on General Whiting's staff. He says:

"Generals Johnston and Whiting were following immediately after Whiting's brigade. As Whiting's brigade reached the road near the railroad crossing, I was sent to halt it. On returning after doing this, I joined Generals Whiting and Johnston, who were riding toward the crossing. General Whiting was expostulating with General Johnston about taking the division across the railroad insisting that the enemy were in force on our left flank and rear. General Johnston replied: 'Oh! General Whiting, you are too cautious.' At this time we reached the crossing and nearly at the same moment the enemy opened an artillery fire from the direction pointed out by General Whiting. We moved back up the road near the small white house. Whiting's brigade (a portion of it) was

gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries (twc separate sections of one battery) which were firing on us. The brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to the left of the Nine-mile road near the crossing. There was only a part of the brigade in this charge. Pender (commanding regiment) soon rallied and re-formed those on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to him to reconnoiter the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken, to try it again. Before he could do so some one galloped up, shouting, 'Charge that battery.' The men moved forward at a double-quick, but were repulsed as before, and driven back to the woods."

Of the Federal resistance to this attack, General E. V. Sumner, in his official report, says:

"On arriving on the field, I found General Couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. These troops were drawn up in line near Adam's house, and there was a pause in the battle."

General Sedgwick, commander of Sumner's leading division, says: "Upon debouching into the open field near Adams's house, we found Abercrombie's brigade of Couch's division sustaining a severe attack and hard pushed by the enemy."

Kirby's six Napoleon guns were promptly placed in position facing south. The infantry of Sedgwick's division was put on the right and left in Couch's defensive line. The Federal accounts show that repeated attempts were made by the Confederates to carry the position, but without success; that the contest continued until dark, at which time Kirby's battery faced west, without having otherwise changed position, and the infantry on the left of the battery was also facing west, with its left very near the railroad, a little east of Fair Oaks Station. On the immediate right of Kirby's battery the line of infantry still faced nearly south. There was no change in this part of the Federal lines; but on the extreme right the line was facing almost west, and had not been closely engaged.

In the meantime, before the action north of Fair Oaks commenced, when the head of Pettigrew's brigade reached the point in the large wood about three-fourths of a mile from the railroad crossing, I halted for the purpose of giving instructions to General Wade Hampton, whose brigade had

reached the rear of Pettigrew's. Generals Johnston and Whiting had gone on with the two leading brigades, and I did not again see either of them until after dark. I directed General Hampton to lead his brigade to the left, on the wood road, a little more than a brigade length, and then resume his march in a direction parallel to the Nine-mile road, which would bring Hampton into line of battle on Pettigrew's left, in the attack General Johnston proposed to make. I remained at that point until Hampton's brigade had filed out of the Nine-mile road; then gave directions to Hatton's brigade to continue moving on the Nine-mile road, which would bring it into position as a reserve, to the line of battle formed by the brigades of Whiting, Pettigrew, and Hampton. In the meantime the action had commenced near Fair Oaks. On reaching the eastern edge of the wood I saw the leading troops moving north from Fair Oaks in direction almost exactly opposite to that in which I had given Colonel Hampton to understand that General Johnston's movement would be made. In a short time I saw our leading troops retiring. This was the second repulse spoken of by Colonel Frobel. I notified General Whiting of Hampton's position, and soon learned from him that the previous attacks had been conducted without proper knowledge of the enemy's position, but that a reconnaissance had been made, and a combined attack by the three brigades would capture the battery in a few minutes. Before this attack was arranged, Kirby's battery of six pieces and the first brigade of Sedgwick's division reached Couch's line and the attack was repulsed. By this time Hatton's brigade had come up and was in the open field, close to the north side of the Nine-mile road. One regiment of Pettigrew's brigade, in reserve, was in the same field about two hundred yards north of the road. Soon after the repulse of the three brigades, the firing of the Federal side greatly increased. General Johnston, who was at the small grove north of Fair Oaks, sent word to me to have all the available troops brought up quickly. The only troops within reach, not already up, were a brigade

and a half of Magruder's command stationed along the New Bridge road. I sent General Johnston's order direct to these brigade commanders; and seeing that Whiting's brigade was pressed back on the right, and learning that Hampton and Pettigrew were suffering great losses in the small wood, 600 to 800 yards north of Fair Oaks, it seemed to me that the Federal reenforcements from the north side of the river were likely to break through the division and reach Longstreet's left flank and rear. I therefore ordered Hatton's brigade and Pettigrew's reserve regiment to move into the woods and aid the troops closely engaged there. Believing that Whiting had on the right as much as he could well attend to, I went with Hatton's brigade to the extreme front line of Hampton and Pettigrew in the woods, and soon learned that General Pettigrew had been wounded, it was supposed mortally, and was a prisoner. General Hatton was killed at my side just as his brigade reached the front line of battle; and in a very few minutes General Hampton was severely wounded. In this state of affairs, I sent word to General Whiting that I would take executive control in that wood, which would relieve him, for the time, of care for the left of the division, and enable him to give his undivided attention to the right.

In the wood the opposing lines were close to each other, in some places not more than twenty-five or thirty yards apart. The contest continued until dark without material variation in the position of either line on that part of the field after I reached the extreme front, until the firing had ceased at dark, when I ordered the line to fall back to the edge of the field and reform. In the meantime Whiting's brigade and the right of Pettigrew's had been forced back to the clump of trees just north of Fair Oaks Station, where the contest was kept up until night.*

On reaching the open field in rear of the line where Hampton's and Hatton's brigades had been engaged, I heard for the first time that General Johnston had been very ser-

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*In the action north of Fair Oaks the four Confederate brigades lost 1061 killed and wounded.—*G.W.S.*

iously wounded and taken from the field an hour or more before. I was second in rank in his army, therefore the command, for the time being, devolved upon me.

In further illustration of views held at that time on the Confederate side in regard to the events of the first day at Seven Pines, the following extracts from a letter dated June 7th, 1862, from Longstreet to Johnston, are not irrelevent, however erroneous the opinions he expresses may be. He says:

"The failure of complete success on Saturday (May 31st) I attribute to the slow movements of General Huger's command. This threw perhaps the hardest part of the battle upon my own poor division . . . Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when Whiting moved, and I could not, therefore, move on with the rush that we could have had his movements been earlier . . . I can't but help think that a display of his forces on the left flank of the enemy by General Huger would have completed the affair and given Whiting as easy and pretty a game as was ever had upon a battle-field."

It is not deemed necessary to make any comments on this letter. The facts already stated and proved are sufficient.

General Johnston says (see p. 214):

"It was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division."

It may not be amiss to mention here that Colonel Frobel, in the letter to me above referred to, says:

"General W. H. C. Whiting was at that time commanding your division, you being in command of the left wing of the army . . . Whiting was directly under General Johnston, who was with the division the whole day until he was wounded, late in the afternoon."

Without dwelling now upon the persistency with which General Johnston insists that I was then in command of the division which bore my name, it may be stated here that General Whiting was clearly of the opinion then and ever after, that but for General Johnston's determination to press on across the railroad to Longstreet's assistance, Couch would have been beaten and his battery captured before Sumner's leading troops reached the field.

Before describing what occurred on the second day, allusion will be made to some of the erroneous views which

have been widely promulgated in regard to these operations. General Johnston, in his official report says: "Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command. He was prevented from renewing his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening." On page 141 of this published "Narrative," he says: "Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks (June 1st) was six miles from those of Heintzelman and Keyes, which were near Bottom's Bridge." In reference to the position of the Confederates at that time, he places D. H. Hill's division in line of battle across the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, more than a mile east of Seven Pines, the left of Hill's line, near the railroad, facing north; Longstreet's and Huger's divisions on Hill's left, parallel to the railroad and extending a short distance west of Fair Oaks Station, uniting there with the division under Whiting; and says, "Magruder's division in reserve" "was under arms near."* On the map in his book he represents Sumner's corps in one line facing west, its left on his railroad a little west of Fair Oaks, with Longstreet's and Huger's divisions close on Sumner's left flank and rear. Having thus placed the contending forces, he adds: "Such advantage of position and superiority of numbers would have enabled the Confederates to defeat Sumner's corps, had the engagement been renewed Sunday morning (June 1st) before any aid could have come from Heintzelman, after which his troops could not have made effectual resistance." He claims that the battle was "unfinished in consequence of the disabling of their commander (Johnston)," and states that after he was disabled, the only thing President Davis "ought to have done, or had time to do, was postponed almost twenty hours—the putting General Lee, who was near, in command of the army."

General Johnston also states that three Federal corps on the Richmond side "were completely separated from the two corps of their right beyond the Chickahominy by

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*"Narrative of Military Operations," by Joseph E. Johnston, pp. 137, 119.—*G.W.S.*

the swollen stream, which had swept away their bridges." This, if true, was not known or believed on our side. Anxiety on account of Federal reenforcements from the north side of the Chickahominy was felt, on the 1st of June as well as on the 31st of May, by the Confederate commander. But General Longstreet seems to have ignored all consideration of that subject on both days.

In the official report of the chief engineer of McClellan's army it is stated:

> "At 8:15 A.M. (June 1st) the pontoon-bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry and artillery. About noon the upper trestle-bridge was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the lower trestle-bridge."

The railroad bridge had been made practicable for all arms, and was not affected by the freshet.

The specific details given by General Johnston in regard to the positions occupied by the divisions of D. H. Hill, Longstreet and Huger on the morning of June 1st, accorded in the main, with General Longstreet's report to me at the time; and I never questioned the accuracy of General Johnston's statement in regard to the general positions occupied by these three divisions until I saw the recently published "Official Records." But I knew there was a gap between Whiting's right and Longstreet's left, and I knew, too, that Magruder's troops were not concentrated at Old Tavern.

Only one of the many remarkable statements made by General Longstreet in regard to the operations of the second day will be mentioned here. In a letter written in 1874 to General George W. Mindil, Federal, for the avowed purpose of throwing light upon the Confederate side, General Longstreet says:

> "I do not remember to have heard of any fighting on the second day, except a sharp skirmish reported by General Pickett as he was retiring, under the orders of General Lee, to resume our former position."

Without dwelling upon what might have happened if General Johnston had not been disabled, or discussing what

President Davis "ought to have done, or had time to do," it is proposed to show that General Johnston is greatly in error in reference to the positions of the contending forces on the morning of June 1st, and to present evidence that will refresh General Longstreet's memory in regard to the fighting he "heard of" that day.

In reference to the positions occupied by the three divisions under General Longstreet, it has already been stated and proved that D. H. Hill's division was in bivouac in the woods west of Casey's earth-works; and that large portions of the divisions of Longstreet and Huger were around Casey's redoubt, in the open field west of the second abatis. Before midnight, May 31st, Colonel Jenkins's command was withdrawn to Seven Pines, and the brigades of Wilcox and Pryor moved forward from the redoubt and bivouacked on the sides of the Williamsburg road, in advance of Seven Pines, the head of their column being on the ground where Colonel Jenkins ceased fighting. Pickett's brigade was still far back on the railroad, where it was posted by Longstreet's order when the attack was commenced, May 31st, and Mahone's brigade was three and a half miles out on the Charles City road.

Two brigades of the division under Whiting were in line of battle, facing nearly east of the right wing on the railroad about five hundred yards west of Fair Oaks, the left in the woods on the north of the Nine-mile road, and the other three brigades within close-supporting distance. There were six brigades in Magruder's command. Two of them were guarding the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge roads. The positions of the other four brigades are given in a note, dated 11 P.M. May 31st, addressed to me by their immediate commander, General McLaws. He says:

> "General Cobb, five regiments (posted) from the Mechanicsville road to General Harvey's place; General Kershaw from General Harvey's to Baker's; Generals Griffith and Semmes from General Kershaw's right to New Bridge, and on the line down New Bridge road."

Magruder's six brigades were the only forces guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge.

On the Federal side Keyes's corps, with abundant artillery, occupied that part of the Federal third line of defense which was on the south side of the Williamsburg road, one and three-eighths miles east of Seven Pines. One brigade and two regiments of Hooker's division were close in rear of Keyes' and two brigades of Kearny's division were in the trenches of the third line of defense on the north side of the Williamsburg road; whilst Birney's brigade of that division was about half a mile in advance, with three regiments in line of battle, facing nearly south-west, their right resting on the railroad, and in close connection with Sumner's corps. In fact, the lines of Sumner's and Heintzelman overlapped here at the time the Confederate attack was made. Sumner's corps (instead of being drawn up in one line, facing nearly west, as represented by General Johnston) was in two lines, nearly at right angles, to each other. Sedgwick's division, with Couch's cut off forces and five batteries, were in line, facing nearly west, the left wing a little north of the railroad, a short distance east of Fair Oaks. Richardson's division was on Sedgwick's left, in three lines, nearly parallel to the railroad, with four batteries. In front of Richardson's position was a dense and tangled wood; on his right, and in front of Sedgwick, the ground was open for several hundred yards.

I find no reasonable cause to doubt the substantial accuracy of the Federal official reports in regard to the position of their forces, or in reference to their accounts of the actual fighting, a synopsis of which will presently be given. I am far from agreeing with General Johnston in the rose-colored view he takes of the situation, at the time he was wounded, when there were, practically, three Federal corps upon the field. But I gave orders for the renewal of the attack, with no expectation, however, of the easy, complete, and certain success he pictures for that day.

When I assumed command of the army, I could learn nothing from those around me in reference to what occurred on the Williamsburg road later than the information contained in the note received from General Longstreet, at 4 P.M. Hood's brigade had been recalled before it reached D. H. Hill's staff-officers with several different parties to communicate with General Longstreet and request him to meet me as soon as possible at the headquarters on the Nine-mile road, near Old Tavern. A few minutes later General J. E. B. Stuart reported to me that the enemy had made no advance during the day on the Charles City road, and that our troops had captured the Federal works at Seven Pines some time before sunset and had advanced beyond that point—he did know how far. He had good guides with him, and offered to go in person to General Longstreet and have him piloted to headquarters. A little after 11 P.M. I received a note from General Stuart, stating that at 10:30 he had failed to find General Longstreet.

In the meantime General McLaws, who was at New Bridge, reported large forces opposite that point, and that they were building a pontoon-bridge. He added: "If this position is forced, your command will be in great danger, as you are aware."

Guided by one of my staff, who had succeeded in finding him about midnight, General Longstreet reached headquarters after 1 A.M. He reported that D. H. Hill's division and a portion of his own, after prolonged fighting and heavy losses, had succeeded in driving the enemy back to Seven Pines late in the afternoon, and had pursued them more than a mile until dark. On learning from him that a portion of his own division had not been in action, and that Huger's division, recalled from the Charles City road, though now at the front, had not been engaged at all, I directed General Longstreet to send a brigade of Huger's division to the Nine-mile road. That brigade was to support McLaws at New Bridge, or Whiting at Fair Oaks, as might be required. General Longstreet was ordered to renew the attack with the rest of his command as soon

after daybreak as practicable, and to fight north rather than attempt to force his way any farther toward Bottom's Bridge. He left me a little after 2 A.M., and returned to the Williamsburg road. I wrote to General Lee, who was stationed in Richmond, in general charge of military operations, informing him of the orders I had given. In reply, dated 5 A.M., June 1st, General Lee says: "Your movements are judicious, and determination to strike the enemy right." In my official report it is stated:

> "General Longstreet was directed to push the successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting, on his left. The latter was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real attack."

Soon after daylight there was sharp firing for a few minutes between Hood's skirmishers, near the railroad, and the extreme right of Richardson's position. These skirmishers were promptly recalled, and Whiting was ordered to make no advance until the attack by the right wing was well developed, in full force. In this affair Hood lost thirteen wounded. No part of the division under Whiting was engaged during the day; because, although there was a good deal of heavy firing in the right wing that morning, nothing was observed from the Nine-mile road that indicated to me a real and determined attack, in full force by the right wing, such as I intended Whiting should support.

At 6:30 A.M. firing in the wood commenced, a little south of the railroad, about half a mile or more east of Fair Oaks, and was sufficiently heavy to indicate that the movement Longstreet had been ordered to make had begun. This heavy firing continued for an hour or more, nearly at the same place, but did not develop into an attack in full force. It lulled for a while, and was presently renewed, but now at a point several hundred yards south of the railroad. Longstreet's troops were evidently losing ground without his having made an attack with more than a very small portion of the right wing.

In the meantime my chief of staff, who was on the Chickahominy bluffs, had, from time to time, reported

movements of troops, pontoons, etc., on the north side of the river, showing preparations for sending over additional Federal reenforcements. The first information received from General Longstreet was contained in a note from him, dated 8 A.M. saying: "I have ordered a brigade of General Huger's, as agreed upon. Please send a guide for it." About 10:30 A.M. the following was received from General Longstreet: "The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a brigade is in action." In a few minutes this came from him: "The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily." And directly after, a note dated 10 A.M. was received, saying: "Can you reenforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me . . . If I can't get help, I fear I must fall back."

His leading troops had fallen back some time before; this was evident from observations made on the Nine-mile road. In Longstreet's dire extremity, as shown in the three notes received almost at one time, there were two ways in which I could then, possibly, help him, one way by ordering Whiting forward over the open ground, and in deep mud, against the strong lines and numerous batteries of Sedgwick and Richardson; the other was to strip the Chickahominy of its defenders above New Bridge, and send reenforcements direct to Longstreet on the Williamsburg road. I adopted the latter course, and requested General McLaws to go to General Longstreet, inform him that about five thousand men had been ordered to reenforce him, assure him that the whole Federal army was not in his front, tell him that he must not fall back any farther but drive the enemy, and, if possible, regain the ground he had lost.

About 1 P.M. I received a note from General McLaws, stating: "Longstreet says he can hold his position with five thousand more men. He has now the same ground the enemy held yesterday." A little after 2 P.M. I received

a letter from General Longstreet, dated 1:30 P.M. in which he says:

> "The next attack will be from Sumner's division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe . . . I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh, that I had ten thousand men more!"

When I received that note from Longstreet there had been little or no firing for several hours, and there was none of any consequence after that time. On reading in the "Official Records" the detailed reports of subordinate fighting commanders on both sides, I asked General D. H. Hill what orders he received from General Longstreet that day. His reply, dated June 26th 1885, authorizes me to state: "General Hill says that he got no orders from General Longstreet on Sunday, June 1st, whatever." This information was to me like lightning from a clear sky, and it cleared the murky atmosphere which had surrounded some of the recently published official reports on the Confederate side, and enabled me to comprehend things that appeared to be inexplicable before I knew that Longstreet had made no attempt to obey my order.

The Federal reports of regimental, brigades and division commanders of troops closely engaged the second day are given in such detail in the "Official Records," that, by comparing them with the limited number of Confederate reports found there, a clear idea may be formed of what actually occurred. This comparison eliminates nearly all of those exaggerated elements in the accounts which relate to the wondrous results claimed to have been achieved by so-called "bayonet-charges" on the one side and the bloody repulse of "ten-times" their own numbers on the other.

It has already been shown that on May 31st, the Confederates struck Keyes's corps, isolated at Seven Pines, with four brigades, and increased the attacking force to five brigades after Keyes had been reenforced by Heintzelman. June 1st, the Confederate attack was made against the left wing of French's brigade, which, with one regiment of Howard's brigade on its left, formed the front line of

Richardson's division. On the left of that division was Birney's brigade of Kearny's division. In his official report, Richardson says:

> "Near our left two roads crossed the railroad and up these the enemy moved his columns of attack. At 6:30 A.M. . . . the enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within fifty yards. It soon became the heaviest musketry firing that I had ever experienced during an hour and a half . . . I now ordered in General Howard to reenforce the first line with his brigade . . . Soon after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first time, unable to stand our fire, and for half an hour the firing ceased on both sides."

In this attack the regiment of Howard's brigade on the extreme left of Richardson's front line was broken, fell back behind the second line, and was not again in action. The regiment next to it on the right was forced back a short distance. The left of Richardson's front line was so rudely shaken that all available means were used to strengthen it: a battery and Meagher's brigade were put in to cover the gap, and Burns's brigade, previously detached to cover the communications with the bridges, was recalled and hurriedly sent by General Sumner to Richardson's assistance.

It will be seen later that this staggering blow against the left of Richardson's line was from three regiments of Armistead's brigade and three regiments of Mahone's brigade, both of Huger's division. It will be seen, too, that these six regiments were the only Confederate forces that attacked the Federals during the second day.

It was about 8 A.M. when General Howard, with two regiments of his brigade, relieved the left wing of French's brigade and took up the fighting. Just at that time the three regiments of Birney's brigade south of the railroad, whose strong advance guards had been slowly driven back, were rapidly thrown forward. The regiment next the railroad struck the flank of the Confederates just at the time Howard was advancing against their front; and under these two attacks the Confederates gave way in great disorder. The center regiment, of Birney's three, met with little resistance until it struck a Confederate force in strong

position on a wood road parallel to and three hundred to four hundred yards south of the railroad, in front of the left wing of French's brigade. The two regiments of Howard's brigade, in their forward movement, soon struck the same Confederates in the densely tangled wood. These three Federal regiments after repeated efforts to dislodge the Confederates—Pickett's brigade, were repulsed with severe losses, and resumed position in the lines from which they had advanced.

General Howard was wounded just as his two regiments were coming to close quarters with Pickett's brigade. The command of Howard's brigade then devolved upon Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire, who says:

"Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had been some time in action and severely handled, I directed that they should move out of the woods and reform in the rear of Meagher's brigade, while I advanced my regiment to occupy the ground. We moved forward in line of battle through the wood, and about three hundred yards from the railroad track encountered the rebel line of battle. The fire was now very close and deadly, the opposing lines being several times not over thirty yards apart. When about ordering another the (third) charge I was struck by a rifle-ball. Lieutenant Colonel Langley then took command of the regiment, and, the rebels endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent order, carrying most of our wounded."

It was now about 11 A.M., perhaps earlier. The fighting was practically ended when the 5th New Hampshire withdrew from in front of the position defended by Picketts' brigade. In the meantime however, there had been some sharp firing, and for a short time a little close fighting, on the Williamsburg road, between the two Confederate brigades, General Wilcox and seven regiments of Hooker's division and the left regiment of Birney's three. The two regiments of the right wing of French's brigade also advanced into the wood a short time before the action was ended. (For losses, see p. 218.)

On the Confederate side, General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says that at daylight, June 1st, he "learned that heavy reenforcements had come up to the support of Keyes," and "that General G. W. Smith had been checked upon the Nine-mile road, and that no help could be expected

in that direction." He also adds: "I therefore resolved to concentrate my troops around the captured works." This resolution was formed in the absence of any instructions "whatever" from his chief, General Longstreet, and he certainly received none from me. It now appears that after Longstreet, about 10:00 A.M., May 31st, assumed control of Huger and Huger's division, all the brigades, when sent to the front, were ordered to report to General D. H. Hill. I did not know that General Longstreet had, for the time being, virtually given up to General Hill the command of the three divisions on the Williamsburg road; much less did I know, or even suspect, that General Longstreet made no attempt, June 1st, to carry into effect the order I gave him to renew the attack. The official reports show that D. H. Hill commanded the thirteen brigades in the right wing that day. It is now proposed to tell what he did with them. It will be seen that he ordered the brigades of Pickett and Mahone to attack, and, by inference that Armistead's brigade was ordered to attack; that the brigades of Wilcox and Pryor were ordered to retire, and that the brigades of Mahone and Colston, just as the fighting ended, were ordered to assist Pickett in the defensive position he had taken up after Armistead's three regiments were repulsed.

General Pickett, in his official report, says that his brigade marched at daylight from its position back on the railroad and, in compliance with General Longstreet's orders given the evening before, reported to General D. H. Hill at Casey's redoubt. He adds:

> "My brigade had marched on some four hundred yards in advance of this point when it was there halted. General Hill directed me to ride over to the railroad and communicate with Brigadier-General Hood, whose right was resting on that road. I asked General Hill of the whereabouts of the enemy. He said they were some distance in advance—in fact, I had no definite idea where."

It is very clear that to the Confederates on the Williamsburg road the expression "in advance" meant toward the east. But Pickett's instructions from Hill required him in person to go north in search of Hood. On his route,

Pickett soon met a small "plundering party" of Confederates rushing past him. He says:

> "One fellow riding a mule with a halter I seized on and detained for explanation. He said the enemy was within a few yards of us, and entreated me to let him save himself. I immediately rode back with him at a gallop, and as briefly as possible informed General Hill of the circumstances. He ordered me to attack, and I supposed (the) same order was given to other brigade commanders."

It is well to call attention here to the fact that the three regiments of Birney's brigade (Federal) had strong outposts well to their front, stationed in the woods several hundred yards south of the railroad, for the purpose of holding any advance of the Confederates in check long enough to enable Kearny, with the rest of his division, to reach and support Birney if closely pressed. The Federal accounts show that these outposts did seriously delay the Confederates advancing east on the south side of the railroad.

General Pickett says that his brigade was "in line of battle nearly perpendicular to the railroad," and that Armistead's was on his left. It will be noticed that, advancing in the line he describes, Pickett's brigade moved nearly parallel to the railroad. Pickett encountered the strong outposts of Birney's brigade. Continuing his account, he says his brigade:

> " . . . struck the enemy within a short distance (who opened heavily upon us), drove him through an abatis over a cross-road leading to (the) railroad, and was advancing over a second abatis, when I discovered Armistead's brigade had broken and were leaving the field pell-mell. At this moment I was on foot and halfway across the abatis, the men moving on beautifully and carrying everything before them."

He had certainly not yet struck Richardson's line, and never did reach it. He called on General Hill for reenforcements and he says that he threw back the left of his brigade so as to oppose a front to the Federals on the side where Armistead's men had given way, and adds:

> "As a matter of course, from having been the attacking party, I now had to act on the defensive. Fortunately the enemy seemed determined on attacking and carrying my front, and driving me out of the abatis, which our men succeeded in preventing, though with considerable loss."

The "Official Records" contain no report from any commander in that portion of Amistead's, or of Mahone's brigade engaged in the attack on Richardson's line. But General Mahone, in a letter to Captain Benj. Huger, October 13th, 1862, says that his brigade moved early on the morning of June 1st from its position on the Charles City road, and reported to General Hill, at the redoubt, "at the same time that General Pickett's brigade reported upon the field," and that his own "brigade was in a few minutes thereafter thrown into action, a report of which General Huger has." That report cannot be found; but General Mahone now says, in letters to me, December, 1885, and January, 1886:

"At the moment I was reporting to General Hill, some person rode up and excitedly stated to him that the enemy were in the wood on the north side of the (Williamsburg) road . . . General Hill said: 'General Mahone, take your brigade in there,' referring to the wood in which the enemy were supposed to be. I am quite certain that Armistead's brigade was on my immediate right, and I suppose it went into the fight about the time my brigade went in. There was no fighting which would indicate an attack by either side before my leading regiments went in . . . and none on my left during the engagement that followed. Armistead's brigade and mine must have struck the enemy about the same time. The impetus of the charge of the 3d Alabama, a splendid regiment, I am satisfied must have severely shocked and disordered Richardson's line, and if there had been any intelligent understanding of the position of the enemy, and instructions as to what we were to do, it can be seen now how easy a destructive blow might have been given."

From different but authentic sources, I learn that the losses in Mahone's brigade were 339, of which 175 were in the 3d Alabama, 112 in the 41st Virginia, and 52 in the 12th Virginia. The other two regiments were detached.

I have not succeeded in getting specific information from any one engaged in either of the regiments of Armistead's brigade that attacked the extreme left of Richardson's line. The effect produced by that attack shows it was of a very determined character, and from the nature of the Federal counter-attack on Armistead, the losses of the latter must have been very heavy. That Armistead's three regiments did not then retire from the wood is shown by the published official report of Colonel H. B. Tomlin, of the 53d Virginia, which had been kept back during the night, May 31st at General Longstreet's headquarters, and

did not get to the front before the other three regiments had been repulsed. On reaching the redoubt, this regiment was ordered to join the other three in the woods. In the tangled undergrowth it became engaged by mistake with one of Mahone's regiments; and, whilst they were firing into each other, one of the regiments of French's Federal brigade came up, and Armistead's regiment, in confusion, fell back to the redoubt, "apprehending more danger from friends than the enemy." In this fiasco that regiment lost one killed and eighteen wounded, and the regiment of French's brigade lost one killed and five wounded. These incidents have been referred to because of the exaggerated importance attached by the Federals to the "bayonet-charge" made by the right of French's brigade.

General Wilcox, commanding his own brigade and Pryor's, says that on the morning of June 1st, having no orders, he formed his brigade in line of battle across and at right angles to the Williamsburg road about half a mile east of Seven Pines, and Pryor's brigade on the left, but facing nearly north. The Federals moved against Wilcox about 8 A.M. In his official report he says that after the firing had continued for some time, the engagement became serious on his entire front, and the contest "was going on as well as could be desired," when "an order was sent to me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done." General Wilcox adds:

> "The order given me to retire my command on the second morning was given in writing by D. H. Hill, and for the reason, as he stated in his note, that Mahone's men had acted badly."

After the withdrawal of these two brigades they were placed in position near the redoubt. In this affair the losses in Wilcox's brigade were 44; those in Pryor's brigade are not stated. The Federal accounts of operations on this part of the field show great misapprehension of the real state of affairs on the Confederate side. General Hooker says:

> "Our advance on the rebels . . . was slow, . . . the fire brisk and unerring. After an interchange of musketry of this character for more than an hour, directions were given to advance with the

bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into wild confusion, throwing away their arms, hats, and coats, and broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond."

A good deal of this "magnificence" vanishes before the plain statements made by General Wilcox; but, in fairness, it should be stated that "extravagances" are also found in the Confederate reports. General Hill says: "Pickett held his ground against the odds of ten to one for several hours."

Pickett's frantic appeals to Hill for help gave color of probability to General Hill's opinion; but the Federal reports, now published, show that Pickett's strong defensive position was attacked by four regiments only. Hill finally sent two brigades to Pickett's assistance, and on their appearance the 5th New Hampshire withdrew from Pickett's front; or, as he expresses it: "the enemy retreated to their bushy cover, and their fire immediately slackened." He adds: "No other attempt was made by them to advance, and about 1 P.M., I judge, by General Hill's order, I withdrew the whole of our front line." He evidently means his own brigade and the two brigades that had been sent to aid him. The losses in the 4 regiments of Pickett's brigade were 350.

General Hill had now succeeded in concentrating the right wing of the army "around the captured works." He says:

"The (remainder of the) day was spent in removing 6700 muskets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, commissary and medical stores. Ten captured guns had been removed the night before. . . . General Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole command. The thirteen brigades were not together until near midnight."

General Pickett says:

"General Hill sent for me about 1 o'clock at night, or rather, morning of June 2d, and I went to the redoubt in search of him . . . General Hill gave me orders to cover (the) withdrawal of the troops with my brigade . . . The whole of our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in sight or even a puff of smoke."

The Federals resumed the positions they held that morning, with the exception of Sickles's brigade of Hooker's division, which occupied the ground where Colonel Jenkins's

command ceased fighting the previous day. Some time after sunrise, June 2d, the Federal pickets discovered that the Confederates had retired from Casey's captured works. At 5 P.M. that day General Hooker reported the result of an armed reconnaissance from which he had just returned. He says that a short distance in front of Casey's camp "the enemy appeared to have a regiment of cavalry and three of infantry, but as the latter were most concealed in the forest, it was not prudent to determine their number." At 3 A.M. that day the chief of staff of McClellan's army wrote to General Sumner: "the general commanding says, in reply to your despatch, that you must do the best you can do hold your own if attacked. General Heintzelman will support you." At 11:50 P.M., June 3d, General Sumner wrote to General Kearny:

> "From information I have received, I have reason to expect a formidable attack tomorrow morning. Please advance with your division at 2 A.M. in order to attack the flank of the enemy if he assails me in large force. Everything may depend upon this movement of yours."

The theory that the "Confederates attacked in full force," were repulsed, retreated in "disorganization and dismay," which sent them to Richmond in a panic on the night of June 1st," is not in accordance with the facts already established, nor with any that are likely to be brought to light hereafter.

The divisions of Longstreet and Hill leisurely returned to the positions they occupied when the order to attack was given; but Huger's division remained well out on the Williamsburg road in advance of D. H. Hill's position. The latter fact is made clear by the following written statement of General Longstreet, dated June 3d, 1862. He says:

> "The entire division of General Huger was left in advance upon retiring with the forces from the later battle-field. He was absent yesterday, but not coming to report after being sent for, I ordered General Stuart to take command of the division."

This in itself shows, beyond doubt, that General Longstreet was exercising control over Huger and Huger's division during these operations.

On the Nine-mile road the division under Whiting remained, for some days after the battle was ended, closely confronting Sumner's corps near Fair Oaks. In the letter already referred to, Colonel Frobel says:

> "We remained in the position indicated until the afternoon when the brigades were withdrawn a short distance to the shelter of heavy woods in our rear. I do not think after this that we changed our position for several days."

In his official report of what occurred the day after he was disabled and left the field, General Johnston says: "In the evening (June 1st) our troops quietly returned to their own camps."

The camps of the division under Whiting were on the Meadow Bridge road; this division remained on the Nine-mile road, a mile or more in advance of Magruder's line at Old Tavern. The camps of Huger's division were on the banks of Gilliss Creek, close to the suburbs of Richmond; this division remained on the Williamsburg road, more than a mile in advance of Hill's camps. The two divisions that did return to their camps left the field on the morning of June 2d—not "in the evening" of June 1st.

To complete this sketch of the battle of Seven Pines, it is essential to mention that, when I received General Longstreet's note, dated 1:30 P.M., June 1st, which ended with the exclamation, "Oh, that I had ten thousand men more," General Lee had just taken command of the army. He seemed very much impressed by the state of affairs on the Williamsburg road as depicted in General Longstreet's note. I assured him, however, that Longstreet was mistaken in supposing that the whole Federal army was opposed to him; that I had several hours before nearly stripped the Chickahominy, between New Bridge and Mechanicsville, in order to send him reenforcements; and that the danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williamsburg road, if it ever had been.

General Lee gave me no orders that day. The fact that Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions were sent back to their former camps induces me to believe that this was in compliance with orders given by General Lee to General

Longstreet—perhaps for the reason that on May 31st we had not fully succeeded in crushing one Federal corps isolated at Seven Pines, and on June 1st had lost all the ground beyond Seven Pines that we had gained the day previous.

I was completely prostrated on the 2d of June by an attack of paralysis, no symptom of which was manifested within eighteen hours after Lee relieved me of the command of the army. But, for that misfortune, I would certainly have required all subordinates to report to me events that took place on the field in their respective commands whilst I was in control of the army.

The detailed reports of regimental and brigade commanders on both sides in this battle show many instances of close, persistent, and bloody fighting, such as have been seldom equaled by any troops on any field. Cases of temporary confusion and disorder occurred, but fair examination shows there was good reason for this. In reference to the general management, however, it may well be said that General McClellan committed a grave error in allowing Keyes's corps to remain isolated for several days within easy striking distance of General Johnston's army. The intention of the latter to throw Longstreet's division against Keyes's exposed and weak right flank was the best plan that could have been adopted. The first great blunder consisted in Longstreet's taking his division from the Nine-mile road to the Williamsburg road, and the next in placing six brigades on the Charles City road, where there was no enemy. Five of these brigades were marching and counter-marching on the latter road, and struggling through the White Oak Swamp, in mud and water waist-deep, to reach the Williamsburg road miles in rear of the fighting, where General Longstreet then was, whilst Colonel Jenkins's three regiments were scouring the rear of the Nine-mile road from Fair Oaks to Seven Pines; thus not only saving the right of Hill's division from being driven out of Casey's captured works by Federal reenforcements under Kearny, but forcing Keyes and Heintzelman to their third line of defense. No one can fairly doubt what would have been the result, if at 3 P.M. when Hill's division alone had carried

Casey's works, the five brigades that had been sent to the Charles City road had been within supporting distance of Hill, and had been promptly put in close action, and Pickett's brigade had been thrown forward instead of being held far back on the railroad by Longstreet's order "to repel any advance of the enemy up that road." Instead of putting his own troops into the fight, even late in the afternoon, Longstreet called on General Johnston for help, and complained of the latter's "slowness."

It is not proposed to speculate here upon what might have happened on the second day, if General Longstreet had made any attempt to carry out the orders he received to renew the attack. But it may be well to emphasize the fact that if Longstreet's division had promptly moved, on the Nine-mile road, at daybreak, May 31st, and been put in close action on that side, whilst D. H. Hill's division attacked in front, as Johnston certainly intended, there would have been no occasion to make excuses for the failure of complete Confederate success in wiping out Keyes's corps, early in the morning of May 31st, before it could have been reenforced by either Heintzelman or Sumner.*

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*On the 15th of May, the Union gunboats opened fire on the forts at Drewry's Bluff, twelve miles below Richmond, and soon after Johnston's army retired, opening the way for McClellan's advance to within seven miles of Richmond, whose citizens believed at this time that the Confederate authorities would be compelled to evacuate the city. The archives were shipped to Columbia, S. C., the public treasure was kept on cars ready for transportation to a place of safety. Confidence was restored before the battle of Seven Pines. On May 25th and 26th, Lieutenant F. C. Davis of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, with eleven men rode from Bottom's Bridge, by way of White Oak Bridge and Charles City Court House, to the James River and communicated with the gunboat fleet. After the battle of Seven Pines, General Lee determined to defend Richmond on the line then held by his army. This fact, in connection with the success of General Jackson in freeing the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, restored the confidence of the people at Richmond. A large draft of soldiers from the ranks furnished a laboring force to build intrenchments, and slaves in the counties around Richmond were impressed for the work.

On the 18th of June, Brigadier-General Cuvier Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, made a reconnaissance between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and found the Confederates in force behind the earthworks. The divisions of Hooker's and Kearny's advanced on the 25th to a point called Oak Grove, about four miles from Richmond, in front of Seven Pines. This was the nearest approach to Richmond during the investment by McClellan.—*Editors.*

V

The Opposing Forces in the Seven Days' Battles

June 25th-July 1st, 1862

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES

Army of the Potomac,

Major-General George B. McClellan.

General Headquarters: Provost Marshal's and Hdqr's Guard, Brig-Gen Andrew Porter; 2d U.S. Cavalry (7 co's), and McClellan (Ill.) Dragons (2 cos), Maj Alfred Pleasonton; 93d N.Y. (4 co's), and Sturges (Ill.) Rifles, Maj. Granville O. Haller; 8th U.S. Inf. (2 co's), Capt. Royal T. Frank and Lieut. Eugene Carter. Escort: 4th U.S. Cavalry (2 co's) and Onedia (N.Y.) Cavalry, Capt. James B. McIntyre. Volunteer Engineer Brigade, Brig-Gen Daniel P. Woodbury; 15th N.Y., Col. J. McLeod Murphy; 50th N.Y., Col Charles B. Stuart, Brigade loss: m. 12. Battalion U.S. Engineers, Capt. James C. Duane, Loss: w. 2: m. 9 m. 11. Casey's Command (at White House), Brig-Gen. Silas Casey: 4th Pa. Cav. (Squadron, Capt William Shorts: 11th Pa. Cav. (5 co's), Col Josiah Harlan; F. 1st N.Y. Arty., Capt. Wm R. Wilson; 93d N.Y. (6 co's), Col. Thos. F. Morris.

Second Corps, Brig-Gen. E. V. Sumner, Staff Loss: w.1.

Cavalry: D. F. and K, 6th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Duncan McVicar.

First Division, Brig-Gen Israel B. Richardson.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John C. Caldwell; 5th N.H., Lieut-Col. Samuel G. Langley, Capt. Edward E. Sturtevant; 7th N.Y., Col. George von Schack; 61st N. Y. Col. Francis C. Barlow; 81st Pa., Col. Charles F. Johnson (w), Lieut-Col. Eli. T. Conner (k). Maj. H. Boyd McKeen. Brigade loss k. 61; w. 356; m, 137=554. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, Col. Robert Nugent, Brig-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher; 29th Mass., Col. Ebenezer W. Peirce (w), Lieut-Col. Joseph H. Barnes; 63d N.Y. Col. John Burke (w), Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler, Capt. Joseph O'Neil; 69th N.Y., Col. Robert Nugent; 88th N.Y., Col. Henry M. Baker, Maj. James Quinlan. Brigade loss: k, 34; w. 227, m, 232=493. Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. William H. French; 2d Det., Lieut Col. William P. Baily, Capt. D. L. Stricker; 52d N.Y. Col. Paul Frank; 57th N.Y., Col. Samuel K. Zook;. 64th N.Y., Col. Thomas J. Parker; 66th N.Y., Col. Joseph C. Pinckney; 53d Pa., Col. John R. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 3; w. 44; m, 162=208. Artillery, Capt. George W. Hazzard (mw); B, 1st

N.Y. Capt. Rufus D. Pettit; A and C, 4th U.S., Capt. George W. Hazzard, Lieut. Rufus King, Jr. Artillery loss: w, 19; m, 10=29. SECOND DIVISION, Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick.

FIRST BRIGADE, Col. Alfred Sully: 15th Mass. Lieut-Col. John W. Kimball; 1st Minn., Lieut-Col. Stephen Miller; 1st Co. Mass., Sharp-shooters, Capt. John Saunders; 34th N.Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N.Y., Col. Henry W. Hudson; 2d Co. Minn. Sharp-shooters, Capt William F. Russell. Brigade loss: k, 12=82; m, 152=246. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. William W. Burns (w); 69th Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen; 71st Pa. Lieut-Col. William G. Jones; 72d Pa., Col De Witt C Baxter; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 193; m, 172=405. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen N. J. T. Dana: 19th Mass., Col. Edward W Hinks (w), Capt Edmund Rice, Lieut. Col., Arthur F Devereux; 20th Mass., Col William R. Lee; 7th Mich., Col. Ira R. Grosvenor; 42d N.Y., Col. Edmund C. Charles (w and c), Lieut-Col.

James J Mooney, Brigade loss: k, 51; w. 262; m, 153=466. ARTILLERY, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: A, 1st R.I., Capt. John A. Tompkins: I, 1st U.S., Lieut Edmund Kirby, Artillery loss: W, 12; m, 4=16.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; B, 1st R.I. Capt Walter O. Bartlett; G, 1st R.I., Capt. Charles D. Owens. Reserve Artillery loss: w, 6; m, 2=8.

THIRD CORPS: Brig. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, Cavalry: 3d Pa., Col. William W. Averell. Loss: k, 6; w, 2; m, 3; =11.

SECOND DIVISION: Brig Gen. Joseph Hooker.

FIRST BRIGADE: Brig-Gen. Cuvier; 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 11th Mass., Col. William Blaisdell; 16th Mass. Col. Powell T. Wyman (k), Lieut-Col. George A. Meacham (w), Maj. Daniel S. Lamson; 2d N.H., Col. Gilman Marston; 26th Pa., Lieut-Col. George D. Wells. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 214; m, 116=355. SECOND BRIGADE Brig-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles: 70th N.Y., Maj. Thomas Holt; 71st N.Y. Col. George B. Hall; 72d N.Y. Col. Nelson Taylor; 73d N.Y. Capt. Alfred A. Donalds; 74th N.Y., Col. Charles K. Graham. Brigade loss: k, 26; w, 173; m, 109=308. THIRD BRIGADE, Col. Joseph B. Carr: 5th N.J. Maj. John Ramsey; 6th N.J., Col. Gershom Mott; 7th N.J., Col Joseph w. Revere, Capt. Henry C. Bartlett; 8th N.J., Maj. William A. Henry; 2d N.Y. Lieut-Col. William A. Olmstead. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 24; 31=59. ARTILLERY: D, 1st N.Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn; 4th N.Y., Lieut. Joseph E. Nairn; H. 1st U.S., Capt. Charles Webber. Artillery loss: w, 1; m, 7=8.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig-Gen. Philip Kearny.

FIRST BRIGADE: Brig-Gen. John C. Robinson: 20th Ind., Col. William L. Brown; 87th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Richard A. Bachia; 57th Pa., Lieut-Col. Elhanon W. Woods; 63d Pa., Col. Alexander Hays; 105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight. Lieut. Col. William K. Corbet, Capt. Calvin A. Craig. Brigade loss: k, 56; w, 310; m, 161=527. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. David B. Birney: 3d Me., Lieut-Col. C.A.L. Sampson, Maj. Edwin Burt; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N.Y., Col. J. H. H. Ward; 40th N.Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 101st N.Y. Col. Enrico Fardella. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 53; m, 185=248. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Maj. Louis Dillman, Capt. William Humphrey; 3d Mich. Lieut. Col. Ambros A. Stevens; Maj. Byron R. Pierce; 5th Mich., Maj. John D. Fairbanks (mw), Capt. Judson S. Farrer; 1st N.Y., Col. Garrett Dyckman; 37th N.Y., Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade Loss; k, 28; w, 225; m, 176=429. ARTILLERY: E, 1st R.I., Capt. George E. Randolph; G, 2d U.S., Capt. James Thompson. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 16; m, 5=23.

Opposing Forces in Seven Days' Battles

Reserve Artillery, Capt. Gustavus A. D. Russy: 6th N.Y., Capt. Walter M. Bramhall; 2d N.J., Capt. John E. Beam (k), Lieut. John B. Monroe; K, 4th U.S., Lieut. Francis W. Seeley. Loss: k, 1; w, 3; m, 1=5.

Fourth Corps, Brig-Gen Erasmus D. Keyes.

Cavalry: 8th Pa., Col. David McM. Bregg.

First Division, Brig-Gen. Darius N. Couch.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Albion P. Howe: 55th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Louis Thonrot; 62d N.Y. Col. David J. Nevin; 92d Pa., Capt John S. Long 88th Pa., Col John F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 148; m, 33=208. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. John K. Abercrombie: 65th N.Y. (1st U.S. Chasseurs), Lieut-Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N.Y. (1st Long Island), Lieut-Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., Col Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa. Col David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Lieut-Col. Frank Vallee. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 168; m, 16=203. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. Innis N. Palmer: 7th Mass. Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Maj. Ozro Miller (mw), Capt Frederick Barton; 36th N.Y., Maj. James A. Raney; 2d R.I. Col. Frank Wheaton. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 194; m, 48=265. Artillery: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood.

Second Division, Brig-Gen John J. Peck.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Henry M. Naglee; 11th Me., Col. Harris M. Plaisted; 56th N.Y., Col. Charles Van Wyck; 100th N.Y., Lieut-Col Phineas Staunton; 52d Pa., Lieut-Col. Henry M. Hoyt; 104th Pa., Lieut-Col. John W. Nields; Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Henry W. Wessells; 81st N.Y. Col. Edwin Rose; 85th N.Y., Col. Jonathan S. Belknap; 92d N.Y. Lieut-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 96th N.Y., Col. James Fairman; 98th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Charles Durkee; 85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell;. 101st Pa., Capt. Charles W. May; 103d Pa., Col. Theodore F. Lehmann. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 2; m, 121=124. Artillery: H. 1st N.Y., Lieut. Charles E. Mink; 7th N.Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan.

Reserve Artillery, Maj. Robert M. West; 8th N.Y., Capt. Butler Fitch; E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. James Brady; M, 5th U.S., Capt. James McKnight.

Fifth Corps, Brig-Gen. Fitz John Porter, Staff loss: m, 1.

Cavalry: 8th Ill., Col. John F. Farnsworth, Loss: k, 3; w, 9, m, 3=15.

First Division, Brig-Gen. George W. Morell.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John H. Martindale: 2d Me., Col. Charles W. Roberts: 18th Mass., (detached with Stoneman's command) Col. James Barnes; 22d Mass., Col. Jesse A. Grove (k), Maj. William S. Tilton (w and k) Capt. Walter S. Sampson, Capt. D. K. Wardwell; 1st Mich., Col Horace S. Roberts; 13th N.Y. Col. Elisha G. Marshall, Maj. Francis Schoeggel; 25th N.Y., Maj. Edwin S. Gilbert (c) Captain Shepard Gleason; 2d Co. Mass., Sharp-shooters, Lieut. Charles D. Stiles. Brigade loss: k, 114; w, 443; m, 329=886. Second Brigade, Brig-Gen. Charles Wilson: 9th Mass., Col. Thomas Cass (mw), Lieut-Col Patrick R. Guiney; 4th Mich., Col. Dwight A. Woodbury (k), Lieut-Col. Jonathan W. Childs (w), Capt. John M. Randolph; 14th N.Y., Col. James McQuade; 62d Pa., Col. Samuel W. Black (k), Lieut. Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer (w and c), Capt. James C. Hull, Brigade loss; k, 182; w, 772; m, 199=1153. Third Brigade, Brig. Gen Daniel Butterfield: 12th N.Y., Lieut Col. Robert M. Richardson; 17th N.Y. (detached with Stoneman's command), Col. Henry S. Lansing; 44th N.Y. Lieut-Col. James C. Rive; 16th Mich., Col. T. B. W. Stockton (c), Lieut-Col. John V. Ruehle; 83d Pa., Col.

John W. McLane (k) Capt. Hugh S. Cambell (w) Brady's Co. Mich. Sharp-shooters, Capt Kin S. Dygert. Brigade loss: k, 166; w, 546; m, 269=981. ARTILLERY: Capt. William B. Weeden; 3d Mass., Capt. Augustus P. Martin; 5th Mass., Lieut. John B. Hyde; C. 1st R.I., Lieut. Richard Waterman; D, 5th U.S., Lieut. Henry W. Kingsburg. Artillery loss: k, 9; w, 38; m, 9=56. Sharp-shooters: 1st U.S., Col. Hiram Berdan. Loss: k, 8; w, 35; m, 13=56.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig-Gen. George Sykes.

FIRST BRIGADE, Col. Robert C. Buchanan: 3d U.S., Maj. Nathan B. Rossell (k), Capt. Thomas W. Walker, Capt. John D. Wilkins; 4th U.S. Maj. Delozier Davidson (c), Capt. Joseph B. Collins; 12th U.S., Maj Henry B. Clitz (w and c), Capt. John G. Read, Capt. Matthew M. Blunt, 14th U.S., Captain John D. O'Connell, Brigade loss: k, 89; w, 297; m, 181=567. SECOND BRIGADE, Lieut-Col. William Chapman, Maj. Charles S. Lovell; 2d U.S., Capt. Adolphus F. Bond, Lieut. John S. Poland; 6th U.S. Capt. Thomas Hendrickson; 10th U.S., Maj. Charles S. Lovell, Maj. George L. Andrews; 11th U.S., Maj. DeLancey Floyd-Jones; 17th U.S. Maj. George L. Andrews. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 228; m, 93=359. THIRD BRIGADE, Col. Gouvernour K. Warren: 5th N.Y., Lieut-Col. Hiram Duryea; 10th N.Y., Col. John E. Bendix. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 154 m, 85=286. ARTILLERY: Captain Stephen H. Weed; L and M, 3d U.S., Capt. John Edwards; I. 5th U.S., Capt S. H. Weed. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 24; m, 4=32.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig-Gen. George A. McCall (c), Brig-Gen. Truman Seymour. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1, m, 1=3.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. John F. Reynolds (c), Col. Seneca G. Simmons (k), Col. R. Biddle Roberts; 1st Pa., Res., Col. R. Biddle Roberts, Maj. Lemuel Todd; 2d Pa., Res., Lieut.-Col. William McCandless; 5th Pa., Res., Col. Seneca G. Simmons, Lieut-Col. Joseph W. Fisher 8th Pa., Rs., Col. George S. Hays; 13th Pa. Res. (1st Rifles 6 Co's), Maj Roy Stone. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 497, m, 403=1009. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. George G. Meade (w), Col. Albert L. Magilton; 3d Pa., Res. Col. Horatio G. Sickel; 4th Pa., Res. Col. Albert L. Magilton; 7th Pa. Res. Col. Elisha B. Harvey; 11th Pa, Res., Col. Thomas F. Gallagher (c), Capt. Daniel S. Porter. Brigade loss: k, 107; w, 284, m, 1009=1400. (The wounded of the 11th Reserves at Gaine's Mill are counted among the captured or missing.) THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Truman Seymour, Col. C. Feger Jackson: 6th Pa. Res. (Detached with Casey's command), Col. William Sinclair; 9th Pa., Res., Col. C. Feger Jackson: 6th Pa. Res. Capt. John C. Uthbertson (w); 10th Pa. Res., Col. James T. Kirk; 12th Pa. Res. Col. John H. Taggart. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 339; m, 142=559. Artillery: A, 1st Pa., Capt. Hezekiah Easton (k), Lieut. Jacob L. Deitrich, Lieut. John G. Simpson; B. Kerns (w), Lieut. Frank P. Amsden; C. 5th U.S., Capt. Henry V. DeHart (mw), Lieut. Eben G. Scott. ARTILLERY loss: k, 21 w, 42; m, 11=72. Cavalry: 4th Pa., Col. James H. Childs, Cavalry loss: k, 2; w, 13; m, 7=22.

ARTILLERY RESERVE: Col. Henry J. Hunt. First Brigade (Horse Artillery), Lieut-Col William Hays: A, 2d U.S., Capt. John C. Tidball; B and L, 2d U.S., Capt James M. Robertson; M, 2d U.S., Capt Henry Benson, C and G 3d U.S. (detached with Casey's command). Capt. Horatio G. Gibson. Brigade loss: w, 6; m, 2=8. Second Brigade, Lieut-Col George W. Getty: E and G, 1st U.S., Lieut. Alanson M. Randol; K, 1st U.S., Lieut Samuel S. Elder; G, 4th U.S., Lieut. Charles H. Morgan; A, 5th U.S., Lieut. Adelbert Ames; K, 5th U.S., Capt. John R. Smead. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 29, m, 6=22. Third Brigade, Maj. Albert Arndt; A, 1st Battalion N.Y., Capt.

Opposing Forces in Seven Days' Battles

Otto Diodveics B, 1st Battalion N.Y., Capt. Adolph Voegelee; C, 1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. John Knieriem; D, 1st Battalion N.Y., Capt Edward Grimm. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 11; m, 4=19. Fourth Brigade, Major Edward R. Petherridge: A, Md., Capt. John W. Wolcott; B, Md., Capt., Alonzo Snow. Brigade loss: k, 2 w, 22; m, 1=25. Fifth Brigade, Capt. J. Howard Carlisle: 5th N.Y. (dismounted and officers and men attached elsewhere) Capt. Elijah D. Taft; E, 2d U.S., Capt. J. Howard Carlisle; F and K 3d U.S. Capt. La Ehett L. Livingston. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 5=7.

SIEGE TRAIN, 1st Conn. Heavy Artillery, Col. Robert O. Tyler. Loss: k, 2; w, 4; m, 29=35.

SIXTH CORPS, Brig Gen William B. Franklin. Cavalry: 1st N.Y. Col. Andrew T. McReynolds.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig-Gen. Henry W. Slocum.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. George W. Taylor; 1st N.J., Lieut-Col. Robert McAllister, Col. A. T. A. Torbert; 2d N.J., Col. Isaac M. Tucker (k), Maj. Henry O. Ryerson (w), Lieut-Col. Samuel L. Buck; 3d N.J., Col. Henry W. Brown; 4th N.J., Col. James H. Simpson (c) Brigade loss: k, 116; w,380; m, 582=1078. SECOND BRIGADE, Col. Joseph J. Bartlett; 5th Me., Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson (w), Lieut-Col. William S. Heath (k), Capt. Clark S. Edwards; 16th N.Y. Col. Joseph Howland (w), Maj. Joel J. Seaver; 27th N.Y. Lt. Col. Alexander D. Adams; 96th Pa., Col. Henry L. Cake. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 409; m, 68=546. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. John Newton: 18th N.Y. Lieut Col. George Myers, Major John C. Meginnis; 31st N.Y., Col. Calvin E. Pratt (w), Maj. Alexander Raszewski; 32d N.Y., Col Doderick Matheson, 95th Pa., Col John M. Gosline (mw), Lieut-Col. Gustavus W. Town. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 279; m, 114=433. ARTILLERY, Capt. Edward R. Platt: 1st Mass. Capt. Josiah Porter; 1st N.J., Capt. William Hexamer; D, 2d U.S. Lieut. Emory Upton. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 13; m, 4=18.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig-Gen William F. Smith.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock; 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N.Y., Col. Francis L. Minton; 49th Pa., Col William H. Irwin; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 93; m, 98=200. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks (w), 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting; 3d Vt., Lieut. Col. Wheelock G. Veazey 4th Vt., Col. Edwin H. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut-Col. Lewis A. Grant; 5th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 271, m, 139=455. Third Brigade, Brig-Gen. John W. Davidson; 7th Me., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th N.Y., Col. James B. McKean. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 23; m, 87=122. ARTILLERY: Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres: E. 1st N.Y., Capt Charles C. Wheeler; 1st N.Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 3d N.Y., Capt. Thadeous P. Mottl, F, 5th U.S., Capt. Romeyn B. Ayers. Artillery loss: k, 3, w, 4; m, 15=22. Cavalry: I and K, 5th Pa., Capt. John O'Farrell. Loss: k, 1.

CAVALRY RESERVE, Brig-Gen. P. St. George Cooke. FIRST BRIGADE: 6th Pa., Col. Richard H. Rush; 5th U.S. (5 co's), Capt. Charles J. Whiting (e), Capt. Joseph H. McArthur. SECOND BRIGADE, Col. George A. H. Blake: 1st U.S. (4 co's), Lieut-Col. William N. Grier; 6th U.S. (with Stoneman's Command), Capt. August V. Kautz. Cavalry Reserve loss: k, 14; w, 55; m, 85=154.

(Brig-Gen. George Stoneman and Brig-Gen. William H. Emory operated on the right flank of the army with a mixed command of infantry, cavalry and artillery.)

Total loss of the Army of the Potomac: 1734 killed, 8062 wounded, and 6053 captured or missing=15,849.

The "present for duty equipped," or effective force of this army (exclusive of Dix's command at and about Fort Monroe) on June 20th, 1862, was 1511 engineers, 6513 cavalry, 6446 artillery, and 90,975 infantry, in all 105,445. See "Official Records" XI., Pt. II., p. 238.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES

Army of Northern Virginia,

General Robert E. Lee.

Jackson's Command, Maj-Gen. T. J. Jackson.
Cavalry: 8d *Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford.*
Whiting's Division, Brig-Gen. William H. C. Whiting.
Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. John B. Hood; 18th Ga., Lieut. Col. S. Z. Ruff; 1st Tex., Col A. T. Rainey (w); 4th Tex., Col John Marshal (k). Capt. W. P. Townsend; 5th Tex., Col. J. B. Robertson; Hampton (S.C.) Legion, Lieut-Col. M. W. Gary. Brigade Loss: k, 92; w, 526; m, 5=623. Third Brigade, Col. E. McIntyre. Col. E. McIver Law; 4th Ala., Lieut-Col. O.K. McLemore (w), Capt. L. H. Scruggs; 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone; 11th Miss., Col J. P. Liddell; 6th N.C., Lieut-Col. I. E. Avery (w), Maj. R. F. Webb. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 428; m, 5=553. Artillery: Va. Battery (Staunton Arty.) Capt. W. L. Balthis (w), N.C. Battery (Rowan Arty). Capt James Reilly. Artillery loss: w, 16.

Jackson's Division.

First Brigade, Brig-Gen. Charles S. Winder: 2d Va., Col. J. W. Allen (k), Lieut-Col. Lawson Botts; 4th Va., Col. Charles A. Ronald; 5th Va., Col. A. J. Grigsby (w), Capt. G. C. Smith; 33d Va., Col. John F. Neff; Va. Battery (Alleghany Arty), Lieut John C. Carpenter. Va. Battery (Rockbridge Artillery), Capt. William De Poague. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 149=179. Second Brigade, Lieut-Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr., Brig-Gen. J. R. Jones (w), Lieut-Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr., 21st Va. Maj. John B. Mosely, 42 Va., Lieut-Col. William Martin; 48th Va., Capt John M. Vermillion; 1st Va., (Irish) Battalion. Capt. B. W. Leigh; Va. Batty. (Hampton Arty), Capt. William H. Caskie. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 15=16. Third Brigade, Col. S. V. Fulkerson (mw), Col. E. T. H. Warren; Brig-Gen Wade Hampton; 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va. Capt. A. V. Scott; 37th Va., Maj. T. V. Williams; Va. Battery (Danville Arty). Capt. George W. Wooding. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 15, m, 1=18. Fourth Brigade, Brig-Gen. Alexander R. Lawton; 13th Ga., Col. Marcellus Douglass; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st Ga., Col. C. A. Evans (w), 38th Ga., Lieut-Col. L. J. Parr (w), Capt. William H. Batter; 60th Ga., Lieut-Col. W. H. Stiles; 61st Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 452=567.

Ewell's Division, Maj-Gen. Richard S. Ewell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Arnold Elzey (w), Col. James A. Walker, Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early: 12th Ga., Capt. James G. Rodgers; 13th Va., Col. James A. Walker; 25th Va., Lieut-Col. John C. Higginbotham; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 44th Va., Lieut-Col. Norvell Cobb; 52d Va., Lieut-Col. J. H. Skinner; 58th Va., Col. F. H. Board. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 229; m, 3=284. Seventh Brigade, Brig-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble: 15th Ala., Col. James Cantey; 21st Ga., Maj. T. W. Hooper (w); 16th Miss., Col. Carnot Posey; 21st N.C. Lieut-Col. W. W. Kirkland; 1st N.C. Battalion sharpshooters Maj. Rufus W. Wharton; Va.

Battery, Capt. A. R. Courtney. Brigade loss: k, 71; w, 280; m, 49=400. EIGHTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Richard Taylor, Col. I.G. Seymour (k), Col. LeRoy A. Stafford; 6th La., Col I. G. Seymour; 7th La., Lieut-Col. David B. Penn.; 8th La., Col. Henry B. Kelly; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford; 1st La. Special Battalion, Maj. C. R. Wheat (k); Va. Battery (Charlottesville Arty), Capt. J. McD. Carrington. Brigade loss: k, 56; w, 236=298. MARYLAND LINE: 1st Inf. Col. Bradley T. Johnson; A, Cav., Capt. Ridgely Brown; Balto. Battery, Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough. Maryland line loss: k, 3; w, 8=11.

HILL'S DIVISION, Maj-Gen. Daniel H. Hill.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Col. John B. Gordon: 3d Ala., Lieut-Col. Charles Forsyth, Maj. Robert M. Sands; 5th Ala., Col. C. C. Pegus (mw), Maj. E. L. Honson; 6th Ala., Col. John B. Gordon, Maj. B. G. Baldwin; 12th Ala., Col. B. B. Gayle; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal; Va. Battery (King William Arty.) Capt. Thomas H. Carter. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 458=570. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen George B. Anderson (w), Col. C. C. Tew: 2d N.C., Col. C. C. Tew: 4th N.C., Col. E. A. Osborne; 14th N.C., Lieut-Colonel William A. Johnston; 30th N.C. Col. Francis M. Parker; Ala. Battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway. Brigade Loss: k, 159; w, 704=863. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr.; 5th N.C., Col. D. K. McRae; 12th N.C., Col. Benjamin O. Wade; 13th N.C., Col. Alfred M. Scales; 20th N.C., Col. Alfred Iverson (w), Lieut-Col. Franklin J. Faison (k), Maj. William H. Toon; 23d N.C., Col. Daniel H. Christie (w), Lieut. I. J. Young (w); Ala. Battery (Jeff Davis' Arty.), Capt. J. W. Bondurant, Brigade loss; k, 192; w, 637; m, 15=844. FOURTH BRIGADE, Col. Alfred H. Colquitt; 13th Ala., Col. Birkett D. Fry: 6th Ga., Lieut Col. J. M. Newton; 23d Ga., Col Emory F. Best; 27th Ga., Col. Levi B. Smith; 28th Ga., Col. T. J. Warthen. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 474; m, 5=554. FIFTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Roswell S. Ripley: 44th Ga., Col. Robert A. Smith (mw), Capt. John W. Beck; 48th Ga., William Gibson; 1st N.C., Col M. S. Stokes (k), Capt. H. A. Brown, Lieut-Col. William P. Bynum; 3d N.C., Col. Gaston Meares (k), Lieut Col. William L. De Rosset. Brigade loss: k, 171; w, 707; m, 30=908. ARTILLERY: Va. Battery (Hanover Artillery), Capt G. W. Nelson. (See, also, Jones's Battalion in Reserve Artillery temporarily attached to this division.)

MAGRUDER'S COMMAND, Maj-Gen. J. B. Magruder.

JONES'S DIVISION, Brig-Gen. David R. Jones. Staff loss w, 1.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Robert Toombs: 2d Ga., Col. Edgar M. Butt (w), Lieut-Col. William R. Holmes; 15th Ga. Col. William M. McIntosh (mw), Lieut-Col. William T Millican, Maj T. J. Smith, Capt. S. Z. Hearnsberger; 17th Ga. Col. Henry L. Benning; 20th Ga., Col. J. B. Cumming. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 380; m, 6=430. THIRD BRIGADE, Col. George T. Anderson; 1st Ga., (regulars), Col. William J. Magill; 7th Ga., Lieut-Col. W. W. White (w), Maj. E. W. Hoyle (w), Capt George H. Carmical; 8th Ga., Col. L. M. Lamar (w and c), Capt. George O. Dawson; 9th Ga., Col. R. A. Turnipseed; 11th Ga. Lieut-Col. William Luffman. Brigade loss: k, 64; w, 327; m, 46=437. ARTILLERY, Maj. John J. Garnett: Va. Battery (Wise Arty), Capt. James S. Brown; S.C. Battery (Washington Arty), Capt. James F. Hart; La. Battery (Madison Arty.), Capt. George V. Moody; Va. Battery, Capt. W. J. Dabney. Artillery loss: k, 3; w, 11=14.

MCLAWS' DIVISION, Maj-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen Paul J. Semmes: 10th Ga., Col Alfred Cumming (w), Capt. W. C. Holt; 53d Ga., Col T. L. Duyal; 5th La.,

Col. T. G. Hunt; 10th La., Lieut-Col. Eugene Waggaman (w and c) 15th Va., Col T. P. August (w), 32d Va., Lieut-Col. William R. Willis; N.C. Battery, Capt. Basil C. Manly. Brigade loss: k, 31; w, 121; m, 63=215. FOURTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw; 2d S. C., Col John D. Kennedy, Maj. F. Gaillard; 3d S.C. Colonel James D. Nance; 7th S.C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S.C., Col John W. Henagan; Va. Battery (Alexandria Arty.) Capt. Del Kemper. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 349, m, 38=457.

MAGRUDER'S DIVISION.

SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Howell Cobb: 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Ga. Legion (Cobb's)—: 2d La., Col. J. T. Norwood (mw); 15th N.C., Col. Henry A. Down (w); Ga., Battery (Troup Arty.), Capt. Henry H. Carlton. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 347; m, 2=415. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Richard Griffith (mw), Col. William Barksdale; 13th Miss., Maj. Kennon McElroy; Col. William Barksdale., Lieut-Col. J. W. Carter (w) 17th Miss., Col. W. D. Holder (w), Lieut-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. Thomas M. Griffin (w), Lieut-Col. William H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys, Lieut-Col. W. L. Brandson (w), Capt. William C. F. Brooks; Va. Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers), Capt. E. S. McCarthy. Brigade Loss: k, 91; w, 434=525.

ARTILLERY, Lieut Col. Stephen D. Lee: Ga. Battery (Pulaski Arty.) Capt. J. P. W. Read; Va. Battery (James City Arty.), Capt. I. W. Richardson; Va. Battery (Magruder Arty.), Capt. T. Jeff Page, Jr.

LONGSTREET'S DIVISION, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet (also in command of A. P. Hill's division), Brig Gen Richard H. Anderson.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. James L. Kemper: 1st Va., Capt. G. F. Norton; 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton; 11th Va., Capt. K. Otey; 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse; 24th Va., Lieut-Col. Peter Hairston; Va. Battery (Loudoun Arty.), Capt. Arthur L. Rodgers. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 205; m, 165=414. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Col. Micah Jenkins: 2d S.C. (Rifles), Col. J. V. Moore; 4th S.C. (Battalion) Maj. S. C. Mattison; 5th S.C., Lieut-Col. A. Jackson; 6th S.C., Col. John Bratton; Palmetto (S.C.) Sharp-shooters, Col. Micah Jenkins, Lieut-Col. Joseph Walker. Brigade loss: k, 136; w, 638; m, 13=787. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. George E. Pickett (w), Col. John B. Stranger 8th Va., Col Eppa Hunton; 18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers (w); 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. Robert C. Allen; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart. Brigade loss: k, 72; w, 563; m, 19=654. FOURTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th Ala., Lieut-Col. L. Royston (w), 9th Ala., Maj. J. H. J. Williams; Capt. J. H. King (w); 10th Ala., Col. J. J. Woodward (k), Maj. J. H. Caldwell (w); 11th Ala., Lieut-Col. S. F. Hale, (w), Capt George Field (w); Va. Battery (Thomas Arty.), Capt. Edwin J. Anderson. Brigade loss: k, 229; w, 806; m, 20=1055. FIFTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Rodger A. Fryor: 14th Ala., Lieut-Col. D. W. Baine (k); 2d Fla., Col. E. A. Perry; 14th La., Col. Z. York; 1st La. Battalion, Lieut-Col. G. Coppens, 3d Va., Lieut-Col. J. V. Scott (w), La. Battery (Donaldsonville Arty), Capt. Victor Maurin. Brigade loss: k, 170; w, 681; m, 11=862. SIXTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston (w); 12th Miss., Maj. W. H. Willy (w), Capt. S. B. Thomas; 19th Miss., Maj. John Mullins (w); 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut-Col. John G. Taylor (k); Va. Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. Benjamin H. Smith, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 543; m, 9=667.

ARTILLERY: La. Battalion (Washington Arty.), Col. J. B. Walton; Va. Battery (Lynchburg Arty.), Capt. James Dearing; Va. Bat'y (Dixie Arty.), Capt. W. H. Chapman.

HUGER'S DIVISION, Maj-Gen. Benjamin Huger.

SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. G. T. Rodgers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Ham; 41st Va., Lieut-Col. William A. Patham (w) 49th Va., Col William Smith; Va. Battery (Portsmouth Artillery), Capt. Carey F. Frimes; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 274; m, 124=464. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright; 44th Ala., Col. James Kent; 3d Ga., Maj. J. R. Sturges (k), Capt. R. B. Nisbet; 4th Ga., Col. George Doles; 22d Ga., Col. R. H. Jones, Maj. Joseph Wasden; 1st La., Lieut-Col. W. R. Shivers (w), Capt. M. Nolan; Va. Battery, Capt. Frank Huger. Brigade loss: k, 93; w, 483; m, 90=666. FOURTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead: 9th Va., Lieut-Col. James S. Gilliam; 14th Va., Col. James G. Hodges; 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds; 53d Va., Capt. William R. Aylett, Maj. George M. Waddill, Capt. R. W. Martin, Col. H. B. Tomlin; 57th Va., Lieut-Col. Waddy T. James; 5th Va. Battalion, Capt. William E. Alley; Va. Battery (Fauquier Arty.), Capt. Robert M. Stribling; Va. Battery, Capt. William H. Turner. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 281; 69=401.

HILL'S (LIGHT) DIVISION (attached to Longstreet's command June 29th-July 1st), Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

FIRST BRIGADE, Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field; 40th Va., Col. J. M. Brockenbrough; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va., Col. Francis Mallory; 60th Va., Col. William E. Starke (w), Lieut-Col. B. H. Jones, Col. William E. Starke, Maj. J. C. Sumners. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 500; m, 2=580. SECOND BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Maxcy Gregg; 1st S. C. Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. (Rifles) Col. J. Foster Marshall; 12th S. C. Col. Dixon Barnes (w); 13th S. C., Col. O. E. Edwards; 14th S. C. Col. Samuel McGowan. Brigade loss: k, 152; w, 773; m, 4=929. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Joseph R. Anderson (w), Col. Edward L. Thomas; 14th Ga., Lieut-Col. Robert W. Folson (w); 35th Ga., Col. Edward L. Thomas: (w); 45th Ga., Col. Thomas Hardeman (w); 49th Ga., Col. A. J. Lane (w); 3d La. Battalion, Lieut-Col. Edmund Pendleton. Brigade loss: k, 62; w, 300; m, 2=364 (estitimated). FOURTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. L. O'b. Branch: 7th N.C., Col. Royle P. Campbell (k), Lieut-Col. E. Graham Haywood (w); Maj. J. L. Hill; 18th N. C., Col. Robert H. Cowan; 28th N. C., Col. James H. Lane; 33d N. C. Lieut-Col. Robert F. Hoke; 37th N. C., Col. Charles C. Lee (w), Lieut-Col. William M. Barbour. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 706; m, 28=839. FIFTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. James J. Archer: 5th Ala. Battalion, Capt. A. S. Van De Graaf (w); 19th Ga., Lieut-Col. Thomas C. Johnson (k); 1st Tenn., Lieut. Col. T. C. Shackelford (k); 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner (w); 14th Tenn., Col. W. A. Forbes. Brigade loss: k, 92; w, 443=535. SIXTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen William D. Pender; 2d Ark. Battalion, Maj. W. N. Bronaugh (k); 16th N. C., Lieut-Col. John S. McElroy; 34th N. C., Col. Richard H. Riddick (w); 38th N. C. Col. William J. Hoke (w); 22d Va. Battalion, Capt. J. C. Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 130: k, 130 w, 692= 822 (approximately). ARTILLERY, Lieut-Col. Lewis M. Coleman: Md. Battery, Capt. R. Snowden Andrews; S. C. Battery (German Arty.) Capt. William K. Bachman; Va. Battery (Fredericksburg Arty.), Capt. Carter M. Braxton; Va. Battery, Capt. William G. Crenshaw; Va. Battery (Letcher Arty.), Capt. Greenlee Davidson; Va. Battery, Capt. Marmaduke Johnson; Master's Battery, Capt. L. Mastrsl S. C. Battery (Pee Dee Arty.), Capt. D. G. McIntosh; Va. Bat-

tery (Purcell Arty.), Capt. W. J. Pegram. Artillery loss k, 12; w, 96=108.

HOLMES'S DIVISION.—Maj-Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes.

SECOND BRIGADE.—(Temporarily attached to Huger's division) Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr; 24th N. C., Col. William J. Clarke; 25th N. C., Col. Henry M. Rutledge; 26th N. C., Col. Z. B. Vance; 35th N. C., Col. M. W. Raason (w), Lieut-Col O. C. Petway (k); 48th N. C. Col. Robert C. Hill; 49th N. C., Col. S. D. Ramseur (w). Brigade loss: k, 95; w, 453; m, 76=624. THIRD BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. Junius Daniel: 43d N. C., Col. T. S. Kenan; 45th N. C. Lieut. Col. J. H. Morehead; 50th N. C., Col. M. D. Craton; Va. Cavalry Battalion, Maj. Edgar Burroughs. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 22=24. FOURTH BRIGADE, Brig-Gen. John G. Walker, Col. Van H. Manning: 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning; 2d Ga., Battalion, Maj. George W. Ross; 27th N. C., Col. John R. Cooke; 46th N. C., Col. E. D. Hall; 30th Va., Col. A. T. Harrison; Va. Cavalry Company, Capt. Edward A. Goodwyn, Brigade loss: w, 12. ARTILLERY, Col. James Deshler: Va. Battery, Capt. James R. Branch; N. C. Battery, Capt. T. H. Brem; Va. Battery, Capt. David A. French; V. C. Battery, Capt. Edward Graham, Artillery loss: w, 17.

WISE'S COMMAND—(temporarily attached to Holmes's Division) Brig-Gen Henry A. Wise: 26th Va., Col. P. R. Page; 46th Va., Col. R. T. W. Duke; Va. Battery, Capt. W. G. Andrews; Va. Battery, Capt. J. H. Rives.

RESERVE ARTILLERY.—Brig. Gen. William S. Pendleton. First Va. Artillery, Col. J. Thompson Brown; Williamsburg Artillery, Capt. John A. Coke; Richmond Fayette Arty., Lieut. William I. Clopton; Watson's Battery, Capt. David Watson, Loss; w, 1.

JONES'S BATTALION.—(Temporarily attached to D. H. Hill's Division) Maj. Henry P. Jones: Va. Battery, Capt. P. H. Clark; Va. Battery, (Orange Arty.), Lieut. C. W. Fry; S.C. Bat'y Capt. A. Burnet Rhett. Loss: k, 5; w, 24=29.

FIRST BATTALION.—(Sumpter), Artillery, Lieut-Col. A. S. Cutts; Ga. Battery, Capt. James Ap. Blackshear; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Lane; Ga. Battery, Capt. John V. Price; Ga. Battery Capt. H. M. Ross; Ga. Battery (Regulars), Capt. S. B. Hamilton. Loss: k, 3; w, 6=9. Second Battalion, Maj. Charles Richardson: Va. Battery (Fluvanna Arty.) Capt. John J. Ancell; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Milledge Jr.; Va. Battery (Ashland Arty.), Lieut. James Woolfolk. Loss; k, 1; w, 4=5. THIRD BATTALION, Maj. William Nelson: Va. Battery (Fluvanna Arty.)., Capt. Charles T. Huckstep; Va. Battery (Amherst Arty), c Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick; Va. Battery (Morris Arty.), Capt. R. C. M. Page. Loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

CAVALRY, Brig-Gen. James E. B. Stuart: 1st N. C., Lieut-Col. James B. Gordon, Col. Lawrence S. Baker; 1st Va., Col. Fitshugh Lee; 3d Va., Col. Thomas F. Goode; 4th Va., Capt. F. W. Chamberlayne; 5th Va., Col. Thomas L. Rosser; 9th Va., Col. W. F. H. Lee, 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; Ga. Legion, Col. Thomas R. R. Cobb; 15th Va. Battalion, Maj. J. Critcher; Hampton (S. C.) Legion (Squadron), Capt. Thomas E. Screven; Jeff Davis (Miss.) Legion, Lieut-Col. W. T. Martin, Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. John Pelham. Cavalry loss (incomplete): k, 5; w, 26; m, 40=71.

Total Confederate loss (approximate): 3286 killed, 15,909 wounded and 940 captured or missing=20,135.

The strength of the Confederates is not officially stated, but is probably ranged from 80,000 to 90,000 effectives.

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VI

Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill

By Fitz John Porter,
Major-General, U. S. V.

Under the direction of General McClellan certain measures for the protection of the right flank of the army in its advance upon Richmond were put in my hands, beginning simultaneously with the march of the army from the Pamunkey.* Among these were the clearing of the enemy from the upper Peninsula as far as Hanover Court House or beyond, and, in case General McDowell's large forces, then at Fredericksburg were not to join us, the destruction of railroad and other bridges over the South and Pamunkey rivers, in order to prevent the enemy in large force from getting into our rear from that direction, and in order, further, to cut the Virginia Central Railroad, the one great line of the enemy's communications between Richmond and Northern Virginia.

A portion of this duty had been accomplished along the Pamunkey as far as was deemed prudent by Colonel G. K. Warren's forces, posted at Old Church, when on the 26th of May, preparatory to an immediate advance upon Richmond, General McClellan directed me to complete the duty above specified, so that the enemy in Northern Virginia, then occupying the attention of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, could not be suddenly thrown upon our flank and rear nor otherwise strengthen the enemy in Richmond. I was allowed to adopt my own plans, and to select such additional forces as I deemed necessary.

At 4 A.M. on the 27th General G. W. Morell, commanding the division consisting of J. H. Martindale's, Dan-

*The army left its camp at White House Landing, on the Pamunkey, May 17th to 20th. The 6th Corps, under Franklin, advanced along the north bank of the Chickahominy, and on the 23d and 24th Davidson's brigade of Smith's division occupied Mechanicsville after a brief encounter with a Confederate column of Magruder's command, under General Paul J. Semmes.—*Editors.*

iel Butterfield's, and James McQuade's brigades, marched from New Bridge preceded by an advance-guard of two regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery under command of General W. H. Emory. At the same hour Colonel Warren with his brigade moved from Old Church. Cavalry under General George Stoneman and regular infantry under General George Sykes followed at a later hour, to protect our left flank and rear. The first two commands were to fall upon the enemy, who I had reason to believe were camped in strong force near Hanover Court House. The first command, under my immediate direction, was to take the enemy in front, while Colonel Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall upon him in flank and rear. In a pelting storm of rain, through deep mud and water, for about 14 miles, the command struggled and pushed its way to Peake's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad, 2 miles from Hanover Court House, where we came in presence of the enemy.

At once a force of infantry (Colonel C. A. Johnson's 25th New York Volunteers and Berdan's Sharpshooters), protected by artillery, was sent forward to hold the enemy in check, pending the arrival of Morell, who was slowly pushing along the swampy roads. Cavalry and artillery were sent to the left along the Ashland road, to guard our flank and destroy the railroad and telegraph at the crossing. On Martindale's arrival he was sent in support of this force, and with it soon became engaged with very persistent opponents. Butterfield was sent to the front, where, deploying in line, he moved rapidly upon the enemy, put them to flight, and captured many prisoners and one cannon and caisson.

As the enemy gave way, the troops were pushed on toward Hanover Court House in pursuit of the fleeing foe and to strike their camp, which I had been informed was nearby, but which was found abandoned. Suddenly the signal officers notified me of a large force attacking our flank and rear, and especially the troops under Martindale. they hastened to the aid of their imperiled comrades. Mc- At once the infantry were faced about, and at double-quick

Quade's brigade, on arriving opposite the contending forces, moved in line to the attack. Butterfield, now in rear as faced about, pushed this brigade through the woods and fell with vigor, upon the enemy's flank. The united attack quickly routed the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in killed and wounded and prisoners.*

Warren, greatly delayed by muddy roads, swollen streams, and the work of building bridges, arrived about 3 P.M., at the close of the first battle, and was sent northward in pursuit of the enemy, and to destroy bridges and boats on the Pamunkey. He, with Rush of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured a company of North Carolina infantry just before reaching the wagon road bridge, which they destroyed. Night put an end to the contest.

The succeeding day was occupied in gathering in the results of our victory and in pushing the troops to Ashland, destroying two of the enemy's railroad trains, abandoned camps, and railroad and other bridges over the Pamunkey and South Anna, and injuring the railroad tracks—it having been decided at Washington that McDowell was not to join us, and that a large portion of his command had been ordered to Northern Virginia in pursuit of Jackson, then on a raid into the Shenandoah Valley. Our movement had caused the rapid retreat to Richmond of General Joseph R. Anderson's command, thereby releasing McDowell's command for active operations in Northern Virginia, as well as opening the way for him to join us. The destruction of the railroad bridges was accomplished by Major Lawrence Williams, 6th U. S. Cavalry, who, while on the South Anna, fell in with some of McDowell's scouts, who were hourly looking for the advance of their corps.

McClellan joined me on the battle-field, and was well pleased with the results of the labors. Besides the destruction of the bridges, trains, etc., we were in possession of a large number of arms and one cannon, of some 730 pris-

*The affair at Hanover Court House was with the brigade of General L. O'B. Branch, who says in his report that he contended against odds in the hope that Confederate troops would come to his assistance. His loss was 73 killed and 192 wounded.—*Editors.*

oners, and had buried some 200 killed. By General McClellan's directions we returned to our camp on the 29th of May.

This was the first occasion that the corps had had to show its good qualities, all being in action at once. The behavior of the officers and men showed the benefit of the good training before Washington, during the fall and winter of 1861, given by their brigade and regimental commanders. The regiments, without exception behaved most gallantly.

On our return to camp all rejoiced at the success of our mission in securing for a reasonable time our flank from injury and preparing the whole army for a rapid advance on Richmond, and also by rendering McDowell's presence unnecessary for the defense of Washington, giving the War Department the opportunity of sending his corps by water to join us. If that had been done, none of the enemy could have been detached from Richmond to threaten Washington, and his forces in Northern Virginia would have been called to defend Richmond. But a mightier power interfered, and through years of trial and sufferings delayed the happy victory we then hoped was in our hands.*

After the Battle of Fair Oaks, during the greater part of the month of June, 1862, the Army of the Potomac, under General McClellan, and the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, confronted each other, east of Richmond. The two armies were of nearly equal strength. (See foot-note p. 187.) McClellan's forces, divided by the Chickahominy, were extended south of that stream, from New Bridge to White Oak Swamp, leaving north of the river only the Fifth Army Corps. The Confederate troops faced the Federal army throughout its length, from White Oak Swamp to New Bridge, and thence up the right bank of the Chickahominy, covering the important crossings at Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge, north of the city.

South of the Chickahominy each army was secured against surprise in flank or successful attack in front by

*The Union loss at Hanover Court House was 62 killed; 223 wounded; 70 missing = 355.— *Editors.*

that swollen stream; by marshy lands and muddy roads; by redoubts studded with artillery and rifle pits well manned, all flanked or covered by swamps, tangled thickets, and slashed timber. Notwithstanding the apparent quiet, both armies were actively engaged in the erection of those defensive works which permit large forces to be detached, at opportune moments, for aggressive action, or for the defense of menaced positions. These preparations for offensive and defensive action, known to both commanders, plainly impressed on each the necessity of guarding against any errors in position, and the importance of preparing promptly to take advantage of any opening in his opponent's line which promised results commensurate with the risks involved.

It was apparent to both generals that Richmond could only be taken in one of two ways: by regular approaches, or by assault. An assault would require superior forces, supported by ample reserves. It was equally apparent that an attack could readily be made from Richmond, because that city's well armed and manned intrenchments would permit its defense by a small number of men, while large forces could be concentrated and detached for offensive operations.

The faulty location of the Union army, divided as it was by the Chickahominy, was from the first realized by General McClellan, and became daily an increasing cause of care and anxiety to him; not the least disturbing element of which was the possibility of quickly reinforcing his right wing or promptly drawing it to the south bank. That this dilemma was known to so intelligent and vigilant a commander as General Lee could not be doubted; and that it was certainly demonstrated to him by General J. E. B. Stuart's dashing cavalry raid around the Union army, on June 14th, was shown in many ways. One evidence of it was his immediate erection of field works on his left, and his increasing resistance to the efforts of Union scouts to penetrate into the roads leading to Richmond from the north. This indicated that Lee was preparing to guard against the reenforcement of McClellan's right, and also

against information reaching us of Confederate reenforcements from the north.

McClellan had been forced into this faulty position on the Chickahominy and held there by the oft-repeated assurances that McDowell's corps of 40,000 men, then at Fredericksburg, would be advanced to Richmond and formed on his immediate right, which would make that wing safe.* On the 27th of May, under promise that McDowell would join him at once, McClellan cleared his front of all opposition to his rapid march, by operations at Hanover Court House. If McDowell had joined McClellan then, it would have resulted in the capture of Richmond. That junction could also easily have been brought about immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks, and even then Richmond could have been taken. But the Confederate authorities so skillfully used Jackson, in the Valley of Virginia, as to draw off McDowell; while the fears of the Administration, then aroused for the safety of Washington, together with a changed policy, caused him to be held back from the Army of the Potomac; and, although orders were several times issued requiring McDowell to unite with McClellan, and assurances were given as late as June 26th that he would so unite, yet he never arrived, and the right wing of McClellan's army, then left exposed, became the object of attack. McClellan saw the coming storm, and guarded against it as best he could. Realizing the faultiness of his position, resulting from McDowell's withdrawal to the north, he desired to correct the error by changing his base from York River to the James, where he could be easily reenforced, and from which point his communications would be safe. This change could not be made so long as McDowell's advance was to be expected nor in any event could it be affected without great risk to the safety of his own army in the face of a vigilant and active foe, and without seriously jeopardizing the success of the cause to which he was devoting all his energies. He, however, secured by careful examination

*See Stanton's letter of May 18th: "You are instructed to cooperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond."—*F. J. P.*

full information of the roads, and the character of the country over which he would be obliged to move, if circumstances or policy should require a change of base, and as early as June 18th sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James River.

In the middle of June General McClellan intrusted to me the management of affairs on the north bank of the Chickahominy, and confided to me his plans as well as his hopes and apprehensions. His plans embraced defensive arrangements against an attack from Richmond upon our weak right flank. We did not fear the results of such an attack if made by the forces from Richmond alone; but if, in addition, we were to be attacked by Jackson's forces, suspicions of whose approach were already aroused, we felt that we should be in peril. But as Jackson had thus far prevented McDowell from joining us, we trusted that McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, who had been directed to watch Jackson, would be able to prevent him from joining Lee, or, at least, would give timely warning of his escape from their front and follow close upon his heels.

With McClellan's approval, my command was distributed as follows:

General Geo. G. Meade's brigade of General Geo. A. McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves was posted at Gaines's house, protecting a siege-battery controlling New Bridge; Generals John F. Reynold's and Truman Seymour's brigades held the rifle pits skirting the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, and the field-works covering the only crossings near Mechanicsville and Ellerson's Mill. These field-works, well armed with artillery, and the rifle-pits, well-manned, controlled the roads and open fields on the west bank of that creek, and were concealed by timber and brush from an approaching foe. The infantry outposts from the same division, and their supports west of Mechanicsville to Meadow Bridge, were instructed, if attacked or threatened by superior forces, to fall back by side approaches to the rear of Reynolds, at the upper crossing, thus leaving the main approaches open to the fire of their artillery and infantry defenders.

North from Meadow Bridge to the Pamunkey Federal cavalry pickets kept vigilant watch, and protected detachments who were felling timber in order to obstruct the roads against the rapid march of any force upon the flank or rear of the right wing.

Cooke's cavalry, near Cold Harbor, guarded the right rear and scouted toward Hanover Court House, while Morell's and Sykes's divisions were conveniently camped so as to cover the bridgecrossings and to move quickly to any threatened point.

Such was the situation on the 24th of June, when, at midnight, General McClellan telegraphed me that a pretended deserter, whom I had that day sent him, had informed him that Jackson was in the immediate vicinity, ready to unite with Lee in an attack upon my command. Though we had reason to suspect Jackson's approach, this was the first intimation we had of his arrival; and we could obtain from Washington at that time no further confirmation of our suspicions, nor any information of the fact that he had left the front of those directed to watch him in Northern Virginia.

Reynolds, who had special charge of the defense of Beaver Dam Creek and of the forces at and above Mechanicsville, was at once informed of the situation. He prepared to give our anticipated visitors a warm welcome. The infantry division and cavalry commanders were directed to break camp at the first sound of battle, pack their wagons and send them to the rear, and, with their brigades, to take specified positions in support of troops already posted, or to protect the right flank.

On the 25th the pickets of the left of the main army south of the Chickahominy were pushed forward under strong opposition, and, after sharp fighting, gained considerable ground, so as to enable the Second and Third Corps (Sumner's and Heintzelman's) to support the attack on Old Tavern which it was intended to make next day with the Sixth Corps (Franklin's). The result of the fighting was to convince the corps commanders engaged that there

had been no reduction of forces in their front to take part in any movement upon our right flank.

Early on the 26th I was informed of a large increase of forces opposite Reynolds, and before noon the Confederates gave evidence of their intention to cross the river at Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville, while from our cavalry scouts along the Virginia Central Railroad came reports of the approach from the north of large masses of troops.

Thus, the attitude of the two armies toward each other was changed. Yesterday, McClellan was rejoicing over the success of his advance toward Richmond, and he was confident of reenforcement by McDowell. Today, all the united available forces in Virginia were to be thrown against his right flank, which was not in a convenient position to be supported. The prizes now to be contended for were: on the part of McClellan, the safety of his right wing, protection behind his intrenchments with the possibility of being able to remain there, and the gain of sufficient time to enable him to effect a change of base to the James; on the part of Lee, the destruction of McClellan's right wing, and, by drawing him from his intrenchments and attacking him in front, the raising of the siege of Richmond.

The morning of Thursday, June 26th, dawned clear and bright, giving promise that the day would be a brilliant one. The formation of the ground south of the Chickahominy opposite Mechanicsville, and west to Meadow Bridge, largely concealed from view the forces gathered to execute an evidently well-planned and well-prepared attack upon my command. For some hours, on our side of the river, all was quiet, except at Mechanicsville and at the two bridge crossings. At these points our small outposts were conspicuously desplayed for the purpose of creating an impression of numbers and of intention to maintain an obstinate resistance. We aimed to invite a heavy attack, and then, by rapid withdrawal, to incite such confidence in the enemy as to induce incautious pursuit.

In the northern and western horizon vast clouds of dust arose, indicating the movements of Jackson's advanc-

ing forces. They were far distant, and we had reason to believe that the obstacles to their rapid advance, placed in their way by detachments sent for that purpose, would prevent them from making an attack that day. As before stated, we did not fear Lee alone; we did fear his attack, combined with one by Jackson on our flank; but our fears were allayed for a day.

General McClellan's desire to make the earliest and quickest movements at that time possible, and his plans for the accomplishment of that desire, as expressed to me, were substantially conveyed in the following dispatch of June 23d from his chief-of-staff:

"Your dispositions of your troops are approved by the commanding general. If you are attacked, be careful to state as promptly as possible the number, composition, and position of the enemy. The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond."

The position selected on Beaver Dam Creek for our line of defense was naturally very strong. The banks of the valley were steep, and forces advancing on the adjacent plains presented their flanks, as well as their front to the fire of both infantry and artillery, safely posted behind intrenchments. The stream was over waist-deep and bordered by swamps. Its passage was difficult for infantry at all points, and impracticable for artillery, except at the bridge-crossing at Ellerson's Mill, and at the one above, near Mechanicsville.

Quite early in the day I visited General Reynolds, near the head of the creek, and had the best reasons not only to be contented but thoroughly gratified, with the admirable arrangements of this accomplished officer, and to be encouraged by the cheerful confidence of himself and his able and gallant assistants, Seymour on his left, at Ellerson's Mill, and Colonel Seneca G. Simmons and Major Roy Stone in his front. Each of these officers commanded a portion of the Pennsylvania Reserves,—all under the command of the brave and able veteran, McCall. These troops were

about to engage in their first battle, and bore themselves then, as they did on trying occasions immediately following, with the cheerful spirit of the volunteer and the firmness of the veteran soldier—examples inspiring emulation in these trying "seven days' battles."

PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK, June 26



a.a.a. Approach of D. H. Hill and Longstreet from Richmond; b.b.b. Approach of A. P. Hill; c.c.c. Route of D. H. Hill to Old Cold Harbor, the day after the battle, to join Jackson's attack on Union right; d.d.d. Route of A. P. Hill to New Cold Harbor, to attack Union center; e.e.e. Route of Longstreet to Dr. Gaines', to attack Union left. Of the five Confederate brigades engaged in this battle, one (Ripley's) was attached to the division of D. H. Hill and came up as a re-inforcement to Pender, who, with Field, Archer, and Anderson, were part of the division of A. P. Hill, his other two divisions, Gregg and Branch, being held in reserve. The losses in their hopeless attack fell chiefly upon Archer, who made the first advance about 5 P.M., and later upon Pender and Ripley. Pegram's battery was badly cut up, losing forty-seven men and many horses. On the Union side, Martindale, Griffin, and Meade came up after the battle had begun, re-enforcing Reynolds and Seymour. When firing ceased, about 9 P.M., Porter's troops held their position; but Jackson's approach on their right flank compelled its evacuation early in the morning.—*Editors.*

Part of the general details previously adopted was then ordered to be followed, and subsequently was enforced as near as practicable in all the battles in which my corps engaged; that under no circumstances should the men expose themselves by leaving their intrenchments, or other cover, merely to pursue a repulsed foe; nor, except in uneven ground which would permit the fire of artillery to pass well over their heads, was infantry or cavalry to be posted in front of a battery, or moved so as to interfere with its fire. Bullet, shot, and shell were to be relied upon for both repulse and pursuit.

Sitting for hours near the telegraph operator at my quarters, prior to the attack, I listened to the constant and rapid "ticking" of his instrument, and was kept informed, by the various intercommunicating messages at the headquarters of the army, of the condition of affairs in front of the three corps farthest to the left. Reports often came from them that the enemy's camps seemed to be largely deserted, confirming the information that the enemy had gathered in front of Franklin and myself. Yet, the following day, when I called for aid to resist the forces of Lee and Jackson at Gaines's Mill, known to be immensely superior to mine, the commanders of these three corps expressed the belief that they were about to be attacked by bodies larger than their own, and objected to detaching any part of their troops. (See foot-note, page 180.)

From the cavalry scouts of Colonel John F. Farnsworth, Stoneman, and General P. St. George Cooke, whose forces stretched in the order named, from Meadow Bridge north to the Pamunkey, reports came that Jackson was advancing slowly upon my flank.* I was also informed that

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*The outposts at Meadow Bridge, the extreme western front of Porter's line, were attacked by the Confederates advancing from Richmond under A. P. Hill, about noon on the 26th, and during the afternoon the columns under Jackson encountered the cavalry pickets on the Hanover Court House road, six miles north of Mechanicsville, and at Hundley's Corner, at the crossing of Topopotomoy Creek. The cavalry under General Cooke and Colonel Farnsworth moved with the main army, and the force under Stoneman, consisting of cavalry and infantry, retired down the Pamunkey to White House landing, and joined the force there under General Casey.—*Editors.*

the departure of Jackson from Northern Virginia was suspected, but not positively known, at Washington; but that at this critical moment no assistance whatever could be expected from that vicinity.

Perhaps at this time the Administration had been crippled by its own acts, and could not respond to General McClellan's calls for aid. About April 1st, when our army began active operations in the field and recruiting should have been encouraged, the enrollment of troops was ordered to be stopped. The War Governor of Pennsylvania (Andrew G. Curtin) notably disregarded this order. His foresight was afterward recognized at Antietam, where he was able to render valuable assistance. In the month of June, however, the policy had begun to change, and the troops in Northern Virginia were being placed in charge of an officer (General John Pope) called to Washington "to take command of Banks and Fremont, perhaps McDowell, take the field against Jackson, and eventually supersede McClellan." At the day the order of assignment was issued, June 27th, however, there was no enemy confronting that officer—Jackson having disappeared from Northern Virginia, and being in my front at Gaines's Mill.

About 2 o'clock P.M., on the 26th, the boom of a single cannon in the direction of Mechanicsville resounded through our camps. This was the signal which had been agreed upon, to announce the fact that the enemy were crossing the Chickahominy. The curtain rose; the stage was prepared for the first scene of the tragedy. At once tents were struck, wagons packed and sent to the rear to cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy. The several divisions were promptly formed, and took the positions to which they had previously been assigned. General McCall assumed command at Beaver Dam Creek; Meade joined him, taking position behind Seymour; Martindale and General Charles Griffin, of Morell's division, went, respectively, to the right and rear of Reynolds; Butterfield was directed to support General Cooke's, and subsequently Martindale's right, while Sykes was held ready to move wherever needed.

Reynolds and Seymour prepared for action and concealed their men.

About 3 o'clock the enemy, under Longstreet, D. H. and A. P. Hill, in large bodies commenced rapidly to cross the Chickahominy almost simultaneously at Mechanicsville, Meadow Bridge, and above, and pushed down the left bank, along the roads leading to Beaver Dam Creek. In accordance with directions previously given, the outposts watching the access to the crossings fell back after slight resistance to their already designated position on the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, destroying the bridges as they retired.

After passing Mechanicsville the attacking forces were divided, a portion taking the road to the right to Ellerson's Mill, while the larger body directed their march to the left into the valley of Beaver Dam Creek, upon the road covered by Reynolds. Apparently unaware, or regardless, of the great danger in their front, this force moved on with animation and confidence, as if going to parade, or engaging in a sham battle. Suddenly, when half-way down the bank of the valley, our men opened upon it rapid volleys of artillery and infantry, which strewed the road and hill-side with hundreds of dead and wounded, and drove the main body of the survivors back in rapid flight to and beyond Mechanicsville. So rapid was the fire upon the enemy's huddled masses clambering back up the hill, that some of Reynold's ammunition was exhausted, and two regiments were relieved by the 4th Michigan and the 14th New York of Griffin's brigade. On the extreme right a small force of the enemy secured a foothold on the east bank, but it did no harm, and retired under cover of darkness.

The forces which were directed against Seymour at Ellerson's Mill made little progress. Seymour's direct and Reynold's flank fire soon arrested them and drove them to shelter, suffering even more disastrously than those who had attacked Reynolds. Late in the afternoon, greatly strengthened, they renewed the attack with spirit and energy, some reaching the borders of the stream, but only to be repulsed with terrible slaughter, which warned them

not to attempt a renewal of the fight. Little depressions in the ground shielded many from our fire, until, when night came on, they all fell back beyond the range of our guns. Night put an end to the contest.

The Confederates suffered severely. All night the moans of the dying and the shrieks of the wounded reached our ears. Our loss was only about 250 of the 5,000 engaged, while that of the Confederates was nearly 2,000 out of some 10,000 attacking.*

General McClellan had joined me on the battle-field at an early hour in the afternoon. While we discussed plans for the immediate future, influenced in our deliberations by the gratifying results of the day, numerous and unvarying accounts from our outposts and scouts toward the Pamunkey warned us of the danger impending on the arrival of Jackson, and necessitated a decision as to which side of the Chickahominy would be held in force. He left me late at night, about 1 A.M. (June 27th), with the expectation of receiving information on his arrival at his own headquarters from the tenor of which he would be enabled to decide whether I should hold my present position or withdraw to a well-selected and more advantageous one east of Gaines' Mill, where I could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy, over which I must retire if compelled to leave the left bank. He left General Barnard, of the Engineers, with me, to point out the new line of battle in case he should decide to withdraw me from Beaver Dam Creek. The orders to withdraw reached me about 3 o'clock A.M., and were executed as rapidly as possible.

The position selected for the new stand was east of Powhite Creek, about six miles from Beaver Dam Creek. The line of battle was semicircular, the extremities being

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*Union forces engaged, 11 regiments, 6 batteries. Confederate forces engaged, 21 regiments, 8 batteries.—*F. J. P.*

According to the official returns the total Union loss at Mechanicsville was 361, but little more than that of the 44th Georgia alone (335). The Confederate loss, exclusive of Field's and Anderson's brigades and of the batteries, is reported at 1589. General Longstreet is quoted by William Swinton as authority for putting the aggregate at "between three and four thousand." ("Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," p. 145.)—*Editors.*

in the valley of the Chickahominy, while the intermediate portion occupied the high grounds along the bank of a creek and curved around past McGehee's to Elder Swamp. Part of the front was covered by the ravine of the creek. The east bank was lined with trees and underbrush, which afforded concealment and protection to our troops and artillery.

From the point where the line of the creek turns suddenly to the east, the front was a series of boggy swamps covered extensively with tangled brush. Near McGehee's and beyond, the ground, elevated and drier, was filled with ravines swept by our artillery and infantry, who were covered by depressions in the ground. The high land embraced within the semicircle was cleared ground, but undulating, and often, with the aid of fences and ditches, giving concealment and cover, breast-high, to both infantry and artillery.

Before sunrise of the 27th troops were withdrawn from Beaver Dam Creek and sent to their new position east of Powhite Creek, destroying the bridges across it after them.

Some batteries and infantry skirmishers, left as a ruse at Beaver Dam Creek, by their fire so fully absorbed the attention of the foe that our purpose suddenly and rapidly to abandon the intrenchments seemed unsuspected. But when they discovered our withdrawal, their infantry pressed forward in small detachments, the main body and the artillery being delayed to rebuild the bridges. Seymour's brigade, the last to start, under its skillful commander, with Captain John C. Tidball's and Captain James M. Robertson's well-managed horse-batteries on its flanks, kept the enemy at a respectful distance and enabled all, horse, foot, and artillery, wagons and wounded, to reach, with little loss, their designated posts in the new positions. My brave and efficient aide, Lieutenant S. M. Weld, however, was taken prisoner.

The siege guns were safely removed by hand from the works overlooking New Bridge and taken to the south bank of the Chickahominy, where, protected by Franklin's corps,

they were posted and used with damaging effect upon the enemy as they advanced that afternoon to attack the left of our line.

Our new line of battle was selected and strong, though long and requiring either more troops to man it than I had, or too great a thinning of my line by the use of the reserves. The east bank of the creek, from the valley of the Chickahominy to its swampy sources, was elevated, sloping, and timbered. The bed of the stream was nearly dry, and its west bank gave excellent protection to the first line of infantry posted under it to receive the enemy descending the cleared field sloping to it. The swampy grounds along the sources of the creek were open to our view in front for hundreds of yards, and were swept by the fire of infantry and artillery. The roads from Gaines's Mill and Old Harbor, along which the enemy were compelled to advance, were swept by artillery posted on commanding ground.

Along the ground thus formed and close to its border were posted the divisions of Morell and Sykes,—the latter on the right; Captain A. P. Martin's Massachusetts battery between—each brigade having in reserve, immediately in its rear, two of its regiments. Sections or full batteries of the division artillery were posted to sweep the avenues opened. Wherever possible and useful, guns were placed between brigades and on higher ground, in front or rear, as judgment dictated. The unemployed guns were in reserve with their divisions. Batteries of Hunt's Artillery Reserve were in rear of the left, covered by timber from view of the enemy, but ready to move at a moment's call, or from their stand to pour their irresistible fire into the enemy's face in case they broke our line.

McCall's division formed a second line, near the artillery in reserve, in rear of Morell, and immediately behind the woods on the left, Reynolds, the first to leave Beaver Dam Creek, had gone to Barker's Mill to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Grapevine Bridge; but, hearing the battle raging on our left, and having no enemy in his front, while Emory, of Cooke's

cavalry, with artillery, was near at hand to do the duty assigned to him, he hastened to join McCall, arriving opportunely in rear of Griffin's left.


General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy—there, with the aid of artillery, to guard our left flank. He was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left. Stoneman's detachment of cavalry and infantry, miles to the north, was no longer available. Fearing it might be cut off by Jackson, I sent Stoneman word to make his way as best he could to White House, and in proper time to rejoin the army—wherever it might be.

Believing my forces too small to defend successfully this long line, I asked General Barnard, when he left me, to represent to General McClellan the necessity of reenforcements to thicken and to fill vacant spaces in my front line. He himself promised me axes. This was my first request for aid, but none came in response. The axes did not arrive till near dark, and were useless; but with the few obtained early in the day from the artillery, and in the little time at command, trees were felled along a small portion of our front, and barriers were erected, which were filled in with rails and knapsacks.

Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill

MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF GAINES' MILL, SHOWING APPROXIMATELY THE POSITIONS OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY ENGAGED

(The Topography from the Official Map)



Confederate brigades: A.A. Anderson (R.H.); B, Wilcox; C, Featherston; D, Pryor; E, Pickett; Z, Kemper; F, G, H, J, L, Y, line of A. P. Hill's six brigades at the opening of the battle, as follows: Archer, Field, Anderson (J.R.), Branch Gregg, Pender; I, K, Hood and Law (Whiting's division of Jackson's corps), replacing Archer, Field, Anderson; M, N, O, P, Jackson's old division, as follows: Fulkerson (3d Va.), Cunningham (2d Va.), Lawton, and Winder; Q, R, S, Seymour, Trimble and Elzey; T, U, V, W, X, line at first; Ripley, Colquitt, Rodes, Anderson (G. B.), Garland. General directions of approach are indicated by dotted lines.

Union batteries: 1, Allen; 2, 3, Weeden; 4, Martin; 5, 5, 5, 5, Edwards; 6, Weed; 7, Tidball; 8, Kingsbury; 9, Hesamer; 10, Upton; 11, 12, 13, 14, Kerns, Easton, De-Hart, Cooper; 15, Diederichs, Knieriem, and Tyler; also Voegelee, Smead, Porter, and Robertson. Total, 124 guns.

Confederate batteries: 16, 17, 18, Longstreet's artillery; 19, Braxton; 20, Pegram; 21, Johnson; 22, Crenshaw; 23, Pelham; 24, Brockenbrough; 25, Carrington; 26, Courtney; 27, Bondurant; also other guns not here indicated.

At 2 o'clock P. M., after a sharp engagement between Gaines' Mill and New Cold Harbor, A. P. Hill made the first severe attack on the Union center and left, and after two hours' fighting was repulsed in such disorder that Longstreet was ordered up to relieve the pressure by a feint on the right, which he converted into an attack in force. Thus, up to 4 o'clock, the Confederate assault was mainly on the Union left center and left. About this hour D. H. Hill's division got fully into action, and Jackson's corps (consisting of Ewell's, Whiting's and Jackson's divisions) was thrown in where needed from the direction of Old Cold Harbor. Major Dabney, Jackson's chief-of-staff, in a letter to General Hill, thus describes the movements of Jackson's corps: "The column," he says, "came on the eastern extension of Gaine's Mill road at Old Cold Harbor, and passing the old tavern a little way, soon ran afoul of McClellan's right wing, with infantry and artillery in position. Your division had taken the lead, and became, therefore, the left or our whole line of battle. Jackson put Ewell in position on your right. He seemed to think that A. P. Hill was to drive the enemy into his corps. But in a little while the state of the firing, convinced him that Porter 'didn't drive worth a cent,' and he bestirred himself to let out his full strength. Then it was that, after ordering Ewell's advance, he wheeled on me and began to give instructions about putting in his six other brigades, which were then standing idle in the road by which we had come. I sent them in from left to right en echelon, each brigade to support its left-hand neighbor, and to move to the sound of the firing. The strangest divergencies, however, took place in consequence of the coppices and woods and lack of guides. Law and Hood kept in proper relation to Ewell's right, and thus helped A. P. Hill's beaten division, attacked the enemy's center or left center, and about 6 P.M. drove it in. But Lawton, bearing too much by his own left, unwittingly crossed Hood's line of march and re-enforced Ewell—a most timely providence, for Ewell's line was about done for. The 2d Virginia brigade seems to have borne as much too far to the right, and at last, near sunset found themselves behind Longstreet's extreme right—the brigade of R. H. Anderson, whom they assisted in driving the enemy. The 3d Virginia brigade brought up behind Longstreet's left, passing near Gaine's Mill, and near sunset participated in the victory. The Stonewall brigade, under Winder, bore too much to the left and entered the fight on your right. Pickett's brigade

headed by the 'Old Ironsides' (18th Virginia), broke Porter's line just west of the Watts house." With regard to this break, General Law, in a letter to the Editors, says: "Whiting's division covered the ground on which J. R. Anderson's, Archer's and Field's brigades had previously attacked. We passed over some of these men as we advanced to the assault. We carried the Federal line in our front, and Longstreet on our right, bringing up his reserves, again attacked and carried his front." At the last and successful advance the line from left to right was: Longstreet (Anderson, Pickett), Whiting (Hood and Law), Jackson (Winder and Lawton), Ewell (one or two brigades), and D. H. Hill (Rodes, Anderson and Garland). General Porter thinks the first break in his line was made by Hood from the direction indicated on the map by an arrow. Of the Union reserves, McCall's division was put in on the line of Morell,—except a part of Reynold's brigade, which went to the assistance of Warren; Slocum's division also went to the left,—except Bartlett's brigade, which was sent to the right of Sykes around the McGehee house.

NOTE.—The map is incorrect in one regard; Longstreet's right did not extend so far south as Morell's left.—*Editors.*

While withdrawing from Beaver Dam, I had seen to my delight, General H. W. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps crossing the river to my assistance. McClellan had promised to send it, and I needed it; it was one of the best divisions of the army. Its able, experienced, and gallant commander and his brave and gifted subordinates had the confidence of their well-trained soldiers. They were all worthy comrades of my well-tried and fully trusted officers, and of many others on that field, subsequently honored by their country-men. But to our disappointment, through some misunderstanding, the division was almost immediately recalled to Franklin. In response, however to a later call, it returned at a time when it was greatly needed, and rendered invaluable services.

I fixed my headquarters at first at the Adams house; but early in the battle that locality became a hospital, and I advanced to the Watt's house, on more elevated ground, whence I could see the greater part of the field and communicate readily with all parts of it.

Thus far, it will be seen, all plans were defensive; I had reason to believe that the enemy largely outnumbered me—three to one. Evidently it was their plan and their policy to crush me, if possible. Their boldness and confidence, I might add incaution, if not imprudence and rash-

ness in exposure and attack, confirmed my belief that at first they deemed the task an easy one.

I, however, determined to hold my position at least long enough to make the army secure. Though in a desperate situation, I was not without strong hope of some timely assistance from the main body of the army, with which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our opponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the main body of the army, under McClellan, the result of any sacrifice or suffering on the part of my troops or of myself. I felt that the life or death of the army depended upon our conduct in the contest of that day, and that on the issue of that contest depended an early peace or a prolonged, devastating war—for the Union cause could never be yielded. Our brave and intelligent men of all grades and ranks fully realized this, and thousands of them freely offered up their lives that day to maintain the sacred cause which they had voluntarily taken up arms to defend to the last extremity.

The Confederates, under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, following us from Mechanicsville, moved cautiously by the roads leading by Dr. Gaines's house to New Cold Harbor, and by 2 P.M. had formed lines of battle behind the crest of the hills east of Powhite Creek. These lines were parallel to ours, and extended from the valley of the Chickahominy through New Cold Harbor around Morell's front, so as nearly to reach Warren's brigade—the left of Syke's division. At Gaines's Mill, Colonel Thomas Cass's gallant 8th Massachusetts Volunteers of Griffin's brigade obstinately resisted A. P. Hill's crossing, and were so successful in delaying his advance, after crossing, as to compel him to employ large bodies to force the regiment back to the main line. This brought on a contest which extended to Morell's center and over Martin's front—on his right—and lasted from 12:30 to near 2 o'clock—Cass and his immediate supports falling back south of the swamps. This persistent and prolonged resistance gave to this battle one of its well-known names.*

*All the severe battles in this campaign began after noon; Seven Pines, 1 o'clock; Mechanicsville, 3 to 4; Gaines's Mill at 12:30; Savage's Station at 4; White Oak Swamp, 12 to 1, Glendale, 3 to 4, Malvern Hill after 1.—*Editors.*

Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill

Another column of the enemy, D. H. Hill's, from Beaver Dam Creek, and Jackson's column, from Northern Virginia, with which it had united, came opposite my right front from the direction of Old Cold Harbor and deployed, connecting with A. P. Hill's on the left and extending to our right beyond McGehee's. The advance column of these troops came a little earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more cautious and for some hours not so aggressive. Believing that they were passing on down the river to intercept our communications, and thinking that I might strike them to good advantage while in motion, I asked permission to follow, intending to attack with Syke's division and Emory of Cooke's cavalry, leaving Morell and McCall to hold the other lines in check. Information, however, soon poured in, convincing me that this force was larger than any I could use against them, and that still larger forces were forming to attack our left and center. This compelled me to keep my troops united and under cover, and also again to ask aid from the south bank of the Chickahominy. My first message to General McClellan was not delivered, as already stated; my second one was responded to by the speedy arrival of Slocum.*

Soon after 2 P. M. A. P. Hill's force, between us and New Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive disposition, independent of its own troops on its flanks, by advancing from under cover of the woods, in lines well formed and extending, as the contest progressed, from in front of Martin's battery to Morell's left. Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and as brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing

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*The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries (several not engaged), in all about 30,000 fighting men; Confederate; 129 regiments, 19 batteries, in all about 65,000 men.

back in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along the whole line to our extreme right. The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, heard above the roar of the artillery and the volleys of musketry, all combined was something fearful.

Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted ammunition by borrowing from their more bountifully supplied and generous companions. Some withdrew, temporarily, for ammunition, and fresh regiments took their places ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their desperate enemy, for the purpose of retaking ground from which we had been pressed and which it was necessary to occupy in order to hold our position.

The enemy were repulsed in every direction. An ominous silence reigned. It caused the inference that their troops were being gathered and massed for a desperate and overwhelming attack. To meet it, our front line was concentrated, reenforced, and arranged to breast the avalanche, should it come. I again asked for additional reenforcements. French's and Meagher's brigades, of Sumner's corps, were sent forward by the commanding general, but did not arrive till near dark.

At 2 P. M., when I took my station beyond the Watts house, my anxieties and responsibilities had been substantially relieved, at least so far as related to the establishment of a line of battle in which all engaged felt their power to resist attack. At that time the practicability of our defensive position, in charge of troops having implicit confidence in each other, had been demonstrated by the successful resistance for nearly two hours against the strong and persistent attacks upon our center and right. The troops were well shielded, with their reserves within immediate call. Commanders of divisions, of brigades, and of batteries were in the midst of their men, all confident and determined to hold their posts to the utmost, to resist and drive back the enemy, prepared to call up their reserves, replenish ammunition, and communicate to me such needs

as they could not fill, and furnish all necessary information for my action. They had been left to their own judgment and energy, to determine in what manner they could accomplish the best results with the means at their command and with the least exposure.

From my post in advance of the Watts house, the field in front of Sykes was visible, and it was easily understood, by the sound of battle in the woods and by the fire of the enemy in his advance and repulse, that the center and left still remained solid and undisturbed. All available means were used by which I could be kept informed so that I could provide in the best possible manner, for the many and rapid changes and wants suddenly springing up. The Prince de Joinville and his two nephews—the Comte de Paris and Duc de Chartres—and Colonels Fant, Radowitz, and Hammerstein, from the commanding general's staff, joined me as volunteer aides. Each of these, with my own staff, Locke, Kirkland, Mason, Monteith, and McQuade, exposed themselves to danger, not only quickly and cheerfully carrying every message, but often voluntarily throwing themselves where needed, to direct, to lead, to encourage and to rally.

During the greater part of the afternoon, D. H. Hill's troops, in detachments, were more or less aggressive on the right. The silence which followed the repulse, already referred to, lasted but a short time. The renewed attacks raged with great fierceness and fury, with slight intermission, along the most of our front, till after five o'clock. Large and numerous bodies of infantry from the direction of Old Cold Harbor, under cover of artillery, directed their attacks upon Syke's division and Martin's battery; others, from the west side of Powhite Creek, were hurled in rapid succession against Martindale and Butterfield. These furious attacks were successfully repelled, but were immediately renewed by fresh troops. McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, as needed, were pushed as rapidly as possible into the woods, in support of Martindale and Griffin, whose brigades for a long time bore the brunt of the attack and whose regiments were relieved as soon as their ammuni-

tion was expended. All our positions were held against enormous odds, and the enemy was driven back by our fresh troops, successively thrown into action. At each repulse they advanced new troops upon our diminishing forces, and in such numbers and so rapidly that it appeared as though their reserves were inexhaustible. The action extended along our entire line. At 4 o'clock, when Slocum arrived, all our reserves were exhausted. His brigades were necessarily separated and sent where most needed. Newton's brigade, being in advance, was led to the right of Griffin, there to drive back the enemy and retake ground only held by the enemy for an instant. Taylor's brigade filled vacant places in Morell's division, and Bartlett's was sent to Sykes, just in time to render invaluable service, both in resisting and attacking.

On the right, near McGehee's, the enemy captured one of our batteries, which had been doing them great damage by enfilading their lines and preventing their advance. They gained thereby a temporary foothold by advancing some infantry; but, prompt to act, Sykes directed its recapture, and the 16th New York,* with arms shifted to the right shoulder, and moving at a double-quick, was soon in possession of the prize, which again renewed its fire.

At times, the enemy on the right would gain an advantage, but in such a case our infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, would move immediately at a rapid gait and regain the lost ground. This occurred frequently in Sykes's command and in the brigades serving near it, all of which were, more or less, in exposed ground. Not less deserving of praise were the divisions of McCall, Morell, and Slocum in their stubborn resistance to the oft-repeated and determined onslaughts of their assailants, who vastly outnumbered them.

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*The men of this regiment wore on this field, for the first time in battle, the white straw hats which made them so conspicuous during the "Seven Days." These hats were presented by Mrs. Joseph Howland, wife of the colonel. As the hats drew upon them, the particular attention of the enemy, they were discarded after the retreat to James River.—*Editors.*

About 6:30, preceded by a silence of half an hour, the attack was renewed all along the line with the same apparent determination to sweep us by the force of numbers from the field, if not from existence. The result was evidently a matter of life or death to our opponent's cause. This attack, like it predecessors, was successfully repulsed throughout its length. The sun had sunk below the horizon, and the result seemed so favorable that I began to cherish the hope that the worst that could happen to us would be a withdrawal after dark, without further injury—a withdrawal which would be forced upon us by the exhausted condition of our troops, greatly reduced by casualties, without food and with little ammunition.

As if for a final effort, as the shades of evening were coming upon us, and the woods were filled with smoke, limiting the view therein to a few yards, the enemy again massed his fresher and reformed regiments, and threw them in rapid succession against our thinned and wearied battalions, now almost without ammunition, and with guns so foul that they could not be loaded rapidly. In preparation for defeat, should it come, I had posted artillery in large force just in rear of our center and left, ready for any emergency and especially to be used against a successful foe, even if his destruction involved firing upon some of our own retreating troops, as might have been necessary. The attacks, though coming like a series of apparently irresistible avalanches, had thus far made no inroads upon our firm and disciplined ranks. Even in this last attack we successfully resisted, driving back our assailants with immense loss, or holding them beyond our lines, except in one instance, near the center of Morell's line, where by force of numbers and under cover of the smoke of battle, our line was penetrated and broken; this at a point where I least expected it. This was naturally the weakest point of our line owing to the closer proximity of the woods held by the enemy. Under this cover they could form, and with less exposure in time and ground than elsewhere, and launch their batalions in quick succession upon our men. I believed that I had guarded against the danger by strongly

and often reenforcing the troops holding this part of the line. Here the greater part of McCall's and Slocum's forces were used. Just preceding this break, to my great surprise, I saw cavalry, Rush's Lancers, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left, and carrying off with sudden fright the limbers of our artillery, then prepared to pour their irresistible fire into a pursuing foe. With no infantry to support, and with apparent disaster before them, such of the remainder of these guns as could be moved were carried from the field; some deliberately, others in haste, but not in confusion.

In no other place was our line penetrated or shaken. The right, seeing our disaster, fell back united and in order, but were compelled to leave behind two guns, the horses of which had been killed. The troops on the left and center retired, some hastily, but not in confusion, often turning back to repulse and pursue the advancing enemy.* All soon rallied in rear of the Adams house behind Sykes and the brigades of French and Meagher sent to our aid, and who now, with hearty cheers, greeted our battalions as they retired and reformed. We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke's cavalry which had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry and in the midst

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*We are informed by Colonel Auchmuty, then assistant adjutant-general of Morell's division, that there was no running or panic when the line broke. The men fell back in small groups, turning and firing as they went, and carrying many of the wounded with them. On the crest of the hill in the rear of the line of battle a stand was made, and from that point regimental organizations were preserved. Near the close of the war General Griffin said to Colonel Auchmuty, that he regarded Gaines's Mill as the hardest-fought battle in his experience.

The same officer informs us that after the line of battle had been formed in the morning, and while the attack was momentarily expected, the mail arrived from the North, and the newsboys went along the line crying the New York and Philadelphia papers.—*Editors.*

of our heavy cannonading, as well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and, dashing through the batteries, satisfied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the failure on our part to hold the battle-field and to bring off all our guns, with few exceptions, in an orderly retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremtorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river.* I never again saw their commander.

At night I was called to General McClellan's headquarters, where the chief of corps, or their representatives, were gathered. The commanding general, after hearing full reports, was of the opinion that the final result would be disastrous if we undertook longer to hold the north bank of the river with my command in the condition in which it was left by a hard fight and the loss of rest for two nights. In this opinion all concurred; and I was then instructed to withdraw to the south bank and destroy the bridges after me. The plans to move to the James River were then explained, together with the necessity for the movement, and the orders were given for their execution.†

My command was safely withdrawn to the south bank of the river, and the bridges were destroyed soon after sunrise on the 28th.‡

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*See "Official Records" Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273, 282.—*F. J. P.*

†At Gaines's Mill the Union loss was: Killed, 895; wounded, 3107; missing, 2836—total, 6837. On the Confederate side the losses of Jackson, Ewell, Whiting, and D. H. Hill, were: Killed 589; wounded, 2671; missing, 24,—total, 3284. Of these, Whiting (i.e. Hood's and Law's brigades) lost 1017. The losses of A. P. Hill and Longstreet for this battle are not reported separately, but a safe estimate from their losses in the campaign would probably bring the total considerably beyond the Union loss, that of the killed and wounded certainly much higher. Almost the whole of two Union regiments, the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves and the 4th New Jersey, were captured.

‡The landing of White House and the railroad south from Tunstall's station were abandoned, the infantry and artillery embarking for Fort Monroe, and the cavalry marching to Yorktown.—*Editors.*

The Prince de Joinville and his two nephews, the Comte de Paris and Duc de Chartres, were on the field as volunteer aides-de-camp, actively engaged in encouraging the men, carrying messages, and performing other duties of aides. Each of these officers was in the midst of flying musket-balls, and was liable to be struck at any moment (see p. 184). At one time the Comte de Paris, regardless of himself, begged me to send his uncle to General McClellan with a message which would at once and permanently remove him from the dangers of the battle, since the family interests at stake were too important to permit him to be so exposed. I had shortly before asked Colonel Thomas L. Gnatt, another of McClellan's aides, to hasten to that general and hurry up reenforcements, as our lines would soon be broken. The danger was now imminent, and I asked the Prince to carry the same message, telling him that he was selected because of the speed of his horse. He turned as if to go, and I went to attend to the field. Soon the Count returned, with tears in his eyes, and with choking utterance, expressive of his care and affection, begged me again to send away his uncle. This also I did. Scarcely had the Prince left the second time when our cavalry fell back on us as I have related, our line was broken and our artillery rendered unserviceable. The Prince and Colonel Gnatt afterward told me that they did not leave, as I had directed, because all seemed favorable to us, and they thought I could not be in earnest or that I had greatly misjudged the situation. This shows how suddenly the tide may turn in battle and on what little incidents success may depend.

The forces arrayed against us, and especially those which had thus far been launched upon my command, were the chosen of Southern manhood from Maryland to Texas. No braver or more spirited body of men was to be found among the Confederates, or any who more strongly believed in their own invincibility.* Their general officers, from the chief down, had been selected for earnest devotion to

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*The known presence of President Davis and General Lee, to oversee, direct, encourage, and urge, was another influential power in favor of the Confederates in this movement.—*F. J. P.*

their cause, and well-earned reputation for intelligent and energetic performance of duty in other fields. With few exceptions they had been my personal friends, and many of them my intimate associates. In the varied relations to them as subaltern, as instructor, as academical and regimental comrade, in social life, as competitor for honor in war and in garrison life, and engaged in watching those performing trying duty in Kansas, Utah, and elsewhere, I learned to know them well and to respect their decision under conviction of duty, when, to my regret, they left the cause of the Union. Notwithstanding, my friendship, my personal regard for these old friends and former comrades, which never varied, it was my duty to oppose them, when arrayed against the Union, to the utmost. At the earliest moment, when separation was attempted, and afterward, my efforts were continuously directed against the success of their cause. One of the results of those efforts was manifested on this battle-field. I was enabled, after great labor and care, to meet these friends and comrades in command of men, than whom there could be none more intelligent, better disciplined, braver, more confiding in each other, and more determined on success. They embraced soldiers from Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and all New England,—together with all the regular army, then at the East, from all parts of the country. Their commanders were not excelled by those in any other corps in ability or experience; they had the highest confidence in each other, in the army, and in their own men, and were fully competent to oppose their able adversaries.

I have said we did not fear Lee alone at Beaver Dam Creek. Nor, though anxious, did we fear the combined attack of Lee and Jackson at Gaines's Mill. Defeat to us was necessarily great damage to them. Our flanks were secure and could not be turned; though fewer in numbers, the advantage of our position combined with the firm discipline of our own brave men, overcame the odds. Our adversaries were forced to meet us face to face. All day they struggled desperately for success, and near night, after fearful destruction, broke our line at one point, just at a time

when a most unforeseen mismanagement on our part aided to crown their labors with possession of the field. Still, our confidence was not broken; and, as we shall see in a succeeding paper, under like circumstances victory crowned our arms with success against the same opponents, strongly reenforced, at Malvern Hill.

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VII

The Charge of Cooke's Cavalry at Gaines's Mill

By Phillip St. George Cooke,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. A.

In "*The Century*" for June, 1885, there is an article on the battle of Gaines's Mill, signed by Fitz John Porter, in which appear singular errors of statement regarding the action of the "Cavalry Reserve," affecting also the conduct and reputation of its commander. He says (see p. 340 of the present volume):

"We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke's cavalry, which had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and, dashing through the batteries satisfied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the failure on our part longer to hold the battle-field, and to bring off all our guns (with few exceptions)* in an orderly retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremptorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river." (Footnote, "See 'Official Records,' Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273.—*F.J.P.*")

To silence forever the injurious statements and insinuation of the last sentence, I give here evidence of two witnesses who were present, and whose high character is known to all. Major-General Wesley Merritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, superintendent United States Military Academy, writes me, April 8th, 1885:

"The cavalry remained, with you in immediate command, on that portion of the field, until after midnight on the 27th of June, 1862. It provided litter-bearers and lantern-bearers for our surgeons who went over the field of battle, succoring and attending the wounded.

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*Insertion by General Porter in the revision of his article for the present work.—*Editors.*

"The cavalry was the last force to leave the field and to cross the Chickahominy,* and the bridge on which it crossed, between 12 midnight on the 27th and 2 A. M. on the 28th of June, was, I think, rendered impassable by your order."

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Martin, assistant-adjutant-General United States Army, wrote me from Fort Leavenworth, April 30th, 1885:

"The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front; the enemy was not driven from his front, but the charge of your cavalry did not stop the advance of the enemy, and this enabled Porter's troops to get off the field. I am by no means alone in the belief that the charge of the cavalry at Gaines's Mill, on June 27th, 1862, saved Fitz John Porter's corps from destruction. . . . You did not direct your command at once to cross the river. There were no frightened men in your vicinity. All the frightened men were far to your right; you could not have reached the retiring crowd; and if you could have stopped them, you could have done more than Porter, himself did do, and he was amidst them, for I saw him. Your command, at least a part of it, was the very last to cross the river."

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*Major William H. Powell, of the 4th Regular Infantry, wrote to the editor on September 8th, 1885: "Probably not much credit attaches to the particular organized force which was the last to cross the Chickahominy River after the battle of Gaines's Mill; but in order to settle the question I desire to state that the cavalry was not the last to cross the river—even if they did leave at the time General Merritt states. The 4th U. S. Infantry was the last organization which crossed, and that regiment passed over about two hours after daylight on the morning of the 28th, and a bridge had to be partly relaid to enable it to do so. This regiment was posted on the extreme right flank of the army at the battle of Gaines's Mill, and was ordered to support Weed's battery. Weed was afterward reenforced by Tidball's battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) until twilight of the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its position until Weed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon the regiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in the Chickahominy Valley, on the road by which it retired from the field. When daylight came we expected orders to renew the engagement and took up our march to return to the battle-field, about a mile and a half distant. It was then that some wounded were met, who informed us that all the army had crossed during the night. We then marched from Grapevine Bridge to Alexander's Bridge in sight of the enemy's pickets, and when we arrived on the south side we were astonished to find that it was thought we had been captured. We learned afterward that orders had been sent to the infantry during the action, but the officer who started with them was killed; another who took them was wounded before they could be delivered, and an orderly who was subsequently dispatched with them did not arrive at his destination and was never heard of afterward."

It should be observed that in the short extract from "*The Century,*" above, General Porter repeats the assertion that the cavalry caused the loss of the (22) guns—emphasizes, makes plainer, the meaning of the opening sentence to the charge "alone I always attributed the failure on our part to longer hold the battle-field and to bring off all our guns in an orderly retreat."

Captain W. C. Weeden, commanding Battery C, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, reports, Vol. XI, Pt. II, p. 282, "Official Records," the loss of a section by stress of the enemy's attacks; the two other sections "held in support in rear of Griffin's brigade" opened fire. "The smoke had filled the whole field to the woods, and it was impossible to direct the fire. The batteries were limbering to the rear in good order" when, he says, the cavalry fugitives ran through them, but he only lost one more piece "mired in the woods." But General Griffin reports that the artillery "opened fire upon the enemy advancing upon our left; but it was too late; our infantry had already begun to fall back, and nothing being left to give confidence to the artillerymen, it was impossible to make them stand to their work." And that was just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done.*

I have examined the "Official Records" and found reports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries:

General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain Easton:

> "This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him."

Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but "loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought four of the guns off the fields." Of another battery he reports:

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*We learned afterward that orders had been sent to the infantry during the action, but the officer who started with them was killed; another who took them was wounded before they could be delivered, and an orderly who was subsequently despatched with them did not arrive at his destination and was never heard of afterward."

"No efforts could not repel the rush of a successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down, and guns lay immovable on the field."

Captain H. J. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, reports, p. 410:

"The remaining infantry falling back, we were compelled to retire from our guns. The charge being too sudden and overpowering it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed by the enemy's fire."

Was General Porter prevented from bringing off all these guns by the cavalry charge?

General Porter says, p. 322:

"Just preceding this break (in Morell's line) I saw cavalry, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left."

All the evidence goes to disprove this very deliberate statement and that all the infantry on the left had broken and was fast disappearing before the first advance of the cavalry. Again he says:

"General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy—there with the aid of artillery to guard our left flank; he was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left."

What strange folly of self-contradiction is betrayed between this order "to guard our left flank" and the violent condemnation in the first extract, which we have been considering, of the march "to resist an attack of the enemy on our left, . . . " in a "charge executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as that of the enemy." Could a poet laureate say more?

"Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Volley'd and thundered—
. . . . . .
Then they rode back—"

Ay, there's the rub.

When I reported to General Porter before the battle, I remember that he proposed that I should take post in the

narrow open meadow on the extreme left. I urged that the flank of the army was virtually covered by the Chickahominy; that, moreover, it was covered by three reserve batteries and 3 29-pounder batteries on the opposite side of the river; while the position I had taken on the hill-slope was within view, and also within cavalry striking distance. If I had gone there, I should not have been able, when the time came, to face and, with artillery aid, to stop the enemy in the flush of his success. To some such objections which I made General Porter evidently yielded, instead of "enjoining" me; for the cavalry remained quite near his first station, Adam's house; and I was there with him repeatedly. An order "under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming on the hill" would have been to a general officer not only unprecedented, but insulting.

How strange, to military ears, would sound an order "to intecept, gather and hold all stragglers" on the extreme front and flank!—and the warning not to "pass in front of our line on the left!" Such extravagance of action—marching, with no earthly object, between two lines of fire—is seldomed thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes the bounds of sanity. But it is emphasized by his map, which represents my cavalry as actually making a flank march between the lines of battle,—Morell's and Longstreet's.

It seems necessary to add the statements of eyewitnesses, from different points of view—men of well-known high character, to corroborate my assertions and my corrections of misrepresentations of the part played by the cavalry and myself in the battle, as found in *"The Century"* article.

Next morning, at Savage's Station, the Prince de Joinville approached me with both hands extended, saying with empressement, "I saw you make your charge yesterday;" and next day he wrote to the Duc d'Aumale (see *"New York Times,"* August 13th, 1862):

> . . . "Those fresh troops rush in good order upon our left, which falters, flies, and passing through the artillery draws on in disorder the troops of our center. The enemy advances rapidly. The fusillade and cannonade are so violent that the projectiles striking the ground

raise a permanent cloud of dust. At that moment General Cooke charged at the head of his cavalry; but that movement does not succeed, and his horsemen on their return only increase the disorder. He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a little courage, to stop the panic, but in vain."

The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2d, 1877:

. . . "I was with de Hart's battery on the crest of the hill when you advanced on our left. . . The sacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainly saved a part of our artillery; as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The main fact is, that with the cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout."

General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d, 1877:

"I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacity of its conduct at that time, together with the rapid firing of canister at short range by the battery mentioned, did much, if not everything, toward preventing the entire destruction of the Union army at Gaines's Mill. The circumstances were these:

"The enemy had emerged from a wood, where his ranks were more or less disorganized, into an open field. Instead of finding the way clear before him he was met by a determined charge of cavalry and a heavy artillery fire. In his mind a new line of fresh troops were before him. It was but natural, at that stage of our military experience, that he should hesitate and halt, to prepare for a new emergency. He did so; and that night the cavalry bivouacked as near the scene of these events as the enemy did."

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me March 24, 1870:

"It is my opinion that but for the charge of the 5th Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that the charge, more than any other thing, was instrumental in saving that part of the army on the north bank of the Chickahominy.

"You were the last general officer of General Porter's command on the field on the left, General Porter himself leaving before you had, therefore an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on."

Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, June 16th, 1879:

"About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and I deployed the 5th and 1st Cavalry in two lines, and a little to the rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then disappeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery further to the left, where Rush's Lancers had been ordered. The 5th Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no more of them. You had ordered me to support them; but there was a warm fire, and the smoke and

dust made everything obscure. I saw none of the 5th, after it was broken, pass through the battery, which was very near. It was soon forced to retire and was followed by the 1st in its rear."

Finally, General William N. Grier, United States Army, wrote me, July 19th, 1879:

"The reserve was stationed on the hill . . . in full view of the slopes of the hill, down to the timber through which the enemy debouched in large numbers. The United States batteries were on the slope of the hill, a little to our right front. You ordered the 5th to make a charge, directing me to make a second charge after the 5th would rally. I never saw that regiment again on that day, after it was enveloped in a cloud of dust, making the charge—but soon after saw a battery or two emerge from the dust . . . withdrawing from the contest. I then wheeled my squadrons into column of fours, at a trot along the top of the hill, until getting in rear of the batteries—receiving the enemy's fire at a loss of an officer and many men and horses—and, as I then supposed, saving the batteries from further loss."

The orders actually given were to support the batteries to the last moment, and then charge, if necessary to save them.

Detroit, June, 1885.

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VIII

Recollections of a Participant in the Charge

By the Rev. W. H. Hitchcock

Remembering clearly the incidents connected with the cavalry charge, I wish to clear up a point in regard to that charge so far as the regiment (the 5th Regular Cavalry) with which I had the honor of being connected was concerned.

The battle did not begin until noon. We were stationed on the left of our position. As the hours passed, the battle became more and more furious. About 5 P.M. we were moved up near to the crest of the hill on our left, and within some 20 rods of the 5 or 6 batteries planted on the crest of the hill.

It was something marvelous to watch those brave men handle their guns; never a man flinched or was dismayed, though a most withering fire of musketry and artillery was poured upon them.

Just before dark when we could tell, by the sound of musketry fire and by the constantly advancing yells of the charging foe, that he was getting near the guns in our front, General Philip St. George Cooke, commanding the cavalry, rode to our front. I was on the right of the front line of the first squadron, and I heard his order to Captain Whiting, commanding the five companies of our regiment that were present on the field. He said, "Captain, as soon as you see the advancing line of the enemy raising the crest of the hill, charge at once, without any further orders, to enable the artillery to bring off their guns." General Cooke then rode back around the right of our squadron.

Captain Whiting turned to us and said, "Cavalry! Attention! Draw saber!" then added something to the effect, "Boys, we must charge in five minutes." Almost immediately, the bayonets of the advancing foe were seen, just beyond our cannon, probably not fifty rods from us. Captain

Whiting at once gave the order, "Trot! March!" and as soon as we were fully under way he shouted, "Charge!"

We dashed forward with a wild cheer, in solid column of squadron front; but our formation was almost instantly broken by the necessity of opening to the right and left to pass our guns. So furiously were our brave gunners fighting that I noticed this incident: The gun directly in my front had just been loaded; every man had fallen before it could be fired. As I bore to the right to pass this gun, I saw the man at the breech, who was evidently shot through the body, drawing himself up by the spokes of the wheel, and reaching for the lanyard, and I said, "He will fire that gun," and so kept to the right, and almost immediately felt the shock of the explosion. Then I closed in to re-form the line, but could find no one at my left, so completely had our line been shattered by the musketry fire in front and the artillery fire in our rear. I rushed on and almost instantly my horse reared upright in front of a line of bayonets, held by a few men upon whom I had dashed. My horse came down in front of the line, and ran away partly to our rear, perfectly uncontrollable. I dropped my saber, which hung to my waist by the saber-knot, and so fiercely tugged at my horse's bit as to cause the blood to flow from her mouth, yet could not check her. The gun I had passed, now limbered up, was being hauled off at a gallop. I could direct my horse a little to right or left and so directed her toward the gun. As she did not attempt to leap the gun, I gained control of her, and at once started back upon my charge. After riding a short distance I paused. The firing of artillery and infantry behind and of infantry in front was terrific. None but the dead and wounded were around me. It hardly seemed that I could drive Lee's battle-scarred veterans alone, and so I rode slowly off the field. The regiment had only about 250 men in action. Our commissioned officer was the only one not wounded except some who were captured. Only about 100 returned from that bloody field for duty next day. Some were captured, but a large number fell in that terrible charge, and sleep

with the many heroes who on that day gave their lives for the Union. So far as those of the 5th Regular Cavalry present in this charge were concerned, we certainly did our whole duty, just as we were ordered. We saved some guns, and tried to save all.

Fairview, Ill., June 13th, 1885.

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IX

Lee's Attacks North of the Chickahominy

By Daniel H. Hill,

Lieutenant-General, C.S.A.

While encamped, about noon on Monday, the 23d of June, 1862, on the Williamsburg road, about a mile from the battlefield of Seven Pines, in command of a division of the Confederate army, I received an order from General Lee to report immediately at his quarters on the Mechanicsville road. On approaching the house which the general occupied, I saw an officer leaning over the yard-paling, duty, travel-worn, and apparently very tired. He raised himself as I dismounted, and I recognized General Jackson, who till that moment I had supposed was confronting Banks and Fremont far down the Valley of Virginia. He said that he had ridden fifty-two miles since 1 o'clock that morning, having taken relays of horses on the road. We went together into General Lee's office. General Jackson declined refreshments, courteously tendered by General Lee, but drank a glass of milk. Soon after, Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill came in, and General Lee closing the door, told us that he had determined to attack the Federal right wing, and had selected our four commands to execute the movement. He told us that he had sent Whiting's division to reenforce Jackson, and that at his instance the Richmod papers had reported that large reenforcements had been sent to Jackson "with a view of clearing out the Valley of Virginia and exposing Washington." He believed that General McClellan received the Richmond papers regularly, and he (Lee) knew of the nervous apprehension concerning Washington.* He then said that he would retire

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*I do not know how far the Federals were deceived by the announcement of reeinforcements sent to Jackson, but during the Seven Days' battles I read in a Northern paper a letter from Strasburg, Va., of the 25th of June, stating that they were expecting

to another room to attend to some office work, and would leave us to arrange the details among ourselves. The main point in his mind seemed to be that the crossings of the Chickahominy should be uncovered by Jackson's advance down the left bank, so that the other three divisions might not suffer in making a forced passage.

During the absence of General Lee, Longstreet said to Jackson: "As you have the longest march to make, and are likely to meet opposition you had better fix the time for the attack to begin." Jackson replied, "Daylight of the 26th." Longstreet then said, "You will encounter Federal cavalry and roads blocked by felled timber, if nothing more formidable; ought you not give yourself more time?" When General Lee returned, he ordered A. P. Hill to cross at Meadow Bridge, Longstreet at the Mechanicsville Bridge; and me to follow Longstreet. The conference broke up about nightfall.

It may be of interest to the student of history to know how Jackson managed to slip off so often and so easily. His plan was to press his infantry as near as possible to the enemy, without bringing on a general engagement; then to occupy these advanced points with dismounted cavalry pickets, and to start his "foot cavalry" in the other direction with all possible speed. His stealthy marches to the rear were made without consulting his highest officers, and even without their knowing his destination.

It was characterisic of Jackson to select for his chief-of-staff, not a military man, but a Presbyterian minister, a professor in a theological seminary, and to clothe him with the power of carrying out his mysterious orders when he was temporarily absent. Jackson's confidence was well bestowed, and he found in the Rev. R. L. Dabney, D.D., a faithful, zealous, and efficient staff-officer. To him, now a professor in the State University of Texas, I am indebted

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Stonewall Jackson there, and were so well fortified that they would give him a warm reception. Jackson's corps was then at Ashland, within twelve miles of Richmond. He certainly had slopped off without observation.—*D. H. H.*

for the following account of the unexpected appearance of Jackson on the Federal right wing before Richmond:

"General Jackson's forced march from Mount Meridian, in the neighborhood of the Port Republic battlefield, began in earnest on Wednesday, June 18th, the general and a few of the troops having left the evening before. About midday on Thursday, the 19th, we were at Mechum's River Station, about ten miles west of Charlottesville, with the head of the column. The general called me into a room in the hotel, locked the door, and told me that he was about to go in advance of his corps by rail to Richmond to see the commander-in-chief; that the corps was going to Richmond to join in a general attack upon McClellan, but that he would return to his command before we got there; that I was to march the corps toward Richmond, following the line of railroad, as near as the country roads would permit, by Charlottesville and Gordonsville, General Ewell's division to form the head of the column with which I was personally to proceed; that strict precautions of secrecy were to be observed—which he then dictated to me. He then got on an express train and left us. I dined that day with General Ewell, and I remember that he complained to me with some bitterness of General Jackson's reserve, saying, 'Here, now, the general has gone off on the railroad without intrusting to me, his senior major-general, any order, or any hint whither we are going; but (Major J. A.) Harman, his quartermaster, enjoys his full confidence, I suppose, for I hear that he is telling the troops that are going to Richmond to fight McClellan.'*

"'You may be certain, General Ewell,' I replied, 'that you stand higher in General Jackson's confidence than any one else, as your rank and services entitle you. As for Major Harman, he has not heard a word more than others. If he thinks that we are going to Richmond, it is only his surmise, which I suppose every intelligent private is now making.'

"The column reached Gordonsville, Saturday, June 21st, about noon. To my surprise, on riding into town, I got an order to go to the general—at a private house, where he was lodging. On reaching Gordonsville, Thursday afternoon, he had been met by news which alarmed the outpost there: that a heavy Federal force was on the Rapidan, about sixteen miles away. He therefore had postponed going to Richmond until he could effectually clear up this rumor. The chief mode adopted was characteristic: it was to send out by night an intelligent private citizen, thoroughly acquainted with the Rapidan people and country, as his scout. This gentleman came back, after thorough inquiry, with news that the rumor was unfounded.

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*This was a source of annoyance to Loring in '61, and later on to Elwell. When Jackson's corps was so strangely left at Winchester after the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, and General Lee had gone to the Rappahannock (we were making a feint every day of holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge, with strict orders not to bring on an engagement), I said to Jackson one day: "I am your next in rank, and should you be killed or captured in your many scouts around, I would not know what the corps was left for, or what it was expected to do." He then told me that he had suggested to General Lee, who had to move back to protect Richmond, that he could remain and remove our wounded and stores, and that his presence on McClellan's flank and rear would keep him from attacking Lee. In case of any casualty to himself, the removal was to on till completed.—*D.H.H.*

About half an hour before sunset on Saturday, the general got into an express car with no one but me and the conductor, and came to Frederick's Hall Station in the county of Louisa, arriving about dawn on Sunday, the 22d. We spent the Sabbath there at the house of Mr. N. Harris, attending camp-preaching in the afternoon. At this house were General W. H. C. Whiting and General Hood, then commanding a Texas brigade. At 1 o'clock that night General Jackson arose, took an orderly whom I had selected for him as trustworthy and well acquainted with the road, and started for Richmond with impressed horses. He had me wake up General Whiting and make him sign a pass and an impressment order (which no one under the rank of major-general had a right to do). He had about fifty-two miles to ride to Richmond; to the Nine-mile bridge, near which General Lee was in person, I suppose the distance was as great, so that the ride occupied him, with the time lost in impressing relays of horses, about ten hours. He must have reached his rendezvous with General Lee and his three major-generals about noon on the 23d. If he rode into the city first, the meeting would have been a few hours later. He rejoined his corps at Beaver Dam Station on Tuesday (24), and assembled the whole of it around Ashland Wednesday night, the 25th. About two hours by sun on the 26th we came into collision with McClellan's outposts. We were much mystified at first to know why the general should put a battery in position and cannonade the bushes furiously for ten minutes only to drive away a picket. We found out afterward this was his signal to you (General D. H. Hill), and in a little while the distant sound of your guns at Ellerson's mill told us that the ball had opened."

It will be seen from the narrative of Major Dabney that General Jackson, who fought some of his most desperate battles on Sunday, would not start to Richmond till Sunday had passed. He had the pass and impressment order from General Whiting that he might not be known on the road; he wore no insignia of rank, and as he would have been known in Richmond he did not go to that city It was 3 P.M. on the 23d when I saw him at General Lee's headquarters. Major Dabney is mistaken in saying that the signal-guns were intended for me. A. P. Hill was farther up the Chickahominy, and he was to cross first, and, being nearer Jackson, could hear his guns better that those of us lower down the stream. On the 25th, there was a brisk fight about King's school-house on the Williamsburg road, between Hooker's division and parts of the divisions of Generals T. H. Holmes and Benjamin Huger. That night my division marched across to the neighborhood of Mechanicsville Bridge. To conceal the movement our camp-fires were freshly lighted up by a detachment after the troops had left, and a company was sent some miles

down the Charles City road to send up rockets, as though signalling an advance in that direction. General Lee's order, issued on the 25th of June, says:

"At 3 o'clock Thursday morning, the 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch (seven miles above Meadow Bridge), who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these colums are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge. . . . The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville, and the passage across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General S. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point—General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill,—the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor, etc."

General Jackson was unable to reach the point expected on the morning of the 26th. General A. P. Hill says:

"Three o'clock P. M. having arrived, and no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once, rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it."

Heavy firing was heard at 3 P.M. at Meadow Bridge and the Federal outposts were seen fleeing toward Mechanicsville, pursued by A. P. Hill. We could see a line of battle drawn up at that village to receive Hill. My division being nearest the bridge, Longstreet ordered me to cross first. Some delay was made in repairing the bridge, and A. P. Hill became hotly engaged before we could get to his relief. At this time President Davis and staff hurried past us, going "to the sound of the firing." Ripley's brigade was pushed forward to the support of three batteries of artillery of Major H. P. Holme's battalion, and the two under Captains R. A. Hardaway and J. W. Bondurant. The five batteries soon silenced the Federal artillery, and the whole plateau about Mechanicsville was abandoned to the Confederates, the Federals retiring across Beaver Dam Creek, which was strongly fortified. Our engineers seem to have had little knowledge of the country, and none of the

fortifications on the creek. The maps furnished the division commanders were worthless. At a request from General W. D. Pender, who had been roughly handled in attacking works on the creek, Brigadier-General Ripley, of my division, was directed to cooperate with him, and the attack was made about dark. The enemy had intrenchments of great strength and development on the other side of the creek, and had lined the banks with his magnificent artillery. The approach was over an open plain exposed to a murderous fire of all arms, and across an almost impassable stream. The result was, as might have been foreseen, a bloody and disastrous repulse. Nearly every field officer in the brigade was killed or wounded. It was fortunate for the Confederates that the crossing was begun before Jackson got in rear of Mechanicsville. The loss of that position would have necessitated the abandonment of the line of Beaver Dam Creek, as in fact it did, the next day. We were lavish of blood in those days, and it was thought to be a great thing to charge a battery of artillery or an earthwork line with infantry. "It is magnificent, but it is not war," was the sarcastic remark of the French general as he looked on at the British cavalry charge at Balaklava. The attacks on the Beaver Dam intrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but of exactly the kind of grandeur which the South could not afford.

A brisk cannonade was kept up on the morning of the 27th for an hour or more from the Federal artillery along the line of Beaver Dam Creek, which was held by a thin line of skirmishers, the main force having retreated to Gaines's Mill and New Cold Harbor. A. P. Hill's division was ordered to pursue on the mill, and my division to take the Bethesda Church road to join Jackson. The works on that road were turned by my division, and some sixty or seventy prisoners holding them were captured. Major Dabney says:

"General Jackson continued his march on the morning of the 27th. When I overtook him he was dismounted in the turnpike road with his cap off before a gentleman sitting on a cedar-stump, who was speaking to him in a suppressed voice. An old acquaintance

whom I met told me that this gentleman was General Lee. The comference soon ended, and the march was resumed—deflecting strongly to the east."

General Lee's object in pressing down the Chickahominy was to unmask New Bridge, and thus to establish close communication between the forces defending Richmond and the six divisions attacking the Federal right. A. P. Hill, who marched close to the Chickahominy, succeeded in driving off the Federal troops defending the creek at Gaines's Mill, and advanced until he developed their full line of battle at New Cold Harbor, half a mile beyond. After waiting till 2:30 P.M. to hear from Longstreet,* he advanced his division without support to the attack of the intrenched position of the Federals. He kept up a struggle for two hours, was repulsed and driven back, and in turn repulsed his pursuers. His report says:

"From having been the attacking I now became the attacked; but stubbornly and gallantly was the ground held. My division was thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attacks afterward, in which attack it was necessary to employ the whole of our army on that side of the Chickahominy."

Longstreet came into action after 4 o'clock. He thus describes the difficulties before him:

"In front of me the enemy occupied the wooded slope of Turkey Hill, the crest of which is fifty or sixty feet higher than the plain over which my troops must pass to make an attack. The plain is about a quarter of a mile wide; the farther side was occupied by sharp-shooters. Above these, and on the slope of the hill, was a line of infantry behind trees, felled so as to form a good breastwork. The crest of the hill, some forty feet above the last line, was strengthened by rifle-trenches and occupied by infantry and artillery. In addition to this the plain was enfiladed by batteries on the other side of the Chickahominy. I was, in fact, in the very position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."

All was done that mortals could do by the two gallant divisions struggling against such disadvantages, but nothing decisive could be effected until the full Confederate

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*General Lee in his official report says: "The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. Under this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should commence."—*Editors.*

forces could be brought into action. In the meanwhile, Jackson moved forward on what we afterward found to be the Grapevine Bridge road, my division in advance. A few squads of Federal stragglers were picked up, and some wagons and ambulances were captured. One sutler, in his desperate desire to save his fancy stock, tried to dash his wagon through J. R. Anderson's brigade. He paid no attention to the orders to halt, or to the presented bayonets. Fortunately for him, his horses did not have so much at stake as he had in canned fruits and vegetables, and were quite willing to surrender. Some poor ragged graybacks got toothsome delicacies then, from which they had been long debarred, and of which before nightfall they had no need forever.

About 2 P.M. we reached the neighborhood of McGehee's house, an elevated knoll, which was the Federal right, and from which a dense and tangled swamp extended westward in an irregular curve to Gaines's Mill. Bondurant's battery was brought up to feel the position. Jackson remained with it for a time after the firing began. The battery was badly crippled, and was withdrawn by my order when I perceived the superiority of the enemy's artillery—always the most effective arm of his service. So little was known of the condition of the battle and of the roads, that Jackson posted my division in the woods to the left of the road, and facing toward the firing at Gaines's Mill, in order to intercept the forces that Longstreet and A. P. Hill might drive in that direction. Jackson's report says:

> "Hoping that Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals toward me, I directed General D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the wood on the right of the road an open space, across which I hoped that the enemy would be driven. . . . But it soon becoming apparent from the direction and sound of the firing that General A. P. Hill was hard pressed, I ordered a general advance of my entire corps, which began with General D. H. Hill on the left and extending to the right, through Ewell's, Jackson's, and Whiting's divisions . . . in the order named."

The swamp was to be gotten through, filled with sharpshooters and obstructed with felled timber and choked with brushwood. The report continued:

"In advancing to the attack, General D. H. Hill had to cross this swamp, densely covered with tangled undergrowth and young timber. This caused some confusion and a separation of regiments. On the farther edge of the swamp he encountered the enemy. The conflict was fierce and bloody. The Federals fell back from the wood under the protection of a fence, ditch, and hill. Separated now from them by an open field, some four hundred yards wide, he promptly determined to press forward. Before doing so, however, it was necessary to capture a battery on his left which could enfilade his line upon his advance. . . .*

"Again pressing forward, the Federals again fell back, but only to select a position for a more obstinate defense, when at dark, under the pressure of our batteries,—of which had then begun to play with marked effect upon the left,—of the other concerning events of the field, and of the bold and dashing charge of General Hill's infantry, in which the troops of Brigadier General C. S. Winder joined, the enemy yielded and fled in disorder."

I have always believed that this was the first break in the Federal line; it disposed of Sykes's division of regulars who had been so stubborn and so troublesome all day. The Comte de Paris says of their retreat: "Fearfully reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volunteers." The general advance of our whole line and their intrepid onset everywhere made the defeat of the regulars possible, but credit should be given to the troops that did it. We discovered that our line overlapped that of the

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*The words of Jackson's report, omitted in the quotation are as follows:

"The battery was captured with severe loss, and held for a short time—sufficiently long, however, to enable the division to move on free from its terrific fire, when it was again retaken by the enemy."

This refers to the battle around the McGehee house, the right of Porter's line under command of General George Sykes. The latter gives an account of the contest with Hill, differing from that of the Confederate generals. He says:

"It was now 5:30 P. M. The enemy still continued to pour in fresh troops against 4500 men who had baffled him at every point since 11 o'clock in the morning. The excess of strength compelled the 12th and 14th (Regulars) to occupy the crest of a secondary ridge somewhat in rear of the position they had previously won. Previous to this a brigade of volunteers, under Colonel J. J. Bartlett, consisting of the 16th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 96th Pa. volunteers, and Kingsbury's bty Reg. Arty., joined my command. Under my direction, Col. Bartlett posted the regiments of his brigade with great daring in front of and around the McGehee house, and firmly maintained himself until the center of Porter's army was pierced, the troops in his front driven in, his left exposed, and his position no longer tenable." General Bartlett states in his report that he maintained his ground at the McGehee farm until after dark. See also pp. 339, 340.—*Editors.*

Federal forces, and saw two brigades (afterward ascertained to be under Lawton and Winder) advancing to make a front attack upon the regulars. Brigadier-Generals Samuel Garland and B. G. Anderson, commanding North Carolina brigades in my division, asked permission to move forward and attack the right flank and rear of the division of regulars. The only difficulty in the way was a Federal battery with its infantry supports, which could enfilade them in their advance. Two regiments of Elzey's brigade, which had got separated in going across the swamp, were sent by me, by way of my left flank, to the rear of the battery to attack the infantry supports, while Colonel Alfred Iverson, of the 20th North Carolina, charged it in front. The battery was captured and held long enough for the two brigades to advance across the open plain. "The effect of our appearance," says Garland's official report, "at this opportune juncture (upon the enemy's flank), cheering and charging, decided the fate of the day. The enemy broke and retreated, made a second brief stand, which induced my immediate command to halt under good cover of the bank on the roadside and return their fire, when, charging forward again, they broke and scattered in every direction." Their retreat was to the woods between the field and the river. Swinton gives credit to Hood and Law for making the first break in the Federal line, and quotes from Jackson's report: "Dashing on with unfaltering step in the face of those murderous discharges of canister and musketry, Gen. Hood and Colonel E. M. Law at the head of their respective brigades rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the intrenchments, these brave and determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from his well-selected and fortified position. In this charge, in which upward of a thousand men fell killed and wounded before the fire of the enemy, and in which fourteen pieces of artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the 4th Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and seize the guns. It is evident that

Jackson means to compliment Hood for being the first to pierce the intrenchments on the Federal left. But the word "first" has been misleading as to the point where the break was first made in the Federal line.

General Lawton in his official report stated that after the forces were broken in front of him on our left, a staff officer rode up and called for assistance to charge a battery on the left, and that after marching two or three hundred yards by the right flank, "the shouts of victory from our friends announced that the last battery had been taken and the rout complete." In a letter to me just received, General Lawton says: "I do believe that the first break was on the right of the Federal line, and I moved against that line in front. My knowledge of the position of the battery to be charged was derived solely from the lips of a staff officer, who rode up to me at full speed on the field, and returned immediately to his chief. My recollection is, that very promptly after I heard the shouts of victory from our friends, the same messenger came again to request me to halt. I cannot feel that my memory fails me when I say that you struck the enemy in flank, while Winder's command and mine moved directly on his front. The effect of these several attacks was promptly felt, and soon became conspicuous."

It was not quite dark, and I took the responsibility of halting all the troops on our left. General Winder thought that we ought to pursue into the woods, on the right of the Grapevine Bridge road; but, not knowing the position of our friends, nor what Federal reserves might be awaiting us in the woods, I thought it advisable not to move on. General Lawton concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the woods in advance, as mine had not got through the swamp. No Confederate officer on the field knew that the Federals had but one bridge over which to retreat, else all the artillery that could have been collected would have opened fire upon the Federal masses crowded into a narrow space in the woods, and there would have been a general advance of our line under cover of this fire. Winder was right; even a

show of pressure must have been attended with great results. I made my headquarters at McGehee's house, and ordered my artillery and infantry to occupy the hill around it. The artillery, however, did not get into position until sunrise next morning. Before the infantry was in place, we heard huzzaing on the bridge road, and understood by that that reenforcements had come to cover up the Federal retreat. They took up their position across the road and showed a determined front, but might have been broken by an artillery fire from our elevated plateau; unfortunately, for us, there was no artillery to do this work.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock General Lawton and myself walked out alone to examine the line of battle across the road, afterward discovered to be Meagher's Irish brigade. We got within thirty yards of the Federals, and must have been seen, but we were not fired upon, probably because we were mistaken for a party of their own men sent up to get water at McGehee's well. We met the party going back, and saw them go into their own lines. Not a word was spoken by them or by us. At such times "silence is golden."*

In his attack upon General McClellan's right wing General Lee had 50,000 men.† General Fitz John Porter, who

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*After this paper appeared in "*The Century*" magazine, I received a letter from William H. Osborne, of East Bridgewater, Mass., of which the following is a part:

"I read your article on the battle of Gaines's Mill, Va., I was especially interested in the circumstances related by you concerning the water party sent out from the Irish brigade to McGehee's well, and the adventure of yourself and General Lawton. I remember the incident with great vividness, as I was one of the party. I was a member of Company "C," 29th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers, which was a part of the brigade referred to, but I have always supposed, till I read your article, that it was later in the night when we started. I have also always supposed that in going for water we went inside the Confederate lines. I remember that several times during the night we approached very near your lines, on one occasion actually seeing your men gathered about a smoldering camp-fire in the woods. I suppose you will not blame me for saying that we should all have estimated it a great honor if we had made your acquaintance that night."—*D. H. H.*

†Dabney, in his "Life of Jackson" puts the Confederate force at 40,000. Swinton estimates Porter's forces at 30,000 and Lee's at 70,000—an under and an over estimate respectively, I think.—*D. H. H.*

General Porter (see foot-note, p. 336) estimates his fighting strength at 30,000, and that of the Confederates at 65,000.—*Editors.*

commanded the Federals at Cold Harbor, handled his 40,000 men with an ability unsurpassed on any field during the war. He had greatly the advantage in position, and he had improved this superiority with intrenchments, log breastworks, rifle-pits, and abatis. He had an immense preponderance in artillery, and that of the most superb character. Many of our field-batteries did not get across the swamp at all, and those which did get over were inferior in range and power to General Porter's. Artillery seems to have been a favorite arm with General McClellan, and he had brought it to the highest point of efficiency.

I do not know how much of our infantry straggled in the swamp. Ripley got lost, and his fine brigade was not in action at all. Of Colquitt's brigade, the 6th and 27th Georgia regiments were engaged; the other three regiments in coming out of the swamp found themselves behind Jackson's corps and were not engaged. Rodes, Garland, and Anderson kept their brigades well in hand and did brilliant service. (These three splendid officers were all killed, subsequently, in battle.) I do not know how many men the other five divisions lost by the difficulties of the swamp.

Riding in advance of his skirmish line through the swamp attended by a few staff officers, General Jackson found himself in the presence of fifteen or twenty Federal soldiers on outpost duty. He judged it the part of prudence to assume the offensive and charge upon them before they fired upon him. I am indebted to Major T. O. Chestney, then assistant adjutant-general of Elzey's brigade, for the following account:

> "As Elzey's brigade was pressing forward to the line held by the Confederates at the bloody battle of Gaines's Mill, a squad of 15 or 20 soldiers were encountered on their way to the rear. A tall fellow at the head of the little party drew special attention to himself by singing out at the top of his voice with an oath, 'Gentlemen, we had the honor of being captured by Stonewall Jackson himself,' a statement which he repeated with evident pride all along the line, as our men tramped past. We subsequently learned that his story was true. General Jackson, having ridden some distance in advance had come suddenly upon the blue-coats and with his characteristic impetuosity had charged among them and ordered them to surrender, which they made haste to do."

One of the saddest things connected with the miserable fratricidal war was the breaking up of ties of friendship and of blood. The troops opposing mine on the murderous field that day were the regulars of General George Sykes, a Southerner by birth, and my roommate at West Point,—a man admired by all for his honor, courage, and frankness, and peculiarly endeared to me by his social qualities. During the negotiations of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners, intrusted to General Dix and myself, I sent word to General Sykes, through General N. B. Sweitzer, of General McClellan's staff, that "had I known that he was in front of me at Cold Harbor, I would have sent some of my North Carolina boys up to take him out of the cold." He replied through the same source: "I appreciate the sarcasm, but our time will be next and the tables will be turned." Alas! it was a true prophecy. About 9 P. M. on the 27th, Major B. H. Clitz was brought into my room at the McGehee house, headquarters for the night, wounded in the leg, and a prisoner. He was very young and boyish-looking when he entered West Point, and was a very great favorite with us of maturer years. It flashed upon my mind how, in the Mexican war, as his regiment filed past, I had almost a fatherly fear lest he should be struck; and now he was here, wounded by one of my own men! He was tenderly cared for by my medical director, Doctor Mott, and I was delighted to learn that he would not lose his leg. The next morning General John F. Reynolds was brought in as a prisoner. He had been my messmate in the old army for more than a year, and for half that time my tent-mate. Not an unkind word had ever passed between us. General Reynolds seemed confused and mortified at his position. He sat down and covered his face with his hands, and at length said: "Hill, we ought not to be enemies." I told him that there was no bad feeling on my part, and that he ought not to fret at the fortunes of war, which were notoriously fickle. He was placed in my ambulance and sent over to Richmond, declining a loan of Confederate money. General Reynolds had gone to sleep in the woods between

the battle-ground and the Chickahominy, and when he awoke, his troops were gone and the bridge was broken down.

Winder, Anderson, and Garland, probably the most promising of all our young brigadiers, fell fighting for the cause they loved. Reynolds, one of the noblest of mankind, fell doing his duty on his side at Gettysburg. Sykes, as the friend of McClellan, never received the recognition which his knightly qualities demanded. Worst of all, Porter, who commanded on the field the most creditable to the Federal arms, received that condemnation so much worse than death from the country he had served ably and loyally.

In these battles, the great want with the Confederates, strange as it may seem, was accurate knowledge of the country in their front. The map furnished me (and I suppose the six other major-generals had no better) was very full in regard to everything within our own lines; but a red line on the east side of the Chickahominy and nearly parallel to it, without any points marked on it, was our only guide to the route on which our march was to be made.* None of us knew of the formidable character of the works on Beaver Dam. The blood shed by the Southern troops there was wasted in vain, and worse than in vain, for the fight had a most dispiriting effect on our troops. They could have been halted at Mechanicsville until Jackson had turned the works on the creek, and all that waste of blood could have been avoided. Ripley's brigade was sent to the assistance of Pender, by the direct order, through

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*General E. M. Law, writing on this point in the "*Southern Bivouac*," says:

"The real trouble was that the Confederate officers, even those in high command, knew little or nothing of the topography of the country in which they were operating. An accurate map in the hands of each division commander would have saved many valuable lives at Gaines's Mill as well as at Ellerson's and time enough would have been gained to have brought the whole Confederate force upon the field at the former place several hours before it actually reached there. If Porter's lines had been broken at 4 o'clock, instead of at half past six, he would not have had the cover of night to withdraw his routed troops, and his whole command could have been captured or destroyed in attempting the passage of the Chickahominy. There was no reason why this was not done, except the one given. The Federals, on

me, of both Mr. Davis and General Lee. They both felt pressing upon them the vast importance of keeping near Richmond, and of opening up communications with it as soon as possible. The crossing of the river by General A. P. Hill before hearing from Jackson precipitated the fight on the first day; and it having begun, it was deemed necessary to keep it up, without waiting for Jackson. The same necessity compelled Lee on the second day to attack his antagonist on his own strong and well-chosen position. Lee knew that McClellan depended upon the York River Railroad for his supplies, and by moving upon that road he could have compelled the battle upon his own selected ground, with all the advantages thereof. The lack of transportation, and the fear of the capture of Richmond while he was making this detour to the Federal rear, constrained him to surrender the advantage of position wisely chosen by the Federals and skillfully arranged for defense.

During Lee's absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan; but Magruder was there to keep up a "clatter," as Swinton expresses it. No one ever lived who could play off the Grand Seignior with a more lordly air than could "Prince John," as Magruder was called.† During the ab-

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the other hand, knew the country thoroughly; they had occupied it for several weeks, and during that time their engineer officers had inspected it carefully. . . . There was no earthly reason why the Confederate authorities should not have been possessed of the same information. The Federal Government had been all the previous winter preparing for the advance upon Richmond. McClellan was a long time getting from Yorktown to his position on the Chickahominy, and all his movements indicated the probable position he would take up in front of Richmond. There was no lack of time, therefore, to map the locality accurately, and no lack of warning that it would be of the most vital importance. To undertake the defense of a city, without attempting to learn the topography of the country around it, was a new principle in modern warfare."—*Editors.*

†In ante-bellum days (so the old army story used to run) Magruder was a lieutenant of artillery at Rouse's Point. There his mess entertained some British officers, two of whom were scions of nobility. The visit having been expected, the mess had borrowed or rented gold plate, and silver plate, cut-glass ware, rich furniture, and stylish equipages for conveying the noble guests. Prince John assured them that these were but the debris of the former splendor of the regimental mess. "Only the debris, my lord; the schooner bringing most of the mess plate from Florida was wrecked." On the 2d day of the festival one of the dazzled nobleman said to Prince John: "We do not wish

sence of Lee he kept up such a clatter that each of McClellan's corps commanders was expecting a special visit from the much-plumed cap and the one-gaudy attire of the master of ruses and strategy. He put on naturally all those grand and imposing devices which deceive the military opponent.

The fortifications around Richmond at that time were very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the disadvantages of a precipitated movement. But McClellan seems to have contemplated nothing of the kind; and as he placed the continuance of the siege upon the hazard of Cold Harbor, he was bound to put every available man into that fight.

Just before we crossed the Chickahominy, I asked General Garland if he remembered what Napoleon said at Austerlitz when one of his marshals had begged permission to attack a column of the Austro-Russian army which was making a flank movement. Garland replied: "I, too, was just thinking that McClellan was saying to his officers, as Napoleon did, 'When your enemy is making a false movement, do not strike him till he has completed it;' and it may be that he will gobble up Richmond while we are away."

While we were lying all day idle on the 28th, unable to cross the Chickahominy, the clouds of smoke from the burning plunder in the Federal camps and the frequent explosions of magazines indicated a retreat; but Whiting kept insisting upon it that all this was but a ruse de guerre of McClellan preparatory to a march upon Richmond. I made to him some such reply as that once made to General Longstreet when a cadet at West Point, by Professor Kendrick.

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to be inquisitive, but we have been so much impressed with this magnificence that we are constrained to believe that American officers must be paid enormously. What is your monthly pay? Assuming an indifferent air, Prince John said: "Damned if I know;" then, turning to his servant, "Jim, what is my monthly pay?" The servant was discreetly silent, it may be from a wink, or it may be that to remember $65 was too heavy a tax upon his memory also.—*D. H. H.*

The professor asked Longstreet, who never looked at his chemistry, how the carbonic acid of commerce was made. Longstreet replied: "By burning diamonds in oxygen gas." "Yes," said Professor Kendrick, "that will do it; but don't you think it would be a *little* expensive?"* Don't you think," I said to Whiting, "that this ruse of McClellan's is a *little* expensive?" The old West Point yarn had a very quieting effect upon his apprehensions.

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*The professor would never contradict any one. The following is a specimen of his style of questioning. X. Y. Z. (whose name is now a household word) was on examination. Professor K.: "What is its color?" X. Y. Z.: "White, sir." Professor K.: "Yes, you mean a kind of grayish white. In fact you might call it coal-black, might you not?" X. Y. Z.: "Yes, sir, that's it."—*D. H. H.*

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X

On the Confederate Right at Gaines's Mill*

By E. M. Law,

Major-General, U. S. A.

By 5 o'clock on the 27th of June the battle of Gaines's Mill was in full progress all along the line. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's men were attacking in a most determined manner, but were met with a courage as obstinate as their own by the Federals who held the works. After each bloody repulse the Confederates only waited long enough to re-form their shattered lines or to bring up their supports, when they would again return to the assault. Besides the terrific fire in front, a battery of heavy guns on the south side of the Chickahominy was in full play upon their right flank. There was no opportunity for maneuvering or flank attacks, as was the case with D. H. Hill on our extreme left. The enemy was directly in front, and he could only be reached in that direction. If he could not be driven out before night, it would be equivalent to a Confederate disaster, and would involve the failure of General Lee's whole plan for the relief of Richmond. It was a critical moment for the Confederates, as victory, which involved the relief or the loss of their capital, hung wavering in the balance. Night seemed about to close the account against them, as the sun was now setting upon their gallant, but so far fruitless efforts.

While matters were in this condition, Whiting's division, after crossing with much difficulty the wooded and marshy ground below Gaines's Mill, arrived in rear of that portion of the line held by the remnants of A. P. Hill's division. When Whiting advanced to the attack a thin and irregular line of General Hill's troops were keeping up the fight, but, already badly cut up, could effect nothing, and

*This description of the fighting in front of Morell's line is from an extended paper on "The Fight for Richmond in 1862," which appeared in *"The Southern Bivouac"* for April, 1887.—*Editors.*

were gradually wasting away under the heavy fire from the Federal lines. From the center of the division to the Chickahominy swamp on the right the ground was open; on the left were thick woods. The right brigade (Law's) advanced in the open ground, the left (Hood's) through the woods.

As we moved forward to the firing we could see the straggling Confederate line laying behind a gentle ridge that ran across the field parallel to the Federal position. We passed one Confederate battery in the edge of the field badly cut to pieces and silent. Indeed there was no Confederate artillery then in action on that part of the field. The Federal batteries in front were in full play. The fringe of woods along the Federal line was shrouded in smoke, and seemed fairly to vomit forth a leaden and iron hail. General Whiting rode along his line and ordered that there should be no halt when we reached the slight crest occupied by the few Confederate troops in our front, but that the charge should begin at that point in double-quick time, with trailed arms and without firing. Had these orders not been strictly obeyed the assault would have been a failure. No troops could have stood long under the withering storm of lead and iron that beat into their faces as they became fully exposed to view from the Federal lines. As it was, in the very few moments it took them to pass over the slope and down the hill to the ravine, a thousand men were killed or wounded.

Law's brigade advanced to the attack in two lines, the 11th Mississippi regiment (Colonel Liddell) and the 4th Alabama (Lieutenant-Colonel McLemore) forming the first line, and the 2d Mississippi (Colonel Stone) and the 6th North Carolina (Colonel Avery) the second. Hood had a similar formation on our left, but just as we came under fire, and before reaching the slope where the charge began, General Hood passed rapidly across my rear at the head of the 4th Texas regiment, closely followed by the 18th Georgia, both of his brigade. They came up on my right, extending our line in that direction. The 1st and 5th Texas regiments and the Hampton Legion of the same brigade remained on the left in the woods. Passing over the scatter-

ing line of Confederates on the ridge in front, the whole division "broke into a trot" down the slope toward the Federal works. Men fell like leaves in an autumn wind, the Federal artillery tore gaps in the ranks at every step, the ground in rear of the advancing column was strewn thickly with the dead and wounded; not a gun was fired in reply; there was no confusion, and not a step faltered as the two gray lines swept silently and swiftly on; the pace became more rapid every moment; when the men were within thirty yards of the ravine, and could see the desperate nature of the work in hand, a wild yell answered the roar of Federal musketry, and they rushed for the works. The Confederates were within ten paces of them when the Federals in the front line broke cover, and, leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in their rear, carrying away their second line with them in their rout. Then we had our "innings." As the blue mass surged up the hill in our front, the Confederate fire was poured into it with terrific effect. The target was a large one, the range short, and scarcely a shot fired into that living mass could fail of its errand. The debt of blood contracted but a few moments before was paid, and with interest.

Firing as they advanced, the Confederates leaped into the ravine, climbed out on the other side, and over the lines of breastworks, reaching the crest of the hill beyond with such rapidity as to capture all of the Federal artillery (fourteen pieces) at that point. We had now reached the high plateau in rear of the center of General Porter's position, his line having been completely cut in two, and thus rendered no longer tenable. From the flanks of the great gap where Whiting's division had torn through, the Federal lines gave way in both directions. R. H. Anderson's brigade, till then in reserve, passed through on the right, and led the way for Longstreet's division, while on the left the roll of musketry receded toward the Chickahominy, and the cheering of the victorious Confederates announced that Jackson, Ewell, and D. H. Hill were sweeping that part of the field.

The battle was won; the Federal infantry was in full flight toward the swamps of the Chickahominy and the bridges in their rear, leaving a large portion of their artillery in the hands of the Confederates. But the fighting was not all over. Several Federal batteries, posted in reserve on the further side of the plateau which the Confederates had gained, opened a rapid but rather ineffective fire, with the view of covering the retreat of their infantry. The 4th Texas and 18th Georgia regiments of Hood's, and the 11th Mississippi and 4th Alabama of Law's brigade, continued their advance across the plateau directly upon these batteries. And here occurred an incident of the battle which has been a subject of much acrimonious dispute among Federal officers, especially Generals Porter, and Philip St. George Cooke, the latter commanding the cavalry on Porter's extreme left next to the Chickahominy. In order to protect the guns upon which Law and Hood were advancing, General Cooke withdrew a portion of his command from the low grounds near the river and ordered a charge by a battalion of the 5th United States Cavalry upon the advancing Confederates.

Our line was ragged and irregular, as every soldier knows will be the case after such fighting as it had passed through, and the oportunity seemed favorable to check its farther advance and save the batteries from capture. The charge was directed upon the center of the Confederate line, which was halted and partly re-formed to receive it. Though delivered in most gallant style, it was repulsed with heavy loss, including all but one of the officers who entered it. This episode consumed scarcely more time than it takes to write it. In the meantime, those of the cavalry who escaped retreated through the artillery they were attempting to save, and in the confusion of the retreat most of the guns were captured.

General Porter represents this charge as having been made on his extreme left (Longstreet's right), and beyond the stream along which his infantry line was originally formed, and severely censures General Cooke, charging him with throwing the artillery into confusion by retreating

through it and preventing it from checking the Confederate advance. His statement as to the locality of the cavalry attack and his charges against General Cooke cannot be reconciled; for, had Cooke's cavalry attacked where General Porter says it did, it would have been utterly impossible for its line of retreat to have passed anywhere near the position of the batteries, and its flight after the repulse could have had no effect whatever upon the loss of the guns. Hood's and Law's line of advance was directly across the plateau from the left center of Porter's original line, where they had broken in, passing south of and near the Watts house on the plateau; and as the cavalry charge was made upon them, and they captured the guns, it follows that the charge could only have been made there, and not half a mile nearer the Chickahominy, where it would have been objectless, and indeed ridiculous. I speak positively on this point, as I was an eyewitness of the whole affair, commanded the troops who received the charge, and was engaged in the capture of the guns. Whatever may be said to the contrary, it is certain that the batteries, having no infantry supports, did not check our advance for a moment. The diversion by the cavalry, on the other hand, did delay their capture for the short period it took to repulse it, and gave time for the artillerists to save some of their guns.

While these events were taking place, on the plateau immediately upon the left of the gap in the Federal line through which we had passed, now some distance in our rear. As the front was clear, my brigade was halted and re-formed. This had scarcely been done when a Confederate cheer rose from the woods in the direction of the firing, and a large body of Federals rushed out upon the plateau on our left and rear, retreating rapidly and in great confusion. Part of them passed to our left, while the greater portion were running across our rear in the attempt to escape to the Chickahominy swamp in that direction. My rear rank was faced about, and they were called on to surrender. No attention was paid to the first summons, and a few shots were fired into our ranks. A volley from our rear rank, which now faced them, induced them to listen

to reason, and they at once threw down their arms in token of surrender.* The 1st and 5th Texas regiments and the Hampton Legion (Hood's brigade) which it will be remembered were on the left of Law's brigade in the original line of attack, had not driven the Federal line in their front at the same time with the rest of the division; but they had now forced it, and were closely following the fugitives. The prisoners, about 800 in number, were turned over to the 5th Texas regiment, which was close on their heels.

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*These troops were the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, of McCall's division, and the 4th New Jersey, Slocum's division. The 11th lost 50 killed, and 634, including wounded, were made prisoners.

Colonel J. H. Simpson, of the 4th New Jersey, explains the circumstances of the capture in a letter written from the military prison, Richmond, Va., July 8th, 1862, in which he says:

"To relieve my friends of all apprehension about my safety, I write to say that I am now here a prisoner of war, with a large portion of my regiment, and in good health and spirits. My regiment was posted in the wood to sustain the center in the battle near Gaines's Mill, on Friday, June 27th, and nobly did it hold its ground till about an hour after the right and left wings of the army had fallen back. Mine (4th New Jersey) and Colonel Gallagher's 11th Pennsylvania Reserve were the last to leave the front, and only did so when we found that the rest of the army had given way, and we were literally surrounded by the infantry and batteries of the Confederate forces.

"Being in the woods, and trusting to our superior officers to inform us when to retreat, and not being able to see on account of the woods what was going on toward our right and left, we continued fighting probably an hour after every other regiment had left the ground. The consequence was inevitable. We were surrounded by ten times our number, and though we could have fought till every man of us was slain, yet humanity, and, as I think, wisdom, dictated that we should at last yield. . . . Our casualties, so far as known, were: killed, 38; wounded, 111; total, 149,—besides 75 missing, of whom a number probably was killed and wounded. Considering the great jeopardy in which we were, I look upon it as a great mercy we all were not shot down."—*Editors.*

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XI

The Cause of a Silent Battle*

By Professor John B. DePauw,
University, Ind.

Reference has been made to the supposed effect of the wind in preventing, as in the case of the heavy cannonading between the Merrimac and Congress, the transference of sound waves a distance of not over three and one-half miles over water; and at another time during the bombardments of the Confederate works at Port Royal, a distance of not more than two miles. "The day was pleasant," says the writer, "and the wind did not appear unusually strong." Yet "people living in St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from the fight."†

*For references to the phenomena of irregular transmission of sound at the battles on the Chickahominy, see the articles of Generals Joseph E. Johnston, Gustavus W. Smith, and Wm. B. Franklin, pp. 223, 244, and 368, respectively. In Vol. I., p. 713, General R. E. Colston, mentions the interesting fact about the engagement between the Congress and Merrimac, at the mouth of the James River, March 8, 1862.

†The Port Royal incident was related in a communication to "*The Century*" magazine by Mr. S. H. Prescott, of Concord, N. H., in part as follows: "At the bombardment of the Confederate works at Port Royal, South Carolina, in November, 1861, the transport my regiment was on lay near enough inshore to give us a fine view of the whole battle; but only in some temporary lull of the wind could we hear the faintest sound of firing. The day was a pleasant one, and the wind did not appear to be unusually strong; but I noticed then and afterward that a breeze on the coast down that way was very different from the erratic gusts and flaws I had been used to in the New England States, the whole atmosphere seeming to move in a body, giving sound no chance to travel against it, but carrying it immense distances to the leeward. People living at St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from where the fight took place. A portion of the siege batteries at Morris Island, South Carolina, were not more than two miles from our camp, but at times the firing from them and the enemy's replies could only be heard very faintly even at that short distance, while at others, when the wind blew from the opposite direction, the sounds were as sharp and distinct as if the battle were taking place within a few yards of us."

It occurs to me that the effect of the wind is greatly exaggerated in these instances. How an ordinary breeze could "carry sounds of the conflict away from people standing within plain sight of it" and yet carry the same sound 150 miles in the opposite direction, is rather too strongly opposed to scientific fact to remain on record undisputed.

In all of these cases, is it not probable that the varying density of the air had much more to do with this strange acoustic opacity than the wind?

These statements call to mind the prevalent belief that fog, snow, hail, and rain, indeed, any condition of the atmosphere that render it optically opaque, render it also acoustically opaque; which, up to the time of Mr. Tyndall's experiments in the English Channel, off Dover, had scarcely been questioned. His tests made in 1873-74 proved conclusively, as is now well known, that on clear days the air may be composed of differently heated masses, saturated in different degrees with aqueous vapors, which produce exactly the deadening effects described above.

I submit as a case in point a similar effect, and its explanation as furnished by Mr. R. G. H. Kean to Professor Tyndall, and considered by the latter of sufficient value to find a place in his published works:

"On the afternoon of June 27th, 1862, I rode, in company with General G. W. Randolph, then Secretary of War of the Confederate States, to Price's house, about nine miles from Richmond. The evening before General Lee had begun his attack on McClellan's army, by crossing the Chickahominy about four miles above Price's and driving in McClellan's right wing.

"The battle of Gaines's Mill was fought the afternoon to which I refer. The valley of the Chickahominy is about one and a half miles wide from hill-top to hill-top. Price's is on one hill-top, that nearest to Richmond; Gaines's farm, just opposite, is on the other, reaching back in a plateau to Cold Harbor.

"Looking across the valley, I saw a good deal of the battle, Lee's right resting in the valley, the Federal left wing the same. My line of vision was nearly in the line of the lines of battle. I saw the advance of the Confederates, their repulse two or three times, and in the gray of the evening the final retreat of the Federal forces. I distinctly saw the musket-fire of both sides, the smoke, individual discharges, the flash of the guns. I saw batteries of artillery on both sides come into action and fire rapidly. Several field-batteries on each side were plainly in sight. Many more were hid by the timber which bounded the range of vision.

"Yet looking for nearly two hours, from 5 to 7 P.M. on a midsummer afternoon, at a battle in which at least 50,000 men were

actually engaged, and doubtless at least 100 pieces of field-artillery, through an atmosphere optically as limpid as possible, not a single sound of the battle was audible to General Randolph and myself. I remarked it to him at the time as astonishing.

"Between me and the battle was the deep, broad valley of the Chickahominy, partly a swamp shaded from the declining sun by the hills and forest in the west (my side). Part of the valley on each side of the swamp was cleared: some in cultivation, some not. Here were conditions capable of providing several belts of air, varying in the amount of watery vapor (and probably in temperature), arranged like laminae at right angles to the acoustic waves as they came from the battlefield to me."*

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*General E. M. Law, of Lee's army, in the "*Southern Bivouac*" for May, 1887, speaks as follows of the "silent battle" of Gaines's Mill: "To the troops stationed near the river, on the Richmond side, the action at Gaines's Mill was plainly visible, that part of it at least, which took place in the open ground. I have been told by an eye-witness that from Price's house, on the opposite side, he could distinctly see the Confederate lines advancing to the attack through the open ground beyond the Chickahominy swamp, and could distinguish the direction of the lines of battle by the volume of smoke arising from the woods farther to the Confederate center and left. But it was all like a pantomine; not a sound could be heard, neither the tremendous roar of the musketry nor even the reports of the artillery. As they saw our assaulting lines recoil from the onset, as they were several times compelled to do early in the fight, the anxiety of our friends 'over the river' to help was intense, but the enemy was in their front also, and their time for action would soon come.—*Editors.*

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XII

Rear-Guard Fighting During the Change of Base

By William B. Franklin,
Major-General, U.S.A.

The positions of the troops holding the Union line on the south side of the Chickahominy on the 26th of June, 1862 (the day before the battle of Gaines's Mill), were the following: General W. F. Smith's division of my corps, the Sixth, held the right of the line, its right resting on the hill overlooking the Chickahominy (two miles north of Fair Oaks Station), and my other division, General Slocum's, was next on the left. Going toward the left, General Sumner's corps came next, then General Heintzelman's, and then, on the extreme left, reaching to White Oak Swamp, General Keyes's corps.* On the 26th an epaulement was thrown up by the troops of the Sixth Corps in a wheat-field in front of our lines on Golding's farm, which was ready for guns on the morning of the 27th. During the night of the 26th five batteries of the Artillery Reserve, under the command of Colonel (now General) G. W. Getty, were collected in rear of the epaulement, ready to take position in it and commence a heavy artillery fire on the enemy's line opposite. (See map, p. 384.) Golding's is near the Chickahominy on the extreme right of the Union intrenched line. Five days' rations, cold tea in the canteens, etc., etc., had been issued, so that everything was ready to follow up the projected bombardment, which it was presumed would commence on the morning of the 27th. But on the evening of

*General Heintzelman's corps, the 3d, advanced to the positions held by its outposts on the 26th, after a sharp engagement along the whole line on the 25th, known as Oak Grove, or King's School House. Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days' battles. The Union loss was 67 killed, 504 wounded, 55 missing. The Confederate reports show a total loss of 441. (For the strategy of this movement see General McClellan's article, page 179.) The ground secured by this action varied in front of the different brigades, and was from a quarter of a mile to one mile in advance of the line that had been held by the Third Corps since the battle of Seven Pines.—*Editors.*

the 26th the fight at Beaver Dam Creek occurred, and General McClellan called at my headquarters on his way to confer with General Porter as to his operations of the next day. I was then absent at General Slocum's headquarters, conferring with him in regard to the attack we were expecting to make, and therefore missed General McClellan, so that I received no word from him until the next morning.

About daylight on the 27th I received orders to send General Slocum's division across the Chickahominy to report to General Porter. This order was countermanded a short time after the division had started by way of Woodbury's Bridge, and it returned to its station. About 10:30 o'clock in the morning the enemy opened on our artillery with theirs, doubtless unaware of the five batteries of reserve artillery mentioned above. The fire was kept up for an hour, and theirs slackened, so did ours, until both sides ceased firing. Two hours before the bombardment began I received orders not to do anything to bring on a general engagement, and after the cessation of the artillery fire everything was quiet in our front for several hours. At 2 o'clock I was ordered again to send General Slocum's division to report to General Porter. The division went, became engaged at once in the battle of Gaines's Mill, where it lost very heavily, and did not return to its station until after nightfall.

During the afternoon several of the heavy guns with us were used with effect on columns of the enemy on the north side of the Chickahominy moving against General Porter, causing them to fall back and seek some other route of attack. The range was about two and one-half miles. About sundown General Hancock's brigade, which held the extreme right of General Smith's line, was attacked furiously by the enemy. It was nearly dark when the fight began, and the combatants were not fifty yards apart; but General Hancock was, as usual, equal to the occasion, and the enemy was driven back. This fight was preceded by a severe artillery fire from the enemy, which, however, was soon silenced. This day's operations of Smith's division

were known as "The Action at Golding's (or Garnett's) Farm."

The position held by General Smith's division was about one and one-half miles from the Gaines's Mill field; and, possibly because the interval was filled with dense timber, not a gun of the Gaines's Mill battle was heard by the troops in our vicinity.

The next morning, the 28th of June, General Smith's division was moved to the rear and left of the clearing of Golding's farm; General Slocum's division remaining to the rear and right of Smith, where it had taken position the night before. During this retrograde movement the enemy kept up a lively cannonade from the left, front, and right, but did remarkably little harm. A sharp infantry attack, however, was made upon the 49th Pennsylvania regiment, Colonel Irwin, and the 33d New York regiment, Colonel Taylor, who were the last to evacuate the position. The time of the attack was about the middle of the afternoon, and the attacking force was the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments. It was handsomely repulsed, and Colonels Lamar and Towers of the Georgia regiments with 50 officers and men were taken prisoners, and more than 100 were killed and wounded. (This action of the 28th, also that of the 27th, see p. 367,—is known as Golding's and Garnett's Farms.)* That evening the corps commanders were assembled at General McClellan's headquarters at the Trent House. The commanding general announced to us his purpose to begin a movement to the James River on the next day, and each corps commander was furnished with a map on which were laid down the positions that the respective corps were to hold until the next evening, when all the troops remaining near their present positions were to move across the White Oak Swamp en route for the James. The assembly broke up about 2 o'clock in the morning, each corps commander having received all the information neces-

*Also on the 28th a detachment of Cobb's Georgia Legion (cavalry) had a skirmish at Dispatch Station with the pickets of the 8th Illinois Cavalry.—*Editors.*

sary to determine his action for the 28th should nothing unforeseen occur.

The relative position of the Sixth Corps was not changed. Smith's division was still to have its right on the Chickahominy, extending down the river, where it was to touch the left of McCall's division (that crossed the Chickahominy during the night of the 27th), which, however, played no part in holding the line on June 29th, as it crossed White Oak Swamp early in the day.

General Slocum's division was to be at Savage's Station in reserve. Then came Sumner's corps and Heintzelman's. Keyes's corps was to cross the White Oak Swamp at once. Porter's corps had already crossed the swamp, and was under orders to press forward to a position on the James River.

This new line was about two miles nearer the White Oak Bridge than the intrenched line in front of Fair Oaks and Golding's farm (described above), and was nearly parallel. It was much shorter than the old line, its left reaching nearly to the swamp, and its right to the brink of the Chickahominy hills. This second line was about three-quarters of a mile in front of Savage's Station on the York River Railroad, which had been the depot for unloading and storing supplies for the troops that held the old line, and where had been gathered in tents 2500 sick and wounded, most of the latter from Gaines's Mill.

General Slocum's and General Smith's divisions both moved to their new positions before daylight of Sunday, the 29th of June—the day of the fighting at Savage's Station. As General Slocum's division had suffered so severely in the battle of Gaines's Mill, and had not yet recovered from its exhaustion, General McClellan ordered it to cross White Oak Swamp at once, and it accordingly left its position. Through some inadvertence I was not informed of this change of plan; so when I joined General Smith early in the morning, I found him in his proper position, but with an interval of more than a mile between him and the troops on the left. It was soon learned, by sending out cavalry, that General Sumner had not moved from the position that

he held the day before, and was, at the very time we learned this fact, engaged with the enemy at Allen's farm.* It was also apparent that straggling parties of the enemy were in front of the interval already mentioned. These circumstances showed an alarming state of things, and General Smith and I rode over to Savage's Station, the vicinity of which offered a good fighting position, and advising him to bring his corps to that place. He answered the note at once, telling me that he was then engaged with the enemy, and that as soon as things were quiet he would join me with his corps. Soon after I had sent to General Sumner General Heintzelman rode up, and I told him what I had done. He approved, and said that he would also join us at the station with his corps. He afterward changed his mind, however, and instead of halting in the wood in front of the station, as we naturally supposed he would, he marched off toward White Oak Bridge, hidden from us by the woods, and crossed the swamp, so that we saw him no more that day, supposing, nevertheless, until we were attacked by the enemy, that his troops were in position on a part of our front.† General Smith's division arrived at the station about noon or shortly after, and took position on the left in a wood. General Sumner's corps, consisting of General John Sedgwick's and General Israel B. Richardson's divisions, arrived about 2 P. M.

There was a cleared field of several acres on the north side of the railroad, filled with hospital tents laid out in rows, each tent containing fifteen or twenty men on com-

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*Sumner's corps, retiring, left the works at Fair Oaks at daylight and halted for bivouac on Allen's farm, between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. The Confederates of Magruder's command opened on the troops at 9 A. M. with musketry and artillery, and a spirited fight was kept until 11 o'clock. This engagement is known also as the Peach Orchard.—*Editors.*

†General Heintzelman in his report says: "The whole open space near Savage's was crowded with troops—more than I supposed could be brought into action judiciously." He then states that an aide of the commanding general was with him to point out the road for his crossing.

"I ordered the whole of my corps to take this road, with the exception of Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries." These were turned over to General Smith's division.—*W. B. F.*

fortable, clean beds, with the necessary surgeons and attendants. South of the railroad, and between it and the Williamsburg road, was another clearing east of which was a ravine running obliquely across the railroad, its edges skirted by trees, and the ravine itself filled with undergrowth. This clearing was nearly square, and was about one-third or one-half mile in length and breadth. In front of the ravine were some small hills which made good shelter for the troops; and west of the clearing was timber, where we supposed General Heintzelman's troops to be; on the left of the Williamsburg road was timber also, and General Smith's division was in position therein. Sumner's corps took position in the clearing between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Burns's brigade of Sedgwick's division was in front, Sedgwick's other two brigades being just behind. The three brigades of Richardson's division, Meagher having joined them, were farther to the rear, but more to the right. Three batteries of field artillery, Hazzard's, Pettit's, and Osborn's, were posted toward the left, near the front of the ravine.

The day was hot and sultry and wore away slowly as we waited either to be attacked or at nightfall to start for White Oak Bridge. Large quantities of all kinds of quartermasters' and other stores, partly in cars, were burning at the station, and at intervals shells would burst as the fire reached them, jarring the nerves of the tired and expectant men.

Shortly before 4 o'clock General Sedgwick and I rode over to the hospital to visit some of our wounded friends, whose condition was found to be as comfortable as could be expected under the circumstances. From the hospital we started to make a call upon General Heintzelman, whose supposed position has already been described. As we rode over the open field we saw a group of men come out of a wood on the north of the railroad, but some distance from the place where we expected to find Heintzelman. I thought they were our men, but General Sedgwick looked at them more closely, stopped, and exclaimed: "Why, those men are rebels!" We turned back in as dignified a manner as

the circumstances would permit. But we had hardly started when they opened on us with a field-piece, keeping up a lively and uncomfortable fire. A second piece soon joined the first and they kept up the fire until they were silenced by our batteries. This ludicrous incident prevented what might have been a disastrous surprise for our whole force. A few minutes afterward, before we had reached our troops, the signal-officers reported the approach of a force of infantry and a railroad car upon which was a rifled cannon, from the direction of Richmond. This artillery car halted in a cut of the railroad a little distance in front of the station, and so about 5 P.M. the fight was begun. I immediately sought General Sumner, to inform him of the situation and get instructions. He had been fighting at the head of his corps during the morning (at the peach orchard), and, being much exhausted, was asleep when I reached his headquarters. I awoke him, and in a short time he had ordered two regiments of General Burns's brigade to attack at a point in the timber in front near the Williamsburg road, where the enemy's infantry had by this time appeared. These regiments entered the wood, and before they became engaged were joined by the 1st Minnesota Regiment. General Burns extended his line to the vicinity of the railroad, so that its center was necessarily weak. During this movement the enemy's artillery played with effect upon our troops but was answered and finally silenced by the three batteries on our side already mentioned.

The enemy made the infantry attack with great fury, and pierced the center of General Burns's line. General Burns was wounded, but remained on the field. At this time General Sumner placed himself in front of two regiments and waved his hat. With a cheer they moved forward at double time to the endangered place in General Burns's line, enabling him to rectify it and drive the enemy from his front. Several other regiments joined General Burns's line at about the same time, but the fight was over not long after the charge, and the enemy was driven from the wood. A Confederate battery placed near the Williams-

burg road was compelled to withdraw in haste. On the left General Brooke's brigade of General Smith's division, Sixth Corps, moved forward, with its right on the Williamsburg road, against a force of the enemy that was moving south of that road in the wood skirting the open field. It steadily drove back the enemy, meeting with heavy loss, particularly in the 5th Vermont Regiment. Darkness ended the fight. General Brooks was wounded in the leg, but did not leave the field. Hancock's and Davidson's brigades (Smith's division) were posted some distance to the rear to repel an anticipated attack from the right and rear, but were not engaged. When the fight was over, our troops held the contested ground. Their behavior throughout the fight had been admirable.*

The Confederate force engaged in this fight was commanded by General J. B. Magruder, and consisted of Semmes's and Kershaw's brigades, Kemper's battery and two regiments of Barksdale's brigade opposite our left. Cobb's division and the guns of Hart's battery were north of the railroad to the right of our line. Cobb's infantry was not engaged.

About a half hour after the fight was ended, I suggested to General Sumner that if he had no objection I would carry out the commanding general's orders, so far as I was concerned, and cross the White Oak Swamp with General Smith's division. We were then on the field. His answer was, "No, General, you shall not go, nor will I go—I never leave a victorious field. Why! if I had twenty thousand more men, I would crush this rebellion." I then told him that I would show him a dispatch from General McClellan directing that all of the troops should cross during that night. With some difficulty a candle was found and lighted, and the general read the dispatch. After read-

*General E. M. Law says in the *"Southern Bivouac"* for May, 1887: "The battle of Savage's Station, although a 'drawn fight' as far as the possession of the field was concerned, was practically a victory for the Federals. Though their loss was three times as great as that of the Confederates, they accomplished the main purpose of the battle, which was to gain time for the passage of trains, artillery, and troops across White Oak Swamp."

ing it he exclaimed, with some excitement, "General McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and gain a victory." I was at my wit's end. I knew that General McClellan's arrangements did anticipate a fight exactly like that just over, and that unless the whole force was on the other side of the swamp by the next morning, his movement might be seriously delayed. Moreover, I believed that if we stayed where we were, the enemy would be upon us in force enough to defeat us utterly on the next morning, endangering the remainder of the army. Yet by all military usage I was under General Sumner's orders. At this juncture General Smith had asked me to introduce Lieutenant Mathew Berry, his aide-de-camp, to General Sumner. After the introduction, Lieutenant Berry told General Sumner that he had seen General McClellan only a short time before, that he knew there had been a fight, and fully expected that all of the troops would cross the swamp that night. General Sumner was convinced by this statement, and with great reluctance permitted me to continue the movement toward the swamp, he following immediately after.


General Smith's division crossed the White Oak Bridge about 3 o'clock on the morning of June 30th, and went into position on the left of the road leading from the bridge toward the James River. The batteries of the division were already there in position. It faced about so that its left rested upon the road, the division bearing southward from the road. At the same time I reported to McClellan at his headquarters.

The rear of Sumner's corps, Richardson's division, crossed the bridge at 10 o'clock, in the morning, destroyed it, and took position some distance on Smith's left, nearly in line with him. Both divisions guarded the crossing.

After the fight at Savage's Station was over, Hazzard's battery of Richardson's division was unhitched, its captain not supposing there was to be any further movement that night, and the men and horses went to sleep, as usual when

there was opportunity, which was not often in those days. The division, as has been told, moved off and by accident no notice of the movement was sent to Captain Hazzard. On the next morning he heard reveille sounded by drums and trumpets from positions that he knew our troops did not hold the evening before. Everything in his vicinity was quiet. He took in the situation at once. He had been left behind, and the enemy might be upon us at any moment. He had the battery quietly hitched up, sent the caissons off in advance, and, bringing up the rear with two guns ready to open on a pursuing force, started off at a walk. When he was clear of the field he ordered the battery to trot. He arrived without harm at the White Oak Bridge at that place just as Richardson was on the point of destroying it. He found on the road many stragglers who were coolly wandering along with no suspicion that they were behind everybody and by his warning was the means of saving many soldiers from a Richmond prison. The pluck and coolness shown in this exploit of Captain Hazzard were admirable. He was killed the next day while doing excellent work with his battery.

PLAN OF THE BATTLE AT SAVAGE'S STATION



The order in which the Union troops entered the fight is thus described by General William W. Burns, in a letter dated Governor's Island, May 10, 1885:

"The enemy appearing in the woods west of Savage's Station, General Sumner sent me forward to occupy the space between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Thinking that two regiments of my brigade would suffice, I led them forward to the fences, at the edge of the woods on the west side of the clearing, about five hundred yards distant from the ravine on the east side of the clearing. General Sumner had his headquarters east of this wooded ravine and could not observe what was occurring on the west side of the open field.

"When I reached the fences I sent skirmishers through the belt of trees, and found the enemy advancing on the Williamsburg road and on the railroad, where General Lee's famous railroad monitor was slowly approaching. I had to throw back the right company of the right regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania, to rake the monitor. Then I found my two regiments not enough to extend across between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. I sent an aide in haste after my other two regiments, informing General Sumner of the situation. The 1st Minnesota, of Gorman's brigade, being most handy, was first sent, my two reserve regiments following. While placing the 1st Minnesota on the left to extend across the Williamsburg road, the battle began. My right flank swept the railroad monitor, which had advanced to the edge of the woods, and it ran back. The battle moved to my left, and I discovered that our works east of Seven Pines had been evacuated by Heintzelman. I threw back the left flank of the 1st Minnesota across the Williamsburg road and sent the 69th Pennsylvania of my brigade to prolong the left, to prevent the turning movement of the enemy; at the same time informing General Sumner of the conditions in front. He would not believe that Heintzelman had withdrawn until I sent my last mounted man, urging and demanding re-enforcements. The 71st Pennsylvania (also called the 1st California), of my brigade, arriving, I placed it behind the center of my line where a gap had been made by extending the 1st Minnesota to the left. General Franklin sent General Brooks' brigade to the left of my line to check the turning movement of the enemy, and Sumner, when he realized that Heintzelman had withdrawn, sent Gorman's and Dana's brigades to my support in front.

"General Sumner formed the 88th New York, of Meagher's brigade, and the 5th New Hampshire, of Caldwell's brigade, for a charge. A mass of men came up in my rear in full yell. I halted the crowd and asked for their commander. 'I am Captain McCartan of the 88th New York, sir,' exclaimed an officer. I got them into line (about 250 men), facing up the Williamsburg road, which was raked by the grape and canister of the enemy's batteries. I gave the command, double quick charge! They went in with a hurrah, and the enemy's battery fell back. General McClellan mistakingly gave the credit of that gallant charge to the 69th New York. It seems that the 5th New Hampshire halted before the charge which General Sumner had put in motion reached me.

"I was shot in the face with a minie-ball at the time the enemy broke through the gap in the center. There we had a hand-to-hand encounter, which determined the day in our favor. At nightfall I relieved the first line, its ammunition being exhausted, with the 71st Pennsylvania, the 15th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 82d New York. My report of the Seven Days' fighting was made at Harrison's Bar in hot July. I was prostrated with my wound, malaria,

and twenty-eight days of constant strain, and was unable to write or to collect my thoughts. The battle of Glendale on the 30th of June, the next day after that of Savage's Station, was saved by my brigade, which kept the army from piercing the center of the Army of the Potomac; but, like the instance above, history has given the credit to 'General Misunderstanding,' who, in history, fights most battles."

Part of Hazzard's, Pettit's, and Osborn's batteries were engaged on the Union side.

The Confederate infantry north of the railroad (Cobb's, Toomb's, and Anderson's brigades) did not take an active part in the battle. Anderson's brigade is not shown, its position being outside the northern bounds of the map.

The Confederate artillery engaged comprised Kemper's battery, two guns of Hart's battery, and Lieutenant Barry's "32-pounder rifled gun mounted on a rail-car, and protected from cannon-shot by a sloping roof, in front, covered with plates of iron, through which a port-hole had been pierced."—*Editors.*

As the result of the dispositions made by the comanding general of the troops (a part of whose operations has just been described) a whole day was gained in getting a large part of the army to the James River without serious opposition, and into a proper defensive position; the enormous trains and heavy artillery had been given a start of twenty-four hours, insuring their safe arrival at the river. The rear of the army also had crossed White Oak Swamp, leaving the way clear to the James River, while at the same time a strong force was ready to protect the movement during its completion.

On the enemy's side, the slowness of Jackson in getting his force to the south side of the Chickahominy (he only arrived at Savage's Station at 3 o'clock on the morning of June 30th) had prevented us from being defeated in the fight of June 29th. The 28th and 29th had been occupied by Jackson in disposing of the dead and wounded at Gaines's Mill and in repairing Grapevine Bridge.

On the north (the enemy's) side of White Oak Swamp, the road for more than a quarter of a mile approaches the White Oak Bridge through low ground, open to artillery fire from the south side (see map, p. 384). On the right of the enemy, looking to the rear, there were hills covered with thick woods approaching the road, forming good cover for artillery, and making it possible for a large force to gather in the wood unseen from our side. The same range

of hills continues up the stream, and approaches quite near it at Brackett's Ford, about one mile above White Oak Bridge. Both of these crossings were passable for artillery, but the bridges had been destroyed by our troops in the morning, after everything had crossed and before the appearance of the enemy.

On our side of the swamp, the ground rises from the bridge, and the road passes along the right, or east, of a ravine and joins the Long Bridge road about one and a quarter miles from the swamp. On the left of the ravine was a cleared space about a half a mile long in the direction of the swamp and running back about the same distance. At the swamp the clearing was fringed with trees and underbrush, and about half-way up the clearing to the left of the ravine were a small farm house and some slight out buildings. On the right of the ravine was a similar clearing, extending from the swamp about a furlong back. All other ground in the vicinity was covered with timber and underbrush. (The troops were disposed as shown on the map, p. 470.)

The cleared space at this time had in it many wagons of the train, and Colonel R. O. Tyler's 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, which I ordered to the rear at once. Glad enough would I have been to keep this accomplished officer, with his gallant regiment and heavy guns, but we both knew that he was needed at the James River. At about 10:30 in the morning, as near as I can now recollect, I accompanied General McClellan to the intersection of the Charles City and Quaker roads, about two miles from the White Oak Bridge. I found General Slocum's division posted somewhat in rear of the intersection of those roads, and in front of the road leading from Brackett's Ford. A small portion of his infantry and one gun were posted near Brackett's Ford. His division formed the right of the force which later in the day fought the battle of Glendale or Frayser's Farm. The small force at Brackett's Ford defeated an attack at that point, some time during the day.

At the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads General McClellan had a conference with the corps com-

manders (Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin), and when it was ended he went toward the James River. A short time afterward I received an order directing me to take charge of the force guarding the White Oak Bridge, and I immediately started back. I had gone but a short distance when a bombardment commenced in the direction of the bridge, the severity of which I had never heard equaled in the field. The wood through which I was riding seemed torn to pieces with round shot and exploding shells. But the danger was really greater from falling branches than from the shot, which did small damage.

It appears that Jackson, having left Savage's Station early in the morning, arrived at the vicinity of White Oak Bridge about noon, without exciting suspicion of his presence on our part, the whole movement being hidden by the woods. Here, masked by the trees, he massed about thirty guns, which opened simultaneously on the troops in the clearings and on the rear part of the wagon train, which had not yet started from the clearing where it had passed the night. The troops immediately got under cover of the woods, except Caldwell's brigade (Richardson's division) which was guarding the batteries. It remained in the open ground, and lost many men, but the effect of the firing was otherwise small, except on the wagon train, which was thrown into some confusion, many of the wagons not being hitched up. These were at first abandoned by the drivers, but nearly all got away during the day. One field piece was dismounted. The batteries were, however, soon in position to return the enemy's fire, which they did with such effect that many of his guns were silenced. It was here that Captain Hazzard, already mentioned, was mortally wounded, ending a brilliant career with a glorious death. Captain (afterward General) Romeyn B. Ayres, who commanded the artillery of Smith's division, used his guns with excellent effect. One of the enemy's batteries came into view near the bridge, but was forced to retire almost immediately. The bombardment lasted with great severity for about a half-hour, when it slackened and gradually fell off, opening again at intervals during the day, but never

with its original vigor. A cavalry force which was sent over by the enemy just after the bombardment had reached its height was forced to retire much faster than it advanced.

The development of our defense of the crossing convinced General Jackson that it would be impossible for him to force it. At any rate, he made no attempt during the day to cross his infantry, unless sending sharp-shooters across to pick off our pickets may be so considered. The fight at White Oak Bridge was entirely with artillery, there being little musketry firing.

About 4 o'clock the enemy made a movement to our left, threatening Brackett's Ford, where I knew we were very weak. This was met by Dana's and Colonel Alfred Sully's brigades of Sedgwick's division, which was sent by General Sumner upon information of the danger. There was no further movement in that direction after these troops appeared; and they were returned to General Sumner about 5 o'clock, in time to do good service at Glendale. Toward sundown at the request of General Sumner, Caldwell's and Meagher's brigades of Richardson's division were also sent to reenforce him.

No other movement was made by General Jackson's force during the day. Our artillery fired at whatever could be seen on the other side, and was answered by theirs in what seemed a reluctant manner. When the bombardment began, the mules belonging to an engineer ponton-train were being watered at the swamp. The noise stampeded them, and they rushed to the rear, going through one of the regiments of Meagher's brigade, and disabling more men than were hurt in the brigade during the remainder of the day. The mules were seen no more, and the ponton-train was deserted. Captain (afterward General) M. T. McMahon, of my staff, volunteered to burn the train about 5 o'clock. It was a plucky thing to do, for the train was under the guns of the enemy, who knew its value as well as we did, and the presumption was that he would open his guns on it. But Captain McMahon got ten volunteers, and the train was soon in flames. He found four mules already harnessed,

and brought off in triumph the most valuable wagon with this team.

In the house which has been described in about the middle of the clearing lived an old man with a young wife and a child about two years old. He came to me about 10 o'clock and asked if I thought there would be a fight there that day. I told him that there certainly would be. He then asked when I thought it would begin. I thought in about a half hour. "Then," said he, "I will have to take my wife and child to my brother, who lives about half a mile down the swamp, and get back before it begins.

"Yes," said I, "but why come back at all?"

"Why," said he, "if I don't your men will take all my chickens and ducks." So he departed with his wife and child and in a little while returned. General Smith's headquarters were near this house, so it was a fair target for the enemy. Several shots went through it, and one of them took off the leg of the poor old man, who bled to death in a few minutes. He had sacrificed himself for his poultry.

One of the brigadier-generals of the command during a lull in the firing came to my headquarters, leaving his brigade to take care of itself. Finding his stay too long, I had him sent back to his post, and a short time afterward I was informed that he had been carried off the field on a stretcher, wounded. I thought it my duty to go to the brigade and find how things were going with it, and asked General Smith to accompany me. We started out, and almost at once the enemy opened on us with great vigor. I looked back, and found to my horror that all my own and General Smith's staff were following us, and that a large cavalry escort belonging to headquarters was also in the procession. The enemy had evidently taken us for a cavalry regiment. Getting rid of them all, we finally arrived at the right of the brigade, unharmed. Making inquiry of a staff-officer about the general, he replied, "Oh, no, sir, he is not wounded, he felt unwell and has gone to the wood to lie down and will soon be back." I turned off in great disgust to return, when another officer looking as neat and clean as if he had just joined the army, stepped up with

the air of a private secretary of some grand official, and, touching his hat, said, "Who shall I say called, sir?" General Smith and I did not hear the last of that expedition for a long time.

During the day a staff-officer of General Smith had explored a road toward James River about two miles in rear of that which the troops at Glendale were to take, and found it impracticable. About 10 in the evening, assuming that my instructions to hold the crossing until nightfall had been obeyed, I sent word to General Heintzelman and General Sumner that I should move to the James River by that road. General Richardson, with French's brigade was instructed to remain, to deceive the enemy as to our movements by firing field-pieces in the direction of the bridge, and then, after an hour, to march. General Henry M. Naglee was to follow Smith's division. These instructions were carried out, and the command arrived at the James about daylight. The discovery of this road made the concentration of the troops at Malvern Hill a completed manœuver by noon of the 1st of July, and was due to the fertile brain of General Smith, who ordered the exploration.

The military results of the defense of White Oak Bridge and the battle of Glendale were: (1) The enemy was repulsed at all points except in the single case of McCall's division at Glendale, which was overpowered by numbers, after it had captured three of the enemy's colors; (2) The trains and heavy artillery arrived in safety at the James River (except those wagons which were destroyed by the bombardment at White Oak Bridge, not exceeding fifty out of more than four thousand), the road along which they passed not having been molested by the enemy; (3) The troops arrived in good time at the river, so that they were all in the positions desired by the commanding general, to await the attack at Malvern Hill, long before that attack was made.

General Jackson in his report intimates that his whole command, consisting of three divisions and D. H. Hill's division of five brigades, were all at White Oak Bridge on the 30th of June. He says: "It was soon seen that the

enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Captain Wooding's battery was consequently recalled." General Lee says: "Jackson, having been unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were without the expected support" at the battle of Glendale. It must be evident to any military reader that Jackson ought to have known of the existence of Brackett's Ford, only one mile above White Oak Bridge, and ought to have discovered the weakness of our defense at that point. He had troops enough to have attacked the ford and the bridge with the forces at both points exceeding ours at the bridge, and the two attacks, to say the least, would have embarrassed us exceedingly. Had he made two attacks simultaneously the result of the day at Glendale and White Oak Bridge might have been different. There may be reasons for his inaction in this matter that I do not understand, but as the record now shows, he seems to have been ignorant of what General Lee expected of him, and badly informed about Brackett's Ford. When he found how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should have turned his attention to Brackett's Ford also. A force could have been as quietly gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement at the ford would have easily overrun our small force there, placing our right at Glendale, held by Slocum's division, in great jeopardy, and turning our force at the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is likely that we should have been defeated on that day had General Jackson done what his great reputation seems to make it imperative that he should have done.

A short time after I separated from General McClellan (as mentioned above) at the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads, I bade farewell to the Prince de Joinville, who told me that he and his nephews were about to leave us and return to Europe. He had always been very friendly, and now expressed many good wishes for my future. Holding my hand in his, he said, with great earnestness, "General, advise General McClellan to concentrate his army at this point, and fight a battle today; if he does, he

will be in Richmond tomorrow." I was much impressed by his manner and by what he said, and from the purely military point of view the advice may have been good; but it was impracticable for me to adopt the suggestion. General McClellan was then well on his way to the James River, and I had no right to leave my command. It was impossible to concentrate the army there that day early enough to give battle, and had it been possible to risk a general engagement there, it would have been contrary to General McClellan's views as to his responsibility connected with the safety of the army, views which were actuating him in the very movement then taking place. It is likely from what we know now that had it been possible to follow the prince's advice, his military forecast might have proved correct. But no one at that hour could have predicted the paralysis of Jackson's large force in our rear for the whole of that day, nor General Lee's ignorance of McClellan's intentions. Had a general engagement taken place, and had we been defeated, the army would have reached the James River, it is true, but instead, of getting there as it did, with its morale unharmed, and with slight damage to its men and material, it would have been a disorganized mob, and as an army would have perished miserably. General McClellan believed that the destruction of the army of the Potomac at that time would have been ruin to our cause, and his actions, for which he alone is responsible, were guided by that belief and by the conviction that at any sacrifice the preservation of that army, at that time, was paramount to every other consideration.

I cannot finish without a word as to the conduct of the men. My experience during the period generally known as "the Seven Days" was with the Sixth and Seventh Corps. During the whole time between June 26th and July 2d, there was not a night in which the men did not march almost continually, nor a day on which there was not a fight. I never saw a skulker during the whole time, nor heard one insubordinate word. Some men fell by the wayside, exhausted and were captured; but their misfortune was due to physical inability to go on. They had no

food but that which was carried in their haversacks, and the hot weather soon rendered that uneatable. Sleep was out of the question, and the only rest obtained was while lying down awaiting an attack, or sheltering themselves from shot and shell. No murmur was heard; everything was accepted as the work for which they had enlisted. They had been soldiers less than a year, yet their conduct could not have been more soldierly had they seen ten years' of service. No such material for soldiers was ever in the field before, and their behavior in this movement foreshadowed their success as veterans at Appomattox.

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XIII

McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill

By Daniel H. Hill,

Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.

Five of the six Confederate divisions north of the Chickahominy at the close of the battle of Gaines's Mill remained in bivouac all the next day (June 28th), it being deemed too hazardous to force the passage of the river. Ewell was sent with his division to Dispatch Station on the York River Railroad. He found the station and the railroad-bridge burnt. J. E. B. Stuart, who followed the retreating Federal cavalry to White House on the Pamunkey, found ruins of stations and stores all along the line. These things proved that General McClellan did not intend to retreat by the short line of the York River Railroad; but it was possible he might take the Williamsburg road. General Lee, therefore, kept his troops on the north side of the river, that he might be ready to move on the Federal flank, should that route be attempted. New Bridge was repaired on Saturday (the 28th), and our troops were then ready to move in either direction. The burnings and explosions in the Federal camp Saturday afternoon and night showed that General McClellan had determined to abandon his strong fortifications around Richmond. Ewell, who was watching him at Bottom's Bridge, and the cavalry, holding the crossings lower down, both reported that there was no attempt at the Williamsburg route. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were sent across the river at New Bridge early on Sunday morning to move down the Darbytown road to the Long Bridge road to intercept the retreat to the James River. This movement began before it was known that General McClellan had evacuated his stronghold. Lee gave here the first illustration of a quality for which he became noted—the remarkable discernment of his adversary's plans

through the study of his character. McClellan could have retreated to Yorktown with as little loss as Johnston sustained on his retreat from it. The roads from Richmond to Yorktown lead through a wooded and swamp country on which strong rear-guards could have afforded perfect protection to a retreating column without bringing on a general engagement. General Johnston, on his retreat from Yorktown, did fight at Williamsburg, but it was a battle of his own choosing, and not forced upon him by the vigor of pursuit. Lee had but little idea that McClellan would return to Yorktown, judging rightly that the military pride of his distinguished opponent would not permit him to march back a defeated column to the point from which he had started, a few months before, for the capture of the Confederate capital, with his splendid army and magnificent outfit.* It is proof of Lee's sagacity that he predicated his orders for an advance upon the belief that General McClellan was too proud a man to fall back by the same route by which the triumphal advance had been made. A great commander must study the mental and moral characteristics of the opposing leader, and Lee was especially endowed with an aptitude in that direction. At the battle of Salzbach, Montecuculi, the Austrian commander, noticed the French troops making a movement so different from the cautious style of his famous rival that he exclaimed, "Either Turenne is dead or mortally wounded." So it proved to be; the French marshal had been killed by a cannon-ball before the movement began.

In pursuance of General Lee's plan, Huger was directed (on the 29th) to take the Charles City road to strike the retreating column below White Oak Swamp. Holmes was to take possession of Malvern Hill and Magruder to follow the line of retreat, as soon as the works were abandoned. The abandonment became known about sunrise on

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*The capture of Petersburg would have been almost as disastrous to the South as the capture of Richmond, and for many days Petersburg was at the mercy of the Federal army. There were no troops and no fortifications there when McClellan reached the James. Some two weeks after the battle of Malvern Hill the first earth-works were begun at Petersburg, by my order.—*D. H. H.*

Sunday morning, but Grapevine Bridge was not completed till sunset. Jackson then crossed his corps at that point, my division leading. We bivouacked that night near Savage's Station, where McLaw's division had had a severe fight a few hours before. Just at dawn on Monday, the 30th, we were in motion, when I discovered what appeared to be a line of battle drawn up at the station, but which proved to be a line of sick and of hospital attendants, 2500 in number. About half a mile from the station we saw what seemed to be an entire regiment of Federals cold in death, and learned that a Vermont regiment (the 5th) had been in the desperate charge upon the division of McLaws' and had suffered great loss (killed, 31; wounded, 143). From the time of crossing the river, we had evidence everywhere of the precipitate nature of the Federal retreat.* Dabney, in his life of Jackson, says:

"The whole country was full of deserted plunder, army wagons, and pontoon-trains partially burned or crippled; mounds of grain and rice and hillocks of mess beef smouldering; tens of thousands of axes, picks, and shovels; camp kettles gashed with hatchets; medicine chests with their drugs stired into a foul medley, and all the apparatus of a vast and lavish host; while the mire under foot was mixed with blankets lately new and with overcoats torn from the waist up. For weeks afterward agents of our army were busy in gathering in the spoils. Great stores of fixed ammunition were saved, while more were destroyed."

In our march from Savage's Station my division picked up a thousand prisoners, stragglers from the retreating army, and gathered a large number of abandoned rifles. I detached two regiments (the Fourth and Fifth North Carolina) to take the prisoners and arms to Richmond. We reached White Oak Swamp about noon, and there found another hospital camp, with about five hundred sick in it. Truly, the Chickahominy swamps were fatal to the Federal

*The Union reports do not indicate precipitancy. The greater part of McClellan's army was within three miles of the original lines at the close of the second day after the battle of Gaines's Mill, that is, on the evening of June 29th. The third day after that battle, the Army of the Potomac fought on three separate fields (White Oak Bridge, Charles City Road, and Glendale) at distances of from 7 to 10 miles from the old positions in front of Richmond. General Wm. B. Franklin was with the rear column of the army during the movement to the James River. (See p. 366.)—*Editors.*

forces. A high bluff was on our side of the little stream called White Oak, and a large uncultivated field on the other side. In this field could be seen a battery of artillery, supported by a brigade of infantry—artillerists and infantry lying down and apparently asleep. Under cover of Thomas T. Munford's 2d Virginia cavalry, thirty-one field-pieces were placed upon the bluff, and were ordered to open fire as soon as the cavalry mask was removed. The battery fired its loaded guns in reply, and then galloped off, followed by its infantry supports and the long lines of infantry farther back in the field. Munford crossed his regiment over the ford, and Jackson and myself went with him to see what had become of the enemy. We soon found out. The battery had taken up a position behind a point of woods, where it was perfectly sheltered from our guns, but could play upon the broken bridge and ford, and upon every part of the uncultivated part of the uncultivated field. It opened with grape and canister upon us, and we retired rapidly. Fast riding in the wrong direction is not military, but it is sometimes healthy. We had taken one prisoner, a drunken Irishman, but he declined the honor of going back with us, and made fight with his naked fists. A soldier asked me naively whether he should shoot the Irishman or let him go. I am glad that I told him to let the man go, to be a comfort to his family. That Irishman must have had a charmed life. He was under the shelter of his gum-cloth coat hung on a stick, near the ford, when a citizen fired at him four times, from a distance of about fifty paces; and the only recognition that I could see the man make was to raise his hand as if to brush off a fly.* One of the shells set a farm-house on fire. We learned from the owner that Franklin's corps was in front of us.

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*After the appearance of this article in "*The Century*" magazine, E. McLaughlin, of East Saginaw, Michigan, wrote me that he was a member of Co. C of the 7th Maine Volunteers, General W. F. Smith's division, and said: "The statement in regard to the drunken Irishman is true. That man belonged to my company and told us, when he came to the company at Malvern Hill that he had been inside your lines and had been repeatedly shot at. He further said that if he had had one more canteen of whiskey he could have held the position all day."—*D.H.H.*

Our cavalry returned by the lower ford, and pronounced it perfectly practicable for infantry. But Jackson did not advance. Why was this? It was the critical day for both commanders, but especially for McClellan. With consummate skill he had crossed his vast train of five thousand wagons and his immense parks of artillery safely over White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed now than at any time in his flank march. Three columns of attack were converging upon him, and a strong corps was pressing upon his rear. Escape seemed impossible for him, but he did escape, at the same time inflicting heavy damage upon his pursuers. General Lee, through no fault in his plans, was to see his splendid prize slip through his hands. Longstreet and A. P. Hill struck the enemy at Frayser's farm (or Glendale) at 3 P.M. on the 30th, and, both being always ready for a fight, immediately attacked. Magruder, who followed them down the Darbytown road, was ordered to the assistance of General Holmes on the New Market road, who was not then engaged, and their two divisions took no part in the action. Huger, on the Charles City road, came upon Franklin's left flank, but made no attack. I sent my engineer officer, Captain W. F. Lee, to him through the swamp, to ask him whether he could not engage Franklin. He replied that the road was obstructed by fallen timber. So there were five divisions within sound of the firing, and within supporting distance, but not one of them moved. Longstreet and A. P. Hill made a desperate fight, contending against Sumner's corps, and the divisions of McCall's, Kearny, and Hooker; but they failed to gain possession of the Quaker road, upon which McClellan was retreating. That night Franklin glided silently by them. He had to pass within easy range of the artillery of Longstreet and Hill, but they did not know he was there. It had been a gallant fight on their part. General Lee reported: "Many prisoners, including a general of division, McCall, were captured, and several batteries with some thousands of small arms, were taken." But as an obstruction to the Federal retreat, the fight amounted to nothing.

McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill

Major Dabney, in his life of Jackson, thus comments on the inaction of that officer: "On this occasion it would appear, if the vast interests dependent upon General Jackson's cooperation with the proposed attack upon the center were considered, that he came short of the efficiency in action for which he was everywhere else noted." After showing how the crossing of White Oak might have been effected, Dabney adds: "The list of casualties would have been larger than that presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer wounded; but how much shorter would have been the bloody list filled up the next day at Malvern Hill? This temporary eclipse of Jackson's genius was probably to be explained by physical causes. The labor of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his invention for the nonce below their wonted tension. And which of the sons of man is so great as never to experience this?

I think that an important factor in this inaction was Jackson's pity for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches, and reduced in numbers by its numerous sanguinary battles. He thought that the garrison of Richmond ought now to bear the brunt of the fighting. None of us knew that the veterans of Longstreet and A. P. Hill were unsupported; nor did we even know that the firing that we heard was theirs. Had all our troops been at Frayser's farm there would have been no Malvern Hill.

Jackson's genius never shone when he was under the command of another. It seemed then to be shrouded or paralyzed. Compare his inertness on this occasion with the wonderful vigor shown a few weeks later at Slaughter's (Cedar) Mountain in the stealthy march to Pope's rear, and later still in the capture of Harper's Ferry. MacGregor on his native heath was not more different from MacGregor in prison than was Jackson his own master from Jackson in a subordinate position. He wrote once to Richmond requesting that he might have "fewer orders

and more men." That was the keynote to his whole character. The hooded falcon cannot strike the quarry.

The gentleman who tried his "splendid rifle" on the drunken Irishman was the Rev. L. W. Allen. Mr. Allen had been raised in that neighborhood, and knew Malvern Hill well. He spoke of its commanding height, the difficulties of approach to it, its amphitheatrical form and ample area, which would enable McClellan to arrange his 350 field guns tier above tier and sweep the plain in every direction. I became satisfied that an attack upon the concentrated Federal army so splendidly posted, and with such vast superiority in artillery could only be fatal to us. The anxious thought then was, Have Holmes and Magruder been able to keep McClellan from Malvern Hill? General Holmes arrived at Malvern Hill at 10:30 A.M. on the 30th, with 5170 infantry, 4 batteries of artillery, and 130 improvised or irregular cavalry. He did not attempt to occupy the hill, although only 1500 Federals had yet reached it. Our cavalry had passed over it on the afternoon of the 29th, and had had a sharp skirmish with the Federal cavalry on the Quaker road.

As General Holmes marched down the river, his troops became visible to the gun-boats, which opened fire upon them, throwing those awe-inspiring shells familiarly called by our men "lamp-posts," on acount of their size and appearance. Their explosion was very much like that of a small volcano, and had a very demoralizing effect upon new troops, one of whom expressed the general sentiment by saying: "The Yankees throwed them lamp-posts about too careless like." The roaring, howling gun-boat shells were usually harmless to flesh, blood, and bones, but they had a wonderful effect upon the nervous system. General Junius Daniel, a most gallant and accomplished officer, who had a brigade under General Holmes, gave me an incident connected with the affair on the 30th, known as the "Battle of Malvern Cliff." General Holmes, who was very deaf, had gone into a little house concealed from the boats by some intervening woods, and was engaged in some business when

the bellowing of the "lamp posts" began. The irregular cavalry stampeded and made a brilliant charge to the rear. The artillerists of two guns of Graham's Petersburg battery were also panic-stricken, and cutting their horses loose mounted them, and, with dangling traces, tried to catch up with the fleet-footed cavaliers. The infantry troops were inexperienced in the wicked ways of war, having never been under fire before. The fright of the fleeing cavalry would have pervaded their ranks also with the same mischievous result but for the strenuous efforts of their officers, part of whom were veterans. Some of the raw levies crouched behind little saplings to get protection from the shrieking, blustering shells. At this juncture General Holmes, who from his deafness was totally unaware of the rumpus, came out of the hut, put his hand behind his right ear, and said: "I thought I heard firing." Some of the pale-faced infantry thought that they also had heard firing.

Part of Wise's brigade joined Holmes on the 20th, with two batteries of artillery and two regiments of cavalry. His entire force then consisted of 5820 infantry, 6 batteries of artillery, and 2 regiments of cavalry. He remained inactive until 4 P.M., when he was told that the Federal army was passing over Malvern Hill in a demoralized condition. He then opened upon the supposed fugitives with six rifled guns, and was speedily undeceived in regard to the disorganization in the Army of the Potomac by a reply from thirty guns, which in a brief time silenced his own. The audacity of the Federals and the large number of their guns (which had gone in advance of the main body of Porter's corps) made General Holmes believe that he was about to be attacked, and he called for assistance, and, by Longstreet's order, Magruder was sent to him. After a weary march, Magruder was recalled to aid Longstreet; but the day was spent in fruitless marching and countermarching, so that his fine body of troops took no part in what might have been a decisive battle at Frayser's farm. General Holmes was a veteran soldier of well-known personal courage, but he was deceived as to the strength and

intentions of the enemy. General Porter says that the force opposed to General Holmes consisted of Warren's brigade and the Eleventh U.S. Infantry; in all 1500 infantry and 30 pieces of artillery. Here was afforded an example of the proneness to overestimate the number of troops opposed to us. The Federals reported Holmes to have 25,000 men, and he hought himself confronted by a large part of McClellan's army. That night he fell back to a stronger position,* thinking apparently that there would be an "on to Richmond" movement by the River road. He lost 2 killed, 49 wounded, 2 pieces of artillery, and 6 caissons. The guns and caissons, General Porter states, were afterward abandoned by the Federals. General Holmes occupied the extreme Confederate right the next day, July 1st, but he took no part in the attack upon Malvern Hill, believing, as he says in his official report, "that it was out of the question to attack the strong position of Malvern Hill from that side with my inadequate force."

Mahone's brigade had some skirmishing with Slocum's Federal division on the 30th, but nothing else was done on that day by Huger's division. Thus it happened that Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with the fragments of their divisions which had been engaged at Gaines's Mill, were struggling alone, while Jackson's whole corps and the divisions of Huger, Magruder, Holmes, McLaws, and my own were near by.

Jackson moved over the swamp early on the first of July, Whiting's division leading. Our march was much delayed by the crossing of troops and trains. At Willis's Church I met General Lee. He bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it. I gave him Mr. Allen's description of Malvern Hill, and presumed to say, "If General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone." Longstreet laughed and said, "Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped." It was this belief in the demoralization of the Federal army

*Half a mile below the upper gate at Curl's Neck. (See "Official Records," Vol. XI:, Part II., p. 908)—*D. H. H.*

that made our leader risk the attack. It was near noon when Jackson reached the immediate neighborhood of Malvern Hill. Some time was spent in reconnoitering, and in making tentative efforts with our few batteries to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. I saw Jackson helping with his own hands to push Reilly's North Carolina battery farther forward. It was soon disabled, the woods around us being filled with shrieking and exploding shells. I noticed an artilleryman seated comfortably behind a very large tree, and apparently feeling very secure. A moment later a shell passed through the huge tree and took off the man's head. This gives an idea of the great power of the Federal rifled artillery. Whiting's division was ordered to the left of the Quaker road, and mine to the right; Ewell's was in reserve. Jackson's own division had been halted at Willis's Church. The divisions of Magruder, Huger, and McLaws were still farther over to my right. Those of Longstreet and A. P. Hill were in reserve on the right and were not engaged.

At length we were ordered to advance. The brigade of General George B. Anderson first encountered the enemy, and its commander was wounded and borne from the field. His troops, however, crossed the creek and took position in the woods, commanded by Colonel C. C. Tew, a skillful and gallant man. Rodes being sick, his brigade was commanded by that peerless soldier, Colonel J. B. Jordon. Ripley, Garland and Colquitt also got over without serious loss. My five brigade commanders and myself now made an examination of the enemy's position. He was found to be strongly posted on a command hill, all the approaches to which could be swept by his artillery and were guarded by swarms of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, and ravines. Armistead was immediately on my right. We remained a long while awaiting orders, when I received the following:

"May 1st, 1862.

"GENERAL D. H. HILL: Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same. R. H. CHILTON, *A. A. G.*"

A similar order was sent to each division commander. However, only one battery of our artillery came up at a time, and each successive one, as it took position had fifty pieces turned upon it, and was crushed in a minute. Not knowing what to do under the circumstances, I wrote to General Jackson that the condition upon which the order was predicated was not fulfilled, and that I wanted instructions. He replied to advance when I heard the shouting. We did advance at the signal, and after an unassisted struggle for an hour and a half, and after meeting with some success, we were compelled to fall back under cover of the woods. Magruder advanced at the same signal, having portions of the divisions of Huger and McLaws, comprising the brigades of Mahone, Wright, Barksdale, Ranson, Cobb, Semmes, Kershaw, Armistead, and G. T. Anderson; but he met with some delay, and did not get in motion till he received a second order from General Lee, and we were then beaten.

The Comte de Paris, who was on McClellan's staff, gives this account of the charge of my gallant division:

"Hill advanced alone against the Federal positions . . . He had therefore before him Morell's right, Couch's division reenforced by Caldwell's brigade, . . and finally the left of Kearny. The woods skirting the foot of Malvern Hill had hitherto protected the Confederates but as soon as they passed beyond the edge of the forest, they were received by a fire from all the batteries at once, some posted on the hill, others ranged midway, close to the Federal infantry. The latter joined its musketry fire to the cannonade when Hill's first line had come within range, and threw it back in disorder on the reserves. While it was reforming, more (Confederate) battalions marched up to the assault in their turn. The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill's soldiers. They try to pierce the line, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny's left first, and Couch's right . . . and afterward throwing themselves upon the left of Couch's division. But, here also, after nearly reaching the Federal positions, they are repulsed. The conflict is carried on with great fierceness on both sides, and, for a moment, it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very center of their adversaries and of the formidable artillery which now was dealing destruction in their ranks. But Sumner, who commands on the right, detaches Sickles's and Meagher's brigades successively to Couch's assistance. During this time, Whiting on the left, and Huger on the right, suffer Hill's soldiers to become exhausted without supporting them. Neither Lee nor Jackson has sent the slightest order, and the din of the battle which is going on in their immediate vicinity has not sufficed to make them march against the enemy. . .

McClellan's Change of Base and Malvern Hill

"At seven o'clock Hill reorganized the debris of his troops in the woods; . . . his tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses." (Pp. 141, 142, Vol. II.)

SKETCH OF THE VICINITY OF MALVERN HILL
(July 1, 1862)



The Union troops reached the field by the so-called Quaker road (more properly the Church road); the Confederates chiefly by this and the Long Bridge road. The general lines were approximately as indicated above. The Confederates on the River road are the troops of General Holmes, who had been repulsed at Turkey Island Bridge of the day before by Warren's brigade, with the aid of the gunboats. The main fighting was in the space between the words "Confederate" and "Union," together with one or two assaults upon the

west side of the Crew Hill from the meadow. Morell's and Couch's divisions formed the first Union line, and General Porter's batteries extended from the Crew house to the West house.

Truly, the courage of the soldiers was sublime! Battery after battery was in their hands for a few moments, only to be wrested away by fresh troops of the enemy. If one division could effect this much, what might have been done had the other nine cooperated with it! General Lee says:

"D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and the numerous batteries of the enemy. Jackson sent to his support his own division, and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve; but owing to the increasing darkness, and the intricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of the ground that he had gained, after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy."

I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance after sunset of the nine brigades under Magruder's orders.* Unfortunately, they did not move together, and were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from the woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes reeled on and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field half a mile wide to cross, under the fire of field artillery in front, and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in their rear. It was not war—it was murder.

Our loss was double that of the Federals at Malvern Hill. Not only did the fourteen brigades which were engaged suffer but also the inactive troops and those brought up as reserves too late to be of any use met many casualties from the fearful artillery fire which reached all parts of the woods. Hence, more than half the casualties were from field-pieces—an unprecedented thing in warfare. The artillery practice was kept up till nine o'clock at night, and

*Toombs's brigade belonged to Magruder, but had moved to my assistance by my order when we were hard pressed. It was not therefore, in the final attack made by Magruder.—*D. H. H.*

the darkness added to the glory of the pyrotechnics. It was quite late when I had posted for the night the last of the reenforcements that had come up when the battle was over. A half hour before, an incident occurred which is thus related by General Trimble:

> "I proposed to General D. H. Hill to ride forward and reconnoiter the enemy's position. We approached within one hundred steps of the enemy's batteries, and could hear plainly the ordinary tone of conversation. The guns were then firing on the woods to our left, where the last attack had been made, at right angles to that part of the field we were then in. I suggested to General Hill the advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that it must be successful, as the enemy would not expect one from our position, and under cover of the darkness we could approach them undiscovered. General Hill did not seem inclined to make the movement."

The chivalrous Trimble proposed to make the attack with his own brigade, but there were many troops now in the woods, and I thought that the attack would but expose them to a more intense artillery fire. We saw men going about with lanterns, looking up and carrying off the dead and wounded. There were no pickets out, and the rumbling of wheels in the distance seemed to indicate that the retreat had begun. The morning revealed the bare plateau stripped of its terrible batteries. The battle of Malvern Hill was a disaster to the Confederates, and the fourteen brigades that had been so badly repulsed were much demoralized. But there were six divisions intact, and they could have made a formidable fight on the 2d.

Possibly owing to the belief that Longstreet and A. P. Hill were making a march between Malvern and Harrison's Landing, the retreat was the most disorderly that took place. Wagons and ambulances were abandoned; knapsacks, cartridge-boxes, clothing, and rifles by the thousand were thrown away by the Federals. Colonel James D. Nance, of the 3d South Carolina regiment, gathered 925 rifles in fine condition that had been thrown away in the wheat-fields at Shirley, a farm between Malvern and Haxall's. The fruits of the Seven Days' fighting were the relief of Richmond, the capture of 9000 prisoners (including 3000 in hospitals), 52 pieces of artillery, and 35,000

stands of arms, and the destruction or capture of many military stores.

I crossed the Chickahominy with 10,000 effective men. Of these 3907 were killed or wounded and 48 were reported missing, either captives or fugitives from the field. With the infantry and artillery detached and the losses before Malvern Hill, I estimate that my division in that battle was 6500 strong, and that the loss was 2000. Magruder puts his force at between 26,000 and 28,000 (I think a high estimate), and states his loss as 2900.

Throughout this campaign we attacked just when and where the enemy wished us to attack. This was owing to our ignorance of the country and lack of reconnaissance of the successive battle-fields. Porter's weak point at Gaines's Mill was his right flank. A thorough examination of the ground would have disclosed that; and had Jackson's command gone in on the left of the road running by the McGehee house, Porter's whole position would have been turned and the line of retreat cut off. An armed reconnaissance at Malvern would have shown the immense preponderance of the Federal artillery, and that a contest with it must be hopeless. The battle, with all its melancholy results, proved, however, that the Confederate infantry and Federal artillery, side by side on the same field, need fear no foe on earth.

Both commanders had shown great ability. McClellan, if not always great in the advance, was masterly in retreat, and was unquestionably the greatest of Americans as an organizer of an army. Lee's plans were perfect; and had not his dispositions for a decisive battle at Frayser's farm miscarried, through no fault of his own, he would have won a most complete victory. It was not the least part of his greatness that he did not complain of his disappointment, and that he at no time sought a scape-goat upon which to lay a failure. As reunited Americans, we have reason to be proud of both commanders.

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XIV

"The Seven Days," Including Frayser's Farm*

By James Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General, C. S. A.

When General Joseph E. Johnston was wounded at the battle of Seven Pines, and General Lee assumed his new duties as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Stonewall Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley, and the rest of the Confederate troops were east and north of Richmond in front of General George B. McClellan's army, then encamped about the Chickahominy River, 100,000 strong, and preparing for a regular siege of the Confederate capital. The situation required prompt and successful action by General Lee. Very early in June he called about him, on the noted Nine-mile road near Richmond, all his commanders, and asked each in turn his opinion of the military situation. I had my own views, but did not express them, believing that if they were important it was equally important that they should be unfolded privately to the commanding general. The next day I called on General Lee, and suggested my plan for driving the Federal forces away from the Chickahominy. McClellan had a small force at Mechanicsville, and farther back, at Beaver Dam Creek, a considerable portion of his army in a stronghold that was simply unassailable from the front. The banks of Beaver Dam Creek were so steep as to be impassable except on bridges. I proposed an echelon movement, and suggested that Jackson be called down from the Valley, and passed to the rear of the Federal right, in order to turn the position behind Beaver Dam, while the rest of the Confederate forces who were to engage in the attack could cross the Chickahominy at points suitable for the

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*The usual spelling is Frazier or Frazer. The authority for the form here adopted is Captain R. E. Frayser, of Richmond.—*Editors.*

succession in the move, and be ready to attack the Federals as soon as they were thrown from their position. After hearing me, General Lee sent General J. E. B. Stuart on his famous ride around McClellan. The dashing horseman, with a strong reconnoitering force of cavalry, made a forced reconnaissance, passing above and around the Federal forces, recrossing the Chickahominy below them, and returning safe to Confederate headquarters. He made a favorable report of the situation and the practicability of the proposed plan. On the 23d of June General Jackson was summoned to General Lee's headquarters, and was there met by General A. P. Hill, General D. H. Hill, and myself. A conference resulted in the selection of the 26th as the day on which we should move against the Federal position at Beaver Dam. General Jackson was ordered down from the Valley. General A. P. Hill was to pass the Chickahominy with part of his division, and hold the rest in readiness to cross at Meadow Bridge, following Jackson's swoop along the dividing ridge between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy. D. H. Hill and I were ordered to be in position on the Mechanicsville pike early on the 26th ready to cross the river at Mechanicsville Bridge as soon as it was cleared up by the advance of Jackson and A. P. Hill.

Thus matters stood when the morning of the 26th arrived. The weather was clear, and the roads were in fine condition. Everything seemed favorable to the move. But the morning passed and we received no tidings from Jackson. As noon approached, General Hill, who was to move behind Jackson, grew impatient at the delay and begged permission to hurry him up by a fusillade. General Lee consented, and General Hill opened his batteries on Mechanicsville, driving the Federals off. When D. H. Hill and I crossed at the Mechanicsville Bridge we found A. P. Hill severely engaged trying to drive the Federals from their strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek. Without Jackson to turn the Federal right, the battle could not be ours. Although the contest lasted until some time after night, the Confederates made no progress. The next day

the fight was renewed, and the position was hotly contested by the Federals until 7 o'clock in the morning, when the advance of Jackson speedily caused the Federals to abandon their position, thus ending the battle.*

It is easy to see that the battle of the previous day would have been a quick and bloodless Confederate victory if Jackson could have reached his position at the time appointed. In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal commanders; we had attacked at Beaver Dam and had failed to make an impression at that point, losing several thousand men and officers. This demonstrated that the position was safe. If the Federal commanders knew of Jackson's approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reenforce Porter's right before Friday morning (27th) with men and field defenses, to such extent as to make the remainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So that the Federals in withdrawing not only abandoned a strong position, but gave up the morale of their success, and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened forces; for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire summer.

From Beaver Dam we followed the Federals closely, encountering them again under Porter beyond Powhite Creek, where the battle of Gaines's Mill occurred. General A. P. Hill, being in advance, deployed his men and opened the attack without consulting me. A very severe battle followed. I came up with my reserve forces and was preparing to support Hill, who was suffering very severely, when I received an order from General Lee to make a demonstration against the Federal left, as the battle was not progressing to suit him. I threw in three brigades opposite the Federal left and engaged them in a severe skirmish with infantry and artillery. The battle then raged with

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*According to General Fitz John Porter, it was not Jackson's approach, but information of that event, that caused the withdrawal of the Union troops, who, with the exception of "some batteries and infantry skirmishers," were withdrawn before sunrise on the 27th.—*Editors.*

great fierceness. General Jackson was again missing, and General Lee grew fearful of the result. Soon I received another message from General Lee, saying that unless I could do something the day seemed to be lost. I then determined to make the heaviest attack I could. The position in front of me was very strong. An open field led down to a difficult ravine a short distance beyond the Powhite Creek. From there the ground made a steep ascent, and was covered with trees and slashed timber and hastily made rifle-trenches. General Whiting came to me with two brigades of Jackson's men and asked me to put him in. I told him I was just organizing an attack and would give him position. My column of attack then was R. H. Anderson's and Pickett's brigades, with Law's and Hood's of Whiting's division. We attacked and defeated the Federals on their left, capturing many thousand stand of arms, fifty-two pieces of artillery, a large quantity of supplies, and many prisoners,—among them General Reynolds, who afterward fell at Gettysburg. The Federals made some effort to reenforce and recover their lost ground, but failed, and during the afternoon and night withdrew their entire forces from that side of the Chickahominy, going in the direction of James River. On the 29th General Lee ascertained that McClellan was marching toward the James. He determined to make a vigorous move and strike the enemy a severe blow. He decided to intercept them in the neighborhood of Charles City crossroads, and with that end in view planned a pursuit as follows: I was to march to a point below Frayser's farm with General A. P. Hill. General Holmes was to take up position below me on the New Market or River road, to be in readiness to co-operate with me and to attack such Federals as would come within his reach. Jackson was to pursue closely the Federal rear, crossing at the Grapevine Bridge, and coming in on the north of the cross-roads. Huger was to attend to the Federal right flank, and take position on the Charles City road west of the cross-roads. Thus we were to envelop the Federal rear and make the destruction of that part of

McClellan's army sure. To reach my position south of the cross-roads, I had about sixteen miles to march. I marched 14 miles on the 29th, crossing over into the Darbytown road and moving down to its intersection with the New Market road, where I camped for the night, about 3 miles south-west of Frayser's farm. On the morning of the 30th I moved two miles nearer up and made preparation to intercept the Federals as they retreated toward James River. General McCall, with a division of ten thousand Federals, was at the crossroads and about Frayser's farm. My division, being in advance, was deployed in front of the enemy. I placed such of my batteries as I could find position for, and kept Hill's troops in my rear. As I had twice as far to march as the other commanders, I considered it certain that Jackson and Huger would be in position when I was ready. After getting my troops in position I called upon General A. P. Hill to throw one of his brigades to cover my right and to hold the rest of his troops in readiness to give pursuit when the enemy had been dislodged. My line extended from near the Quaker road across the New Market road to the Federal right. The ground upon which I approached was much lower than that occupied by General McCall, and was greatly cut up by ravines and covered with heavy timber and tangled undergrowth. On account of these obstructions we were not disturbed while getting into position, except by the firing of a few shots that did no damage. Holmes got into position below me on the New Market road, and was afterward joined by Magruder, who had previously made an unsuccessful attack on the Federal rear-guard at Savage's Station.

By 11 o'clock our troops were in position and we waited for the signal from Jackson and Huger. Everything was quiet on my part of the line, except occasional firing between my pickets and McCall's. I was in momentary expectation of the signal. About half past 2 o'clock artillery firing was heard on my left, evidently at the point near White Oak Swamp where Huger was to attack. I very naturally supposed this firing to be the expected signal, and

ordered some of my batteries to reply, as a signal that I was ready to co-operate. While the order to open was going around to the batteries, President Davis and General Lee, with their staff and followers, were with me in a little open field near the rear of my right. We were in pleasant conversation, anticipating fruitful results from the fight, when our batteries opened. Instantly the Federal batteries responded most spitefully. It was impossible for the enemy to see us as we sat on our horses in the little field, surrounded by tall, heavy timber and thick undergrowth; yet a battery by chance had our range and exact distance, and poured upon us a terrific fire. The second or third shell burst in the midst of us, killing two or three horses and wounding one or two men. Our little party speedily retired to safer quarters. The Federals doubtless had no idea that the Confederate President, commanding general and division commanders were receiving point-blank shot from their batteries. Colonel Micah Jenkins was in front of us, and I sent him an order to silence the Federal battery, supposing that he could do so with his long-range rifle. He became engaged, and finally determined to charge the battery. That brought on a general fight between my division and the troops in front of us. Kemper on my right advanced his brigade over difficult ground and captured a battery. Jenkins moved his brigade forward and made a bold fight. He was followed by the other four brigades successively.

The enemy's line was broken, and he was partly dislodged from his position. The batteries were taken, but our line was very much broken up by the rough ground we had to move over, and we were not in sufficiently solid form to maintain a proper battle. The battle was continued, however, until we encountered succor from the corps of Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, when we were obliged to halt and hold the position the enemy had left. This line was held throughout the day, though at times, when vigorous combinations were made against me, McCall regained points along his line. Our counter-movements, however, finally pushed him back again, and more formidable efforts

from our adversary were required. Other advances were made, and reenforcements came to the support of the Federals, who contested the line with varying fortune, sometimes recovering batteries we had taken and again losing them. Finally McCall's division was driven off, and fresh troops seemed to come in to their relief. Ten thousand men of A. P. Hill's division had been held in reserve, in the hope that Jackson and Huger would come up on our left, enabling us to dislodge the Federals, after which Hill's troops could be put in fresh to give pursuit, and follow them down to Harrison's landing. Jackson found Grapevine Bridge destroyed and could not reach his position; while for some unaccountable reason Huger failed to take part, though near enough to do so.*

As neither Jackson nor Huger came up, and as night drew on, I put Hill in to relieve my troops. When he came into the fight the Federal line had been broken at every point except one. He formed his line and followed up in the position occupied by my troops. By night we succeeded in getting the entire field, though all of it was not actually occupied until we advanced in pursuit next day. As the enemy moved off they continued the fire of their artillery upon us from various points, and it was after 9 o'clock when the shells ceased to fall. Just before dark General McCall, while looking up a fragrant of his division, found us where he supposed his troops were, and was taken prisoner. At the time he was brought in General Lee happened to be with us. As I had known General McCall pleasantly in our service together in the 4th Infantry, I moved to offer my hand as he dismounted. At first motion, however, I saw he did not regard the occasion as one for renewing the old friendship, and I merely offered him some of my staff as an escort to Richmond.† But for succoring

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*General Huger says, in his official report, that the road was very effectually obstructed.—*Editors.*

†Major W. Roy Mason, who served on the staff of General C. W. Field, C. S. A., gives this account of the capture of General McCall at Glendale, on the evening of June 30th:

"We occupied as headquarters (at the close of the battle) the center of an old road that ran through a dense pine-wood which the

forces, which should have been engaged by Jackson, Huger, Holmes, and Magruder, McCall would have been entirely dislodged by the first attack. All of our forces were within a radius of 3 miles, and in easy hearing of the battle, yet of the 50,000 none came in to cooperate. (Jackson should have done more for me than he did. When he wanted me at the Second Manassas, I marched two columns by night to clear the way at Thoroughfare Gap, and joined him in due season.) Hooker claimed at Glendale to have rolled me up and hurriedly thrown me over on Kearny, tennis-like, I suppose; but McCall showed in his supplementary report that Hooker could as well claim, with a little tension of the hyperbole, that he had thrown me over the moon. On leaving Frayser's farm the Federals withdrew to Malvern Hill, and Lee concentrated his forces and followed them.

On the morning of July 1st, the day after the battle at Frayser's farm, we encountered the enemy at Malvern Hill, and General Lee asked me to make a reconnaissance and see if I could find a good position for the artillery. I found a position offering good play for batteries across the Federal left over to the right, and suggested that sixty pieces should be put in while Jackson engaged the Federal front. I suggested that a heavy play of this cross-fire on the Federals would so discomfit them as to warrant an assault by in-

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enemy had occupied only two hours before, and the dead and wounded were lying about us. General Field asked me to remain with the other members of the staff, and volunteered to go down to a watercourse where he had seen water trickling, to fill the canteens and make some coffee for me, for I was much exhausted, having been thrown violently by a wounded horse during the battle. While General Field was absent we saw, in the shadows, three or four men riding toward us, one of them being in advance and having a cloak thrown around him. I recognized the figure at once as that of a Federal officer. 'What command is this?' he asked. 'General Field's, sir,' was my answer. 'General Field! I don't know him.' 'Perhaps not, as you are evidently in the wrong place.'

"He at once turned to retreat, spurring his horse, and I gave the alarm. A soldier of the 47th Virginia (S. Brooke Rollins) now came forward and seized the bridle of the horse, saying to the rider, 'Not so fast.' The captured officer proved to be General McCall, of the Pennsylvania Reserves."

The staff officers were fired upon while attempting to ride back, and Captain H. J. Biddle, McCall's adjutant-general, was instantly killed. Owing to the darkness the others escaped.—*Editors.*

fantry. General Lee issued his orders accordingly, and designated the advance of Armistead's brigade as the signal for the grand assault. Later it was found that the ground over which our batteries were to pass into position on our right was so rough and obstructed that of the artillery ordered for use there only one or two batteries could go in at a time. As our guns in front did not engage, the result was the enemy concentrated the fire of fifty or sixty guns upon our isolated batteries, and tore them into fragments in a few minutes after they opened, piling horses upon each other and guns upon horses. Before night, the fire from our batteries failing of execution, General Lee seemed to abandon the idea of an attack. He proposed to move around to the left with my own and A. P. Hill's division, turning the Federal right. I issued my orders accordingly for the two divisions to go around and turn the Federal right, when in some way unknown to me the battle was drawn on. We were repulsed at all points with fearful slaughter, losing six thousand men and accomplishing nothing.

The Federals withdrew after the battle, and the next day I moved on around by the route which it was proposed we should take the day before. I followed the enemy to Harrison's Landing, and Jackson went down by another route in advance of Lee. As soon as we reached the front of the Federal position we put out our skirmish-lines, and I ordered an advance, intending to make another attack, but revoked it on Jackson urging me to wait until the arrival of General Lee. Very soon General Lee came, and, after carefully considering the position of the enemy and of their gunboats on the James, decided that it would be better to forego any further operations. Our skirmish-lines were withdrawn, we ordered our troops back to their old lines around Richmond, and a month later McClellan's army was withdrawn to the North.

The Seven Days' fighting, although a decided Confederate victory, was a succession of mishaps. If Jackson had arrived on the 26th—the day of his own selection,—the

Federals would have been driven back from Mechanicsville without a battle. His delay there, caused by obstructions placed in his road by the enemy, was the first mishap. He was too late in entering the fight at Gaines's Mill, and the destruction of Grapevine Bridge kept him from reaching Frayser's farm until the day after that battle. If he had been there, we might have destroyed or captured McClellan's army. Huger was in position for the battle of Frayser's farm, and after his batteries had misled me into opening the fight he subsided. Holmes and Magruder, who were on the New Market road to attack the Federals as they passed that way, failed to do so.

General McClellan's retreat was successfully managed; therefore we must give it credit for being well managed. He had 100,000 men, insisted to the authorities at Washington that Lee had 200,000. In fact, Lee had only 90,000. General McClellan's plan to take Richmond by a siege was wise enough, and it would have been a success if the Confederates had consented to such a programme. In spite of McClellan's excellent plans, General Lee, with a force inferior in numbers, completely routed him, and while suffering less than McClellan, captured over 10,000 of his men. General Lee's plans in the Seven Days' Fight were excellent, but were poorly executed. General McClellan was a very accomplished soldier and a very able engineer, but hardly equal to the position of field marshal as a military chieftain. He organized the Army of the Potomac cleverly, but did not handle it skillfully when in actual battle. Still I doubt if his retreat could have been better handled, though the rear of his army should have been more positively either in his own hands or in the hands of Sumner. Heintzelman crossed the White Oak Swamp prematurely and left the rear of McClellan's army exposed, which would have been fatal had Jackson come up and taken part in Magruder's affairs of the 29th near Savage's Station.

I cannot close this sketch without referring to the Confederate commander when he came upon the scene for the first time. General Lee was an unusually handsome man,

even in his advanced life. He seemed fresh from West Point, so trim was his figure and so elastic his step. Out of battle he was as gentle as a woman, but when the clash of arms came he loved fight, and urged his battle with wonderful determination. As a usual thing he was remarkably well-balanced—always so, except on one or two occasions of severe trial when he failed to maintain his exact equipoise. Lee's orders were always well considered and well chosen. He depended almost too much on his officers for their execution. Jackson was a very skillful man against such men as Shields, Banks, and Fremont, but when pitted against the best of the Federal commanders he did not appear so well. Without doubt the greatest man of rebellion times, the one matchless among forty millions for the peculiar difficulties of the period, was Abraham Lincoln.

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XV

The Battle of Malvern Hill

By Fitz John Porter,
Major-General, U. S. V.

Before the battle of Gaines's Mill (already described in these pages), a change of base from the York to the James River had been anticipated and prepared for by General McClellan. After the battle this change became a necessity, in presence of a strong and aggressive foe, who had already turned our right, cut our connection with the York River, and was also in large force behind the intrenchments between us and Richmond. The transfer was begun the moment our position became perilous. It now involved a series of battles by day and marches by night which brought into relief the able talents, active foresight, and tenacity of purpose of our commander, the unity of action on the part of his subordinates, and the great bravery, firmness, and confidence in their superiors on the part of the rank and file.

These conflicts from the beginning of the Seven Days' fighting were the engagement at Oak Grove, the battles of Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines's Mill, the engagements of Golding's and Garnett's farms, and at Allen's farm or Peach Orchard; the battle of Savage's Station; the artillery duel at White Oak Swamp; the battle of Glendale (or Charles City cross-roads); the action of Turkey Creek, and the battle of Malvern Hill. Each was a success to our army, the engagement of Malvern Hill being the most decisive. The result of the movement was that on the 2d of July our army was safely established at Harrison's Landing, on the James, in accordance with General McClellan's design. The present narrative will be confined to events coming under my own observation, and connected with my command, the Fifth Army Corps.

The Battle of Malvern Hill

Saturday, June 28th, 1862, the day after the battle of Gaines's Mill, my corps spent in bivouac at the Trent farm on the south bank of the Chickahominy. Artillery and infantry detachments guarded the crossings at the sites of the destroyed bridges. Our antagonists of the 27th were still north of the river, but did not molest us. We rested and recuperated as best we could, amid the noise of battle close by, at Garnett's and Golding's farms, in which part of Franklin's corps was engaged, refilling the empty cartridge-boxes and haversacks, so as to be in readiness for immediate duty.

Our antagonists on the north bank of the river were apparently almost inactive. They seemed puzzled as to our intentions, or paralyzed by the effect of their own labors and losses, and, like ourselves, were recuperating for a renewal of the contest in the early future; though to them, as well as to us, it was difficult to conjecture where that renewal would be made. The only evidence of activity on their part was the dust rising on the road down the river, which we attributed, with the utmost unconcern, to the movements of troops seeking to interrupt our already abandoned communications with York River. The absence of any indication of our intention to maintain those communications, together with the rumble of our artillery, which that night was moving southward opened the eyes of our opponents to the fact that we had accomplished the desired and perhaps necessary object of withdrawing to the south bank of the Chickahominy, and for the first time had aroused their suspicion that we were either intending to attack Richmond or temporarily abandon the siege, during a change of base to the James River. But the active spurts on the 27th and 28th of June made by the defenders of that city against our left created the false impression that they designed to attack the Second, Third and Fourth Corps, and thereby succeeded in preventing an attack upon them. So, in order to thwart our plans, whatever they might be, promptly on the 29th our opponents renewed their activity by advancing from Richmond, and by recrossing to the south bank of the river all their forces

lately employed at Gaines's Mill. But at the time the main body of our army was beyond their immediate reach, taking positions to cover the passage of our trains to the new base and to be ready again to welcome our eager and earnest antagonist.

Between 2 and 9 P. M. on the 28th, my corps was in motion and marched by the way of Savage Station to the south side of White Oak Swamp; and at the junction of the roads from Richmond (Glendale) to be prepared to repel attacks from the direction of that city, General Morell, leading the advance, aided General Woodbury, of the engineer corps, to build the causeways and bridges necessary for the easy passage of the trains and troops over the swamps and streams. Sykes and McCall followed at 5 and 9 o'clock, respectively, McCall being accompanied by Hunt's Artillery Reserve. We expected to reach our destination, which was only ten miles distant, early on the 29th; but, in consequence of the dark night and of the narrow and muddy roads, cut up and blocked by numerous trains and herds of cattle, the head of the column did not arrive until 10 A. M., the rear not till midnight. McCall arrived latest, and all were greatly fatigued.

The enemy not having appeared at Glendale on the afternoon of the 29th, and other troops arriving to take the place of mine, General McClellan ordered me to move that night by the direct road to the elevated and cleared lands (Malvern Hill) on the north bank of Turkey Creek, there to select and hold a position behind which the army and all its trains could be withdrawn with safety. General Keyes was to move by a different road and form to my right and rear.

Again the dangers and difficulties of night marches attended us, followed by the consequent delay, which, though fortunately it was counter-balanced by the slowness of our opponents in moving to the same point, endangered the safety of our whole army. Although we started before dark, and were led by an intelligent cavalry officer who had passed over the route and professed to know it, my command did

not reach Turkey Creek, which was only five miles distant, until 9 A. M. on the 30th. In fact, we were misled up the Long Bridge road toward Richmond until we came in contact with the enemy's pickets. Then we returned and started anew. Fortunately I was at the head of the column to give the necessary orders, so that no delay occurred in retracing our steps.

Our new field of battle embraced Malvern Hill, just north of Turkey Creek and Crew's Hill, about one mile farther north. Both hills have given name to the interesting and eventful battle which took place on July 1st, and which I shall now attempt to describe.

The forces which on this occasion came under my control, and were engaged in or held ready to enter the contest, were my own corps, consisting of Morell's, Sykes's and McCall's divisions, Colonel H. J. Hunt's Artillery Reserve of one hundred pieces, including Colonel R. O. Tyler's Connecticut siege artillery, Couch's division of Keyes's corps, the brigades of John C. Caldwell and Thomas F. Meagher of Sumner's corps, and the brigade of D. E. Sickles of Heintzelman's corps. Though Couch was placed under my command, he was left uncontrolled by me, as will be seen hereafter. The other brigades were sent to me by their respective division commanders, in anticipation of my needs or at my request.

This new position, with its elements of great strength was better adapted for a defensive battle than any with which we had been favored. It was elevated, and was more or less protected on each flank by small streams or by swamps while the woods in front through which the enemy had to pass to attack us were in places marshy and the timber so thick that artillery could not be brought up, and even troops were moved in it with difficulty. Slightly in rear of our line of battle on Crew's Hill the reserve artillery and infantry were held for immediate service. The hill concealed them from the view of the enemy and sheltered them to some extent from his fire. These hills, both to the east and west, were connected with the adjacent valleys

by gradually sloping plains except at the Crew house, where for a little distance the slope was quite abrupt, and was easily protected by a small force. With the exception of the River road, all the roads from Richmond, along which the enemy would be obliged to approach, meet in front of Crew's Hill. This hill was flanked with ravines, enfiladed by our fire. The ground in front was sloping, and over it our artillery and infantry, themselves protected by the crest and ridges, had clear sweep for their fire. In all directions, for several hundred yards, the land over which an attacking force must advance was almost entirely cleared of forest and was generally cultivated.

I reached Malvern Hill some two hours before my command on Monday, June 30th; each division, as it came upon the field, was assigned to a position covering the approaches from Richmond along the River road and the debouches from the New Market, Charles City and Williamsburg roads. Warren, with his brigade of about six hundred men, took position on the lowlands to the left, to guard against the approach of the enemy along the River road, or over the low, extensive, and cultivated plateau beyond and extending north along Crew's Hill. Warren's men were greatly in need of rest. The brigade had suffered greatly at Gaines's Mill, and was not expected to perform much more than picket duty, and it was large enough for the purpose designed, as it was not probable that any large force would be so reckless as to advance on that road. Warren was supported by the 11th U. S. Infantry, under Major Floyd-Jones, and late in the afternoon was strengthened by Martin's battery of 12-pounders, and a detachment of the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry under Lieutenant Frank W. Hess.

On the west side of Malvern Hill, overlooking Warren, were some thirty-six guns, some of long range, having full sweep up the valley and over the cleared lands north of the River road. These batteries composed Captain S. H. Weed's Battery I, 5th U. S. Artillery, Captain John Edward's Batteries L and M, 3d U. S. Artillery, J. H. Carlisle's Battery E, 2d U. S. Artillery, John R. Smead's Battery K, 5th U. S.

Artillery, and Adolph Voeglee's, Battery B, 1st N. T. Artillery Battalion, with others in reserve. To these, later in the day, were added the siege guns of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, under Colonel Robert O. Tyler, which were placed on elevated ground immediately to the left of the Malvern House, so as to fire over our front line at any attacking force, and to sweep the low meadow on the left.

To General (then Colonel) Hunt, the accomplished and energetic chief of artillery, was due the excellent posting of these batteries on June 30th, and the rearrangement of all the artillery along the whole line on Tuesday (July 1st), together with the management of the reserve artillery on that day.

Major Charles S. Lovell, commanding Colonel William Chaplan's brigade of Sykes's division, supported some of these batteries, and, with the brigade of Buchanan on his right, in a clump of pines, extended the line northward, near the Crew (sometimes called the Mellert) house.

Morell, prolonging Sykes's line on Crew's Hill, with headquarters at Crew's house, occupied the right of the line extending to the Quaker road. To his left front, facing west, was the 14th New York Volunteers, under Colonel McQuade, with a section of Captain W. B. Weeden's Battery C, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, both watching the Richmond road and the valley and protecting our left. On their right, under cover of a narrow strip of woods, skirting the Quaker road, were the brigades of Martindale and Butterfield, while in front of these, facing north, was Griffin's brigade. All were supporting batteries of Morell's division, commanded by Captain Weeden and others, under the general supervision of Griffin, a brave and skilled artillery officer.*

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*These batteries as located on Tuesday, the day of the battle, were those of Edwards, Livingston, Kingsbury, Ames, part of Weeden's under Waterman, part of Allen's under Hyde, and Bramhall's. Other batteries as they arrived were posted in reserve south of Crew's Hill, and were used to replace batteries whose ammunition was exhausted or were thrown forward into action to strengthen the line.

The different commands as soon as they were posted prepared to pass the night (June 30th) in securing the rest greatly needed both

About 3 o'clock on Monday the enemy was seen approaching along the River road, and Warren and Hunt made all necessary dispositions to receive them. About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced and opened fire from their artillery upon Warren and Sykes and on the extreme left of Morell, causing a few casualties in Morell's division. In return for this intrusion the concentrated rapid fire of artillery was opened upon them, soon smashing one battery to pieces, silencing another, and driving back their infantry and cavalry in rapid retreat, much to the satisfaction of thousands of men watching the result. The enemy left behind in possession of Warren a few prisoners, two guns and six caissons, the horses of which had been killed. The battery which had disturbed Morell was also silenced by this fire of artillery. On this occasion the gun-boats in the James River made apparent their unwelcome presence and gave good support by bringing their heavy guns to bear upon the enemy. Though their fire caused a few casualties among our men, and inflicted but little, if any, injury upon the enemy, their large shells were bursting amid the enemy's troops, far beyond the attacking force, carried great moral influence with them, and naturally tended, in addition to the effect of our artillery, to prevent any renewed attempt to cross the open valley on our left. This attacking force formed a small part of Wise's brigade of Holmes's division. They were all raw troops, which accounts for their apparently demoralized retreat. This affair is known as the action of Turkey Bridge or Malvern Cliff.*

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by man and beast. Later on June 30th Couch's division of Keyes's corps came up and took its place, extending Morell's line to the right of the Quaker road. The greater part of the supply trains of the army and of the reserve artillery passed safely beyond Turkey Creek through the commands thus posted, the movement only ceasing about 4 o'clock in the afternoon.—*F. J. P.*

*Some idea may be formed from the following incident of how indifferent to noises or unconscious of sudden alarms one may become when asleep, under the sense of perfect security or from the effect of fatigue. For several days I had been able to secure but little sleep, other than such as I could catch on horseback, or while resting for a few minutes. During this heavy artillery firing I was asleep in the

Our troops lay on their arms during the night, in substantially the positions I have described, patiently awaiting the attack expected on the following day.


McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, now under General Truman Seymour, arrived during the night and was posted just in front of the Malvern house, and was held in reserve to be called upon for service only in case of absolute necessity.*

Malvern House. Although the guns were within one hundred yards of me, I was greatly surprised some two hours afterward to learn that the engagement had taken place. For weeks I had slept with senses awake to the sound of distant cannon, and even of a musket-shot, and would be instantly aroused by either. But on this occasion I had gone to sleep free from care, feeling confident that however strong an attack might be made, the result would be the repulse of the enemy without much damage to us. My staff, as much in need of rest as myself, sympathized with me and let me sleep.—*F. J. P.*

*This division had reached me at New Market cross-roads at midnight of the 29th, greatly in need of rest. This fact, and the necessity that a reliable force should hold that point until the whole army had crossed the White Oak Swamp and the trains had passed to the rear, compelled the assignment of McCall to the performance of that duty. During the afternoon of the 30th he was attacked by large forces of the enemy, which he several times repulsed; but he failed to enjoy the advantages of his success through the recklessness and irrepressible impetuosity of his men or the forgetfulness of orders by infantry subordinates. They were strictly cautioned, unless unusual fortune favored them, not to pass through a battery for the purpose of pursuing a repulsed enemy, and under no circumstances to return in face of one, so as to check its fire. In the excitement of presumed success at repulsing a heavy attack, a brigade pushed after a rapidly fleeing foe, and was impulsively joined by its neighbors who wished not to be excelled in dash or were perhaps encouraged by injudicious orders. Passing through their own batteries as they advanced, they lost the benefit of their fire, as they did also when returning after being repulsed and pursued by the enemy's reserves. Disregard of these principles at this time caused heavy losses of men, and led to the demoralization at a critical moment of one good volunteer battery and the capture, through no fault of its commander, of one of the best batteries of the regular army. This battery was commanded by Lieutenant A. M. Randol, a brave and accomplished artillery officer of the regular army. This division had otherwise suffered heavily. At Gaines's Mill it had lost, by capture, one of the ablest generals, John F. Reynolds, with other gallant and efficient officers and men, captured, killed or wounded. Its misfortunes culminated in the capture at New Market cross-roads of McCall, the wounding of General George C. Meade, his able assistant, and the loss of many excellent subordinates. Fortunately the brave and experienced soldier, General Seymour, with his worthy officers, escaped to lead the survivors of the division to our camp, where they were welcomed by their sympathizing comrades.—*F.J.P.*

Early on Tuesday our lines were re-formed and slightly advanced to take full advantage of the formation of the ground, the artillery of the front line being reposted in commanding positions and placed under General Griffin's command, but under Captain Weeden's care, just behind the crest of the hill. The infantry was arranged between the artillery to protect and be protected by its neighbors, and prepared to be thrown forward, if at any time advisable, so as not to interfere with the artillery fire.

MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL, SHOWING, APPROXIMATELY, POSITIONS OF BRIGADES AND BATTERIES



NOTES TO MAP, Page 651

The Union batteries, as indicated on the map, were: 1, Martin's; 2, Tyler's; 3, 4, 5, 6, batteries in reserve; 7, Hunt's reserve artillery; 8 and 11, first and second positions of Waterman's (Weeden's); 9-9, Edwards', Livingston's, Ames', Kingsbury's, and Hyde's; 10, Snow's, Frank's and Hyde's; 11, Kingsbury's and Seeley's.

On the Union side the chief variations from these positions were the advance of a part of Butterfield's brigade, between Griffin and Couch, and the transfer of batteries from Morell to Couch. During the afternoon Sickles' brigade took the place of Caldwell's, which had come up to Couch's aid and had suffered severely. Meagher advanced about 5 o'clock, accompanied by 32-pounders under Colonel H. J. Hunt, which did terrible execution.

The Confederate brigades are placed in the order of their attack; those marked with an arrow were in the charges or in the front line after dark. It is difficult to fix the positions of the Confederate artillery. In general, 12 indicates Moorman's, Grimes', and Pegram's; and 13 denotes the position of Balthis', Poague's, and Carpenter's. In other positions the batteries of Wooding (one section under Lieutenant Jones), Carrington, Hardaway, Bondurant, Hart, McCarthy, and the Baltimore Light Artillery were engaged to some extent.—*Editors.*

The road passing Willis Church and uniting, north of the West house, with the road to Richmond (via Darbytown road) was known locally as the Quaker road. Union generals and, with few exceptions, Confederate generals, mean that highway whenever they mention the Quaker road. An unused road nearly two miles farther west, communicating between the Long Bridge road and Charles City (River) road, was sometimes called the Quaker road.

General Magruder supposed he was to take the latter road when ordered to move by the "Quaker road," and ascribed to that mistake his delay in getting into position on the right of Jackson and Malvern Hill.—*Editors.*

The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner had arrived during the night and taken position in the order named to the right and rear of Couch's division, protecting that flank effectively toward Western Run.* They did not expect to be seriously engaged, but were ready to resist attack and to give assistance to the center and left, if circumstances should require it. At an early hour in the day Sumner kindly sent me Caldwell's brigade, as he thought I might need help. This brigade I placed near Butterfield, who was directed to send it forward wherever it should be needed or called for. He sent it to Couch at an opportune moment early in the day.

General McClellan, accompanied by his staff, visited our lines at an early hour, and approved my measures and

*Franklin's corps and French's brigade of Sumner's corps arrived at Malvern Hill on the morning of July 1st. During the day Franklin's columns were in line of battle on the right of Sumner.—*Editors.*

those of General Couch, or changed them where it was deemed advisable. Though he left me in charge of that part of the field occupied by Couch, I at no time undertook to control that general, or even indicated a desire to do so, but with full confidence in his ability, which was justified by the result of his action, left him free to act in accordance with his own judgment. I cooperated with him fully, however, having Morell's batteries, under Weeden, posted so as to protect his front, and sending him help when I saw he needed it. The division of Couch, though it suffered severely in the battle of Fair Oaks, had seen less service and met with fewer losses in these "Seven Days' battles" than any one of my three and was prepared with full ranks to receive an attack, seeming impatient and eager for the fight. Its conduct soon confirmed this impression. Batteries of Hunt's Artillery Reserve were sent to him when needed—and also Caldwell's brigade, voluntarily sent to me early in the day by Sumner, and Sickles's brigade, borrowed of Heintzelman for the purpose.

About 10 A. M. the enemy's skirmishers and artillery began feeling for us along our line; they kept up a desultory fire until about 12 o'clock, with no severe injury to our infantry, who were well masked, and who revealed but little of our strength or position, retaliatory firing or exposure.

Up to this time and until nearly 1 o'clock our infantry were resting upon their arms and waiting the moment, certain to come, when the column of the enemy rashly advancing would render it necessary to expose themselves. Our desire was to hold the enemy where our artillery would be most destructive, and to reserve our infantry ammunition for close quarters to repel the more determined assaults of our obstinate and untiring foe. Attacks by brigade were made upon Morell, both on his left front and on his right, and also upon Couch; but our artillery, admirably handled, without exception, was generally sufficient to repel all such efforts and to drive back the assailants in confusion, and with great loss.

While the enemy's artillery was firing upon us General Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of Malvern

Hill, to the right of the Malvern house, which descended into the valley of Western Run. Then, deeming it advisable to withdraw all our troops to that line, he ordered me to fall back to Malvern House; but I protested that such a movement would be disastrous and declined to obey the order until I could confer with General McClellan, who had approved of the disposition of our troops. Fortunately Sumner did not insist upon my complying with the order, and, as we were soon vigorously attacked, he advanced his troops to a point where he was but little disturbed by the enemy, but from which he could quickly render aid in response to calls for help or where need for help was apparent.*

The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable attacks of our antagonists, at different points along our whole front, up to about 4 o'clock, were presumably demonstrations or feelers, to ascertain our strength, preparatory to their engaging in more serious work. An ominous silence, similar to that which had preceded the attack in force along our whole line at Gaines's Mill, now intervened, until at about 5:30 o'clock, the enemy opened upon both Morell and Couch with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon afterward pressed forward his columns of infantry, first on one and then on the other, or on both. As if moved by a reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at Gaines's Mill, with a determination to capture our army, or destroy it by driving it into the river, regiment after regimnet, and brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister; while our infantry, withholding

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*On one occasion when I sent an urgent request for two brigades, Sumner read my note aloud, and, fearing he could not stand another draft on his forces, was hesitating to respond, when Heintzelman, ever prompt and generous, sprang to his feet and exclaimed: "By Jove! if Porter asks for help, I know he needs it and I will send it." The immediate result was the sending of Meagher by Sumner and Sickles and Heintzelman. This was the second time that Sumner had selected and sent me Meagher's gallant Irish brigade, and each time it rendered invaluable service. I had served under General Heintzelman up to the capture of Yorktown and I ever appreciated his act as the prompting of a thoughtful, generous, and chivalrous nature. —*F. J. P.*

their fire until the enemy were within short range, scattered the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up and capturing prisoners and colors.*

As column after column advanced, only to meet the same disastrous repulse, the sight became one of the most interesting imaginable. The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any position far or near, and in any direction, was fearful to be-

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*Captain William B. Weeden, in a letter dated May 24th, 1885, says of the battle: "It was a fine afternoon, hot but tempered by a cooling breeze. The soldiers waited; patience, not courage, kept them steady. The ranks were full now; each knew that in himself he might be a possible victor or a possible victim by nightfall. Crew's deserted house, more hospitable than its owner, had furnished a luxury seldom enjoyed in the field. Water, not warm in the canteen but iced in a delf pitcher with glasses, was literally 'handed around.' Pickets and skirmishers had kept us informed of the opposing formations and of batteries going into position. The sharp-shooters' bullets began to thicken. Action might begin at any moment, and between 2 and 3 o'clock it did begin. Out of the woods, puffs of smoke from guns and nearer the light wreaths from their shells lent new colors to the green of woods and fields and the deep blue sky. The musketry cracked before it loudened into a roar, and whizzing bullets mingled with ragged exploding shells. The woods swarmed with butternut coats and gray. These colors were worn by a lively race of men and they stepped forward briskly, firing as they moved. The regimental formations were plainly visible, with the colors flying. It was the onset of battle with the good order of review. In this first heavy skirmish—the prelude of the main action—Magruder's right made a determined attack by way of the meadow to pierce Griffin's line to turn Ames's Battery and to break the solid advantages of position held by the Union forces.

"The brunt of the blow fell upon Colonel McQuade's 14th N.Y. This was a gallant regiment which had suffered much in the rough work at Gaines' Mill. The Confederate charge was sudden and heavy. The New Yorkers began to give ground, and it looked for a moment as if the disasters of Gaines's Mill might be repeated. But only for a moment. The men stiffened up to the color line, charged forward with a cheer, and drove back the enemy. Weeden's Rhode Island Battery of three-inch rifled ordnance guns had lost three pieces at Gaines's Mill. The remaining guns, under command of Lieutenant Waterman, were stationed south and west of Crew's fronting left and rearward. It was the angle of our position, and so far west that Tyler's heavy guns mistook it for the enemy and fired 4½-inch shells into it. One caused severe casualties. The battery was withdrawn from this dangerous range, and later in the afternoon, when the main action was raging, Waterman's three guns, with two of the same type under Lieutenant Phillips of Massachusetts relieved Kingsbury and Hazzard's regular batteries of Parrotts on Couch's right. The service here was admirable. Waterman with only half a battery had a whole company of experienced gunners. When the ammunition gave out they were in turn relieved by a fresh battery."—*Editors.*

hold. Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of our men was fully tried. The safety of our army—the life of the Union—was felt to be at stake. In one case the brigades of Howe, Abercrombie, and Palmer, of Couch's division, under impulse gallantly pushed after the retreating foe, captured colors, and advantageosuly advanced the right of the line, but at considerable loss and great risk. The brigades of Morell, cool, well-disciplined, and easily controlled, let the enemy return after each repulse, but permitted few to escape their fire. Colonel McQuade, on Morell's left, with the 14th New York, against orders and at the risk of defeat and disaster, yielding to impulse, gallantly dashed forward and repulsed an attacking party. Assisted by Buchanan of Sykes's division, Colonel Rice, with the 44th New York Volunteers, likewise drove a portion of the enemy from the field, taking a flag bearing the inscription "Seven Pines." Colonel Hunt, directing the artillery, was twice dismounted by having his horse shot under him, but though constantly exposed continued his labors until after dark. General Couch, who was also dismounted in like manner, took advantage of every opportunity to make his opponents feel his blows.

It is not to be supposed that our men, though concealed by the irregularities of the ground, were not sufferers from the enemy's fire. The fact is that before they exposed themselves by pursuing the enemy, the ground was literally covered with the killed and wounded from dropping bullets and bursting shells and their contents; but they bravely bore the severe trial of having to remain inactive under a damaging fire.

As Morell's front ranks became thinned out and the ammunition was exhausted, other regiments eagerly advanced; all were stimulated by the hope of a brilliant and permanent success, and nerved by the approving shouts of their comrades and the cry of "Revenge, boys!" "Remember McLane!" "Remember Black!" "Remember Gove!" or "Remember Cass!" Black and McLane and Gove had been killed at Gaines's Mill; Woodbury and Cass were then lying

before them.* Colonel McQuade was the only regimental commander of Griffin's brigade who escaped death during the Seven Days, and he was constantly exposed.

During that ominous silence of which I have spoken, I determined that our opponents should reap no advantage, even if our lines yielded to attack, and therefore posted batteries, as at Gaines's Mill, to secure against the disaster of a break in our lines, should such a misfortune be ours. For this purpose I sent Wood, Carlisle, and Smead, with their batteries, to the gorge of the roads on Crew's Hill, from which the enemy must emerge in pursuit if he should break our lines; instructing them to join in the fight if necessary, but not to permit the advance of the foe, even if it must be arrested at the risk of firing upon friends. To these Colonel Hunt added three batteries of horse artillery. Though they were all thus posted and their guns loaded with double canister, "they were," as Captain Smead reported, "very happy to find their services not needed on that occasion."

It was at this time, in answer to my call for aid, that Sumner sent me Meagher, and Heintzelman sent Sickles, both of whom reached me in the height of battle, when, if ever, fresh troops would renew our confidence and insure our success. While riding rapidly forward to meet Meagher, who was approaching at a "double-quick" step, my horse fell, throwing me over his head, much to my discomfort both of body and mind. On rising and remounting I was greeted with hearty cheers, which alleviated my chagrin. This incident gave rise to the report, spread through the country, that I was wounded. Fearing that I might fall into the hands of the enemy, and if so my diary and dispatch-book of the campaign, then on my person, would meet with the same fate and reveal information to the injury of our cause, I tore it up, scattering the pieces to the winds, as I rode rapidly forward, leading Meagher into

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*Colonel Samuel W. Black, of the 62d Pennsylvania, Colonel John W. McLane, of the 83d Pennsylvania, Colonel Jesse A. Gove, of the 22d Massachusetts, Colonel Dwight A. Woodbury, of the 4th Michigan, and Colonel Thomas Cass, of the 9th Massachusetts.—*Editors.*

action. I have always regretted my act as destroying interesting and valuable memoranda of our campaign.

Advancing with Meagher's brigade, accompanied by my staff, I soon found that our forces had successfully driven back their assailants. Determined, if possible, satisfactorily to finish the contest, regardless of the risk of being fired upon by our artillery in case of defeat, I pushed on beyond our lines into the woods held by the enemy. About fifty yards in front of us, a large force of the enemy suddenly rose and opened with fearful volleys upon our advancing line. I turned to the brigade which thus far had kept pace with my horse, and found it standing "like a stone wall," and returning a fire more destructive than it received and from which the enemy fled. The brigade was planted. My presence was no longer needed, and I sought General Sickles, whom I found giving aid to Couch. I had the satisfaction of learning that night that a Confederate detachment, undertaking to turn Meagher's left, was met by a portion of the 69th New York Regiment, which, advancing, repelled the attack and captured many prisoners.

After seeing that General Sickles was in a proper position, I returned to my own corps, where I was joined by Colonel Hunt with some 32-pounder howitzers. Taking those howitzers, we rode forward beyond our lines, and, in parting salutation to our opponents, Colonel Hunt sent a few shells, as a warning of what would be ready to welcome them on the morrow if they undertook to disturb us.

Almost at the crisis of the battle—just before the advance of Meagher and Sickles—the gun-boats on the James River opened their fire with the good intent of aiding us, but either mistook our batteries at the Malvern house for those of the enemy, or were unable to throw their projectiles beyond us. If the former was the case, their range was well estimated, for all their shot landed in or close by Tyler's battery, killing and wounding a few of his men. Fortunately members of our excellent signal-service corps were present as usual on such occasions, and the message signaled to the boats, "For God's sake, stop firing," promptly relieved us from further damage and the demoralization of

a "fire in the rear." Reference is occasionally seen in Confederate accounts of this battle to the fearful sounds of the projectiles from those gun-boats. But that afternoon not one of their projectiles passed beyond my headquarters; and I have always believed and said, as has General Hunt, that the enemy mistook the explosions of shells from Tyler's siege-guns and Kusserow's 32-pounder howitzers, which Hunt had carried forward, for shells from the gun-boats.

While Colonel Hunt and I were returning from the front, about 9 o'clock, we were joined by Colonel A. V. Colburn, of McClellan's staff. We all rejoiced over the day's success. By these officers I sent messages to the commanding general, expressing the hope that our withdrawal had ended and that we should hold the ground that we now occupied, even if we did not assume the offensive. From my standpoint I thought we could maintain our position, and perhaps in a few days could improve it by advancing. But I knew only the circumstances before me, and these were limited by controlling influences. It was now after 9 o'clock at night. Within an hour of the time that Colonels Hunt and Colburn left me, and before they could have reached the commanding general, I received orders from him to withdraw, and to direct Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to move at specified hours to Harrison's Landing, and General Couch to rejoin his corps, which was then under way to the same point.*

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*The order referred to read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *9 P.M., July 1st, 1862.*

"*Brigadier-General F. J. Porter, commanding Fifth Provisional Corps;—General*:

"The General Commanding desires you to move your command at once, the artillery reserve moving first to Harrison's Bar. In case you should find it impossible to move your heavy artillery, you are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages. Couch's command will move under your orders. Communicate these instructions to him at once. The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner will move next. Please communicate to General Heintzelman the time of your moving. Additional gun-boats, supplies, and reenforcements will be met at Harrison's Bar. Stimulate your men by informing them that reenforcements, etc., have arrived at our new base. By command of MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, JAMES A. HARDIE, *Lieutenant-Colonel, A.D.C., A.A.A.G.*"

These orders were immediately sent to the proper officers, and by daybreak, July 2d, our troops, preceded by their trains, were well on their way to their destination, which they reached that day, greatly wearied after a hard march over muddy roads, in the midst of a heavy rain. That night, freed from care and oblivious of danger, all slept a long sleep; and they awoke the next morning with the clear sun, a happier, brighter, and stronger body of men than that which all the day before, depressed and fatigued, had shivered in the rain.

The conduct of the rear-guard was intrusted to Colonel Averell, commander of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, sustained by Colonel Buchanan, with his brigade of regulars, and the 67th New York Regiment. No trying trust was ever better bestowed or more satisfactorily fulfilled. At daybreak Colonel Averell found himself accidentally without artillery to protect his command in its difficult task of preventing an attack before our rear was well out of range. He at once arranged his cavalry in bodies to represent horse-batteries, and, maneuvering them to create the impression that they were artillery ready for action, he secured himself from attack until the rest of the army and trains had passed sufficiently to the rear to permit him to retire rapidly without molestation. His strategem was successful, and without loss he rejoined the main body of the army that night. Thus ended the memorable "Seven Days' battles," which, for severity and for stubborn resistance and endurance of hardships by the contestants, were not surpassed during the war. Each antagonist accomplished the result for which he aimed: one insuring the temporary relief of Richmond; the other gaining security on the north bank of the James, where the Union army, if our civil and military authorities were disposed, could be promptly reenforced, and from whence only, as subsequent events proved, it could renew the contest successfully. Preparations were commenced and dispositions were at once made under every prospect, if not direct promise, of large reenforcements for a renewal of the struggle on the south bank of the James,

and in the same manner as subsequenly brought a successful termination of the war.

In the Fifth Corps, however, mourning was mingled with rejoicing. Greatly injured by the mishap of a cavalry blunder at Gaines's Mill, it had at Malvern, with the brave and gallant help of Couch and the generous and chivalric assistance of Heintzelman and Sumner, successfully repulsed the foe, in every quarter, and was ready to renew the contest at an opportune moment. Our killed and wounded were numbered by thousands; the loss of the Confederates may be imagined.*

While taking Meagher's brigade to the front, I crossed a portion of the ground over which a large column had advanced to attack us, and had a fair opportunity of judging of the effect of our fire upon the ranks of the enemy. It was something fearful and sad to contemplate; few steps could be taken without trampling upon the body of a dead or wounded soldier, or without hearing a piteous cry, begging our party to be careful. In some places the bodies were in continuous lines and in heaps. In Mexico I had seen fields of battle on which our armies had been victorious, and had listened to pitiful appeals; but the pleaders were not of my countrymen then, and did not, as now, cause me to deplore the effects of a fratricidal war.

Sadder still was the trying scenes in and around Malvern house, which at an early hour that day had been given up to the wounded, and was soon filled with our unfortunate men, suffering from all kinds of wounds. At night, after issuing orders for the withdrawal of our troops, I passed through the building and the adjoining hospitals with my senior officer (medical), Colonel George H. Lyman. Our object was to inspect the actual condition of

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*It is impossible to estimate the casualties of each of these battles, so quickly did one follow another. Our total loss in these battles is recorded at 15,849, while of the Confederates sums up to 20,135. The loss in the Fifth Corps was 7601. This does not include the losses of Slocum's division and Cooke's cavalry engaged with us at Gaines's Mill, nor of Couch's division and the brigades of Caldwell, Meagher, and Sickles serving with it at Malvern. (See pp. 314-318.)—*F. J. P.*

the men, to arrange for their care and comfort, and to cheer them as best we could. Here, as usual, were found men mortally wounded, by necessity left unattended by the surgeons, so that prompt and proper care might be given to those in whom there was no hope of recovery.

While passing through this improvised hospital I heard of many sad cases. One was that of the major of the 12th New York Volunteers, a brave and gallant officer, highly esteemed, who was believed to be mortally wounded. While breathing his last, as was supposed, a friend asked him if he had any message to leave. He replied, "Tell my wife that with my last thoughts were blended herself, my boy, and my flag." Then he asked how the battle had gone, and when told that we had been successful he said, "God bless the old fla——" and fell back apparently dead. For a long time he was mourned as dead, and it was believed that he had expired with the prayer left unfinished on his closing lips. Though still an invalid, suffering from the wound then received, that officer recovered to renew his career in the war.*

On the occasion of this visit we frequently witnessed scenes which would melt the stoutest heart: bearded men pitcously begging to be sent home; others requesting that a widowed mother or orphan sisters might be cared for; more sending messages to wife or children, or to others near and dear to them. We saw the amputated limbs and the bodies of the dead hurried out of the room for burial. On every side we heard appeals of the unattended, the moans of the dying, and the shrieks of those under the knife of the surgeon. We gave what cheer we could, and left with heavy hearts.

At noon on the 4th of July the usual national salute was fired, and the different corps were reviewed. General McClellan, as opportunity offered, made a few remarks full of hope and encouragement, thanking the men in most feeling terms for their uniform bravery, fortitude, and

*Afterward Brevet Major-General Henry A. Barnum.—*Editors.*

good conduct, but intimating that this was not the last of the campaign.

Contrary, however, to his expectations, the Peninsular campaign of the Army of the Potomac for 1862 virtually ended on the 4th of July. From that date to August 14th, when the army at sundown took up its march for Fort Monroe, its commander was engaged in the struggle to retain it on the James, as against the determination of the Secretary of War to withdraw it to the line of the Rappahannock, there to act in conjunction with the Army of Virginia.

Although General McClellan was assured, in writing, that he was to have command of both armies after their junction, he preferred, as a speedy and the only practical mode of taking Richmond, to remain on the James, and renew the contest from the south bank, for which he had commenced operations.* During this period he omitted nothing which would insure the removal of the army without loss of men and material. The withdrawal of the army changed the issue from the capture of Richmond to the security of Washington, transferred to the Federals the anxiety of the Confederates for their capital, and sounded an alarm throughout the Northern States.

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*It was publicly announced that Halleck would assume command and take the field. Pope had reason to believe that "he would eventually supersede McClellan" and McDowell had been so satisfied of his future supremacy that he confided to a friend that "he would be at the highest round of the ladder."—*F. J. P.*

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XVI

The Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing

By George L. Kilmer,
Company D, 27th N. Y. Volunteers

The withdrawal of General McClellan's army from Malvern Hill, a position that seemed to be impregnable, was a surprise to the men in the ranks, and for the first time in the campaign they became discouraged. During July 2d rain fell copiously, and when the columns arrived at Harrison's Landing the fields were soaked and the soil was quickly reduced to paste by the men and trains. The infantry and the division wagons and batteries were drawn up in an immense field of standing wheat near the Harrison mansion, also called Berkeley. The grain was trampled into the soil, or laid down so as to serve under the tents as protection from the wet ground. Neither wood nor boards were to be had, and the army was exceedingly uncomfortable. Transports in the James landed rations, which proved a great blessing, since many of the men had not had food in forty-eight hours. The rain continued all night, and the flimsy wheat floors were soon floating in pools of water; besides, the soil would not hold the tent-pins, and in the morning the tents were nearly all down, exposing men whose beds were sinking deeper and deeper into the mud and to the pelting rain. About 8 o'clock, while some of the men were yet asleep and others were attempting to get breakfast, the camp was startled by a sudden outburst of artillery fire, and shells came whistling over the plain. The shots were scattering, and seemed to be directed principally at the shipping. The troops were summoned to arms, but, as very little damage was done by the shells, the affair was soon turned to account as a joke. General J. E. B. Stuart for some days had been operating in the center of the Peninsula, and learning of the exposed

position of McClellan's army on the James, had hastened there and stationed his battery near Westover Church, across Herring Creek, north of the landing. A few shells from our gun-boats caused his guns to speedily shift their position, and General Nathan Kimball of Shields's division (just arrived from the Shenandoah), advanced and cleared the field after some lively skirmishing.

The army immediately took position on the high ground about Harrison's Landing, and went into camp on an intrenched line several miles in extent. The air was filled with rumors about future operations. To the soldiers McClellan was less a hero now, perhaps than before, but he was more a martial leader than ever. The unusual strain imposed upon the men, the malarial character of the region around Richmond, the lack of proper nourishment, the want of rest, combined with the excitement of the change of base, and the midsummer heat prostrated great numbers. In my notes written at the time, it is stated that 50 of the regiment, about 15% of the duty men, were sick in the camp hospital July 24th. This was in addition to the casualties of 162 sustained in the "Seven Days." According to the report of Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, Medical Director (Vol. XI., Part I., "Official Records," pp. 210-220), about 6000 sick were sent away soon after the army reached Harrison's Landing, over 12,000 remaining in camp. On July 30th, the report says, there were 12,000 sick with the army, and of these only 2000 were able to take the field. Fortunately the Sanitary Commission hastened to our relief with tents, food, medical supplies, and competent nurses.

After the departure of Stuart from Westover, July 4th, the army did not see or hear the enemy, with a slight exception, until search was made for him toward Richmond, early in August. The exception was on the night of Thursday, July 31st. About midnight the whole army was startled by a lively cannonade and by shells flying over the lines, some bursting within them. The troops turned out under arms, and it was soon discovered that a

mild fusillade from across the James was being directed on the shipping and on the supply depots near the camps.* Comparatively little damage was done. The next day a Union force was thrown across the river to seize Coggins's Point, where the elevated ground favored that style of attack on our camps. The army soon became restless for want of work, and there was great rejoicing at the prospect of a forward movement. On the 2d of August, Hooker marched a portion of his division to Malvern Hill, and on the 4th extended his advance to Charles City Cross-roads, near Glendale. But orders came to withdraw from the Peninsula, so we marched to Williamsburg, Yorktown, Newport News, and Fort Monroe. The Fifth and Third Corps embarked, on August 20th and 21st, for Aquia Creek and Alexandria; the Sixth (August 23d and 24th), and the Second (August 26th), and the Fourth for Alexandria, except Peck's division, which remained at Yorktown.

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*A Confederate force under General S. G. French had been sent out from the command of D. H. Hill, at Petersburg. General W. N. Pendleton reported that 1000 rounds were fired. The casalties in the Union camps, as reported by General McClellan, were 10 killed and 15 wounded.—*G.L.K.*

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XVII

With the Cavalry on the Peninsula

By William W. Averell,
Brevet Major-General, U.S.A.

In the Peninsular campaign of 1862 there were employed fourteen regiments of cavalry, entire or in parts, and two independent squadrons (see p. 517). Considerably over half this force was composed of volunteers, and had been in existence about six months. In the regular cavalry three years had been regarded as necessary to transform a recruit into a good cavalryman. The amount of patient and persistent hard work required to convert 1200 untrained citizens, unaccustomed to the care of a horse or to his use under the saddle, and wholly inexperienced in the use of arms, into the semblance of a cavalry regiment in six months is known only to those who have done it.

The topography and soil of the peninsula presented a most difficult field for cavalry operations. From Fort Monroe to Hanover Court House there was hardly a field with sufficient scope for the maneuvers of a single regiment of cavalry. After a rain the deep alluvium became, under the tread of horses, a bed of mortar knee-deep. The forests between the York and the James rivers were filled with tangled thickets and unapproachable morasses. The tributaries of the rivers, mostly deep, crooked, and sluggish, became more tortuous as they approach their confluence, and the expanse of floods is converted by evaporation into stagnant swamps. A heavy rain in a few hours rendered these streams formidable obstacles. Above this dismal landscape the fierce rays of the sun were interrupted only at night, or by deluges of rains, so that men and animals were alternately scorched and drenched. These conditions made cavalry operations in this region affairs of squadrons.

The cavalry had been organized into a divisoin under General George Stoneman, chief of cavalry, and distributed by assignment to the corps of the army, excepting the cavalry reserves under General P. St. George Cooke and that portion which was attached to general headquarters. During the month of the siege of Yorktown not an hour was lost which could be applied to cavalry instruction. Alertness and steadiness soon characterized our cavalrymen. No incident was fruitless. When grindstones were procured and the sabers of my regiment were sharpened at Hampton, it produced a similar effect upon the men.

Few but cavalry names reached the ears of the army on the day of the evacuation and pursuit. Stoneman and Cooke, on the right, with the 1st and 6th Regulars, struck cavalry, infantry, batteries, redoubts, and ravines, and pushed their attack with audacity. Cavalrymen galloped around field works. We soon heard of the gallantry of Colonel Grier, Major Lawrence Williams, Captains Sanders, Davis, Baker and others in cavalry charges, and that the French Princes were among the first in the advance. Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, commanding the 1st ("Old Billy Grier, the *bueno commandante*"), had led a charge and engaged two of the enemy in personal combat, wounding one and himself receiving a wound. Then came tidings of the dash of Chambliss and McLean leading Hancock's column and crowding the left-center of the enemy's line, and soon the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry met the enemy in the woods and drove him out with skirmishers and canister, and cleared our left toward the James of the enemy's cavalry under Stuart. During the following day, the cavalrymen were spectators of the battle at Williamsburg (except the 3d Pennsylvania actively engaged on our left) and were only occupied with the rather serious business of procuring food for the horses.

Although pursuit was again undertaken on the morning of the 6th by squadrons of the 3d Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois Cavalry was continued for four miles, and five pieces of artillery were recovered and some prisoners were captured, it came to a dead halt from necessity. During the

succeeding twenty days the cavalry swept the country in advance of our marching army by day and hovered around its bivouacs by night.

When the army was in line about seven miles from Richmond, on the 25th of May, I was directed to communicate with the gun-boats on the James River at City Point. Lieutenant Davis, of the 3d Pennsylvania, with ten men, was selected for the duty, and he made his way along various roads infested with the pickets and patrols of the enemy to the bank of the James, where, taking a skiff, with two negroes, he went on board the Galena, and communicated to Captain Rodgers the position of the army, and received from the captain a statement of the position of the gun-boats.

On the 27th, not satisfied with the picnic appearance of our front on our left, south of the Chickahominy, I reported its perilous condition to McClellan, who at once sent Colonel N. B. Sweitzer, of his staff, to me, and together we rode to the front. As a result orders were given at once for slashing the first, and positions for batteries and outposts were determined,—precautions which, three days later, disclosed their value in the battle of Fair Oaks.

On the same day (27th) we were searching the ground away up to our right at Hanover Court House, in invitation to McDowell to come down from Fredericksburg. Almost within his sight and quite within his hearing, the principal northern gate to Richmond was set ajar, the Virginia Central and the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads were destroyed. In the resultant melee about Hanover Court House, the cavalry under Emory, Royall, Lawrence Williams, Chambliss, Whiting, Harrison, and Arnold, and Rush's 6th Pennsylvania, aggressively attacked infantry, captured whole companies with arms, swept right, left, and rear, and generally filled the ideal of cavalry activities in such a battle.

General Lee assumed command June 1st. On the 13th he announced himself through his cavalry, in Stuart's raid around our army. This expedition was appointed with ex-

cellent judgment, and was conducted with superb address. Stuart pursued the line of least resistance, which was the unexpected. His subordinate commanders were Colonels Fitz Lee, W. H. F. Lee, and W. T. Martin, all intrepid cavalrymen. It was an easy thing to do, but being his first raid, Stuart was nervous, and imagining perils which did not exist, neglected one great opportunity—the destruction of our base of supplies at the White House. Had he, at Garlick's, exchanged purposes with his detachment, sending it on the road home while he with the main body bent all his energies to the destruction of our base of supplies, we might have had something to lament even had we captured his command. On our side were developed many things to remember with pride, and one thing to regret with mortification. The memories are glorious that not a single vedette or picket was surprised, and that never was outpost duty more honorably and correctly performed than by Captain W. B. Royall and Lieutenant McLean of the 5th United States Cavalry. They met the enemy repeatedly, and the lieutenant gave his life and the captain was prostrated with saber wounds in resisting Stuart's column. The killing of the dashing Confederate Captain Latané and several men with the saber, and the checking of the invading forces for an hour attest the courage and devotion of Royall and his picket. We had to regret that there was no reserve to the outpost within supporting distance, and that when the reserve was alarmed in its camp precious time was lost by indirections. This raid of Stuart's added a new feature to cavalry history. A similar expedition, however, had been projected previously. Just before the Army of the Potomac advanced on Manassas in March, '62, in a conference with General McClellan, it was suggested that I should take my brigade, consisting of the 3d and 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, the first brigade of cavalry formed in the war, and go around the enemy, then at Manassas, destroying the bridge at Rappahannock Station, and that at Fredericksburg; but the immediate movement of the enemy from Manassas prevented its being carried out.

Our general's plans were not disturbed by Stuart's raid, and two days after it was over, the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry crossed the Pamunkey River on our right and rear, ascended to the King William Court House and Ellett's Mills, burned the bridge and ferry-boat, and a schooner and other boats, and a storehouse containing 30,000 bushels of grain. Scouts were pushed out many miles in quest of news of Jackson's coming. This was the last extension of our hands toward McDowell, for Jackson came sooner than he was expected, on the 26th, the day upon which a general advance had been determined and the battle of Gaines's Mill was opened.

McClellan met and mastered the occasion. Alert, radiant, and cheerful, he stood out in front of his tent in his shirt-sleeves nearly all the day of the 26th listening to his army. To the north, across the Chickahominy his clipped right wing, environed with our cavalry, was sullenly retracting its lines to the position at Gaines's Mill. Stoneman, with infirmities that would have kept a man of less fortitude in hospital, was in the saddle confronting Stuart's cavalry and covering the White House Landing.

The ensuing day was without rest for the cavalry. The strain of the following day to help the Fifth Corps to hold its ground until dark will never be forgotten, and it was not devoid of heroic cavalry effort. Fragments of the reserve under General Cooke stood massed in the valley of the Chickahominy, on its left flank. About 5 P.M., when it was evident that we were being pressed on the right and left of our line by all the force the enemy could bring into action against Porter, and that we were not likely to be able to resist his attack, the cavalry was moved from its masked position to the edge of the hill and placed in a formation to charge should a charge seem likely to do good. It was there exposed to the enemy's fire, and must either retire, advance, or be destroyed. In a few minutes the order to charge was given to the 5th Regulars, not 300 strong. Chambliss, leading, rode as straight as man ever rode, into the face of Longstreet's corps, and the 5th Cav-

alry was destroyed and dispersed. Six out of the seven officers present and fifty men were struck down. Chambliss, hit by seven balls, lost consciousness, and when he recovered found himself in the midst of the enemy. The charge at Balaklava had not this desperation and was not better ridden. Chambliss lay on the field ten days, and was finally taken to Richmond, where he was rescued from death by the kind care of Generals Hood and Field. In this battle there were two and a half squadrons of the 5th and two squadrons of the 1st U. S. Cavalry, three squadrons Rush's Lancers (6th Pennsylvania Cavalry), and one squadron 4th Pennsylvania (Col. Child's).

Two or three weeks before this several officers of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, Newhall, Treichel, W. E. Miller, and others, penetrated the region between the Chickahominy and the James, taking bearings and making notes. Their fragmentary sketches, when put together, made a map which exhibited all the roadways, fields, forests, bridges, streams, and houses, so that our commander knew the country to be traversed through the seven days far better than any Confederate commander.

On the evening of June 27th, my pickets from Tunstall's Station and other points were called in and at 6:30 A. M., on the 28th, the regiment crossed White Oak Swamp, leading Keyes's corps, and advanced to the Charles City road. Lieutenant Davis was again sent to communicate with the gun boats on the James.

At daylight, on the 29th, Captain White's squadron, with 200 infantry and 2 guns, was sent to picket and hold Jones's Bridge on the Chickahominy. About 9 A. M. my scouts reported a regiment of the enemy's cavalry advancing in column about a mile away. Some woodland intervened. Between this and my position was an open field a quarter of a mile across. A picket was quickly posted at the hither edge of the wood, with orders to fire upon the enemy when he should come within range and then turn and run away, thus inviting pursuit. On my position two guns were already placed to enfilade the road, and a

few squadrons held in readiness to charge. The enemy came, was fired upon, and the picket fled, followed by the enemy in hot pursuit. Upon arriving within two hundred yards of our position, the picket quitted the road through gaps in the fences made for that purpose, thus unmasking the enemy's columns; the two guns of Major West fired two rounds and two squadrons, led by Captains Welsh and Russell, of the 3d Pennsylvania, were let loose upon the enemy, and over 60 of his officers and men were left on the ground, whilst the survivors fled in great disorder toward Richmond. The command was the 1st North Carolina and 3d Virginia Cavalry, led by Colonel Lawrence Baker, a comrade of mine in the old army. The 3d Pennsylvania lost 1 man killed and 5 wounded.

After this affair I galloped back to see General McClellan, and found him near a house south of White Oak Swamp Bridge. Near him were groups of a hundred officers eagerly but quietly discussing our progress and situation. So soon as McClellan descried me, he came with the Prince de Joinville to the fence, where I was dismounted. After telling him all I knew and had learned from prisoners and scouts, I ventured to suggest that the roads were tolerably clear toward Richmond, and that we might go there. The Prince seemed to exhibit a favorable interest in my suggestion, but the general, recognizing its weakness, said promptly: "The roads will be full enough tomorrow;" and then earnestly, "Averell, if any army can save this country, it will be the Army of the Potomac, and it must be saved for that purpose." The general rode to the front with me, and reconnoitered the ground in all directions. In the afternoon with Hay's regiment of infantry and Benson's battery, I established our outposts and pickets within one mile of New Market, where we were first touched with some of the enemy's infantry during the night. On the 30th, there were battles on our center and right and having joined the Fifth Corps, I proceeded to Malvern Hill in the evening and rode over the field with Captain Colburn, my classmate and the favorite aide of McClellan, and made a topographical sketch

of the position, which was of some use afterward in posting the infantry and artillery as they arrived.

During the night of the 30th, the general commanding asked me for two officers for hazardous service. Lieutenants Newhall and Treichel, because of their intimate knowledge of the country, were sent to communicate with our right and center, and a second time that night made their way for a mile and a half through the enemy's camps.

During the battle of July 1st (Malvern Hill) my cavalry was deployed as a close line of skirmishers with drawn sabers in rear of our lines, with orders to permit no one to pass to the rear who could not show blood. The line of battle was ready and reserves of infantry and artillery in position some time before the enemy came in force and developed his attack. There were some preliminary bursts of artillery, but the great crash of all arms did not begin before 6 P.M. It lasted about two hours. The commanding general, with his mounted staff, was standing on the plateau in front of the farm house at the rear verge of the hill, a conspicuous group, when a round shot from the enemy struck the ground a few yards directly in front of him and threw dirt and gravel over the little group around him. General Porter, with whom I was riding, had just started toward the front when he turned and said to McClellan: "General, everything is all right here and you are not needed; if you will look after our center and right that would help us here more than you can by remaining." Then we separated from them and rode toward our left, at Crew's house. The wounded were already coming away from the lines.

When the battle was over and the field had become quiet, the cavalry bivouacked half a mile in rear of the line of battle. Men and horses were too tired to do aught but sleep for hours. At night I found myself in the saddle with a cup of hot coffee held to my lips, a portion of its contents having scalded its way down my throat. When awakened I was informed by the Duc de Chartres that General McClellan desired to see me. We found him near by, in a little orchard by a camp fire, giving orders rapidly to

his general staff officers. When my turn came, McClellan said:

"Averell, I want you to take command of the rearguard at daylight in the morning, and hold this position until our trains are out of the way. What force do you want?"

I asked for just enough to cover the front with a strong skirmish line. The orders were given for Buchanan's brigade of Sykes's division, Fifth Corps, to report to me at daylight, and also a battery.

At daylight the cavalry advanced toward the front. There was a fog so dense that we could not see a man at fifty paces' distance. Colonel Buchanan was met with his staff returning from the front on foot, their horses being led. He informed me that the enemy was threatening his pickets, and advancing on both flanks. I asked him to halt his command until further orders, and galloped to the front, where our line of battle had been the night before. I could see nothing, but could hear shrieks and groans and the murmur of a multitude but no sounds of wheels nor trampling horses. I ordered the line reestablished, with skirmishers and a squadron of cavalry, on either flank. Colonel Hall, with the 2d Regiment, Excelsior Brigade, also reported for duty, and took position in the line. The battery not having reported some cavalry was organized into squads resembling sections of artillery, at proper intervals, behind the crest. By this time the level rays of the morning sun from our right were just penetrating the fog, and slowly lifting its clinging shreds and yellow masses. Our ears had been filled with agonizing cries from thousands before the fog was lifted, but now our eyes saw an appalling spectacle upon the slopes down to the woodlands half a mile away. Over five thousand dead and wounded men were on the ground, in every attitude of distress. A third of them were dead or dying, but enough were alive and moving to give to the field a singular crawling effect. The different stages of the ebbing tide are often marked by the lines of flotsam and jetsam left along the seashore. So here could be seen three distinct lines of dead and wounded marking the last front of three Confederate charges of the

night before. Groups of men, some mounted, were groping about the field.

As soon as the woodland beyond, which masked the enemy, could be clearly seen, I offered battle by directing the infantry lines to show on the crest, the sham sections of artillery to execute the movements of going "into battery, action front," and the flank squadrons to move toward the enemy until fired upon. All these details were executed simultaneously at the sound of the trumpet. The squadrons had not proceeded three hundred yards when they were fired upon and halted. At the same time, a horseman from among those on the field approached our line with a white flag. An aide was sent to meet and halt him. The Confederate horseman, who was an officer, requested a truce of two hours in which to succor their wounded. I was about to send a demand that his request be put in writing when I reflected that it would be embarrassing for me to reply in writing so word was sent to him to dismount and wait until his request had been submitted to the commanding general. In the meantime the scattered parties of the enemy withdrew hastily from the field to the woods, and there was some threatening desultory firing on my flanks, killing one man and wounding another. After waiting thirty minutes, word was sent to the officer with the flag that the truce was granted, and that their men could come out without arms and succor their wounded. I had no idea that the flag was properly authorized, else there would have been no firing on my flanks, but time was the precious thing I wished to gain for our trains which crowded the bottomlands below Malvern. My squadrons were withdrawn to the line, the infantry lay down, while officers took position in front of the line to prevent conversation with the enemy. In a few minutes thousands of men swarmed from the woods and scattered over the field. I kept myself informed by couriers of the movements of our army and trains, and had already sent officers to reassure our rear of its security and also to bring me back a battery of artillery. Captain Frank with his battery responded. I sent a request to General Wessells, commanding Keyes's rear brigade, to select a good

position about two miles in my rear in case I should need a checking force when the time for withdrawal should come. That excellent soldier had already chosen such a position and established his brigade in line of battle.

When the quasi-truce had expired, at the sound of the trumpet the line resumed its attitude of attack, and the officer with the flag again appeared with a request that the truce be extended two hours. After a reasonable wait, answer was returned that the time was extended but that no further extension would be granted. I had come on the line at 4 A. M., and these maneuvers and truces had consumed the time until after 9 o'clock. The Army of the Potomac was then at its new base on the James, and all its trains were safely on the way there, with Keyes's corps some miles below in my rear awaiting the enemy. So when the extended truce had expired, my command, with the exception of the cavalry, had left the field. Our dead and wounded, about 2500 in number, had been cared for during the night. Not above a dozen bodies could be found on our field during the truce, and these were buried. Twelve stalled and abandoned wagons were destroyed, and two captured guns which could not be removed were spiked and the carriages were broken. The 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, which had led the Army of the Potomac across White Oak Swamp, now saw its last serviceable man safe beyond Malvern Hill, before it left that glorious field, about 10 A. M., July 2d. A heavy rainstorm was prevailing. When everything movable was across Turkey Bridge it was destroyed by my rear squadron. My command passed through Wessells's lines about noon, and the lines of General Naglee a little later. Everything was now quiet and in good order, and the 3d Pennsylvania proceeded to camp at Westover after dark.

The 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry under Colonel D. McM. Gregg, had scoured the left bank of the Chickahominy, on the 28th, and had swum the river to the right bank, rafting its arms across at Long Bridge. He subsequently picketed the front of our center and right on the 30th, and on July 1st and 2d—an extremely important service. The 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, after its efficient service, at and about

Gaines's Mill, during the day and night of the 27th of June, performed similar duties with General McCall at Charles City road on the 30th. The 11th Pennsylvania, Colonel Harlan, which, on the 13th, had covered the White House Landing during Stuart's raid, on the 28th, joined Stoneman on similar duty, and retired with him.

Colonel Farnsworth, 8th Illinois, after his active participation in covering our right wing on the 26th, and guiding trains and maintaining steadiness of lines on the 27th, guided Keyes's corps to the James River below Malvern, on the 29th, and assisted the 8th Pennsylvania in covering that corps on the 30th and 1st of July. The 2d U. S. Cavalry and McClellan Dragoons, under Major Pleasonton, escorted Colonel B. S. Alexander of the corps of Engineers, on the 29th, to Carter's Landing, on the James. Captains Norris and Green, of the 2d, performed scouting service in the direction of the Chickahominy and Charles City Court House, after the arrival of the regiment on the James. And so ended the first lesson of the cavalry service of the Army of the Potomac.*

Near the White House, on the morning of the 29th of June (at the very time that the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry was repelling the 1st North Carolina and 3d Virginia Cavalry at Willis Church, south of the Chickahominy), Stuart received a note from General Lee asking for his impressions in regard to the designs of the Union Army. He replied that there was no evidence of a retreat down the Williamsburg road, and that he had no doubt that it was endeavoring to reach the James. On the 30th, while we were establishing our advance on Malvern Hill, Stuart, north of the Chickahominy, was directing his cavalry columns toward the bridges of that river behind us. Had the disposition of his forces been reversed at the outset, and had he with his main body gone to Charles City road and obstructed and defended the crossings of White Oak Swamp,

*The total losses of our cavalry reported in the Seven Days' battles was 234; that of the Confederates 71, of which number 61 were credited to the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry at Willis Church, on the 29th of June.—*W.A.A.*

he could have annoyed and perhaps embarrassed our movements. Finally, had his cavalry ascertained on July 1st, any time before 3 P. M., that the center and right of our lines were more vulnerable and favorable to attack than the left, the enemy need not have delivered the unsuccessful and disastrous assault on Malvern Hill, but, while maintaining a strong demonstration at that point, might have thrown two or three corps upon our center below Malvern with hopes of dividing the Union army. Undoubtedly Gregg and Farnsworth, with the 8th Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois Cavalry, would have successfully prevented the reconnaissance of our center and right, but that it was not attempted was a discredit to Stuart's cavalry.

At Harrison's Landing, General Stoneman having taken sick-leave and General Cooke having been relieved, on the 5th of July I was appointed acting Brigadier-General and placed in command of all cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and at once issued orders organizing it into a cavalry corps, and the history of cavalry brigades was begun. Stoneman, returning the same day, resumed command, and I took the First Brigade, composed of the 5th United States, the 3d and 4th Pennsylvania, and the 1st New York Cavalry.

Active scouting followed in the direction of Richmond and up the Chickahominy. On the 3d of August I crossed the James, with the 5th United States and 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, to explore the ways to Petersburg, encountering the 13th Virginia Cavalry in a charge led by Lieutenant McIntosh, of the 5th United States, supported by Captain Miller, of the 3d Pennsylvania. The enemy was driven over seven miles, and his camp and supplies destroyed.

All the successes and sacrifices of the army were now to be worse than lost—they were to be thrown away by the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, instead of reenforcing it.

XVIII

The Rear-Guard at Malvern Hill

I.—By Henry E. Smith,
Brevet-Major, U. S. A.

Referring to the retreat from Malvern Hill, July 2d, General McClellan gives Keyes's corps the credit of furnishing the entire rear-guard. According to the report of Colonel Averell, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, the rear-guard was made his command and consisted of his regiment of Heintzelman's corps, First Brigade of Regular Infantry, consisting of the 3d, 4th, 12th, and 14th Infantry, of Porter's corps, and the New York Chasseurs, of Keyes's corps. The "Official Records," Vol. XI., Part II., p. 235, confirm this statement. In the same volume, p. 193, will be found Keyes's official report, but no mention of Averell. In fact, Averell was the rear-guard to Turkey Bridge and a mile beyond that point, where he found General Wessells of Keyes's corps. The official report of Fitz-John Porter, Sykes, and Buchanan all speak of Averell as having covered this retreat. The writer was a first lieutenant in the 12th Infantry, and in command of Company D, First Battalion, at Malvern Hill, and remembers distinctly that the First Brigade of Regulars slept on the field on the night of July 1st in line of battle. We were surprised the next morning to find that the entire army had retreated during the night, leaving Averell with his small command as a rear-guard to cover the retreat, which was done in the masterly manner stated by General McClellan, but by Averell, and not by Keyes.

United Service Club,
Philadelphia, May 25th, 1885.

II.—By Erasmus D. Keyes,
Major-General, U. S. V.

A few days ago, in Switzerland, my attention was called to a communication in the August (1885) number of "*The*

Century," p. 642, which falsifies history. It is under the heading, "The Rear-Guard After Malvern Hill," and is signed Henry E. Smith. Mr. Smith asserts that it was General Averell who commanded the rear-guard, and that to Averell, and not to Keyes, belongs the credit which General McClellan gives the latter in his article. Mr. Smith cites authorities for his statements, and refers to the "Official Records of the Rebellion," Vol. XI, Part II, p. 235, and to my report, p. 193, same volume, in which he says there is "no mention of Averell." It is not unreasonable to suppose that Mr. Smith had read General McClellan's and my reports, since he refers to them, but it is certain that he discredits both, and that he rejects my claim to approval unceremoniously (see p. 435). General McClellan says, in his book, "Report ———— of the Army of the Potomac," etc., p. 273:

"The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and the 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes's corps to cover the maneuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averell, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, was intrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his command, he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battlefield until about 7 o'clock of the 2d of July. Meantime General Keyes, having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army, and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obtructing the road after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable, by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the road, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words, 'I do not think that more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state

of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, instead of away from him'—and when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated. . . . . Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties intrusted to his charge."

The above extract defines General Averell's duties on the field of Malvern, and gives him credit, and it is equally distinct in reference to me, but General McClellan's article is vague in its expressions regarding the same subjects. As Mr. Smith's article is historically erroneous, I trust you will consider it just to give place to this explanation, and to the following account of "The Rear-Guard after Malvern Hill."

After the battle of Malvern Hill, which was fought on the 1st of July, 1862, the army retired to Harrison's Landing. Late in the evening of that day I received orders from Adjutant-General Seth Williams to command the rear-guard. I spent nearly the whole night making preparatory arrangements; dispatched a party to destroy Turkey Bridge; selected twenty-five expert axe-men under Captain Clarke, 8th Illinois Cavalry, with orders to chop nearly through all the large trees that lined the road below the bridge. All my orders were well executed, and within fifteen minutes after the tail of the column passed, the bridge was destroyed without blowing up, and the road blocked beyond the possibility of passage by wheels and cavalry, and made difficult for infantry for several hours.

The force composing the rear-guard consisted of Peck's division of infantry and four batteries of artillery of my own corps, Gregg's 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Farnsworth's 8th Illinois Cavalry. Averell's regiment of cavalry was also designated in a dispatch sent me by Adjutant General Williams, and he may have taken part below the bridge, but I do not remember to have seen him during the day.

The danger to the trains arose from the fact that the narrow country roads were insufficient in number, and their composition was mostly clay, which was soon con-

verted into mud by the torrents of rain which fell nearly the whole day, and from the liability to attack on the flank. The main road was skirted with woods on the left the entire distance, which is about seven miles from Turkey Bridge to Harrison's Landing. The opposite side of the main road was open, and the columns of troops could move parallel with the wagons. When General W. F. Smith came along at the head of his division, I was opposite an opening in the woods at the highest point of the road. Smith exclaimed to me: "Here's a good place for a battle!" "Would you like to have a fight?" said I. "Yes; just here, and now!" While the columns of troops were moving alongside the trains I felt no apprehension but after they had all passed there still remained in rear not less than five hundred wagons struggling in the mud, and it was not above ten minutes after the last vehicle had entered the large field bordering the intended camp when the enemy appeared and commenced a cannonade upon us. Fortunately I had in position Miller's and McCarthy's batteries, and they replied with such effect that the attack was discontinued.

The anxiety at headquarters was such that I was authorized, in case of necessity, to cut the traces and drive the animals forward without their loads. Nothing of that kind was done, and we saved all the wagons except a small number that broke down and were as necessarily abandoned as a vessel in a convoy would be after it had sunk in the ocean.

About the middle of the day I received a note from headquarters at Harrison's Landing, of which the following is a copy:

GENERAL: I have ordered back to your assistance all the cavalry that can be raised here. It is of the utmost importance that we should save all our artillery, and as many of our wagons as possible; and the commanding general feels the utmost confidence that you will do all that can be done to accomplish this. Permit me to say that if you bring in everything you will accomplish a most signal and meritorious exploit, which the commanding general will not fail to represent in its proper light to the Department.

Very respectfully,

R. B. MARCH,
Chief of Staff.

July 2d.
Brigadier-General Keyes.

General McClellan came out half a mile and met me. I was engaged sending forward sheaves of wheat to fill the ruts in the road near camp, which were so deep that in spite of all efforts to fill them, about 1200 wagons were parked for the night under guard outside. The general appeared well satisfied with what had been done by the rear-guard, and after all the proofs cited above, it is scarcely probable that he made a mistake in the name of its commander.

Blangy, Seine-Inferieure, France, August 20, 1885.

XIX

The Administration in the Peninsular Campaign

By Richard B. Irwin,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General, U.S.V.

The views entertained by General McClellan as to the manner and extent to which his plans and operations on the Peninsula were interfered with or supported by the Government having been fully set forth by him in these pages, it is now proper to show, as far as this can be done from the official reports, how the case must have presented itself to the President and the Secretary of War.

Appointed on the 25th of July, 1861, immediately after Bull Run, to the command of the shattered and reduced forces then gathered about Washington, at one time not exceeding 42,000 all told, General McClellan was rapidly reenforced, until on the 15th of March, 1862, he had under his command within the division or department of the Potomac 203,213 men present for duty. The field-artillery was increased from 30 guns to 520; to these had been added a siege train of nearly 100 heavy guns. From these materials he organized the Army of the Potomac.

In the last days of October General McClellan presented to the Secretary of War a written statement of his views as to the conduct of operations, in which, after representing the Confederate forces in his front at not less than 150,000, his own movable force at 76,285, with 228 guns, and the force required for active operations as 150,000 men, with 400 guns, he recommended that all operations in other quarters be confined to the defensive, and that all surplus troops be sent to reenforce the Army of the Potomac.

"A vigorous employment of these means [he proceeds] will, in my opinion, enable the Army of the Potomac to assume successfully this season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon

the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it.

"Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole, and not in detached parts. One plan should be agreed upon and pursued; a single will should direct and carry out these plans. The great object to be accomplished, the crushing defeat of the rebel army (now) at Manassas, should never for one instant be lost sight of, but all the intellect and means and men of the Government poured upon that point."

On the 1st of November, 1861, the President, "with the concurrence of the entire Cabinet," designated General McClellan "to command the whole army" of the United States. No trust approaching this in magnitude had ever before been confided to any officer of the United States.

Everywhere the armies remained inactive. For seven months the Army of the Potomac was held within the defenses of Washington. Its only important movement had resulted in the disheartening disaster of Ball's Bluff. The Confederates, with headquarters at Manassas, confronted them with an army, represented by General McClellan, on the faith of his secret-service department, as numbering at least 115,500, probably 150,000, but now known to have at no time exceeded 63,000.* The Potomac was closed to navigation by Confederate batteries established on its banks within twenty-three miles of the capital. Norfolk, with its navy-yard, was left untouched and unmenaced. The loyal States had furnished three-quarters of a million of soldiers, and the country had rolled up a daily increasing war debt of $600,000,000. There is no indication that General McClellan appreciated, or even perceived, the consequences that must inevitably follow the loss of confidence on the part of the people, as month after month passed without action, and without success in any quarter, or the position in which, under these circumstances, he placed the President with respect to the continued support of the people and their representatives, by withholding full information of his plans. In his "Own Story" he tells how he refused

*Of which only 44,563 were at Manassas.

to give this information when called upon by the President in the presence of his Cabinet.

The President having, on the 31st of January, ordered the movement of all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, for the purpose of seizing a point on the railroad beyond Manassas Junction, General McClellan on the same day submitted his own plan for moving on Richmond by way of Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. On the 8th of March, yielding to General McClellan's views, supported by the majority of his division commanders, the President approved the Urbana movement, with certain conditions; but on the 9th the Confederates evacuated Manassas, and thus rendered the whole plan inoperative. On the 13th, upon General McClellan's recommendation, supported by the commanders of all four of the newly constituted army corps, the President authorized the movement by Fort Monroe, as it was finally made.

McClellan expected to take with him to the Peninsula 146,000 men of all arms, to be increased to 156,000 by a division to be drawn from Fort Monroe. On the 31st of March, the President informed him that he had been obliged to order Blenker's division of about 10,000 men,* with 18 guns, to Fremont. "I did this with great pain," he says, "knowing that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would approve."

The council of corps commanders had annexed to their approval among other conditions, the following:

"Fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. . . . NOTE.—That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell). A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Summer.)"

Upon this point the President's orders were:

"1st. Leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 2d. Leave Washington secure."

*General McClellan's figures. The latest return, Feb. 28th, showed 8396 for duty.—*R. B. I.*

On the 1st of April, as he was on the point of sailing, General McClellan reported from his headquarters on board the steamer Commodore, the arrangements he had made to carry out these provisions, and at once set out for Fort Monroe without knowing whether they were satisfactory to the Government or not. They were not. General McClellan had arranged to leave 7,780 men at Warrenton, 10,859 at Manassas, 1,350 on the Lower Potomac, and 18,000 men for the garrisons and the front of Washington, to be augmented by about 4,000 new troops from New York. The President, deeming this provision wholly insufficient for the defense of the capital, ordered McDowell with his corps of 33,510 men and 68 guns to remain and charged him with the duty of covering and defending Washington.

This led to a telegraphic correspondence, thus characterized in the President's letter to General McClellan, dated April 9th:

"Your dispatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, pain me very much."

Then, after again explaining the detachment of Blenker and the retention of McDowell, Mr. Lincoln concludes with these noteworthy admonitions:

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will steadily gain on you,—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by reenforcements alone.

"And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to *you** that you strike a blow! I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. *But you must act.*"*

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*Original italicized.

On the 11th of April, Franklin's division was ordered to the Peninsula, in response to General McClellan's earnest renewal of his request.

General McClellan estimates his force before Franklin's arrival at 85,000, apparently meaning fighting men, since the returns show 105,235 present for duty on the 13th of April. On the 30th, including Franklin, this number was increased to 112,392. General McClellan also estimated the Confederate forces at "probably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more,"* "probably greater a good deal than my own."† We now know that their total effective strength on the 30th of April was 55,633 of all arms. When the Army of the Potomac halted before the lines of the Warwick, Magruder's whole force was but 11,000. General McClellan estimated it at only 15,000, and his own, confronting it, at the same period, at 53,000.

The plan of a rapid movement up the Peninsula having resolved itself into an endeavor to take Yorktown by regular approaches in front, leaving its rear necessarily open, General McClellan thus describes the result:

"Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6th of May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position during the night."

The effect of these delays on Mr. Lincoln's mind is curiously indicated by his telegram of May 1st:

"Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

Then followed the confused and unduly discouraging battle of Williamsburg; the attempt to cut off the Confederate retreat by a landing at West Point came to nothing; and on the 20th of May, the Army of the Potomac, having moved forward 52 miles in 16 days, reached the banks of the Chickahominy. There it lay, astride of that sluggish stream, imbedded in its pestilential swamps, for thirty-nine days.

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*Telegram to Stanton, April 7th, 1862.

†Telegram to Stanton, May 5th, 1862.

On the 31st of May, at Fair Oaks, Johnston failed, though narrowly missing success, in a well-meant attempt to crush McClellan's forces on the right bank of the swollen stream before they could be reenforced. On the 1st of June the Confederate forces were driven back in disorder upon the defenses of Richmond, but the damage suffered by the Union forces on the first day being over-estimated, and their success on the second day insufficiently appreciated, or inadequately represented, and no apparent advantage being taken of them, the general effect was to add to the discouragement already prevailing.

Reenforcements continuing to be urgently called for, Fort Monroe with its dependencies, reporting 9,277 for duty, was placed under General McClellan's orders; McCall's division, with 22 guns, was detached from McDowell, and arrived by water 9,514 strong on the 12th and 13th of June; while McDowell, with the rest of his command, was ordered to march to join McClellan by land; this movement was, however, promptly brought to naught by Jackson's sudden incursion against Banks in the Shenandoah.

Meanwhile, the flow of telegrams indicated an ever-increasing tension, the Executive urging to action, the General promising to act soon, not acting, yet criticising and objecting to the President's orders to him and to others. On the 25th of May the President said:

"I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington."

McClellan replied:

"The time is very near when I shall attack Richmond."

Then, June 10th, he says:

"I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery."

June 14th:

"If I cannot control all his (McDowell's) troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results."

On the 18th:

"After tomorrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

While appealing to the President when some of his telegrams to the Secretary remained for a time unanswered, General McClellan allowed Mr. Stanton's cordial assurances of friendship and support to pass unnoticed.

At last, on the 25th, General McClellan advanced his picket lines on the left to within four miles of Richmond, and was apparently preparing for a further movement, though none was ordered, and the next day, as at Manassas and Yorktown and Fair Oaks, his adversary once more took the initiative out of his hands. Jackson had come from the Valley.

As soon as this was known, on the evening of the 25th, General McClellan reported it to Mr. Stanton, adding that he thought Jackson would attack his right and rear, that the Confederate force was stated at 200,000, that he regretted his great inferiority in numbers, but was in no way responsible for it, and concluded:

"I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs."

The battle of Gaines's Mill followed, where, on the 27th, one-fifth of the Union forces contended against the whole Confederate army, save Magruder's corps and Huger's division; then the retreat, or "change of base," to the James, crowned by the splendid yet unfruitful victory of Malvern; then a month of inaction and discussion at Harrison's Landing.

At 12:20 A. M., on the 28th of June, General McClellan sent a long telegram, of which these sentences strike the key-note:

"Our men [at Gaines's Mill] did all that men could do . . . but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. . . . I have lost this battle

because my force is too small. . . . The Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you *or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.*"*

On reaching the James River, General McClellan reported the he had saved his army, but it was completely exhausted and would require reenforcements to the extent of 50,000 men. On the 3d of July, he wrote more fully from Harrison's Landing, then saying that "reenforcements should be sent to me rather much over, than much less, than 100,000 men." He referred to his memorandum of the 20th of August, 1861. That memorandum called for 273,000 men. General Marcy, his chief-of-staff, who bore this dispatch to Washington, telegraphed back:

"I have seen the President and Secretary of War. 10,000 men from Hunter, 10,000 from Burnside, and 11,000 from here have been ordered to reenforce you as soon as possible. Halleck (who had been originally called on for 25,000 men which he had reported he could not spare) has been urged by the President to send you at once 10,000 men from Corinth. The President and Secretary speak very kindly of you and find no fault."

The dispatches of the President and Secretary of War breathe the same spirit:

"Allow me to reason with you a moment (wrote Mr Lincoln on the 2d of July, adding that he had not fifty thousand men who could be sent promptly). If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of 18 States offer me a new levy of 300,000 which I accept."

On the 5th Mr. Stanton wrote that he had nominated all the corps commanders for promotion.

"The gallantry of every officer and man in your noble army shall be suitably acknowledged. General Marcy will take you cheering news. Be assured that you shall have the support of this Department and the Government as cordially and faithfully as ever was

*Original not italicized. These words are omitted in the dispatch as printed in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of War.—*R. B. I.*

rendered by man to man, and if we should ever live to see each other face to face, you will be satisfied that you have never had from me anything but the most confiding integrity."

The next day Mr. Stanton followed this by a personal letter, couched in still warmer terms.

"No man (he wrote) had ever a truer friend than I have been to you, and shall continue to be. You are seldom absent from my thoughts, and I am ready to make any sacrifice to aid you. Time allows me to say no more than that I pray Almighty God to deliver you and your army from all perils and lead you on to victory."

General McClellan's reply was long, cold and formal. He reviewed their past relations, and alluded to the Secretary's official conduct toward him as "marked by repeated acts done in such manner as to be deeply offensive to my feelings, and calculated to affect me injuriously in public estimation."

"After commencing the present campaign [he continued], your concurrence in the withholding of a large portion of my force, so essential to the success of my plans, led me to believe that your mind was warped by a bitter personal prejudice against me. Your letter compels me to believe that I have been mistaken in regard to your real feelings and opinions, and that your conduct, so unaccountable to my own fallible judgment, must have proceeded from views and motives which I did not understand."

The campaign had failed. The President visited Harrison's Landing to see for himself what was to be done next. Then General McClellan handed him his well-known letter, "upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble." He called Mr. Stanton's attention to this letter, in the reply we have just cited, and told him that for no other policy would our armies continue to fight. This must have been the last straw.* On one point, however, he was in accord with the President. He wound up by recommending the appointment of a commander-in-chief of the army who should possess the President's confidence. On the 11th General Halleck was appointed.

On the 26th General Halleck arrived at General McClellan's camp. He reports that McClellan:

*Confirmed by Chase and Welles.—*R. B. I.*

". . . expressed the opinion that with 30,000 reenforcements he could attack Richmond, with a good chance of success." I replied that I was authorized by the President to promise only 20,000 and that if he could not take Richmond with that number we must devise some plan for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with those of General Pope without exposing Washington. . . . He . . . the next morning informed me he would attack Richmond with the reenforcements promised. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was a chance, and he was 'willing to try it.'

"With regard to the force of the enemy he expressed the opinion that it was not less than 200,000."

The orders for the removal followed.

"There was, to my mind," General Halleck says, "no alternative." I have taken the responsibility of doing so and am to risk my reputation on it."

Upon whatever side, if upon either, of these many-sided controversies, history shall at last adjudge the right to be, upon whatever shoulders and in whatever degree the burden of blame shall finally rest, certain it is that no fair account of these operations can ever be written without taking note of these delays, whereby the initiative was transferred to the adversary; of these disasters, these unproductive victories, this ceaseless flow of telegrams, surcharged with the varying words of controversy, criticism, objection, reproach; and of the inevitable effect of all these causes combined, in weakening the confidence of the President and in undermining his authority and influence, which, however, to the last were exerted to uphold the general of his first choice at the head of his greatest army.

FIFTY YEARS
IN CAMP AND FIELD

Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, U. S. A.

EDITED BY
W. A. CROFFUT, Ph. D.

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"At New York, I finally determined to say by note to the Secretary that if, with his knowledge of my broken health, I could be useful in the way he had pointed out, he might announce my acceptance of the commission if not too late, and order me to report to him. That was done and I reached here this morning—March 15 (1862). On reporting to the Secretary, almost without a word of preface he asked me if I would take McClellan's place in command of the army of the Potomac!* I was amazed and told him at once that I could not. He spoke of the pressure on the President, and said that he and the President had had the greatest difficulty in standing out against the demand that McClellan be removed.

"He then asked me if I would allow him to put me at the head of the Ordnance Department, and remove General R. This surprised me almost as much as the other offer, and was entirely unlike anything I had anticipated and I declined.

"He then took me to President Lincoln and introduced me. I was civilly received. Secretary Seward was present and some dispatches were read—reports from the army, etc.

"The President took a letter out of his pocket and read it as a sample, he said, of what he was exposed to. It was anonymous, marked 'urgent,' and called on him to 'remove the traitor McClellan'—using the most extravagant language of condemnation. Judge Blair, Postmaster-General, came in and asked for a brigadier-general's commission for a relation of his wife.

"I offered to go, but Mr. Lincoln detained me till the others went. He then expressed the wish to have the benefit of my experience: said he was the depository of the power of the Government and had no military knowledge. I knew his time was important and shortly left him.

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*The tardy engineer, McClellan, had now marched upon Manassas.

"Now—what is to come of this? I want no command, I want no department; I came to be at hand for 'contingent service', and must adhere to my purpose. General Scott, whom I saw in New York told me I could be very useful here. He even said that I ought to be in command of the army, but that was impossible.

"I urged the Secretary to extend General Halleck's command over the whole valley of the Mississippi, and this has been done at once, putting Buell under his orders.

"On the whole, I am uncomfortable. I am almost afraid that Secretary Stanton hardly knows what he wants himself.*

"WASHINGTON, *Monday evening, March 17, 1862.* A tolerably quiet day, closing with the most tremendously threatening cloud I have ever had come near to me.

"How shall I describe it?

"First of all, this morning in an interview with the Secretary of War, I declined his offers of a high station (two or three of them) and finally asked him if he would allow me to be placed under his own orders as a staff officer, to render such service as I might be capable of.

"He asked me to write the order myself and he would sign it. I wrote a simple order and he signed it and handed it to the Adjutant-General, with directions to distribute it.

"He then asked me to take a seat in his private council room, where I remained most of the day. Towards evening he came in, and shutting the door behind him, stated to me the most astounding facts, all going to show the astonishing incompetency of General McClellan. I cannot recite them: but the Secretary stated fact after fact, until I felt positively *sick*—that failing of the heart which excludes hope.

"I do not wonder, now, that the Secretary offered even me the command of this Army of the Potomac, which, he

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*During this week an army board, of which General Hitchcock was President, decided that the safety of Washington required the retention of its front of one corps of the army. The President thereupon kept McDowell's corps between the city and Richmond.

says, is 230,000 strong. If mentally capable, I am physically unable to enter upon such responsibility.

"The Secretary is immensely distressed and with reason: he is dreadfully apprehensive of a great disaster, which, also, is not improbable. What can I do in this case?

"When the evening had set in we separated, the Secretary asking me to be at the office early. But to what purpose? I cannot now, on a sudden, improvise a campaign, having had nothing to do with the army now in the field. Truly, I am heart-sick.

"WASHINGTON, *March 23, Sunday.* My intercourse becomes confidential, without design on either side, apparently. I have corroborated his opinions of certain persons without aiming to do so and before I knew what he thought. I wrote to him from Baltimore (on my way to N. Y.) that I would not be in haste to assign Fremont to a command, urging as a reason, that he was the willing idol of a party whose design is to pervert the constitutional power of the government to revolutionary purposes. It happened to be his own opinion, I found, on returning.

"Today the Secretary asked me very abruptly what I thought of the Blairs.* I told him and found that my estimate agreed with his."

On April 2d, at the request of the Secretary, General Hitchcock drew up complete regulations for the government of officers in charge of prisoners of war, which were enforced to govern the actions of the Union army throughout the Rebellion.

"WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1862.* On the 13th I went down to McClellan's camp on the Peninsula, before Yorktown, and remained there one day. I had a full conversation with him in which he explained his contemplated plan for taking Yorktown. From Fortress Monroe I went on board the little *Monitor* that disabled and beat off the *Merrimac*, visited Goldsboro's flagship, etc."

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*In his diary General Hitchcock writes "President Lincoln tells me that the Secretary and General Blair are not on speaking terms."

When he returned to Washington he reported to the President and Secretary Stanton, but does not record any result or even conversation on the subject. It having been reported at this time that Secretary Stanton was soon to vacate his place, General Hitchcock was urged for Secretary of War by newspapers in different Northern cities, the *Boston Courier* following his nomination with, "There is not in our army a more accomplished officer—eminently national in his feelings, a powerful writer, and a gentleman of large experience, of vigorous mind, and of great executive ability." Then came more trouble for Secretary Stanton, and the account of it is carefully written in ink:

"WASHINGTON, *April 29, 1862.* Yesterday I handed in the resignation of my commission of Major-General of volunteers. Thus:

"On Saturday, the 26th, the Secretary became for the first time a little impatient towards me. I had often seen him in such a mood towards others—towards General Ripley and General Thomas, and once even towards General Meigs, and at one time he spoke very abruptly to General Totten—all members of the Army Board. I had resolved that I would not permit it towards myself.

"On Saturday he suddenly seemed to think that he had no one around him to give him opinions on military subjects, and at length he exclaimed: 'It is very extraordinary that I can find no military man to give opinons. *You* give me no opinions!' he added. The particular subject he had been speaking of was the position of General Banks. Now I had given him a very definite opinion on that very point two or three days before, and, without giving way to the least excitement, I asked him to look at the map, and pointed out what I thought and what I had said. I then briefly adverted to several opinions which I had given from time to time since I came here.

"After the conversation ceased, and the Secretary went to another room, I wrote a letter of resignation, designing to hand it in the next morning. As that was Sunday, I deferred it to yesterday morning. He no sooner received

it from the Adjutant-General, who told him it was because of something he had said on Saturday, than he came to the Adjutant-General's room, where I had remained, and we had a scene of it. He declared in the most emphatic manner that he had no intention of wounding my feelings: that he knew he had faults of temper, etc.; that he was oppressed with a sense of responsibilities, to which he knew he was not equal, etc.

"The first thing he said, however, was, 'You don't wish to ruin me!' 'Certainly not!' I cried. 'If you send in that paper,' said he, 'you will destroy me!' "

The Secretary cried out in exclamations of self-reproach and lamentation and besought the General in humiliating terms not to proceed to such extremities. This appeal he repeated several times with visible emotion.

"I tried my best to stop him, assuring him that I had no intention of doing him any injury; that I could not see how my going away could affect him; that if he thought it would, I would destroy the paper. In the end, we went up to his room together, and I put the paper in the fire before his face. An hour or two afterwards he became more calm, and I took occasion to tell him many things which I hope will serve him. His idea that my resignation would destroy him was not from the loss of my supposed services, but because he knows his reputation for acting on impulse and he knows that my withdrawal would be construed to his disadvantage."

During the next few weeks, General Hitchcock's physical afflictions returned upon him, and almost disabled him. He served as the military advisor and assistant of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton whenever he could go in the office.

"NEW YORK, *May 21, 1862.* Again sent in my resignation as Major-General on the 15th inst. I could not persuade the Secretary to accept it, and could not require it against his wishes. He told me to take a leave of absence, recruit my strength, and return when I felt sufficiently recovered. I told him (the truth) that I am positively

ashamed to be in receipt of the pay and emoluments of a major-general and render no adequate service on account of disability. He proposed some nominal duty, as an inspecting duty to look into the conditions of prisoners of war, but declined to make an order.

"NEW YORK, *May 21.* By this time I have discovered the whole country has begun to look upon me as the 'Military Adviser' of the Secretary of War. This is very distasteful to me because it seems to make me responsible for those very movements which I have disapproved. In reply to requests by Secretary Stanton and Mr. Lincoln I made several important recommendations to both, which were ignored and disaster followed. Finally, when some troops were ordered out of the Shenandoah Valley against my urgent advice, and Stonewall Jackson made a successful raid on Banks and swept the Valley, I insisted upon resigning rather than, any longer, be put in a false position. Neither the Secretary nor the President would accept my resignation although I offered thrice."

On May 28th, General Hitchcock wrote an elaborate letter to General Scott explaining his relation to affairs and protesting that he was made to bear responsibility for movements which he had expressly condemned in advance. He and General Thomas had been appointed by the President to report as to the number of men required to defend Washington. They reported that 25,000 men were needed, whereas only 10,000 were present in the forts. Thereupon the President withheld a part of McDowell's corps from McClellan's army. General Hitchcock's repeated advice, however, that Blenker's division of Bank's corps should be withheld from Fremont for the defense of the city was ignored, and two months later the disaster occurred which he had predicted.

"NEW YORK, *June 1, 1862.* A few days ago I wrote a private note to Secretary Stanton calling his attention to my resignation and requesting him to announce its acceptance. I told him I had made a trial of several days' change of atmosphere as he had suggested, but did not feel strength-

ened to the point of making another experiment in Washington. I received a note from him yesterday, in which he refers to my ill health in very kind terms, but says that the President apprehends that acceptance of my resignation at this time might be misunderstood and might even be injurious to the public interests. He urges that I take an unlimited leave of absence till recovered.

"The injury apprehended, of course, is a public suspicion that I am dissatisfied with the conduct of the war—and this would be in some degree true. I was dissatisfied with General McClellan's movement to Yorktown. I repeatedly urged the President not to permit the Shenandoah Valley to be uncovered. He persisted, however, and Banks was driven out of it by Stonewall Jackson and across the Potomac."

* * * * * * *

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE GORDON MEADE

MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

BY

GEORGE MEADE

Captain and Aide-de-Camp and Brevet Lt. Col.,
United States Army

EDITED BY

GEORGE GORDON MEADE

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Extract

* * * * * * *

Camp near the Chickahominy,
June 17, 1862.

Today we hear very heavy firing in the direction of Fort Darling on the James River, and we presume the gunboats are engaging the batteries on the river; though I understood from Commodore Dahlgren whom I met at Fredericksburg that the gunboats could not pass the obstructions in the river at Fort Darling, the enemy having pretty much destroyed the navigation, which it would take a long time to correct by removing the vessels and rocks, etc., which have been sunk and thrown in. I learned very little at headquarters yesterday. I think McClellan is awaiting the arrival of all his reinforcements, before pushing his lines any farther forward, or making any grand attack. In the meantime the enemy is busily at work fortifying all the approaches to the city, and without doubt will make a most vigorous and desperate resistance to our advance. McClellan, I understand, is in good spirits and confident of success, which I most sincerely trust he may attain. Our division remains where it was first posted, just behind the Chickahominy at the railroad crossing, where it is understood we will remain for a few days, as it is a good position for defending the railroad, and from whence we can readily be sent to reinforce any part of the line that may be suddenly attacked. From what I can gather, the taking of Richmond will be the work of time, by our slowly but gradually and surely advancing until we get near enough to make a final assault. In this operation we shall, of course, have frequent skirmishes, and now and then big battles, like the recent one at Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, as it is sometimes called, where they thought they had a fine chance to cut off our left wing, isolated from the rest of the army by the sudden rising of the Chickahominy. Unfortunately for their calculations, our bridges stood the freshet, and our communication was not cut off, enabling us to meet their attack and repulse it.

Camp near New Bridge, Va.,
June 18, 1862.

Late last night orders came for our division to march at early daylight this morning, which we did, arriving here about 11 A. M., and relieving Slocum's (formerly Franklin's) division, being thus posted on the extreme right flank of our army and in the front. The enemy are in plain view of our picket line, we holding here the left bank of the Chickahominy, and they the opposite one. There is quite a wide bottom and swamp between the two banks, but our respective pickets are within musket range of each other. But shots are not exchanged unless there is a collection on either side, looking like an advance or a working party. The "New Bridge" as it is called, you have doubtless seen mentioned and referred to in the newspapers. It is the bridge by which one of the main roads into Richmond crosses the Chickahominy. We hold the approaches on this side, the enemy on the other. They are throwing up earthworks to prevent our crossing and all the afternoon our batteries have been shelling their working parties, and they have been shelling our batteries, with I fancy no damage on either side. The "New Bridge" is only five miles from Richmond and from the high grounds near our camp we can plainly discern the spires of Sacred City. Tomorrow Reynolds and Seymour go to Mechanicsville, which is a little higher up the river and about four and a half miles from the city. Immediately adjoining our camp we have Fitz-John Porter's corps, in which General Morell now commands a division. Stonewall's division of cavalry is also in our vicinity, as well as Sykes's brigade of regulars. Willie* has been with me all the afternoon. He looks very well—better than he did at Alexandria.

Did you see in the papers of the 12th the instructions of Joe Johnston to Stonewall Jackson? I hope you have, for they most singularly confirm my expressed views of the object of Jackson's raid. Johnston tells him that anything he can do, either to prevent reinforcements reaching Mc-

*William Sergeant, brother of Mrs. Meade.

Clellan or to withdraw any portion of his force, will be of inestimable service; suggests his attacking either McDowell or Banks—whichever he thinks most practicable—and says it is reported McDowell is about advancing on Richmond, which he, Johnston, thinks extremely probable. You see how completely Jackson succeeded in carrying out these, by paralyzing McDowell's force of forty thousand men, through the stupidity of the authorities at Washington becoming alarmed, and sending McDowell on a wild-goose chase after a wily foe, who never intended to be caught in a trap, and was prepared to back out so soon as his plans proved successful. I must do McDowell the justice to say that he saw this himself, but no protest on his part could shake the strategy of the War Department.

We are so near the enemy that we hear their bands distinctly at tattoo and parade. On our side no drums, bugles or bands are allowed, except to announce the approach of the enemy. I can hardly tell you how I felt this afternoon, when the old familiar sound of the heavy firing commenced. I thought of you and the dear children—of how much more I have to make me cling to life than during the Mexican War; I thought, too, of how I was preserved then and since in many perilous times through God's mercy and will, and prayed He woud contine His gracious protection to and in His own good time to restore to me, or if this was not His will and it was to be decreed that I was to be summoned, that He would forgive me, for His Son's sake, the infinite number of sins, I have all my life been committing. You see, I do not shut my eyes to the contingencies of the future but I look upon them with a hopeful eye and a firm reliance on the mercy of my Heavenly Father. It is now 10 o'clock at night, dark and rainy. All is quiet in both camps and the immense hosts arrayed against each other are, doubtless, quietly and peacfully sleeping, unless some one with thoughts like those I have expressed has a disturbing conscience.

Camp near New Bridge, Va.,
June 20, 1862.

Today we have had a little excitement. Our camp is on the edge of a small strip of woods that fringes the Valley of the Chickahominy. The enemy occupy the heights on the opposite side, where they are busily throwing up fortifications, to dispute our advance. Our people very foolishly, as I thought, undertook to interrupt their work by shelling their works. For a day or two they were quite quiet and let us have it all our own way, but this morning they opened on us with heavy guns at long range, and pretty soon gave us evidence that two could play at this game. Their fire was at first directed against our batteries, but my men, notwithstanding I had cautioned them to stay in camp and not expose themselves to the view of the enemy, would rush through the woods into the open ground beyond, to stare about like idiots. The enemy, seeing the crowd, soon ascertained our position, and moving one of their long-range guns, began throwing shot and shell right into our camp, scattering the curious gentlemen and giving them a pretty good scare. Fortunately no one was hurt, though the shell fell all around. I went in amongst them and remonstrated with them for their disobedience of orders, which had brought this on them, and after letting them stand the fire till they were pretty well subdued, I moved the camp to another position, and all has since been quiet.

Camp near New Bridge, Va.,
June 22, 1862.

I yesterday rode over to headquarters and saw McClellan. While with him Franklin and Baldy Smith came in, and I had a very pleasant visit. McClellan has been a little under the weather, but is now well and looks very well and is in good spirits. He talked very freely of the way in which he had been treated, and said positively that had not McDowell's corps been withdrawn, he would long before now have been in Richmond. Last night we heard from a deserter that we were to be attacked today. We

were all under arms before daybreak, but everything has been quiet up to this moment. (9 A.M.)

I suppose you have heard of William Palmer's death. They seemed to be quite shocked at it at Headquarters, as he had left only about a week ago, sick, but not considered dangerously so. Poor fellow! His death makes me a Major of Topogs.

Camp near New Bridge, Va.,
June 24, 1862.

We have been in a pleasant state of excitement for the last twenty-four hours, under the impression that the enemy were disposed to attack our right flank in force, in which case the first onset would be received by our division. The result of this little expectation is our being under arms before daylight (3 A.M.) till nightfall and the almost total destruction of one's rest at night by constant and frequent orders, messages, etc., occurring from hour to hour. The trouble about the whole thing is that the men become wearied with these constant stampedes, as they are called, and it becomes more and more difficult to get them out at any prescribed time, they saying, "Oh, it's the old cry of wolf!" and I am really afraid we shall carry out the old fable, and when the wolf does come, be unprepared. I don't intend, however, that such shall be the case with my command, and am making myself very unpopular by insisting on the utmost vigilance and requiring all hands to be up and ready by daylight every morning, whether we have a stampede or not.

Last evening Reynolds made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, driving in their pickets, stirring them up generally and making them display their force. I think he had two or three men wounded in the affair. This morning all seems quiet, though late last night it was the impression of the superior officers on our side that we should be attacked. Too be sure, there was a very heavy fall of rain during the night, overflowing the Chickahominy Swamp, and most probably preventing any attack, had they designated making one.

Camp near New Bridge, Va.,
June 26, 1862.

Everything is quiet on our part of the line. Yesterday Heintzelman, on the left, made an advance, which of course was disputed, resulting in brisk skirmishing, with some loss in killed and wounded on both sides. Heintzelman gained his point, however, and maintained it. We were under arms all day ready to take part in a general action, if one should result. In the meantime, the batteries opposite to us, have been throwing their shot and shell at us, but without inflicting any injury. There is a report that the great "Stonewall" Jackson with his army has left Gordonsville and is coming to Richmond, to turn our right flank. His withdrawal from the Valley of Virginia would indicate weakness of the army here, for he would never leave so important a field, and where he had been doing good service, unless it was a matter of great importance to strengthen their Richmond army. This report, in connection with the fact that they keep up a great drumming and bugling in front of us, to make us believe they are in great force, leads me to doubt whether their army is as strong as represented, and whether they do actually outnumber us, as some believe.

I yesterday rode to the extreme right of our lines, where our cavalry are stationed, watching the whole country, to apprise us of any advance. At one of the outposts, Reynolds, whom I was accompanying on a tour of inspection, sent for the officer in command of the detachment to give some instructions, when I found he was our old neighbor, Benoni Lockwood, who seemed really glad to see me. The adjutant of the Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, now serving with our division, is your relative, Will Biddle. The health of the army, at least of our division, is very fair—some little billious attacks and diarrhoea, but nothing serious. We have an abundance of good food; no army in the world was ever better supplied and cared for than ours is, all reports to the contrary notwithstanding.

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LIFE
AND CAMPAIGNS
OF
LIEUT. GEN.
THOMAS J. JACKSON

(Stonewall Jackson)

BY

PROF. R. L. DABNEY, D.D.

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Illustrated With Steel Portrait and
Eleven Diagrams

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On the evening of June 17th, General Jackson began to move his troops from Mount Meridan, and leaving orders with his staff to send away the remainder the next morning, he went to the town to set the new brigades in motion. No man in the whole army knew whither it was going. General Ewell, the second in command, was only instructed to move toward Charlottesville, and the rest were only ordered to follow him. Two marches brought them to the neighborhood of the latter town, where General Jackson rejoined them, and confiding to his chief of staff the direction of his movement, with strict injunctions of secrecy, departed by railroad, to hold a preliminary conference with General Lee in Richmond. He directed that an advanced guard of cavalry should precede the army continually, and prohibit all persons, whether citizens or soldiers, from passing before them toward Richmond. A rear-guard was to prevent all straggling backward, and when they encamped, all lateral roads were to be guarded, to prevent communication between the army and country.

But on reaching Gordonsville, whither the brigade of General Lawton had gone by railroad, he was arrested for a day by a groundless rumor of the approach of the enemy from the Rappahannock. Then, resuming the direction of the troops, he proceeded to a station called Frederickshall, fifty miles from Richmond, where he arrested his march to give the army its Sabbath rest. No general knew better than he, how to employ the transportation of a railroad in combination with the marching of an army. While the burthen trains forwarded his stores he caused the passenger trains to proceed to the rear of his line of march, which was chosen near the railroad, and take up the hindmost of his brigades. These were forwarded, in a couple of hours, a whole day's march; when they were set down, and the trains returned again, to take up the hindmost and give them a like assistance.

After a quiet Sabbath, the General rose at 1 o'clock A. M. and mounting a horse, rode express with a single courier, to Richmond. A few miles from his quarters, a pleasing evidence of the fidelity of his pickets was presented to him. He endeavored to pass this outpost, first as an officer on military business and then as an officer bearing important intelligence for General Lee. But the guard was inexorable, and declared that his instruction from General Jackson especially prohibited him to pass army men, as well as citizens. The utmost he would concede was, that the captain commanding the picket should be called and the appeal made to him. When he came, he recognized the General; who praising the soldier for his obedience to instructions, bound them both to secrecy touching his journey. Having held the desired interview with the Commander-in-Chief, he returned the next day to the line of march pursued by his troops, and led them, the evening of June 25th to the village of Ashland, twelve miles north of Richmond.

To understand the subsequent narrative, the reader must have a brief explanation of the position of the two great armies. The Chickahominy River, famous for the adventures and capture of Captain John Smith, in the childhood of Virginia, is a sluggish stream of fifteen yards' width, which flows parallel to the James, and only five miles north of Richmond. It is bordered by extensive meadows, which degenerate in many places into marshes, and its bed is miry and treacherous; so that it constitutes an obstacle to the passage of armies far more formidable than its insignificant width would indicate. During this year, especially the excessive rains and repeated freshets had converted its little current into an important stream, its marshes into lakes, and its rich level cornfields into bogs. But at the distance of half a mile from the channel, the country on each side rises into undulating hills, with farms interspersed irregularly among the tracts of forest, and the coppices of young pine. General McClellan, taking his departure from the White House, on the Pamunkey, and using the York River Railroad as his line of supply, had pressed his vast army to the east and north of Richmond. Its two wings,

placed like the open jaws of some mighty dragon, the one on the north and the other on the south of the Chickahominy, almost embraced the northeast angle of the city. To connect them with each other, he had constructed three or four elaborate bridges across the stream, with causeways leading to them, and along the length of the valley by which he hoped to defy both mire and floods. On both sides, his front was so fortified with earthworks, abattis, and heavy artillery, that they could not be assailed, save with cruel loss. These works, on his left were extended to the front of the battle-field of Seven Pines, and on his right to the hamlet of Mechanicsville; which, seated upon the north bank of the Chickahominy, six miles from Richmond, commanded the road thence to Hanover Court House.

The Confederate army, under the immediate order of General Robert E. Lee, confronted McClellan and guarded the course of the Chickahominy, as high as the half sink farm, northwest of Richmond, where Brigadier-General Branch, of Major A. P. Hill's division, was stationed within a few miles of Ashland. General Lee, after the battle of Seven Pines, had fortified his front, east of Richmond, in order that a part of his forces might hold the defensive against the Federal army; while, with the remainder, he attempted to turn its flank north of the Chickahominy. To test the practicability of this grand enterprise, and to explore a way for General Jackson's proposed junction, he had caused General J. E. B. Stuart, of the cavalry to make his famous reconnaissance of the 12th of June; in which that daring officer had marched a detachment of cavalry from north to south around McClellan's whole rear, and had discovered that it was unprotected by works, or by proper disposition of forces, against the proposed attack.

The conception of the Commander-in-Chief is thus developed in his own general order of battle, communicated to General Jackson. He was to march from Ashland on the 25th of June, to encamp for the night, west of the Central Railroad, and to advance at three A. M., on the 26th, and turn the enemy's works at Mechanicsville, and on Beaver Dam Creek, a stream flowing into the Chickahominy a

mile in the rear of that hamlet, where he had a powerful reserve entrenched. Major-General A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy, to the north side of the meadow bridges, above Mechanicsville, and associating to himself Branch's brigade, which was to advance as soon as the march of General Jackson opened a way for it, was to sweep down against the enemy's right. As soon as the Mechanicsville bridge should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the latter to proceed to the support of Jackson and the former to that of A. P. Hill. The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy, toward the York River railroad; Jackson on the left and in advance, Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. Huger and Magruder were to hold their positions south of the Chickahominy, against any assault of the enemy, to observe him closely, and to follow him should he retreat. General Stuart, with his cavalry, was thrown out on Jackson's left, to guard his flank, and give notice of the enemy's movements.

The evening of June 25th found the army of General Jackson a few miles short of their appointed goal—at Ashland—instead of the line of the Central Railroad. The difficulties of handling so large a force with inexperienced subordinates, concurred with the loss of the bridges on his direct line of march (lately burned by order of the Federalists) to delay him this much. No commander ever sympathized more fully with the spirit of Napoleon's answer, when he replied to one of his marshals, in view of a similar combination of his armies for a great battle: "Ask me for anything but time." Jackson's ardent soul, on fire with the grandeur of the operations before him, and with delight in their boldness and wisdom and chafing at the delays of blundering and incompetent agents, forbade rest or sleep for him on this important night. He deliberately devoted the whole of it to the review of his preparations, and to prayer. Rations were to be distributed and prepared by the men for three days. The leaders of the different divisions, encamped around Ashland, were to be instructed in their routes, so that the several commands might

take their places in the column without confusion or delay. After all his staff were dismissed for a short repose, he still paced his chamber in anxious thought or devoted to wrestling with God the intervals between the visits of his officers. In the small hours of the night, two of the commanders of these divisions came to suggest that he should move the army by two columns on parallel roads, instead of by one. He listened respectfully, but requested that they await his decision until morning. When they left him, the one said to the other: "Do you know why General Jackson would not decide upon our suggestion at once? It was because he has to pray over it, before he makes up his mind." A moment after, the second returned to Jackson's quarters to fetch his sword, which he had forgotten; and, as he entered, found him upon his knees! praying, doubtless, for Omniscient guidance in all his responsible duties, for his men, and for his country.

Notwithstanding his efforts, the army did not move until after sunrise; when, all being ready, it advanced in gallant array toward the southeast, crossed the Central Railroad, and, meeting here and there the vigilant cavalry of General Stuart, which came in from the left at the cross-roads approached the Pole-Green Church, a century before sanctified by the eloquence of the Rev. Samuel Davies, at 4 o'clock in the afternon. Jackson was now abreast of the enemy's right flank at Mechanicsville, and but a few miles north of it. Between him and the church was the Totto-pottamoy, a little stream which still bears its Indian title. The pickets of McClellan occupied the opposite bank, and had destroyed the light wooden bridge, and obstructed the road beyond with prostrate trees. The Texas brigade of Hood, which was in front, deployed a few skirmishers, who speedily cleared the opposing bank with their unerring rifles; and the woods beyond was shelled by one of Whiting's batteries while the bridge was rapidly repaired. This initial cannonade was intended to observe the additional purpose of a signal, by which the Confederates before Mechanicsville might be advertised of his presence.

For many hours the brigades of A. P. Hill had been patiently awaiting the expected sound, before the enemy's works. They now pressed forward, and a furious cannonade opened on both sides. General Hill, supported by Ripley's brigade, of D. H. Hill's division, speedily carried the little village, with the field-works and camp of the enemy, while the latter retired a mile to the eastward, to their stronger lines upon Beaver-Dam Creek. Jackson's advance would in due time have turned this position, as it had Mechanicsville, and would thus have given to the two Hills an easy conquest; but the presence of the Commander-in-Chief and the President of the Confederate States upon the field, with their urgency that the place should be carried without delay, impelled them to the attack. The heroic troops pressed up to the stream, and held the nearer bank throughout the night, but could effect no lodgment within the hostile works; and thus, at nine o'clock, the cannonade died away, and the opposing forces lay down upon their arms, after a bloody and useless struggle. As General Jackson's forces passed the Pole-Green Church, and went into camp a little below, at Hundley's Corner, the sound of the guns and the roar of the musketry told them that the gigantic struggle had begun.

Thus opened the seven days' tragedy before Richmond. The demeanor of its citizens during the evening of June 26th, gave an example of their courage, and their faith in their leaders and their cause. For many weeks, the Christians of the city had given themselves to prayer; and they drew from heaven a sublime composure. The spectator passing through the streets saw the people calmly engaged in their usual avocations, or else wending their way to the churches, while the thunders of the cannon shook the city. As the calm summer evening descended, the family groups were seen sitting upon their door-steps, where mothers told the children at their knees, how Lee and his heroes were now driving away the invaders. The young people promenaded the heights north of the town, and watched the distant shells bursting against the sky. At one church, a solemn cavalcade stood waiting; and if the observer had entered, saying to himself: "This funeral reminds me that Death claims all

seasons for his own, and refuses to postpone his dread rites for any inferior horrors," he would have found a bridal couple before the altar. The heart of old Rome was not more assured and steadfast when she sold at full price in her Forum the fields on which the victorious Carthaginian was encamped.

During the night, detachments of the enemy approached General Jackson's camp at Hundley's Corner, but were checked by Brockenborough's battery, and the 1st Maryland, 13th Virginia and 6th Louisiana regiments. At an early hour, the troops were put in motion, and speedily crossed the higher streams of the Beaver-Dam, thus turning the right of the enemy's position. The way was now opened, by their retreat, for the advance of General D. H. Hill, who crossing Jackson's line of march, passed to his front and left. The evacuation of the lines of Beaver-Dam also soon followed. At the dawn of day, the contest between the Federal artillery there, and that of General A. P. Hill had been resumed; but perceiving the divisions of General Jackson approaching their rear, the enemy retreated precipitately down the Chickahominy towards Cold Harbor, pursued by Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet, burning vast quantities of army stores, and deserting many uninjured. As General Jackson approached Walnut Grove Church, he met the Commander-in-Chief; and while he halted his column to receive his final instructions from him, the gallant division of A. P. Hill filed past, in as perfect array as though they had been unscathed of battle. General Lee presuming that the Federalists would continue to withdraw, if overpowered, toward the York River Railroad and the White House, directed General Jackson to proceed, with General D. H. Hill, to a point a few miles north of Cold Harbor, and thence to march to that place, and strike their line of retreat. The roads led thither, the one direct, the other circuitous. The latter, which passed first eastward, and then southward, was the one which offered the desired route for General Jackson; for the former would have conducted him to ground in the rear of the retreating army, already occupied by General A. P. Hill. General Jackson

had selected young men of the vicinage, found in a company of cavalry near him, for guides. When he asked them the road to Cold Harbor, his habitual reticence, in this instance too stringent, withheld all explanation of his strategic designs. They therefore naturally pointed him to the direct and larger road, as the route to Cold Harbor. After marching for a mile and a half, the booming of cannon in his front caught his ear, and he demanded sharply of the guide near him: "Where is that firing?" The reply was, that it was in the direction of Gaines's Mill. "Does this road lead there?" he asked. The guide told him that it led by Gaines's Mill to Cold Harbor. "But," exclaimed he, "I do not wish to go to Gaines's Mill. I wish to go to Cold Harbor, leaving that place to the right." "Then," said the guide, "the left-hand road was the one which should have been taken; and had you let me know what you desired, I could have directed you aright at first." Nothing now remained, but to reverse the column, and return to the proper track. It was manifest that an hour of precious time must be lost in doing this, while the accelerated firing told that the battle was thickening in front, and every heart trembled with the anxious fear lest the irreparable hour should be lost by the delay. But Jackson bore the same calm and assured countenance, and when this fear was suggested to him, he replied: "No, let us trust that the providence of our God will so overrule it, that no mischief shall result." Nor was he mistaken in this confidence; for the time thus allowed to General D. H. Hill enabled him to reach the desired point of meeting north of Cold Harbor, just in front of Jackson, and brought them into precise conjunction. They then turned to the right and moved directly toward the supposed position of the enemy, with the division of Hill in front, followed by those of the Ewell, Whiting, and Jackson in the order of their enumeration. After passing Cold Harbor, and arresting at that spot a few Federal carriages, they perceived the enemy about a half mile southward, drawn up in battle array, and fronting to the north. General Jackson, with a numerous suite, rode forward to observe their position; and at his suggestion a battery from Hill's divi-

sion was posted opposite to them. But before they began to fire, several Federal batteries opened upon them a furious cannonade, by which the Generals were speedily driven to a distant part of the field, and the Confederate guns were silenced, after a gallant but unequal contest of half an hour.

It was not two o'clock in the afternoon. The firing west of Cold Harbor told that General A. P. Hill was fully engaged with the enemy there. In fact, he was fighting single-handed, the whole centre of the opposing host. For a time, General Jackson held his troops back in the margin of the woods looking toward the highway, and along the line of their march, in the hope that the enemy, retreating before Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet, would expose their flank to a crushing blow from him. But the firing on his right began evidently to recede, showing that Hill, instead of driving the savage game into his toils, was giving way before their overpowering numbers. He then determined to bring his whole infantry into action. Assigning to General D. H. Hill the extreme left, he placed General Ewell's division next him, and sent orders to Generals Whiting and Lawton, and to the Brigadiers of his own original division, which brought up the rear, to form for battle along the road by which they were marching, and then moving in echelon, beginning on the left, to feel for the position of the enemy and engage him. The topography was unknown to Jackson and to his subordinates, the forests forbade a connected view of the country, and no time was left for reconnaissance. Nothing remained, therefore, but to move toward the firing, and engage the foe wherever he was found.

The expectations that the Federalists would continue their retreat, when hard pressed, toward the White House, was erroneous. Their commander proposed to himself another expedient: to concentrate his troops on the south of the Chickahominy, and relinquishing his connections with the York River, to open for himself communications with the River James below Richmond, now accessible to his fleets up to Drewry's Bluffs. Accordingly, his present purpose was to stand at bay upon the northern bank of the former stream, until he could withdraw his troops across it in safety.

He chose, for this end, a strong position covering two of his military bridges, and confronting with a convex array, the Confederates who threatened him from the north and west. His right, or eastern wing occupied an undulating plateau protected in front by thickets of pine and the rude fences of the country, and presenting numerous commanding positions for artillery. In front of that wing a sluggish rivulet, speedily degenerated into a marsh, thickset with briers and brushwood, stretched away to the east, affording a seeming protection to that flank. An interval of a few hundred yards in front of his right was unprotected by any such obstruction; but the fields were here swept by a powerful artillery. And as his line passed westward, another rivulet commenced its course, and flowed in front of his whole centre and left wing, in an opposite direction to the first until, merging itself into Powhite Creek, it passed into the Chickahominy above. His centre was enveloped in a dense forest, which, with the marshy stream in front, precluded the use of artillery by the assailants. His left was posted in a belt of woodland, which descended with a steep inclination from the plateau to a deep and narrow gully, excavated for itself by the rivulet. Three formidable lines of infantry held this hill-side, the first hidden in the natural ditch at its bottom, the second behind a strong barricade of timber a little above, and the third near the top. The brow of the eminence was crowned with numerous batteries, which screened by the narrow zone of trees, commanded every approach to the position. Last, a number of heavy rifled cannon upon the heights south of the Chickahominy, protected the extreme left, and threatened to enfilade any troops advancing across the open country to the attack. These formidable dispositions were only disclosed to the Confederates by their actual onset, so that maneuvers was excluded, and the only resort was the stubborn courage and main force. And it was only on General Jackson's extreme left that the Confederate artillery could find any position, from which the enemy could be reached effectively. The front upon which these two great armies were to contend was less than three miles in extent. Hence, as the brigades

of Longstreet and A. P. Hill from which the Confederate right, and of D. H. Hill and Jackson from the left, moved into the combat on convergent radii, they formed, in many places, an order of battle two or three lines deep; and those first engaged were supported by those which arrived later.

The road along which General Jackson drew up his line for battle, made with the enemy's front an angle of forty or fifty degrees. Hence, the troops toward the right had the longer arc to traverse, in reaching the scene of combat, and all were required to incline toward their left, in order to confront the enemy. General D. H. Hill, on the Confederate left, moved first, and was soon furiously engaged. For two or three hours he struggled with the enemy with wavering fortunes, unable to rout them, but winning some ground, which he stubbornly held against a terrible artillery and musketry fire. General Ewell moved next, with one brigade upon the left, and two upon the right of the road which led from Gaines's Mill toward the Federal left. Crossing the marsh, he ascended the opposing hill-side, and engaged the enemy in the forest. Before their terrific fire, General Elzey, commanding his left brigade, fell severely wounded, and Colonel Seymour, commanding the Louisiana brigade of Taylor, was slain. Whole regiments were killed, wounded, or scattered under this leaden tempest; but still their dauntless General rallied his fainting men, repaired his line, and held all his ground against the double and triple lines of the enemy; until just as his ammunition was exhausted welcome success arrived under General Lawton.

One cause of delay in the arrival of the remaining troops has already been seen, in the larger space which they were required to pass over in order to reach the enemy. Another, and a more dangerous one, arose out of a fatal misconception of General Jackson's orders by his messenger. Communicating to all the commanders in the rear of Ewell the plan for their advance he had concluded by instructing them to await further orders before engaging the enemy. But another officer of the staff, comprehending better the General's true intentions, and the urgency of the occasion, corrected the error, and at length moved the remaining

brigades into action. Their leaders could learn nothing of the country, to which they were all strangers; and their movements were partially concealed from each other by the numerous tracts of coppice and forest. Hence, instead of advancing toward the enemy in parallel lines, they unconsciously crossed each other; and several of them, at last, went into action far aside from the points at which they were expected to strike. But the providence of God to whom their General ever looked, guided them aright to the places where their aid was most essential.

The Stonewall Brigade, under General Winder, was next the last in the line of march, and should therefore have formed almost the extreme right of General Jackson's battle. Their General, so soon as he comprehended the error of the instructions which held him inactive, advanced with chivalrous zeal. But his neighbors on the left, with whom he should have connected his right, having already passed out of sight in the thickets, he had no other guide than the din of the battle. Feeling his way rapidly toward this he passed transversely from right to left, across the ground over which the corps had already swept, and found himself behind the struggling line of D. H. Hill. This indomitable soldier was just devising, with his two Brigadiers, Garland and Anderson, upon his left, a daring movement, to break the stubborn resistance of the Federalists. Garland proposed to swing around their extreme right with his brigade; and, taking them in reverse, to charge with the bayonet, while the rest of the division renewed their attack in front. One formidable obstacle existed; a hostile battery at that extremity of the field threatened to enfilade his ranks while marching to the attack. To obviate this danger, Hill determined to storm the battery with five regiments; but only one—that of Colonel Iverson, of North Carolina—arrived at it. He was severely wounded; and, after ten minutes, his men were driven from it by overpowering numbers; but this interval, during which its guns were silenced, was decisive. For meantime, Winder had advanced the famed Stonewall Brigade, in perfect order; had rallied to him all the shattered regiments of Elzey and Hill which he found

lurking under cover, or waging a defensive struggle; and now swept with an imposing line and a thundering cheer across the whole plateau occupied by the enemy's right. Garland and Anderson dashed simultaneously upon their flank; the contested battery was in an instant captured a second time; and the whole wing of the Federal army, with their reinforcements, hurled back into the swamps of the Chickahominy. There they broke into a scattered rabble in the approaching darkness, and crouched behind the trees, or found their way across the stream to their friends. This brilliant movement, with simultaneous successes upon other parts of the field, decided the day. Nowhere were the panic and confusion of the beaten army more utter than here. The fields which were the scene of this terrific struggle composed the farms of two respectable citizens, named Maghee. The one of these farthest in the Federal rear was spectator of their rout. Regiments sent over to McClellan to support the wavering battle were seen to pause, even before they came under fire; to break without firing a musket; and to throw away their arms, and fly to the swamps. As ordnance wagons and ambulances galloped toward the scene of action, they were arrested by the frantic fugitives, who snatched the animals from them, and, mounting two or three on each, fled toward the bridge, leaving ammunition and wounded comrades to their fate. One officer was seen, delirious with terror, with his hat in one hand, and his empty scabbard in the other, screaming as he ran: "Jackson is coming! Jackson is coming!" Indeed the baseness of the Northern soldiery was shown by the fact that, throughout this battle, it was usually the supporting regiments in the rear, unscathed as yet, which gave way first; while the resistance was sustained by the old United States regulars of Sykes and Porter in the front. In the volunteer regiments, the "will of the majority," which was usually a determination to retire at the critical moment, was sometimes expressed against the authority of the officers by a formal popular vote. To the entreaties of their commanders their answers were: "We're tired out fighting;" "Got no more ammunition;" "Guess the rebels will be down to them bridges

soon." And so they broke away, and the rout was propagated from the rear to the front.

The two other brigades of Jackson's old division, the 2d and 3d Virginia, under the lead of Colonels Cunningham and Fulkerson, also advanced with spirit as soon as they received correct orders. Having met messengers from the Commander-in-Chief, and General A. P. Hill, they obtained more correct guidance, and advanced to the Confederate right. The second brigade supported Brigadier-General R. H. Anderson, near General Longstreet's extreme right. Just as they arrived, the troops of Anderson were giving ground momentarily before the enemy. Colonel Cunningham proposed to take the front, and give him an opportunity to reform behind his lines; but the gallant Carolinain insisted upon completing his own work. The shout was raised; "Jackson's men are here," and his regiments answering with a cheer, rushed forward again, and swept all before them, leaving to the Virginians little more to do than to fire a parting volley. In like manner, the third brigade reinforced the line of A. P. Hill, near the centre, but only arrived in time to see the enemy give way before Whiting's division, which had come earlier to its help. As Colonel Fulkerson advanced to relieve these wearied and decimated troops of the labors of the pursuit, the retreating enemy fired a last volley, by which he was mortally wounded. In him General Jackson lost an able and courageous subordinate, who had proved himself equal to every task imposed upon him. Had he lived, the highest distinction must have crowned his merits; for his judgment, diligence and talent for command, were equal to his heroic courage.

Just before the three original brigades of Jackson, had marched the Georgia brigade of Lawton, nearly four thousand strong. The time had now come for them to fight their maiden battle. As they advanced towards the enemy's centre, they unconsciously crossed the line of march just before pursued by General Whiting, and passing under a severe fire from a battery upon the plateau near Maghee's they crossed the marsh, and entered the wood in rear of General Ewell, passing between two regiments which had

retired from the contest after exhausting their ammunition. Here the brigade was thrown into line, and advanced firing, with imposing force. Their appearance was most timely; for the shattered remnant with which Ewell still stood at bay were firing their last rounds of cartridges. As the grim veteran saw this magnificent line of 3500 bayonets sweeping through the woods, he waved his sword with enthusiasm and shouted; "Huzza for Georgia!" Lawton, receiving directions from him, pressed forward with a steady advance, drove the enemy's centre from the woods, into the open fields, nearer the river, and connecting with D. H. Hill and Winder on his left, assisted them in sweeping the Federalists at nightfall into the swamps.

But the most brilliant achievement of the day was reserved for the division of General Whiting, consisting of the Mississippi brigade of Colonel Law, and the Texan brigade of General Hood. In Jackson's initial order of battle, they filled the space between Ewell and Lawton, thus being the third division, counting from the left. Whiting, after being sorely embarrassed by the confused and erroneous instructions received, was properly informed of General Jackson's wishes, and put his two brigades in motion. Before they had advanced far, he met the Commander-in-Chief, who directed him to the part of the field held, at the beginning of the battle, by A. P. Hill. Passing through the forest from which this General had already driven the enemy, he emerged into a broad, open field, in front of that ravine and gully, which have already been described as covering the left centre, and left of the Federal army. Farther toward the Confederate right, Longstreet was bringing up his division simultaneously, to storm this desperate line; and, after other brigades had recoiled, broken by a fire under which it seemed impossible that any troops could live, was just sending in his never-failing reserve, Pickett's veteran brigade. These troops, after advancing heroically over the shattered regiments of their friends, within point blank range of the triple lines before them, unfortunately paused to return the fire of the concealed enemy. The entreaties of their officers to charge bayonets were unheard amidst

the terrific roar of musketry. It was as they stood thus, decimated at every volley, unable to advance, but too courageous to flee, that the brigades of Hood and Whiting were launched against the Federal lines on the left. The charge may be best described in the language of General Jackson himself:

"Advancing thence, thru a number of retreating and disordered regiments, he came within range of the enemy's fire; who concealed in an open wood, and protected by breastworks, poured a destructive fire, for a quarter of a mile, into his advancing line, under which many brave officers and men fell. Dashing on with unfaltering step, in the face of these murderous discharges of canister and musketry, Gen. Hood and Col. Law, at the heads of their respective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the entrenchments, these brave and determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from his well-selected and fortified position.

"In this charge, in which upwards of a thousand men fell, killed and wounded, before the fire of the enemy, and in which 14 pieces of artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the Fourth Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strong-holds and seize the guns."

The shouts of triumph which rose from our brave men as they, unaided by artillery, had stormed this citadel of their strength, were promptly carried from line to line, and the triumphant issue of this assault, with the well-directed fire of the batteries, and successful charges of Hill and Winder upon the enemy's right, determined the fortunes of the day. The Federalists, routed at every point, and aided by the darkness of the night escaped across the Chickahominy.

The next morning, as Jackson inspected this position, and saw the deadly disadvantages under which the Texans had carried it, he exclaimed; "These men are soldiers indeed!" Here, and in front of Pickett's charge near by, all the Confederate dead were on the north side of the gorge.

Just as soon as the enemy saw them determined to advance, in spite of their fire, and the first line was dislodged from the channel of the rivulet in front, the other two lines incontinently fled from their barracados, although well able still to have repulsed the shattered assailants twice over; nor did the artillery hold their ground with more firmness upon the brow of the ascent. But now, as the troops of Longstreet and Whiting drove the throng of their foes from cover into the open fields, they speedily reaped a bloody revenge for all previous losses. The Federal infantry, resigning all thought of battle, fled across the fields or huddled together in the open vales, where the furious Confederates mowed them down by hundreds. The Federal artillery flying to another position a few hundred yards in the rear, opened upon retreating friends and advancing foes, distinguished nothing in the gathering gloom; and as the victors rushed upon the guns again, they drove before them as a living shield, a confused herd of fugitives, whose bodies received the larger part of the volleys of canister.

During the afternoon, General Jackson, with his escort, occupied a position near Cold Harbor, where five roads met, in the rear of his left centre. Ignorant of the delay which had kept his reserves for two hours out of the strife, and of its unlucky cause, he grew more and more anxious as the sun approached the horizon, and the sustained firing told him that the enemy was nowhere broken. Sending first for Stuart, he suggested to him a vigorous charge of cavalry; but this was relinquished as impracticable. His gigantic spirit was manifestly gathering strength, and its rising tides were chafing stormily against their obstacles. Riding restlessly to and fro to the different points of interest, he issued his orders, in a voice which rang with the deadly clang of the rifle, rather than the sonorous peal of clarion. Cheek and brow were blazing with the crimson blood, and beneath the vizor of his old drab cap, his eye glared with a fire, before which every other eye quailed. But a half hour of sunlight now remained. Unconscious that his veteran brigades were but now reaching the ridge of battle, he supposed that all his force had been put forth, and

(what had never happened before) the enemy was not crushed. It was then that he dispatched messengers to all the commanders of his divisions, with these words: "Tell them this affair must hang in suspense no longer; sweep the field with the bayonet." The officers darted away with their messages; but before they reached the line, the ringing cheers, rising from every side of the smoking woods, told that his will was anticipated and the day was won. At this sound, no elation lighted up his features, but subduing the tempest of his passion, he rode calmly forward, to direct the pursuit of the enemy.

In this battle, Gen. Jackson employed little artillery. Upon his wing a few of the batteries of D. H. Hill were put in action at the extreme left, with small effect at first, upon the enemy's fire. Later in the day, Major Pelham, of Stuart's horse-artillery, whose splendid courage Jackson then first witnessed took position in front of Cold Harbor, with two guns, and engaged the Federal batteries which obstructed the movements of Hill. One of his pieces was speedily disabled; but with the other, he continued the unequal duel to the close of the day. At sunset, the batteries upon the extreme left were reinforced by those of Courtenay and Brockenborough. Thirty guns now opened upon the retreating enemy, and contributed much to his final discomfiture.

In the battle of Chickahominy, the Confederates used almost forty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand belonged to the command of General Jackson, exclusive of the division of D. H. Hill, temporarily associated with it. General McClellan asserted that he had but thirty-six thousand men engaged. The length of his triple lines of battle, and the superior numbers met by the Confederates at every point, show that if this statement was correct, it excluded the reserves engaged at the close of the day; and if a similar subtraction were made on the other side, their numbers also would be reduced far below that amount. General Lee declared that the principal part of the Federal army was engaged. When it is remembered that this force embraced all of their regulars, and that the adroit use of

the position selected by McClellan debarred the Confederates from the employment of artillery, while it exposed them on both wings to that powerful implement of war, their victory will be received as a glorious proof of their prowess. They captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, and more than four thousand prisoners; while the field showed that the carnage among the Federalists was considerably heavier than than among the patriots. The victory was purchased by a loss of five hundred and eighty-nine men killed on the field, two thousand six hundred and seventy-one wounded, and twenty-four missing, in Jackson's corps. In the other divisions engaged, the loss was also heavy. Several circumstances made the price paid for the splendid advantages of this achievement, heavier than it might have been, and the fruits more scanty. Of these, the one most worthy of the attention of the Confederates, because susceptible of a remedy, was the lack of a competent general staff, by which the plans of the Commander-in-Chief might be carried out with accuracy, and unity of action secured. Next, it should be remarked, that the generals were possessed of no topographical surveys, and were therefore compelled to maneuver their troops without any acquaintance with the ground, in an intricate country, obscured by woodlands, and devoid of any elevated points of view. The whole space over which Jackson's troops moved was occupied by a succession of thickets of pine, and insignificant farms; so that scarcely anywhere did two brigades move in view of each other, and an advance of a quarter of a mile invariably hid them from view. It was vain therefore, for the General to depend upon his own eyes; and with a scanty and ill-organized staff, he had no means of knowing, for a considerable time, whether his orders were executed or not.

On the morning of Saturday, June 28th, there was not a Federal soldier in arms north of the Chickahominy. The two bridges by which McClellan had retreated were jealously guarded by his sharpshooters, and by commanding batteries upon the southern heights, which forbade their passage save at an expense of blood too great to be contemplated. Ewell's division, with the cavalry of

Stuart, marched, early in the morning, for the York River Railroad; which they occupied without opposition, at Dispatch Station. The enemy thereupon retreated to the south side of the river, and burned the railroad bridge, while General Ewell destroyed a part of the track. Stuart, pursuing a detachment of cavalry toward the White House, found all the stations in flames, including the dwelling and farm buildings of General Lee, at the latter place, and a vast amount of military stores destroyed. It was not manifest from the enemy's own act, that this line of retreat was finally surrendered. Two other alternatives remained to him: one was to cross the Chickahominy below, by the Williamsburg road and the neighboring ways; the other, to turn to the river James. To prevent the adoption of the former, General Ewell was ordered to guard Bottom's Bridge, the next below the railroad, while the cavalry watched the lower course of the stream. To resist the latter, General Holmes's division was directed to watch the roads leading toward the James, with a portion of the cavalry, while Generals Magruder and Huger guarded his front, and stood prepared to press the Federalists upon the first appearance of retreat. The Confederate forces upon the north bank of the Chickahominy remained there until their purposes were developed.

McClellan, although still superior to Lee in numbers and materiel of war, was not in a situation which might well excite his solicitude. His vast army, cut off from its established line of supplies, must either move at once or starve. Before him, and on both his flanks, was a determined and victorious foe. Behind him was a forest country, possessing few good roads, and intersected by sluggish water-courses, which the unprecedented rains had this year converted into swamps. But the forests were, in another aspect, his friends; for they concealed his designs and prevented the watching of his movements. One vigorous day's march, moreover, would bring him to his powerful fleet, which would give him a secure refuge and the needed supplies. Saturday evening, there was manifest signs of movement behind the Federal entrenchments, and

Sunday morning they were abandoned and the bridges across the Chickahominy were broken down. General Longstreet now marched to the south side by the New Bridge; but the Grapevine Bridge opposite General Stonewall Jackson's position was so destroyed that the pioneers consumed nearly the whole day in repairing it. Late in the afternoon, the Stonewall Brigade, with the General and his staff, passed over, and inspected the country. At the Trent farm near by were extensive bowers, ingeniously woven of cedar boughs, which had surrounded the headquarters where McClellan had recently resided, in a village of canvas, provided with every appliance of luxury. Here also was his telegraph office, whence lines diverged to each corps of his army and to Washington, with the floor littered with the originals of these fictitious despatches, with which his Government was wont to delude its people. A little farther, General Jackson found the forces of General Magruder, with the Commander-in-Chief, watching the retreating enemy; and, it was agreed, after consultation, that the evening was too far advanced for an effective movement, and that General Jackson should return to his bivouac, and commence his march in pursuit at dawn the next morning. As he rode across the fields this evening, he witnessed a spectacle of inexpressible grandeur. The attention was attracted toward the east by the roar of an invisible railroad train, which seemed to be rushing toward the Chickahominy, far beyond the distant woods, with a speed which was constantly accelerated until it became frightful. Suddenly, as the beholders were speculating upon the cause of this sound, a vast pillar of white smoke was seen to spring upwards into the sky, which rose higher and higher, and continually unfolded itself from within, in waves of snowy vapor, until it filled that quarter of the heavens. And, a moment after, the atmosphere, slower than the sunbeams, brought to the ear an astounding explosion, in which a multitude of nearly simultaneous thunder-claps were mingled into a roar louder than cannon. The explanation was learned afterwards. The retreating foe had loaded a train with a vast bulk of ammunition, and,

firing the engine to its most intense heat, had launched it from Savage's Station without a guide, with a slow match lighted. Just as it plunged into the Chickahominy at the chasm where the bridge had lately been, the powder caught; and ammunition, engine, and carriages were blown into one huge wreck.

This was not the only form of destruction which the Federalists employed to prevent their enemies from profiting by the spoils. Their industry in attempting to demolish was equal to the haste of their flight. The whole country was full of deserted plunder; and this, indeed, was equally true of the tracts over which they had been driven on the north side of the river, from Mechanicsville downward. Army wagons and pontoon trains, partially burned or crippled; mounds of grain and rice, and hillocks of mess-beef smouldering; tens of thousands of axes, picks, and shovels; camp-kettles gashed with hatchets; medicine-wagons with their drugs stirred into foul medley; and all the apparatus of a vast and lavish host, encumbered the roads; while the mire under foot was mixed with blankets lately new, and overcoats torn in twain from the waist up. For weeks afterwards, the agents of the army were busy gathering in the spoils; while a multitude of the country people found in them partial indemnity for the ruin of their farms. Great stores of fixed ammunition was saved, while more was destroyed.

Scarcely had General Jackson returned to the northern bank, when a rapid outbreak of firing told that General Magruder had attacked the enemy near Savage's Station. Here were the last entrenchments behind which McClellan could stand at bay. By a vigorous attack in flank and front, he was driven out of them just at sunset, and pursued for a short space with great slaughter. The sound of this combat kindled again in Jackson's heart the fire of battle, and as he lay down under the open sky for a short repose, he gave orders that everything should be ready to move in pursuit at the earliest dawn. At midnight, however, a sudden shower awoke him, and finding himself wet through, he determined to sleep no more, but to precede

the troops to the position of General Magruder in order to have time for fuller conference. When the head of his column composed again of the division of D. H. Hill, reached the scene of the evening's combat, the General was found drying himself by a camp-fire. Without procuring any food or refreshment, he now advanced through the troops of Magruder, and took the old highway which led to Williamsburg. When the station near Savage's came in view, a city of canvas was seen upon a distant hill-side, glittering in the morning sun. This was a vast field-hospital of McClellan, where twenty-five hundred sick and wounded, with their nurses, had been left by him to the care of the Confederates. General Jackson, having sent a suitable officer to receive the submission of these, advanced rapidly upon the enemy's traces. At every step the Federal stragglers issued from the thickets, and submitted themselves as prisoners of war, until a thousand additional men were sent to the rear. A vast drove of mules deserted by the Federal army, was gathered from the woods. Every hut and dwelling near the roadside was also converted into a refuge for the wounded, whose numbers showed the sanguinary nature of the struggle of the previous evening. An officer congratulating the general upon the great number of his prisoners, said jocularly, that they surrendered too easily, for the Confederacy would be embarrassed with their maintenance. He answered, smiling: "It is cheaper to feed them than to fight them."

Before reaching White Oak Swamp, an inconsiderable stream which crossed the road, he diverged toward the right in the direction of the courthouse of Charles City County, pursuing still the wrecks of the enemy's flight. It now became manifest that he had relinquished all thought of a retreat toward the river James. To explain the subsequent movements, the disclosure of McClellan's plans, still doubtful to the Confederate commander, must be a little anticipated. His purpose was to collect his army and all its apparatus upon the bank of the James, at some point below the mouth of the Appomattox: where the greater width and depth of the stream would enable his great fleets

to approach him with convenience, and maneuver for his defence. To disencumber the roads leading directly thither, and leave them free for the march of his columns, he sent his whole baggage trains down the way which Jackson had now reached, leading from the neighborhood of Savage's Station on the railroad, to Charles City Court House. Having followed this route until they were effectually protected, they made their way across this thoroughfare, to the deep water at Harrison's Landing. To protect them, Franklin's corps was stationed on the eastern bank of White Oak Swamp; and when Jackson reached it, he stubbornly contested its passage with him during the whole of Monday, June 30th. On the other hand, the corps of Keyes, from McClellan's left, with the beaten troops of Porter, were rapidly marched to Malvern Hill, a range of highlands accessible by the shortest march from the southern end of the Federal line, and overlooking at once the river James, and the New Market, or river road, which leads from the city of Richmond down its northern side. The object of this movement on the part of McClellan, was to protect his communications with the deep water from an advance down the New Market road, which he had good reason to fear. The remainder of his great army was massed on Monday midway between the White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill, under Generals Heintzelman and McCall, to watch the roads going eastward; by which the Confederates might insinuate themselves between his right and left, and pursue his baggage trains. These judicious dispositions, made in a forest country, and chiefly by night marches, were not immediately disclosed in all their details to the Confederate leader. But his troops were now directed, with a masterly and comprehensive foresight, to meet every contingency, in such sort that had all his purposes been carried out, the adroit concealments of his adversary would have been in vain. Major General Holmes was ordered to cross from the south bank of the James river, which he had been left to guard, on the 29th, and march down the New Market road, to prevent the enemy from reaching the water. He did not approach Malvern Hill until the 20th, when he

found it already powerfully occupied by the enemy under Keyes and Porter, crowned by a formidable artillery and flanked by gunboats in the river. Early on the 29th Major Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill were directed to cross the Chickahominy at the New Bridges, and march eastward by the Darby-town road, a highway parallel to the New Market road, and north of it. Major Generals Huger and Magruder were directed to press the enemy in front, by the road leading direct from Richmond to Charles City; while Jackson was to advance rapidly upon the left and the south side of the Chickahominy, and endeavor to attain the enemy's rear.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who moved first on the 29th, first came up with the enemy's centre, upon the 30th, posted a little below the termination of the Darby-town road. Magruder, who advanced by the same road, was diverted by a request of General Holmes for reinforcements; and, thus unfortunately, was turned aside from the centre, where a fatal blow was practicable, toward the heights of Malvern Hill, which were now unassailable; and did not retrace his steps until the day was decided. But General Huger still remained to support the attack of Longstreet and Hill upon the right; and General Jackson, on the other hand, if able to force his passage across White Oak Swamp, would have found himself upon the enemy's flank and rear. Such was the attitude of the respective parties at mid-day of June 30th.

When Jackson approached the stream last named, at this hour, he found in the fields near it, extensive camps deserted, and full of spoils, and another field-hospital crowded with wounded. The hills descended by long and gentle declivities on both sides toward the little watercourse, and the meadows along its margin were soft and miry from the recent rains. On the Confederate side, the right of the road was occupied by the open fields of an extensive farm, and the left by a dense forest of pines. On the side occupied by Franklin, the fields extended far both to the right and left of the highway; but the low margin of the stream opposite the Confederate right was covered

by a belt of tall forest, in full leaf, which effectually screened all the Federal left from view. But the hills on their right were occupied by fifteen or twenty cannon in position, and were black with long lines of infantry. General Jackson, riding, as was his wont, with the advanced guard, no sooner saw the ground than he halted his army, and ordered twenty-eight guns to be brought up, by a little vale through the fields on his right, just deep enough to hide them effectually from the enemy's view. These, although upon his right wing, were directed to the batteries of the Federalists opposite his left. At a preconcerted signal, the guns, ready shotted, were now moved forward upon the brow of the eminence, and opened their thunders upon the enemy. So sudden and terrible was the revelation, they scarcely made an effort to reply, but galloped away, leaving two or three rifled pieces behind them; while the ranks of infantry melted swiftly into the woods far in their rear. After a little, several batteries upon the enemy's left, concealed behind the belt of forest, began to reply to this fire; and, from this time, the two parties kept up a desultory artillery-duel during the day. But as each was invisible to the other, much damage was neither given nor received.

The General now advanced a section of artillery near the crossing of the stream, which speedily drove the Federal sharpshooters from the opposite bank and trees; and he ordered over the cavalry regiment of Colonel Munford. They found the wooden bridge broken up, and its timbers floating—a tangled mass—in the waters. But just above was a deep and narrow ford, which they passed over, followed immediately by the General. They scoured, with drawn sabers, over the ground lately occupied by the Federal right wing, noted the deserted cannon, and picked up a few prisoners. But the enemy's left, behind the long screen of forest, was found standing fast, while they were bringing both artillery and infantry into position to command the crossing. Colonel Munford therefore passed down the stream to his left, and, finding a spot where it was practicable, returned to his friends without loss. Jackson,

upon observing this, advanced the divisions of D. H. Hill and Whiting into the pine wood on his left, detailed a working party to act with their support, and attempted to repair the bridge, with the purpose of forcing his way by a simultaneous advance of his infantry and artillery. But the men could not be induced to labor steadily, exposed to the skirmishers of the enemy; and the attempt was abandoned. The remainder of the afternoon was spent in endeavors to discover some way, on the right or the left, by which the vexatious stream could be crossed, and the enemy's position turned; but the roads were so effectually obstructed with fallen trees, that no hope appeared of removing them in time to fight a battle that evening. The troops were then withdrawn out of reach of the enemy's shells, and bivouacked, to await a more propitious morning. On this occasion it would appear, if the vast interests dependent on General Jackson's cooperation with the proposed attack upon the center were considered, that he came short of that efficiency in action for which he was everywhere else noted. Surely the prowess of the Confederate infantry might have been trusted, for such a stake as Lee played for that day, to do again what it had so gloriously done, for a stake no greater, on the 27th; it might have routed the Federal infantry and artillery at once, without the assistance of its own cannon. Two columns, pushed with determination across the two fords at which the cavalry of Munford passed over and returned—the one in the centre, and the other at the left—and protected in their onset by the oblique fire of a powerful artillery so well posted on the right, would not have failed to dislodge Franklin from a position already half lost. The list of casualties would indeed have been larger than that presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer mortally wounded. But how much shorter would have been the bloody list filled up the next day at Malvern Hill? This temporary eclipse of Jackson's genius was probably to be explained by physical causes. The labor of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his in-

vention, for the once, below their wonted tension. And which of the sons of men is there so great as never to experience this? The words which fell from Jackson's lips, as he lay down that night among his staff, showed that he was conscious of depression. After dropping asleep from excessive fatigue, with his supper between his teeth, he said: "Now, gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we cannot *do something!*" Yet he found time, amidst the fatigues of this day, to write to Mrs. Jackson, with a heart full of piety and of yearning for domestic happiness:

"Near White Oak Swamp Bridge,
"June 30th.

"An ever kind Providence has greatly blessed our efforts and given us great reason for thankfulness in having defended Richmond as he has."

"I hope that our God will soon bless us with an honorable peace, and permit us to be together at home, in the enjoyment of domestic happiness."

Meanwhile, Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill, after confronting the enemy's powerful centre until 4 o'clock P.M., heard firing upon the Charles City road, which they supposed indicated the near approach of Huger. The former placed a battery in position and discharged it against the enemy to give notice of his presence. The Federalists replied, and the old war-horse, whose mettle forbade his ever declining the gage of battle, rushed to the contest. None of his expected supports came up; and the advantage of position and numbers was wholly with his adversaries. But after a sanguinary conflict, he drove them from their whole line save at one point, and captured many prisoners, including a general of division, several batteries, and some thousands of small arms; when night arrested the furious struggle. This action has been known as the battle of Frazier's farm. So near did its issue bring the enemy's left wing to destruction, even without the expected assistance of Jackson, Huger, and Magruder, that when it closed, at dark, the victorious troops of Longstreet were, unconsciously, within sight of the cross road by which Franklin

was required to march his corps, in the rear of the Federal centre, in order to reach the appointed place of concentration at Malvern Hill. Nay, the cornfields beyond that road were ploughed up with Longstreet's cannonshot. What then might not the triumph have been, if the intended co-operation had been given? As soon as the night grew quiet, Franklin, informed of his critical position, moved off from White Oak Swamp, glided silently behind the shattered ranks which still confronted Longstreet, and retired, with them, to the protection of McClellan's lines at Malvern Hill. When the morning dawned, there was nothing in front of Jackson save the forsaken cannon of the enemy, and they had deserted to Longstreet a field ghastly with multitudes of their slain and wounded. His wearied troops, with those of A. P. Hill, were drawn off to seek the needed repose, and Magruder took his place.

General Jackson putting his corps in motion at an early hour, July 1st, with Whiting's division in front, crossed the White Oak Swamp; and, a little after, turning south, marched upon the traces of the enemy toward Malvern Hill. As he approached Frazier's Farm, a Confederate line of battle was seen a little distance from the right of the road, with their skirmishers upon the opposite side, looking eastward. These were the forces of Magruder, which had relieved those of Longstreet during the night. Jackson passed between the line and the skirmishers lustily cheered by them, and pursued the enemy swiftly. The road now plunged into an extensive woodland, with the Willis' Church upon the right hand, filled with the wounded of both armies. After advancing for a mile and a half through this forest, the General's suite was suddenly greeted with a volley of rifle-balls from the Federal outpost, and a moment after, by a shower of shells. Retiring to a safer spot, he now ordered up his troops, and prepared to attack. His reconnaissance showed him the enemy most advantageously posted upon an elevated ridge in front of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by several lines of infantry partially fortified, and by a powerful artillery. In short, the whole army of McClellan, with three hundred pieces of field ar-

tillery, was now, for the first time, assembled on one field, determined to stand at bay, and contend for its existence, while the whole Confederate army was also converging around it, under the immediate eye of the Commander-in-Chief and the President. The war of the giants was now about to begin, indeed! before which the days of Gaines's Mill and Frazier's Farm were to pale. The position of the Federalists had been selected by McClellan himself, with consummate skill. His line fronted north, covering the river road behind it, and presenting a convex curve toward the Confederates. His right was covered by a tributary of Turkey Creek, and his left by the fire of his gunboats, which threw their monstrous projectiles beyond his whole front. The ground occupied by him dominated by its height over the whole landscape; and nowhere in his front was there a spot, where artillery could be massed to cope with his on equal terms. For, the country before him was not only of inferior altitude, but covered with woods and thickets, save within a few hundred yards of his own lines. And here, the open fields sloped gently away, offering full sweep to his murderous fire; while this approach was only reached, before his right and centre, by struggling across the treacherous rivulet in front.

General Lee now assigned the left to Jackson and the right to Magruder, supported by Huger and Holmes. Longstreet and A. P. Hill with their wearied divisions, were held in reserve. The only spot where open ground appeared in opposition to the enemy's, was upon Jackson's extreme left. Here an extensive farm, belonging to a gentleman named Poindexter, indented the forests, and its luxuriant wheat fields, partially reaped, descended to the stream from which the Federal position rose on the opposite side. This field offered the only ground for the maneuvering of artillery. After an examination of it, General Jackson ordered a few batteries to enter it from the cover of the woods, and engage the enemy. But the number of guns directed against them by him was too great; and after a short contest, they retired crippled. The batteries of Poague and Carpenter from the Stonewall Brigade, and of Balthis from the divi-

sion of Whiting, were then ordered forward, and by approaching the enemy more nearly, found a position which, though of inferior altitude, offered some shelter. Here they maintained a stubborn and gallant contest with the numerous batteries opposed to them during the remainder of the day, and barred the way to the advance of the enemy's infantry. The infantry of Whiting was now disposed upon the left, the brigade of Colonel Law concealed in the tall wheat of the field, and that of General Hood in the adjoining forest, while the 3d Virginia brigade, of Jackson's division, commanded by General Hampton, supported the guns. The centre was occupied by the Louisiana brigade of Taylor, and the right by D. H. Hill. The reserve was composed of the remainder of the division of Ewell, and the brigades of Lawton, Winder and Cunningham. These dispositions were completed by 2 o'clock P.M., and the General anxiously awaited the signal to begin. But the corps of Magruder, moving after Jackson's and delayed by a misconception of the route, was later in reaching its position. Instructions were sent by General Lee, that the onset should begin upon the right, with the brigades of Magruder, and that when D. H. Hill heard the cheer with which they charged the enemy, he should attack with the bayonet, to be followed immediately by the leaders upon his left. To approach the Federal centre, Hill was compelled to emerge from the forest, and cross an open field, where he suffered a preliminary loss of no small amount from their artillery. His own batteries had been left in the rear, their ammunition exhausted; and the Confederate artillery sent to his support was advanced, piece-meal, only to be crippled in detail and driven from the field. Fording the rivulet, however, in despite of his losses, he found a partial shelter for his division under a body of woodland within four hundred yards of the enemy's front. Accompanied by General Jackson, he then made a more particular examination of the ground, and found himself confronted by two or three lines of infantry and batteries, whose murderous fire commanded every approach. Five o'clock had now arrived, when suddenly Hill heard a mighty shout upon his right, followed

by an outburst of firing. Regarding this as doubtless the appointed signal, and the beginning of Magruder's charge under a storm of artillery and musketry, the first line of the enemy was forced, and their guns were compelled to withdraw to avoid capture; but the other points of the line, unoccupied by a simultaneous attack, advanced reinforcements to them; and Hill was beaten off, after inflicting and suffering a severe loss. Jackson reinforced him, by sending the brigades of Trimble, Winder, Lawton and Cunningham, but the difficulties of the position, the approaching darkness, and the terrific fire of the enemy, prevented their doing more than holding their ground, and maintaining an uncertain conflict.

As sunset approached, and after the attack of Jackson was checked, Magruder at length got his troops into position, and advanced with similar results. Much heroism was exhibited by his men, some ground was won from the enemy, a bloody loss was inflicted upon them, and received in his own command. At these attacks, the fire of the Federal artillery, which had been heavy, became inexpressibly furious. Along their whole line, whether assailed or not, their countless field-pieces belched forth their charges of flame with an incessant din, which was answered back by the hoarser bellowings of the gunboats in the rear. Wherever the eye turned, it was met by a ceaseless stream of missiles shrieking and crashing through the forest. A moonless night descended on the turmoil, and the darkness was lighted up for miles with the glare flashing across the heavens, as when two thunder clouds illuminate the adverse quarters of the horizon with sheet lightning. Beneath the fitful lines of light danced amidst the dark foliage, showing where the stubborn ranks of infantry piled their deadly work; and the roar of the musketry filled the intervals of the mightier din with its angry monotone; while a fierce yell from time to time told of some hardly won vantage ground gained by the Confederates. At ten o'clock the battle died away; for the Federalists were silently withdrawing from the field, under the friendly veil of the darkness. Indeed, much of the cannonade was doubtless in-

tended to cover this retreat; and no sooner had it sunk into silence, than the rumbling of the multitude of wheels began to tell that the artillery was withdrawing from a field which was already abandoned by their infantry. The Confederates lay down upon their arms where the battle had ceased, in many places within a few paces of the opposing pickets, and during the night they saw the lanterns flitting over the field, where they were busy removing the wounded.

When the battle had ceased thus, General Jackson retired slowly and wearily to the rear, to seek some refreshment and rest. In the midst of a confused multitude of wagons and stragglers, his faithful servant had prepared a pallet for him upon the ground; and here, after taking a morsel of food, he lay down and slept. At one o'clock his division commanders awoke him, to report the condition of their forces, and receive instructions for the morrow. None of them knew, as yet, those signs of retreat and discomfiture, which the advanced pickets were observing; they only knew what they had suffered in their own commands. Their imaginations were awe-struck by the sights and sounds of the fearful struggle, and every representation which they gave was gloomy. At length, after many details of losses and disasters, they all concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggressive in the morning, and that the Confederate army was in no condition to resist him. Jackson had listened silently, save as he interposed a few brief questions, to all their statements; but now he replied, with an inexpressible dryness and nonchalance: "No, I think he will clear out in the morning." These words reveal one element of his power and greatness. Such was the clearness of his military intuitions, and the soundness of his judgment, such the steadfastness of his spirit, that he viewed every fact soberly, without distortion or exaggeration. His excited fancy played no tricks with his understanding. Dangers never loomed into undue proportions before his steady eye. Hence, in the most agitating or even appalling circumstances, his conclusions were still correct. Such they proved to be now; for when morning dawned upon the battle-field, McClellan

was gone indeed, leaving every evidence of precipitate retreat.

The battle of Malvern Hill was technically a victory for the Confederates, for they held the field, the enemy's killed and wounded, and the spoils; while the Federalists retreated precipitately at its close. But, practically, it was rather a drawn battle; because the loss inflicted on them was probably no greater than that of the assailants; and, especially, because the enemy would have retired to the same spot, and at the same time, if no assault had been made. The loss of Jackson's corps was three hundred and seventy-seven killed, and one thousand seven hundred and forty-six wounded, with thirty-nine missing. The larger part of this bloodshed was in the division of D. H. Hill. The divisions under command of General Magruder lost about two thousand nine hundred men, killed and wounded.

The struggle for the possession of the Confederate capital was not closed. The results of Lee's victories were, indeed far less than the overweening hopes and expectations of the people; for Richmond was agitated with daily rumors that the Federal army was wholly dissipated; and, then, that it was about to surrender in a body. But, in the language of the Commander-in-Chief, "Regret that more was not accomplished, gives way to gratitude to the Sovereign Ruler of the universe for the results achieved." The siege of Richmond was raised; and the object of a campaign, which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than ten thousand prisoners,—including officers of rank,—fifty-two pieces of artillery, and upwards of thirty-five thousand stand of small arms were captured. The stores and supplies of every description, which fell into our hands, were great in amount and value; but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field; while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled."

But yet, the same exalted authority has declared, that, "under ordinary circumstances, the Federal army should have been destroyed." While that which was effected is creditable to the Confederates, yet the ruin of the enemy was within the scope of probability; and might have been effected by them, by a higher degree of skill and effort. It is therefore of interest to the student of the military art, to learn what were the obstacles and blunders which prevented the fullest success. Of these, some were unavoidable; and among these latter must be reckoned a large part of the ignorance concerning the movements of McClellan, and the proper direction to be taken by the Confederates, by which General Lee found himself so much embarrassed. There were no topographical surveys of the country, and all the general officers were strangers to it. It was a country of numerous intricate roads, of marshy streams, and of forests. Hence every march and every position of the enemy was enveloped in mystery until it was disclosed in some way at the cost of the Confederates; and every movement made by them in pursuit was in some degree tentative.

Among the unavoidable difficulties may, perhaps, be also ranked that which was, directly or indirectly, the fruitful parent of every miscarriage. The army was not sufficiently instructed, either in its officers or its men, for its great work. The capacity to command, the practical skill and tact, the professional knowledge, the devotion to duty, which make the efficient officer, do not come in a day; and few are the natures which are capable of learning them to a high degree. When the Confederate Government attempted to produce extempore officers of all grades for armies so great, out of people who had been reared in the pursuits of peace, it could only be partially successful. The company and field officers competent to instruct and govern their men thoroughly and to keep them to their colors amidst the confusion of battle and the fatigues of forced marches, were far too few for the regiments to be commanded. There was not enough Brigadiers who knew how to maneuver a brigade quickly or vigorously; nor enough Major-Generals able to handle a great mass of troops. Hence that deficiency in the

functions of the Staff which has been already explained, by reason of which the commander was ever in imperfect communication with his forces, and was never certain that his wishes were properly conveyed to all of them, or that he was possessed of their whole situation when out of his sight. Through so imperfect a medium perfect unison in action could never be gained, upon a theatre like that of Malvern Hill, extended over miles of wooded country, and including the convergent masses of several separate armies. It was from these causes the bungling combinations proceeded, upon every important field of this brief campaign. Enough officers always maneuvered their commands so slowly as to compel the Commander-in-Chief to let slip critical hours, and to wear away the day which should have been employed in attacking and pursuing. Thus it was ever: at Mechanicsville, at Cold Harbor, at Savage's Station, at Frazier's Farm, and especially at Malvern Hill; the prime of the day was spent in waiting for somebody, or getting into position; the battle, which should have been the business of that prime, was thrust into the late afternoon; and when the bloody victory was won, no time remained to gather in its fruits fully by a vigorous pursuit.

The event also taught, what no forecast, perhaps, would have foreseen, that a more efficient employment of cavalry upon the enemy's flanks would have put the Commander-in-Chief in earlier possession of essential information. It has been seen that General Stuart, after his return from the White House, was directed to remain upon the north side of the Chickahominy, guarding the Long Bridge, and the other crossings below; and that he only rejoined the army the night of July 1st. He should rather have been required to cross the Chickahominy immediately and press as closely upon the line of the enemy's actual operations, let it be where it might, as was possible. He would thus have equally fulfilled the purpose of his stay upon the north side, to ascertain that they did not retire toward Yorktown by the lower roads; and he would probably have discovered at once, their real movement. It afterward appeared, that the whole baggage train of McClellan, with numerous strag-

glers, passed nearly to Charles City Court House, by a road parallel to the Chickahominy and only a few miles distant from it, on the 29th of June. Had this fact been reported to General Lee by the first of July it might have thrown a flood of new light upon the momentous question, which he was required that day to decide: must McClellan be attacked in his almost impregnable position or not? It was known that he was assembling all the corps of his army at Malvern Hill; that his gunboats had ascended thither; that he was beginning to entrench himself there. Was it his purpose to convert this spot into a permanent entrenched camp, to defend it from all such assaults as he had just experienced on the Chickahominy, by his engineering skill; to provision it from his ships, and thus to establish himself again within fifteen miles of Richmond, upon a base which General Lee's wisdom taught him to be a better one than that which he had lost? If this was his design, then it was imperative that he should be dislodged; and the more speedily it was attempted the less patriot blood would it cost. For if he were permitted to fix himself here, all the toil and loss of the glorious week would be trains to another spot, and that he stood upon Malvern Hill with nothing but his ammunition, and the supplies of a day; and it became probable that he would retreat from this place, whether he were attacked or not; that he would retreat whither his trains had preceded him, and that he was only standing at bay for a short time, to secure the privilege of that retreat. The question thus assumed a new aspect, whether it were better to assail him on his chosen ground, at such a cost of blood, or to wait for a fairer opportunity as he withdrew.

If it were granted that McClellan ought to have been attacked at once, on his ground, much yet remains in the management of the battle on the Confederate side, which, though excused, cannot be justified. The attack was made in detail, first at one point, and then at another, instead of being simultaneous. Had the corps of Jackson and Magruder charged simultaneously, with the devoted gallantry which a part of each exhibited, the Federal lines would doubtless

have given way, and a glorious success would have rewarded the Confederates without any greater expenditure of blood than they actually incurred. But it is worthy of question whether McClellan's advantage of position could not have been neutralized. Malvern Hill is upon the convexity of a sharp curve in the river James, which just below that neighborhood, flows away toward the south, while the river road pursues still an easterly course. If McClellan moved eastward, he must either forsake the coveted help of his gunboats or, to continue near the water, he must leave he highlands, and descend to a level region commanded from the interior. These facts seemed to point to the policy of extending the Confederate left, until his egress by the river road was so violently threatened as to compel him to weaken his impregnable front. The great body of forest, which confronted his centre, might have been safely left to the guardianship of a skirmish line; for their weakness would have been concealed by the woods, and the enemy was, on that day, in no aggressive mood. A powerful mass of artillery and infantry displayed beyond their extreme right, would probably have produced the happiest effects. Last the tardy and indirect pursuit which followed the battle, was the least excusable blunder of all. The two days which were allowed to McClellan proved the salvation of his army. But what are all these criticisms more than an assertion in different form, of the truths that all man's works are imperfect, and that every art must be learned before it is practised? When it is remembered that the South had very few professional soldiers, that the men who formed the victorious army of Lee were, the year before, a peaceful multitude occupied, since their childhood, in the pursuits of husbandry, and that half the brigades into which they were organized had never been under fire before the beginning of the bloody week, the only wonder will be that the confusion was not worse, and that the failures were not eminent courage of the people, and their native aptitude for war.

It is a fact worthy of note in this narrative, that the fire of the gunboats, so much valued by the Federals and at first so dreaded by the Confederates, had no actual in-

fluence whatever in the battle. Their noise and fury doubtless produced a certain effect upon the emotions of the assailants; but this was dependent on their novelty. The loss inflicted by them was trivial when compared with the ravages of the field artillery, and it was found chiefly among their own friends. Far more of their ponderous missiles fell in their own lines, than in those of the Confederates. Indeed, a fire directed at an invisible foe, across two or three miles of intervening hills and woods, can never reach its aim, save by accident. Nor is the havoc wrought by the larger projectiles proportioned to their magnitude. Where one of them explodes against a human body, it does indeed crush it into a frightful mass, scarcely cognizable as human remains. But it is not likely to strike more men, in the open order of field operations, than a shot of ten pounds; and the wretch, blown to atoms by it, is not put hors du combat more effectually, than he whose brain is penetrated by half an ounce of lead or iron. The broadside of a modern gunboat may consist of three hundred pounds of iron, projected by thirty or forty pounds of powder. But it is fired from only two guns. The effect upon a line of men is therefore but one-fifteenth of that which the same metal might have had, fired from thirty ten-pounder rifled guns.

In conclusion, a statement of the numbers composing the two armies in this great struggle, is necessary to estimate its merits. Under the orders of General Lee there were, at its beginning, about seventy-five thousand effective men, including the corps brought to his aid by General Jackson. McClellan confidently represented the numbers opposed to him as much larger than his own; but the habitual exaggerations of his apprehensive temper were patent, even to his own Government. He states that his own force was reduced to eighty thousand effective men. It must be remembered that during the campaign before Richmond, the motives of McClellan's policy dictated a studied depreciation of his own numbers. In the returns given by himself in another place, his effective force present for duty is set down at one hundred and six thousand men, inclusive of the garrison of Fortress Monroe under General Dix.

Halleck declared, in his letter of Aug. 6th, that McClellan still had ninety thousand men at Berkeley, after all his losses! These McClellan had estimated at fifteen thousand, how truthfully may be known from this: that he places the men lost by desertion and capture under six thousand, whereas the Confederates had in their hands more than ten thousand prisoners; and the woods of the peninsula were swarming with stragglers. Whatever may have been his numerical superiority, it is indisputable that every advantage of equipments, arms, and artillery was on his side.

But the arrival of General Jackson brought a strength to the Confederates beyond that of his numbers. His fame as a warrior had just risen to the zenith; while all the other armies of the Confederacy had been retreating before the enemy, or at best holding the defensive with difficulty, his alone had marched, and attacked, and conquered. A disaster had never alighted on his banners. His assault was regarded by friends and foes as the stroke of doom, and his presence gave assurance of victory. Hence, when the army before Richmond learned that he was with them, they were filled with unbounded joy and confidence, while their enemies were struck with a corresponding panic.

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MILITARY MEMOIRS OF A CONFEDERATE

A CRITICAL NARRATIVE

BY

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WITH SKETCH MAPS BY THE AUTHOR.

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Yorktown and Williamsburg

[EXTRACT]

McClellan at Fortress Monroe—Johnston Goes to Yorktown—Reorganization—Dam No. 1—Yorktown Evacuated—Retreat from Yorktown—Battle of Williamsburg—Early's Attack—Hancock's Report—Casualties—Eltham's Landing.

In the latter part of March, the Confederate signal lines began to report the movement of a great army down the Potomac, and it was soon discovered that it was being concentrated at Fortress Monroe. On April 5, some five divisions of Federal infantry, with cavalry and artillery, from that point, approached the Confederate lines across the Peninsula at Yorktown. These were held by General Magruder, whose force at the time was only about 13,000 men. They occupied a line about 12 miles in length—partly behind the Warwick River, and partly protected by slight earthworks. Another opportunity as good as that offered McDowell at Bull Run was here offered to McClellan, who could have rushed the position anywhere. He contented himself, however, with some cannonading and sharpshooting. Of course, he was still under the Pinkerton delusion as to the enemy's strength. Magruder, who was expecting reinforcements, made the bravest possible display; exhibiting the same troops repeatedly at different points. It was just at this juncture, when a great success was in McClellan's grasp, had he had the audacity to risk something, that the news reached him that Lincoln had taken from him McDowell's 37,000 men. This, doubtless, had its effect in discouraging him and leading him to resort to siege operations against Yorktown instead of attempting to pass the position by main force.

Meanwhile, Johnston had been summoned to Richmond, and had advised Davis that a defence of Yorktown involved great risk, and at the best could gain no important result. He advocated its abandonment, and the concentration at Richmond of all forces from Virginia to Georgia. With

these McClellan's force should be attacked when it came near Richmond.

A conference was called, which included Lee, Longstreet, G. W. Smith, and the Secretary of War, Randolph. It was advocated by Lee, and finally determined, that Johnston should risk making all the delay possible at Yorktown. This was a safe conclusion to reach, only in view of the cautiousness of McClellan.

Johnston had already begun sending some reinforcements to Magruder, and had brought a large part of his army near Richmond. About April 15 he went to Yorktown, taking Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, which gave him a total force of 55,633.

In the whole course of the war there was little service as trying as that in the Yorktown lines. There was much rain and the country was low and flat, so that the trenches were badly drained and would frequently be flooded with water. The general flatness left no cover in rear of the lines. The enemy's rifle pits were within range and view at many points, and the fire of the sharpshooters with telescopic rifles was incessant, and that of artillery was often severe. At many important points, the crowded ranks in the trenches had to either sit or crouch behind the parapet in water up to their knees, from daylight until darkness permitted one to rise upright or to step outside of the trench. The only rest at night was to sleep in the universal mud and water. Although the men in the worst locations were relieved as often as possible, an unusual amount of sickness resulted. General D. H. Hill wrote in his official report:

> "Our revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge than did our army at Yorktown, and in the retreat from it. Notwithstanding the rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching and fatigue I never heard a murmur or witnessed an act of insubordination. The want of discipline manifested itself only in straggling which was and still is the curse of our army. This monstrous evil can only be corrected by a more rigid government and a sterner system of punishment than have yet been introduced into our service."

During our stay here a reorganization of the army took place. The majority of our troops had enlisted for a year in the spring of 1861. It was now necessary to reenlist

them for the war. Congress had enacted that reenlistment furloughs should be given to a few men at a time, and that a reelection of officers should take place in each regiment. This feature was very detrimental to the standard of good discipline.

During the whole of the siege there was but one affair of any consequence, and it is of interest principally as indicating the great improvement wrought in the Federal troops by the discipline which had been given them during the fall and winter.

On April 16, a Federal reconnaissance was made by W. F. Smith's division, of a position on our lines called Dam No. 1. Here our entrenchment, at the upper part of Warwick Creek, was protected by inundations. Just below Dam No. 1, the inundation from No. 2 was only about waist deep and perhaps 100 yards wide, thickly grown up with trees and undergrowth. These facts were discovered by a bold reconnaissance under cover of a heavy fire. Four companies of the 3d Vermont were ordered to cross the inundation and develop what we had on the other side.

They made their advance very handsomely, fording the overflow, and actually got possession of our line of infantry parapet some 20 yards on the farther side. This was occupied at the time by only a picket line of the 15th N. C., Colonel McKinney, the rest of the regiment being at work upon a second line 200 yards in the rear. McKinney promptly formed his regiment and moved forward to drive the enemy out, but was killed, and his men repulsed in confusion, the enemy fighting from the far side of our parapet. Presently, however, the brigade commander, Howell Cobb, arrived and, as the enemy was not reinforced, after holding their ground for perhaps a half hour, they retreated, losing 83 men, out of 192 who crossed the stream. The entire casualties of the Federals were 165. The casualties of the 15th N. C. were 12 killed and 31 wounded.

It was plain from this affair that the fighting we would soon have to face was to be something better than that of 1861.

Meanwhile McClellan was preparing for Yorktown a terriffic bombardment by which he hoped to wreck our water batteries so that his fleet could pass us. Siege batteries mounting 71 guns, including two 200-pounder rifles and five 100-pounders, and several 13-inch mortars were being rapidly mounted. On May 1 his 100-pounder rifles opened fire, and by May 6 he expected all the other batteries to be able to join in. But Johnston had never intended to risk siege operations at this point and at sundown on May 3 put his army in motion toward Richmond. His heavy guns were fired actively all the day before, and until midnight, when the artillerists spiked them and withdrew.

I recall that night's march as particularly disagreeable. The whole soil of that section seemed to have no bottom and no supporting power. The roads were but long strings of guns, wagons, and ambulances, mixed in with infantry, artillery and cavalry, splashing and bogging through the darkness in a river of mud, with frequent long halts when some stalled vehicle blocked the road. The men from the nearest ranks would swarm in to help the jaded horses pull the vehicle out. Meanwhile, everything in the rear must halt and wait, and so it went on all night—a march of one or two minutes, and halt for no one could guess how long. The average time made by the column was under a mile an hour.

Our movement was not discovered by the enemy until after daylight on the 4th. His cavalry was at once started in pursuit, and these were followed during the day by five divisions of infantry under Smith, Hooker, Kearney, Couch, and Casey, the whole under command of Sumner. Besides these, Franklin's division was loaded upon transports during the day, and early on the 6th sailed up the York to intercept us near West Point. Two other divisions, Sedgwick's and Richardson's, were also to have been sent by water, and McClellan remained in Yorktown to see them loaded and despatched. But the fighting next day at Williamsburg proved so severe that he rode to the front and had both divisions to follow him.

Near Williamsburg, Magruder had, some months before, selected a line of battle across the Peninsula, four or five miles long, on which he had at a few places some slight intrenchments with slashings of timber in front, and, about the centre, an enclosed fort of some size, called Fort Magruder.

As the rear of our column came into Williamsburg during the afternoon of the 4th, the enemy's cavalry suddenly appeared so near to this fort, that Semmes' tired infantry brigade had to be taken at the double quick to occupy it, and a sharp skirmish was fought before sundown. McLaws reinforced Semmes with Kershaw and two batteries, and we captured one of the enemy's guns, stuck in the mud, ten horses being unable to get it off. After dark Kershaw and Semmes were relieved by Anderson's and Pryor's brigades of Longstreet's division.

That night we stayed at Williamsburg, and it poured rain all night. About 2 A.M., the leading divisions were pushed forward. Johnston was anxious to get his troops ahead to meet the forces he expected McClellan to send by water to West Point.

To hold the enemy in check at Williamsburg, Longstreet retained his whole division of six brigades as a rear-guard. Soon after daylight on the 5th, the enemy developed their presence before Pryor and Anderson. Hooker's and Smith's Federal divisions had reached the field about dark on the 4th.

The fighting began with fire upon our lines from artillery and skirmishers, and gradually increased in volume. The whole of Longstreet's division was brought up, and advanced upon the enemy in the edge of the wood, where it captured one of his batteries. Toward noon, when it became evident from the slow progress of the marching columns that the enemy would have to be held off until night, Johnston returned to the field and the division of D. H. Hill, which had only advanced a short distance from Williamsburg, was brought back as a reserve. One of its brigades, Early's, was divided, two regiments sent into the fight on

our right, and the other four sent out in observation beyond our left flank.

D. H. Hill and Early both went with this left column, and got into trouble from a little superfluous aggressiveness.

On the extreme right of the Federals, Gen. Hancock had discovered some vacant intrenchments—part of Magruder's old line, before mentioned. With five regiments, parts of two brigades, and 10 guns, he occupied a commanding ridge, and opened artillery toward the Confederate lines. Early, on lower ground and in the woods, could not see Hancock's position, but suggested an attack to Hill. Hill approved but referred the question to Johnston. Johnston, who had left the battle entirely to Longstreet's direction, referred it to the latter. Longstreet very properly refused to give permission, as we fought only to cover our retreat up the Peninsula, and it was assured. But this message taken to Hill did not satisfy him. He was a brother-in-law of Stonewall Jackson and was a soldier of the same type. He visited Longstreet in person, and Longstreet now weakly yielded to his appeal. Rains' brigade had meanwhile been brought up behind Early's, and it would have been possible to organize an attack, which might have routed Hancock. But Hill, to lose no time, began the formation of the four regiments for the charge. The distance to be traversed was over half a mile, much of it wood and swamp. Hill placed the four regiments in a line of battle extending through a wood, with Early leading the two left regiments, while he led the two right. But Early mistook one of Hill's commands to his own wing for the order to charge, and he led off at once with his left regiment, the 24th Va., which had open ground before it. Hill's extreme right regiment, the 5th N. C., also had open ground in front, and, soon becoming aware that a charge had begun, it also advanced without orders. Hill, tangled in wood and swamp, with the two centre regiments, could do nothing. After passing the wood between them, the two outside regiments could see each other and the Federal guns, now scarcely 500 yards distant in front. These guns immediately opened a severe fire of shell and

canister. The 5th N. C. obliqued to its left to close the wide gap between them and both advanced to the charge, reserving their fire generally until within 150 yards of the enemy. A large portion of Hancock's infantry lay concealed behind the crest of the ridge until the two regiments, now with ranks disorganized by their advance, were within 30 yards, when the Federals raised and fired, advancing over the crest and continuing the fire for 15 or 20 rounds.

Hancock says in his official report:

"The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right and the oblique fire from the left were so destructive that, after it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose, it seemed that no man had left the ground unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards of our line.

"The enemy's assault was of the most determined character. No troops could have made a more resolute charge. The 5th North Carolina was annihilated. Nearly all of its superior officers were left dead or wounded on the field. The 24th Virginia suffered greatly in superior officers and men."

Gen. Early, Col. Terry, and Lt.-Col. Hairston of the 24th Va. all fell severely wounded, and the regiment lost: killed 30, wounded 93, missing 66, total 190. In the 5th N. C. Lt.-Col. Badham was killed, and the regiment lost "about fifty per cent" of its members, but no official report was made.

Hancock reported his losses in the affair as: killed, 10, wounded 88, missing 31, total 129. This affair about terminated the fighting. It had rained nearly all day, and on our right Longstreet simply kept back the enemy's advance by fire, and by threatening their flanks.

The total Federal casualties as reported were: killed 456, wounded 1410, missing 373, total 2239. The Confederate casualties (reported by Longstreet only) were: officers 102, men 1458, total 1560. We captured 12 guns of which five were brought off, five were chopped down with axes, and two had to be left, as neither horses or axes were available. We also brought off about 400 prisoners.

As far as possible the wounded were brought into Williamsburg and soon after dark our march was resumed over roads now even worse than any we had had before. I rode with Johnston's staff, and late in the forenoon of May

6th we were at Barhamsville, and the greater part of the army was halted and resting in the vicinity.

It had been a special feature of McClellan's strategy that on our retreat from Yorktown we should be intercepted at Eltham's landing by a large force. But our battle at Williamsburg had proved a double victory, for it had prevented Franklin's division from being reenforced so as to be either formidable or aggressive. It arrived at the mouth of the Pamunkey at 5 P.M. on the 6th. During the night it disembarked and next morning reconnoitered its vicinity and took a defensive position, sending Newton's and Slocum's brigades through a large wood to examine the country beyond.

On the far edge of that wood about 9 A.M. their skirmishers ran into those of Hood's and Hampton's brigades of Whiting's division, which were there to see that our trains passed without interruption.

The Federals fell back and were followed until they were under the protection of Franklin's intrenched camp, and all our trains passed unmolested.

The Federals reported: killed 48, wounded 110, missing 28, total 186.

The Confederate loss was but 8 killed, and 40 wounded, and they captured 46 prisoners. There was no further effort to interfere with our retreat. This was continued at leisure until the 9th, when we halted on the north bank of the Chickahominy.

Seven Pines or Fair Oaks

Drury's Bluff—The Situation—Attack Planned—Johnston's Plan Changed—Johnston's Problem—Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks—A Misunderstanding—Longstreet's Mistake—Huger Delayed—Huger Unjustly Blamed—Signal Given—Hill's Battle in Brief — Losses — Reenforcements — Reports—Wilcox's Report—Couch's Position — Johnston's Battle — Whiting's Advance — A Second Attack—Johnston Wounded—G. W. Smith in Command—Smith's Battle, June—The Confederates Withdraw—Lee Placed in Command—Resume—Staff and Organization—Artillery Service—Davis and Johnston.

Meanwhile, Norfolk had now been evacuated by our forces, which were withdrawn at first to Petersburg and then to Richmond. Our ironclad, the Virginia (the old Merrimac), drawing too much waster to ascend the James, had been blown up. This river was now open to the Federal fleet, except for some hurriedly built batteries at Drury's Bluff, about six miles below Richmond, covering obstructions made of a row of piles and some sunken schooners.

On May 15 the fleet, which included three ironclads, the Monitor, Galena, and Naugatuck, attacked the batteries, but was repulsed with 25 killed and wounded, and considerable injury to some of the vessels. Until that time Johnston had contemplated fighting on the north of the Chickahominy, but he now decided to concentrate his army nearer Richmond, and on May 17 it was all encamped within three of four miles to the east of the city.

The situation had grown very threatening; for McDowell's army, still at Fredericksburg with 31,000 men, had again been assigned to McClellan. He only awaited the arrival of Shields, marching to join him with 11,000 men, before advancing.

If it was now in Johnston's power to do anything to save Richmond, it must be done before McDowell arrived. It was not likely that McClellan would himself seek battle when such a large reenforcement was near. Johnston's only chance, therefore, lay in taking the offensive. He had no such works to rely upon as the Federals had around Washington. There were, indeed, a few small enclosed

forts, erected during the first year of the war, each armed with a few of the smooth-bore guns of that day, but they were located too near the city limits to have any value.

The lines in which we afterward fought were but light infantry trenches with occasional barbette batteries, usually thrown up by the troops under emergency.

The enemy soon followed us and established a line of battle, upon which at different points earthworks began to appear.

His right flank, on the north bank of the Chickahominy, rested upon Beaver Dam Creek, a strong position which Johnston's engineers had selected for our own left flank, before we left Yorktown, when Johnston contemplated fighting on that bank. Thence, the Federal line extended southeast along the Chickahominy some three miles to New Bridge. Then, crossing this stream, it bent south and ran to White Oak Swamp, where the left rested, giving about four miles on the south side in a line convex toward Richmond, and scarcely six miles away to its nearest point.

In observation of McDowell at Fredericksburg was Gen. J. R. Anderson at Hanover Junction with about 9,000 men; and near Hanover C. H. was Branch's brigade, about 4,500. Johnston directed that these forces should be drawn behind the Chickahominy, on our left, and united into a new division under A. P. Hill. Before this could be accomplished, however, Branch was attacked by Morell's division and Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, and was forced back with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded, and 700 prisoners, the enemy reporting 62 killed, 223 wounded, and 70 missing, total 355.

At Fredericksburg McDowell's column was at last joined by Shields, who had been detached from Banks in the Valley, and on May 26 McDowell was put in motion. In the forenoon of the 27th notice of his advance reached Johnston, who at once recognized that he must now attack before McDowell could unite with McClellan.

The latter had moved so cautiously as to offer no favorable opportunity until his last move which had put his army astride of the Chickahominy. That presented as fair

a chance as Johnston could expect. So he immediately determined to attack on the 29th. As McDowell was approaching behind the enemy's right, his strongest effort would be made to crush that flank. On the 28th Johnston got his troops into position to attack at dawn on the 29th. Three of his seven divisions (Whiting's, A. P. Hill's and D. R. Jones's) were to attack Porter's corps at Beaver Dam. The other four divisions on the south side of the Chickahominy (McLaws's, Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and Huger's) would be held in observation, ready to cross when Porter's corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness by sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had happened was that Jackson had again broken loose in the Valley and defeated Banks at Strasburg on May 23, and at Winchester on May 25, and was moving on the Potomac, as will be told more fully in a later chapter.

This had created a panic at Washington, for rumor had magnified Jackson's forces greatly, and McDowell, just in the nick of time for us, had been turned back for the defense of the capital.

Johnston was glad of a respite, and an opportunity to consider as an alternative an attack upon McClellan's left. The strength of the position at Beaver Dam Creek, made any direct attack very dangerous, and to turn it would consume time. To attack the enemy's left was certainly a safer proposition. On the south side his force was smaller and was much more easily gotten at. And while it was already partially fortified by abattis and trenches, quickly constructed in flat and wooded country, yet they had had time to do but little. Longstreet urged going on with the attack for which the troops were already in position, but Johnston decided to withdraw the troops north of the Chickahominy during the night of the 28th, and to have reconnaissances made to discover the location and strength of the enemy's position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 29th, and again on the 30th, one or two brigades were advanced and drove in the enemy's pickets on our extreme right flank,

developing his presence and that he was fortifying. This being reported to Johnston by D. H. Hill soon after noon on the 30th, Hill was informed in reply that "he would lead an attack upon the enemy next morning."

There was nothing to gain by further delay; for, by the arrival at Richmond of Huger's division from Norfolk on the 29th, Johnston now had all the force possible to get. His problem was to defeat four divisions of the enemy, 12 brigades fortified, and crush them before assistance could cross the Chickahominy to their relief. If he could do this quickly his chance was good to involve in the defeat also some of the reenforcements the enemy would be sending across the bridges. He had seven divisions, 27 brigades, numbering about 60,000 infantry and artillery. The four divisions to be attacked numbered about 37,000. Considering the morale of our men, which will appear more fully after a description of the battle, the proposition was an easy one, if only we could succeed in bringing our fighting strength to bear in the right places and at the right times. But just there lay our greatest difficulty and weakness. Our army was not yet organized into corps, our divisions were often too large, and our staff service, by which information and orders were disseminated, was insufficient in amount and deficient in technical training and experience. Johnston was endeavoring to remedy some of these evils by assigning his ranking officers, G. W. Smith, Longstreet, and Magruder, to command two or more divisions each, which he called wings and centre, but such temporary arrangements are always more apt to mar than to promote unity of action. And our general himself was impatient and unmindful of small detail. Let us now have the story of what happened.

To use the slang expression, it was "up to" Johnston to play and in a conference with Longstreet during the afternoon of May 30, the battle for the next day was planned in accordance with the intimation given D. H. Hill about noon.

The conference was prolonged by the coming up of a violent rain-storm, scarcely second to any in violence, ac-

cording to my recollection that I saw during the war. Over three inches of rain must have fallen in the first two hours, and it kept up more or less, until late at night. It was hoped that this rain would make our task easier by rendering the Chickahominy impassable for reenforcements to the enemy. Indeed, it did have this effect, but not until the night of the day after the rain. The immediate effect was only to make all our marchings and maneuvers slower and more difficult, and the flat swampy country of much of the battle-field was entirely inundated.

During this afternoon—prolonged by the rain-storm—Johnston gave verbal instructions to Longstreet as to the battle of the next day, and it is hard to imagine how any serious misunderstandings of such a simple movement could have taken place in a conversation prolonged for hours. One would need to have heard the whole of it to tell how it arose. But Johnston afterward recognized the fact that it had occurred, and wrote to G. W. Smith that the misunderstanding, "may be my fault, as I told you at the time." Smith, however, denies recollection of any such telling.

Johnston intended to have the battle begun at an early hour by D. H. Hill's division of four brigades, three of which were already in position, in the front line, on our extreme right on the Williamsburg road. Rodes was on picket on the Charles City road, not far off, and, unfortunately, Johnston's plan included his being relieved and joining his division before the attack was begun. Any preliminary movement, however simple it may appear, will usually turn up fated to cause unexpected delay. Rodes is ordered to be relieved by a brigade of Huger's division, of three brigades, now in camp on the north bank of Gilliss Creek, near Richmond. This is ordered at an early hour to go down the Charles City road and relieve Rodes, after which it will guard and protect Hill's right flank and render it aid if opportunity offers.

Longstreet's division of five brigades is in camp on the Nine Mile road nearest the Chickahominy on our left. Johnston's plan is that it shall march straight down that road, perhaps three miles, pass our line of battle, here

held by Magruder's division, form line of battle, and listen for the sounds of battle begun by D. H. Hill's attack upon Casey's division, which will be within a mile or two of his front and right. He will be in a position to take Casey on the right flank and with Hill's four brigades, having abundant force, can hope to make short work of it.

Meanwhile, Whiting's division of five brigades (considered a part of Smith's wing) had been a part of the attack proposed two days before, and were still encamped farther up the Nine Mile road. After Longstreet left Johnston's headquarters the rain having slacked, the latter sent word to Smith to order Whiting to march down the Nine Mile road early in the morning and take position at our line of battle behind Longstreet, to further reenforce him in the battle.

Smith came in person, some five miles, arrived at 4:30 A.M., and now first learned of the proposed attack, and had it all explained. Johnston proposed to make his own headquarters on the Nine Mile road where he could observe any efforts of the enemy to cross the Chickahominy. It would have been much wiser to have first visited the right and seen his battle started. The whole Confederate plan at Bull Run had gone astray for the lack of this precaution, and now it turned out that Longstreet had understood him either to order or to consent that his division was to be marched across from the Nine Mile road to the Williamsburg road and to go into action behind D. H. Hill's division. It will soon appear how utterly this wrecked and ruined Johnston's excellent and simple plan. How the misunderstanding occurred has never been explained, for neither Johnston or Longstreet in their official reports or other writings ever gave any explanation or even admitted openly that a mistake was made. But Johnston induced G. W. Smith to change his official report, to avoid its being made public therein. The official reports also disclose that on that day Longstreet was anxious to have Huger's division recognized as under his command, although Huger was the senior officer. Possibly Longstreet made some request of Johnston for authority over Huger, and Johnston in com-

plying may have thoughtlessly used some expression which Longstreet interpreted as permission to go to the right. But the whole history of this battle remains a monument of caution against verbal misunderstandings.

Longstreet's division was early upon the road, and it soon developed that its route to the Williamsburg road cut off and blocked the prescribed marches of both Whiting's and Huger's divisions as they respectively came up.

After some delay, Whiting sent a note to Johnston's headquarters, complaining that his march was obstructed by Longstreet. Johnston, supposing only that Longstreet was preceding Whiting down the Nine Mile road, as ordered to do, answered to that effect, and G. W. Smith, who was still with Johnston, sent an aide, Capt. Beckham, down the Nine Mile to overtake Longstreet and learn the cause of any delay. Beckham followed this road to Magruder's line, and, not finding Longstreet, guessed that he had gone across to the Williamsburg road. So he sent back a note saying that he would continue his search in that direction.

When this note was shown Johnston about 9 A.M., he was still so convinced that Longstreet was upon the Nine Mile road that he despatched his aide-de-camp, Lieut. Washington, down the same road to find him.

Washington pushed his investigation so far as to follow the Nine Mile road into the enemy's pickets where he was captured about 10 A.M. His capture, and his disturbed manner when some firing was soon after heard, convinced Gen. Keyes that an attack was on foot, and Keyes was accordingly alert and prepared.

Meanwhile, Longstreet's column, having delayed Whiting on the Nine Mile road for two or three hours (for the column took its wagons along), found itself next blocking the column of Huger at Gilliss Creek. The creek was bank full from the rain. Longstreet says:

> "The delay of an hour to construct a bridge was preferred to the encounter of more serious obstacles along the narrow lateral road flooded by the storm. As we were earlier at the creek, it gave us precedence of Huger's division, which had to cross after us."

As Longstreet knew that one of Huger's brigades must relieve Rodes's brigade, on the Charles City road, and let it rejoin Hill's division before the battle could commence, it would have saved much to waive this precedence at least for one brigade.

Colston, commanding one of these brigades, wrote as follows of this occasion:

"A little brook near Richmond was greatly swollen, and a long time was wasted crossing it, on an improvised bridge, made of planks, a wagon midstream serving as a trestle. Over this the division passed in single file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division commander had given orders for the men to sling their cartridge boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and wade, without breaking formation they could have crossed by fours with water up to their waists, and hours would have been saved. *When we got across we received orders to halt on the roadside until Huger's division passed us. There we waited five or six hours.*"

He had just passed Huger, and now he waits for Huger to pass him!

When one contemplates the fact that there was a commanding officer, hoping to win a great victory, than at his headquarters within two miles of this spot, where nine brigades were thus wasting the precious hours passing and repassing each other, the whole performance seems incredible. And when it is further said that six of these brigades were lost, with their commander, and that the staff of the general was seeking them at that moment, high and low, miles away along the picket line, it is almost ludicrous. And any friends of Huger may be excused for finding even a tragic side to the situation. For when the whole affair was over, and had ended in defeat, Johnston and Longstreet laid the entire blame upon Huger. I give as illustrations two quotations from Johnston, and there were equally disparaging statements by Longstreet.

"General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for Huger's division."—"Had Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes's corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely defeated. Had it gone into action even

at four o'clock the victory would have been much more complete."

After the battles were over and Johnston was recovering from his wound, Huger made vain effort to have the injurious statements corrected and applied for a Court of Inquiry. This was promised by the War Department, but it was to be held "as soon as the state of the service will permit." The state of the service never permitted, and the court was never held.

About 1 P.M., however, Rodes's brigade was relieved on the Charles City road, and hurried to join the other three brigades under Hill, who had fretted greatly under the delay. He started his two brigades on the left of the road as soon as he saw Rodes approaching.

The formation was Garland's brigade on the left of the road, followed by G. B. Anderson; Rodes's brigade on the right, followed by Rains. Each brigade marched in column until the enemy were met, when it formed line. The rear brigades formed about 300 yards behind the leading ones.

In Johnston's Narrative, he states that "Longstreet as ranking officer of the three divisions to be united near Hill's camp was instructed verbally to form his own and Hill's division in two lines crossing the Williamsburg road at right angles and to advance to the attack in that order." But the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming that on the morning of the battle, Johnston was expecting Longstreet to be in position on the Nine Mile road, and to support Hill's attack upon the Williamsburg road by his attack down the Nine Mile. That was the only quick way of bringing his large force into proper action, and it is hard to see how the two divisions could have failed to crush the enemy in their front.

It is no wonder that Johnston said when he found out where Longstreet was, that he wished the troops were all back in their camps, for the victory was surely his if he could play his game correctly.

It was being started badly. It was on a front of only two brigades, supported by two in a second line, while nine

other brigades encumbered the one good road leading to the battle. From a glance at the field one might now confidently predict the outcome.

It is D. H. Hill's division, about 8,500 strong, excellent troops, and there is not living a more honest fighter than D. H. Hill. They will first meet Casey's division, of about equal strength, partly fortified with trenches and abattis. Behind Casey are three other divisions holding two other lines partly intrenched. Hill may carry the first line and even have some success against the second. But, by that time, he will be worn out, and the daylight will be gone before enough of the nine brigades (those behind him) can be gotten to him in force to cut any figure. The fight on this road cannot amount to more than a bloody draw, prolonged until night.

That is what anyone, knowing the conditions might have predicted, and that is just what happened. To follow all the details is useless, but the list of casualties, and some brief descriptions of incidents will give a good idea of the fighting.

The Confederate reports of casualties, particularly in battles fought during active campaigns, are far from being full, and are not all uniform in their shape and detail. Complete figures, therefore, for the whole division cannot be given.

Of Rains's brigade, the official report only states that its losses were one-seventh of the force. The reports show that this brigade was employed in a flank movement around the enemy's left which it executed successfully, but did not repeat it. Hill expressed disappointment and says that Rains might have saved Rodes's brigade from suffering 500 casualties.* Rains fought on the left. Had Long-

*Rains was a graduate of West Point of class of 1827, and was now fifty-nine years of age. He had had some Indian fighting in Florida, and had been wounded, but he was not in the Mexican War. He was an expert and enthusiast upon explosives, and, soon after the action at Seven Pines, he was relieved of his brigade, and assigned to the Torpedo Bureau, which was organized for submarine defence of our rivers and harbors.

street's division that morning not gone astray, all of its brigades would have been on the enemy's flank, and have had similar chances. The other three brigades reported their strength and losses as follows:

SEVEN PINES, MAY 31, 1862

Position	Brigade	Present	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total	Per cent
Front right	Rodes	2200	241	853	5	1099	50
Front left	Garland	2065	98	600	42	740	37
Rear left	Anderson, G. B.	1865	149	680	37	866	47
Totals		6130	488	2133	84	2705	44

This record shows great fighting power, and will compare favorably for a half-day's fighting of an equal body of men, with any records of the war.

At Waterloo, the losses were: Allies 20 per cent, French 34 per cent, British regulars 29 per cent. At Balaklava, the Light Brigade (600) lost 49 per cent.

On the Federal side the battle was opened by Casey's division, moderately well fortified with trenches, batteries, and abattis, and soon supported by Peck's brigade of Couch's division. These four brigades were finally routed from their first line by the Rains's flank movement. They then fell back upon the second intrenched line, where they united with Couche's two remaining brigades. Rains's brigade now dropped out of the fight.

The three other brigades pushed their attack upon the enemy's second line, which was now being reenforced by Kearny's division, but Hill received also a reenforcement of R. H. Anderson's brigade, which he divided. Two regiments under Jenkins he sent to the left and the remainder under Anderson to his right. A little later also he received two regiments, the 11th Ala. and the 19th Miss., of Wilcox's brigade. With this help the second line was carried. Four Federal regiments and a battery retreated north toward the Chickahominy unpursued. The remainder fell back slowly and night put an end to the fighting. Kemper's brigade also arrived, brought by Longstreet to Hill's aid. It came upon the field, but too late to take effective part. On the

Federal side Hooker's division also came up as the fighting ceased.

Hill's division was now worn out, and Longstreet relieved it from the seven idle brigades still left on the Charles City and Williamsburg roads.

Hill's forces during the battle had averaged about four brigades, for R. H. Anderson had come up, after Rains dropped out with a loss of only 14 per cent. Anderson's losses are not given, but they were severe and probably equalled the average of Hill's. Jenkin's official report says:

"We never fought twice in the same place, nor five minutes in one place, and steadily on the advance; were under fire from 3 P.M. to 7:40 P.M. The service we did will be evidenced by our list of killed and wounded. In my two color companies out of 80 men who entered, 40 were killed or wounded, and out of 11 in the color guard 10 were shot down, and my colors, pierced by 9 balls, passed through four hands without touching the ground."

The following shows a comparison of the total casualties of Hill's part of the battle, as nearly as they can be ascertained including the three brigades already given:

CASUALTIES, HILL'S BATTLE, WILLIAMSBURG ROAD, MAY 31, 1862

	Division	Strength	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Keyes's Corps	Casey	8,500	177	927	325	1429
Keyes's Corps	Couch*	8,500	195	773	127	1095
Heintzelman's	Kearny	8,500	193	816	82	1091
Federal	**Total**	25,500	565	2516	534	3615
Confederate	Total†	12,000	608	2751	156	3515

The Confederates captured 10 guns, 5,000 muskets, and about 400 prisoners. The following extracts from official reports give an idea of the fighting. Rodes writes:

"The total number of men carried into action was about 2,200. The aggregate number present at camp was, however, 2,587. The 6th Ala. lost nearly 60 per cent of its aggregate force. Some of its men were drowned after having been wounded, as they fought at

*This includes 12 killed, 45 wounded, 12 missing, total 69, which occurred in Johnston's battle on the left.

†This omits Kemper, who was not seriously engaged.

times in a swamp in which the water was from six inches to two feet in depth. The right company of the 6th Alabama was thrown back at right angles to the line of battle by Col. Gordon, to protect his rear, and engaged the enemy at such close quarters that its brave commander, Capt. Bell, after having fallen wounded mortally, was able to use his revolver, with effect upon the enemy. The company fought with great heroism. Its loss was 21 killed and 23 wounded out of a total of 55 (80 per cent)."

It remains to say a few words of the movements of the unengaged troops on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads. Longstreet at 3:30 P.M. placed Wilcox in charge of his own, Pryor's, and Colston's brigades, and ordered him to follow and support Huger. Soon after this order was modified and Wilcox was ordered to precede Huger. But, having moved to the front, he was soon countermarched and ordered to return to the Williamsburg road, and then to follow that road to the front. He had retraced his steps about a mile when his fourth order again reversed his direction. He was now to follow down the Charles City road, keeping abreast of the firing which was heavy. And soon a fifth order came, of which Wilcox writes in his report:

"Again orders were received in writing to move across to the Williamsburg road, following country roads and paths through woods and fields, a guide being furnished to conduct the command. The intervening distance between the two roads was low and flat, and in many places covered with water, at one point waist deep. The march was of necessity very slow. It was about 5 P.M. when the head of the column reached the Williamsburg road.

It was at this time that the 11th Ala. and 19th Miss. of Wilcox's brigade were sent into the action, as has already been told. Later, these brigades with the others of Longstreet's and Huger, which were brought up, relieved the troops which had been so heavily engaged.

So terminated what should properly be called "D. H. Hill's Battle" for the whole, as we shall see, embraced three minor battles, at different times and places, and under different commanders. Hill's battle was fought principally against Keyes's corps; and we have seen that Couch with four regiments and a battery retreated northward toward the Chickahominy.

Here he soon found friends. Sumner's corps on the north side of the river had been formed about 1 P.M., and

moved toward two recently constructed roadways and bridges across the Chickahominy. At 2:30 P.M. orders to cross were received, and Sumner, having two roads, was able to cross quite rapidly. The river was high and rising, and by nightfall and until next morning the stream was impassable.

Now we enter upon the second, which may be called "Johnston's Battle."

It has been told how his original plans were destroyed by Longstreet's taking his division to the Williamsburg road. It must have been near eleven o'clock when Johnston learned where Longstreet was, and realized that it was too late to get the troops back for the day. He hesitated whether to wait and prepare for the morrow or to go on and unfortunately decided to let it go on. He took no measures to supply the place on the Nine Mile road of the six brigades of Longstreet. Whiting's five brigades, however, were at hand. Three of them, Whiting's, Hood's and Pettigrew's, were at the fork of the Nine Mile and New Bridge roads; Hatton's and Hampton's in reserve near by.

Toward noon Johnston left his headquarters, which were on the Nine Mile road about three miles from Richmond, and took his position at a house near the fork of the Nine Mile and New Bridge roads. His intention now was to send Whiting's division down the Nine Mile road to cooperate with D. H. Hill's attack down the Williamsburg road.

By coincidence of bad luck, his right wing having lost several hours in the morning, his left wing lost about three hours in the afternoon. The signal for Whiting's advance was to be the sound of Hill's musketry on the Williamsburg road, two miles southeast, through a wooded country. This musketry began about one o'clock, and was heard in the Federal lines, five miles northeast; also near Richmond five miles west; but was not audible two miles to the northwest at the position occupied by Whiting's division and by Gen. Johnston.*

*Such phenomena, called acoustic shadows, are of common occurrence and are to be expected upon every battle-field, in some direction; especially in wooded localities. Here the intervening ground was moderately wooded. The artillery could be distinguished, but the amount of it was not great.

Longstreet reports having sent a message, upon the capture of Casey's first line, but it was not received, and Johnston's first knowledge of the battle came about four o'clock, from an officer whom he had sent at three to investigate and report.

Soon after 4 P.M. Whiting's five brigades were put in motion, with Hood in front. Hood was directed to leave the Nine Mile road to his left and to push over toward the York River Railroad, and find Hill's troops, while the remaining brigades moved down the railroad. Already there had been upon the railroad all day Pickett's brigade of Longstreet's division, sent there by Longstreet before the beginning of the action, "to report any advance of the enemy up that road." It is remarkable that Longstreet contented himself with this, and did not utilize this road as a route of advance for some of his many brigades. Besides his own six he could have called on some of Huger's three, and have led a strong attack down the railroad, turning Casey's right flank. An opportunity for one of the most brilliant strokes in the war was here overlooked and lost. Soon after five o'clock, Whiting's four rear brigades had straightened out upon the Nine Mile road, with Whiting's own brigade in front near Fair Oaks Station, when a battery opened fire upon the column from its left.

It was the battery with four regiments of Couch's division, which had been cut off from Casey's second line and had retreated northward, unpursued, toward the Sumner bridges. Here it had met Sedwick's division of Sumner's corps and Richardson's division was not far away. Johnston was riding with Whiting when the Federal battery opened fire, but supposing the Chickahominy to be impassable, he thought that there could be no great force there, and Whiting was ordered to charge the position with his brigade. Near the Chickahominy the ground was rolling, and the enemy's guns secured fine positions. For fully 800 yards the Confederate advance was exposed to fire.

The reception which it met, however, made it speedily apparent that the errand upon which it had been sent was much beyond the dimensions of a brigade.

Johnston was impatient, and directed the attack to be renewed at once by all the brigades present. Hood's brigade might have been recalled, and several batteries of artillery, not far off, could have found positions against the two batteries the enemy presently had in action. But a very hurried formation of the three remaining brigades—Hatton's, Hampton's and Pettigrew's—was made, and the attack was renewed without bringing up artillery, although there was much of it near. It was met by Sedgwick's division and Abercrombie's four regiments, and received a bloody repulse, to which the enemy's artillery contributed largely, having a fair sweep and no artillery opposing them. Hatton was killed, Pettigrew wounded and captured, and Hampton wounded.

The casualties of the division for the day were reported as follows:

Johnston's Battle	Strength	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Hood's Brigade	1922		13		13
Hampton's	2225	45	284		329
Whiting's (Law)	2398	28	286	42	356
Pettigrew's	2017	47	240	54	341
Hatton's	2030	44	187	13	244
Total Confederate	10592	1640	1110	109	1283
Sedgwick's Division	8000	62	282	3	347
Abercrombie's Brigade	2000	12	45	12	69
Total Federal	10000	74	327	15	416

Before sundown Johnston recognized that his attack was a failure and he was about to arrange that his troops should sleep on their arms and renew the fight at dawn, when he received two wounds. The first was a flesh wound in the shoulder from a musket ball, and the second, a few moments later, was a blow in the chest from a heavy fragment of shell, knocking him from his horse. He was placed in an ambulance and started toward his headquarters, but suffered such pain from the motion caused by the fearful roads that a litter had to be substituted. He was incapacitated for service until the middle of November, when he was assigned to the principal command of the army in the west.

G. W. Smith succeeded Johnston in the command, and the action of the next day is therefore to be called "Smith's Battle." It is sometimes stated in Confederate accounts, that this day offered the Confederates their best opportunity to crush the enemy, because it is supposed that the Chickahominy was not entirely impassable. This is a mistake. The railroad bridge had been repaired, and covered with plank, and was always available for infantry and horses, though not for vehicles. By 8 A.M. June 1, the Federal engineers had built a pontoon bridge at the site of the New Bridge, but it was under Confederate fire, and the approaches to it were impassable during the flood. By noon Sumner's upper bridge was again practicable for infantry, and by dark the lower one. By morning, June 1, therefore, the Federal army was practicably safe from any Confederate attack. It had six divisions on the ground and a good line of battle, extending across the railroad nearly parallel to the Nine Mile road, with its left flank retired and protected by White Oak Swamp. The only chance of a successful assault by the Confederates would have been with a heavy artillery fire upon the obtuse angle where Sedgwick's line bent back to connect with the other divisions. The condition of the ground, as well as the unorganized state of the Confederate artillery service, made such an attack impossible and no effort at it seems to have been made. Late at night, May 31, Longstreet reported to Smith, and received orders to attack in the morning from the Williamsburg road northward, Smith proposing to take up the battle, with Whiting and other troops, when it was well developed.

It is easy to see that the Federals had nothing to fear from anything the Confederates were likely to do.

Early in the morning there was some sharp firing at many points along the line, where daylight brought into view troops and skirmishers which had been posted after dark; and, in accordance with Smith's instructions, four of Longstreet's brigades—Pickett's, Armistead's, Pryor's, and Colston's—and two of Huger's, Mahone's, and Armistead's, advanced upon the enemy's position, which ran

largely through the woods. There resulted a number of more or less severe affairs at different points, which were waged with varying fortunes for some hours. The brigades which had been engaged the day before were held in reserve near the captured redoubt. Meanwhile, with daylight, the enemy's position of the afternoon before, opposite Whiting, showed itself strengthened by intrenchments, and Smith thought there was evidence of additional reenforcements being sent from the north side. So the battle in Whiting's front was not renewed. Longstreet, too, soon began to call for reenforcements. The following notes were received from him in quick succession:

"June 1st. Yours of today received. The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too easily."

"10 A.M., June 1. Can you reenforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together, we can finish the work today, and Mac's time will be up. If I can't get help, I fear that I must fall back."

On receipt of these notes, Smith ordered 5,000 men to be withdrawn from Magruder's force along the Chickahominy, above New Bridge, and sent to Longstreet, but meanwhile D. H. Hill, seeing that the fighting was accomplishing nothing, sent orders withdrawing the troops to the line of the night before. This was done rapidly at some points, and more slowly at others, but the enemy made no marked advance, and the action soon died out, it being now about 11 A.M.

About 1:30 P.M. President Davis arrived at Smith's headquarters, and informed him that Lee had been assigned to the command of the army, and Lee himself soon arrived. The party then rode aver to Hill's position, whence Magruder's troops, which had arrived, were ordered back to the Chickahominy. After dark orders were received by Hill from Longstreet for all troops to return to their camps within the Confederate lines. In his official report, Hill says: "The thirteen brigades were not got together until near midnight . . . We regained our own intrenchments near sunrise." The moon that night was about five days old.

The official reports do not show separately the casualties either of this last action or of Hill's battle on the 31st, though those of Johnston's battle are given by both sides. But Kearney's division and some of Longstreet's brigades were engaged both on the 31st and the 1st, and, on the latter day, two of Huger's. The totals of the whole affair, as nearly as can be estimated, are shown in the following table, averaging where exact figures are wanting:

TOTAL CASUALTIES, SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS.

Battle		Engaged	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Hill's May 31	Confederate	11642	608	2751	156	3515
	Federal	18000	565	2516	534	Y3615
Johnston's May 31	Confederate	10592	164	1010	109	1283
	Federal	10500	74	327	15	416
Smith's June 1	Confederate	14136	208	988	140	1336
	Federal	17000	151	751	98	1000
Aggregate	Confederate	36370	980	4749	405	6134
	Federal	45500	790	3594	647	5031

"When Gen. Lee came back he told me that Gen. Johnston proposed on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy as follows: Gen. A. P. Hill was to move down the right flank and rear of the enemy; Gen. G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge, and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped for by both of us."

The "next Thursday" was May 29. In the Records appear no signs of battle until May 27. On that day news came that McDowell was starting south from Fredericksburg. Johnston immediately ordered troops into position for the attack at dawn on the 29th. But, as has been told, on the 28th, he received news of McDowell's recall north. That night he countermanded the battle orders, and had the troops withdrawn under cover of darkness from all advanced positions.

The President's narrative goes on:

"On the morning of the day proposed, I hastily despatched my office business and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the action commence. On the road I found Smith's division halted, and the men dispersed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom I could get information, I finally saw Gen. Hood, and asked him the

meaning of what I saw. He told me that he did not know anything more than that they had been halted. Riding on to the main road, which led to the Mechanicsville bridge, I found Gen. Longstreet walking to and fro in an impatient, it might be said, fretful manner. Before speaking to him, he said his division had been under arms all day waiting for orders to advance, and that the day was now so far spent that he did not know what was the matter. Thus, ended the offensive-defensive programme from which Lee expected much, and of which I was hopeful."

But two days afterward, May 31, the President rode out again, late in the afternoon, and when on the Nine Mile road, heard firing in the direction of Seven Pines. Mr. Davis writes:

"As I drew nearer I saw Gen. Whiting with part of Gen. Smith's division file into the road in front of me; at the same time I saw Gen. Johnston ride across the field from a house before which Gen. Lee's horse was standing.* I turned down to the house and asked Gen. Lee what the musketry firing meant. He replied by asking whether I had heard it, and being answered in the affirmative, he said he had been under the impression himself; but Gen. Johnston had assured him that it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a design to attack the enemy that day."

It seems clear from this narrative that Gen. Johnston entirely disregarded the letter of May 21st, so far as it required him to acquaint the President with his proposed programme of operations. The verbal message conveyed by Lee, that he proposed to attack north of the Chickahominy on the 29th, may serve to acquit him of literal disobedience; but the change of programme was neither notified beforehand, or explained afterward, nor was any notice given of the attack at Seven Pines on the 31st, although there was ample opportunity to do so.

It is not probable, however, that Johnston intended his course to be one either of disrespect or disobedience. It had its source, doubtless, in his aversion to detail, or to committing himself as to what he proposed to do, when he was fighting a superior force and was really waiting for opportunities to turn up.

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*Among the staff-officers who saw this incident, it was believed that Gen. Johnston saw Mr. Davis approaching, and that he sought to avoid a meeting by mounting quickly and riding rapidly to the extreme front, where he remained until he received his wounds. I was a witness of the scene.

Seven Pines or Fair Oaks

It must be admitted that at Seven Pines our prospects, had Johnston not been wounded, would have been dismal. Besides the lack of cordial relations between the President and Johnston, the latter's effort to handle the army in battle had been an utter failure. His orders were given, he says, "for the concentration of 23 of our 27 brigades against McClellan's left wing." Yet nowhere were ever over four brigades in action at one time. No complaint is made of any disobedience, slowness, or nonperformance, by any officer, except Huger, and the facts in his case distinctly relieve him from any blame whatever. Indeed, it is almost tragic the way in which he became the scapegoat of this occasion, the true history of which is even yet not generally understood. Gen. Smith, in 1891, published all the facts for the first time with documentary proof.

Seven Days' Campaign—The Attack

Lee in Command—Ives Predicts Lee's Audacity—Lee's Plan—McClellan's Delay—Lee's Opportunity—Lee's Order—Stuart's Raid—Intimations to the Enemy—Conference of Officers—Jackson's First Failure—Jackson's March—Stuart and Trimble—Branch Moves—A. P. Hill Moves—Battle of Mechanicsville—Porter's Retreat—A. P. Hill's Advance—Gaines' Mill Position—The Chances—Jackson at Cold Harbor—Porter's Account—Hill's Account—Lee's Account—Jackson Ordered in—General Advance—Enemy's Escape—Casualties—Remarks.

When Gen. Lee on June 1, 1862, took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he brought with him his personal staff, Col. R. H. Chilton, Adjutant, Col. A. L. Long, Military Secretary, and Majs. Taylor, Venable, Marshall and Talcotts, as Aides. He retained the chiefs of all departments—Corley, as Quartermaster, Cole as Commissary, Guild as Medical Director, and myself as Ordnance Officer—and all matters of routine went on as before.

The chances of a successful campaign against McClellan had increased greatly when Johnston fell, wounded, as has been already told. Johnston had proposed the concentration at Richmond of a large force, to be drawn from points farther south. Lee would be able to bring this about more effectively, occupying, as he had done, the position of Military Adviser to the President. He had, as yet, never commanded an army, and his accession to his present command did not at once inspire popular enthusiasm. His only active service had been in West Virginia, where he was Department Commander in the fall of 1861. This campaign had generally been considered a failure, but should have been recognized as a success, for there had been at least no loss of men, nor any serious reverse. It was absurd for the Confederacy to seek to occupy so extensive and mountainous a country as West Virginia, so close to the great state of Ohio, and with a population strongly favoring the Federal cause. It was impossible to supply our armies over their long and difficult roads. Mountain barriers in that section not only gave the country to the Federals, but proclaimed peace. This came to be recog-

nized after one campaign. With this for a result, and no battles having been fought, an idea arose that he would not be an aggressive commander. This was strengthened when Lee's first care was to select a line of battle and begin to fortify it. To some of the amateur critics, who wrote for the public press, this seemed little better than a confession of cowardice.

The *Richmond Examiner*, edited by Pollard, was conspicuous in the bitterness of its attacks. Through some of these I chanced upon an interview which impressed me very forcibly at the time, and which proved to be quite a prophetic estimate of Lee as a commander. It came about as follows: On the staff of the President was Col. Joseph C. Ives, a graduate of West Point in the class of '52. He was born in New York and appointed from Connecticut, but had married in the well-known Semmes family of Georgia and Alabama, and had joined his fortunes with the south. He served on the staff of President Davis during the whole of the war. While in no way conspicuous, he impressed all who met him as particularly intellectual, and as an unusually accomplished officer.

When Lee had been in command about two weeks, I had a long ride with Ives about our lines, one afternoon, during which he referred to these newspaper attacks and asked if I thought they in any way impaired the confidence of the army in Lee. I had seen no such effect and told him so, and then went on to say: "Ives, tell me this. We are here fortifying our lines, but apparently leaving the enemy all the time he needs to accumulate his superior forces, and then to move on us in the way he thinks best. Has Gen. Lee the audacity that is going to be required for our inferior force to meet the enemy's superior force—to take the aggressive and to run risks and stand chances?"

Ives's reply was so impressive, both in manner and matter, that it has always been remembered as vividly as if today. He reined up his horse, stopped in the road, and turning to me, said: "Alexander, if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in audacity, it is Gen. Lee! His name

might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances and take them quicker than any other general in this country, North or South; and you will live to see it, too."

It is needless to say that I did live to see it many times over. But it seems even yet, a mystery how, at that time, Ives or President Davis or any other living man had divined it. No one could meet Lee and fail to be impressed with his dignity of character, his intellectual power, and his calm self-reliance; but all those qualities might be recognized without deducing from them, also, the existence of such phenomenal audacity, except by an inspiration of genius.

The principal feature of Lee's proposed plan had long been the bringing down of Jackson from the Valley to attack the enemy's right wing. Even before Jackson had extricated himself from the pursuit of his enemies on June 8, Lee had written him to set on foot the arrangements to mislead the enemy as to his intentions.

The arrangements adopted were both elaborate and effective. Not only were all sorts of exciting false rumors set on foot throughout the Valley, but Whiting's division, from before Richmond, and Lawton's large brigade—arriving from Georgia nearly 4,000 strong—were sent by rail from Richmond to Staunton about June 11, to create the impression that Jackson's raid was about to be repeated with a much larger force. Meanwhile, Jackson's force was marched again to the Shenandoah near Port Republic, about the 11th, after Shields and Fremont had fallen back to the neighborhood of Strasburg. Here Jackson took five days of rest preparatory to the movement upon Richmond.

During most of this period, by all the rules of the game, McClellan was in default for not attacking. He had come within arm's length but allowed the initiative to Lee. McDowell had been taken from him, so that he had nothing to gain by waiting, while his enemy had the opportunity both of reenforcement and of fortification. Lee, was indeed, doing his utmost in each direction. McClellan seemed to have been subconsciously aware that he ought to attack, and that his advantage was being lost by every

day's delay; for his reports to Washington represented his army, from day to day, as being only held back from a general advance by waiting for some slight additional advantage, which a day or two would bring.

On June 2, which was his best opportunity, he was only waiting for the water to fall in the Chickahominy. On June 7, he was waiting for McCall's division (about 10,000 strong) which arrived on the 12th and 13th. On June 16th he was waiting for two days to let the ground harden. On June 18 the general engagement might begin at any hour. On June 25, "the action will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time." And at last he was right, for Lee began it on the 26th, and during the interval, since June 2, the advantage had shifted from McClellan's side to Lee's.

As the game and the players now stood, the game was Lee's for a great success—the greatest ever so fairly offered to any Confederate general. His strategy had been good and had been carried through without a flaw. Jackson's entire army, reenforced by Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade, had been brought down secretly from the Valley, and, on the night of June 25, was encamped at Ashland within 13 miles of Mechanicsville. It was about 18,500 strong. Meanwhile, Lee had drawn together, available for battle, around Richmond, about 65,000 other troops, and had fortified his lines on the southeast between the Chickahominy and the James, enough to make them quite secure with half his force. McClellan's right flank was but a single corps, Porter's not over 30,000 strong, and separated from the Federal centre by the Chickahominy River and about four miles of distance. Under these circumstances, with even fairly good tactics, Porter's corps should have been practically destroyed, and with it the Federal line of supply from the York River. That once accomplished, the capture or destruction of the remainder of McClellan's army, during their retreat to the James River, would have been an easier task than the first.

All this was in the game which Lee set out to play, on June 26, and the stakes were already his if his execution

were even half as good as his plan. At the beginning there was every promise that it would be. Two days before, a confidential order had been issued to general officers and heads of departments, which is given in part, in contrast with Johnston's method, as developed at Seven Pines.

"General Orders No. 78.

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
"*June 24, 1862.*

"Gen. Jackson's command will proceed tomorrow from Ashland toward the Stark (or Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's brigade of A. P. Hill's division will also to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy near Half-Sink.

"At three o'clock Thursday morning, 26th Inst, Gen. Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to Gen. Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville.

"As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, Gen. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville.

"To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will, at the proper time, open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across the bridge opened, Gen. Longstreet, with his division and that of Gen. D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point, Gen. D. H. Hill moving to the support of Gen. Jackson, and Gen. Longstreet supporting Gen. A. P. Hill. The four divisions keeping in communication with each other and moving en echelon on separate roads if practicable, the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, Gen. Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, taking the direction toward Cold Harbor.

"They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting his progress. . . . "

But one grave error had been committed. Among the preparations which Lee had made for the occasion had been a forced reconnaissance of the enemy's rear, which was made by his cavalry commander, Stuart, between June 11 and 15. Stuart with about 1,200 men and two guns, passing well behind the enemy's right, had gotten into his rear and discovered that his right flank did not extend for any distance northward from the Chickahominy and rested on no natural obstacle. But the expedition could not safely

return, Stuart thought, by the route taken in going. He determined, therefore to make the circuit of the Federal army, crossing the Chickahominy below by a bridge which he expected to find.

In this he was disappointed, but with great resource he got safely across, partly by swimming, and partly by rebuilding a bridge, and brought off his guns and a few prisoners.

But this raid, though ordered by Lee and handsomely conducted, had one unfortunate effect. It would have been much better to have obtained the necessary information by scouts. It seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear. But for it the probabilities are that he never would have given the subject any thought, and he would certainly not have been prepared with a fleet of loaded transports on hand when he was, soon after, forced to change his base to Harrison's Landing on the James River. It is hard to estimate the difference in the result, had McClellan been taken by surprise on this occasion and been forced, perhaps, to retreat down the Peninsula. On the whole, therefore, the eclat of our brilliant raid cost us much more than its results were worth. Where important strategy is on foot, too great care can scarcely be used to avoid making any such powerful suggestions to the enemy as resulted in this case.

It is interesting to note that the enemy got no intimations of what was going on until June 24. On that day a deserter from Jackson's force was brought in. After trying in vain to pass himself off as a Union prisoner, escaped from Jackson, he had told of Jackson's march and its supposed intent to attack McClellan's flank.

McClellan wired the story to Stanton, and also sent out two negroes to go along the railroad and investigate, but Stuart's pickets were too vigilant for the negroes to pass them. Stanton gave some credence to the deserter's story, but it cut small figure among the rumors which McClellan was receiving from his detective bureau. He believed that Beauregard had arrived and that Lee now had 200,000 men.

On June 25 he made his first forward movement by advancing the skirmish-lines of several brigades and taking

up a portion of the neutral ground in front of our picket lines, near the Williamsburg road. Sharp skirmishing ensued and lasted all day, the Federal losses being reported as about 700, and our own about 400. The affair was called Orchard or Oak Grove Skirmish.

Before issuing order of battle No. 75, Lee had on June 23 Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Jackson, to meet in conference at his headquarters to arrange all details. Longstreet had asked Jackson to fix the date on which the attack should be made. The latter named June 25. Longstreet suggested that he allow more time, and the 26th was agreed to.

When summoned to this meeting by Lee on Saturday, June 21, Jackson was near Gordonsville. He started on a freight train bound to Richmond, but left the train before midnight that night at a station where he spent Sunday, attending church twice.* At midnight he set out on horseback for the conference at Richmond about 50 miles away, arriving about 3 P.M.

Had he kept on the freight train to Richmond he would have arrived early Sunday morning. His brigades on the march also kept Sunday in camp. It was usually the general's custom to keep account of Sundays spent in fighting or marching, and to make up for each by a week-day rest, and sermons, at the earliest opportunity.

On the march from Gordonsville the railroad was utilized for the infantry as far as could be done, by picking up the rear brigades and carrying them forward. Artillery and cavalry marched all the way.

On Tuesday morning, June 24, Jackson's infantry, was at Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central road, about 18 miles from Ashland, where they were expected to encamp that night, and about 25 miles from the Virginia Central R.R. near the Stark Church, whence order No. 75 required Jackson to march at 3 A.M. Thursday, June 26.

We now enter upon the story of performances. The orders governing the beginning of the action were simple

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*Henderson says it was Frederick Hall, other reports say Louisa C. H.

and explicit. Every officer must have realized the supreme importance of time, even without the hint given by Lee in his order fixing the hour of Jackson's march at 3 A.M.

It is, therefore, a great surprise to see that instead of crossing the Virginia Central R.R. at 3 A.M. on the 26th, they do not begin to cross it until 10 A.M. on that date. That is practically a whole day late, because, with the distance still to be traversed it will be too late to commence the great battle intended, in time to win it and gather the fruits of victory.

Had Jackson pushed his march to Ashland on the night of the 24th, about 18 miles from Beaver Dam, as Lee's order contemplated, he would have had only six miles to march on the 25th, and his men would have been in excellent condition to set out at 3 A.M. on the 25th, with less than 10 miles to go to reach the enemy. The result of crossing the Central R.R. at 10 A.M. was to fight the battle a day late and at Gaines's Mill, three miles nearer McClellan's main army, thus losing the opportunity to cut off Porter's corps at Beaver Dam. This opportunity, the cream of the whole campaign, was lost by Jackson's not demanding of his troops better marching on the 24th and 25th.

His biographers have found many excuses for him, but, however good or bad these excuses may be, they will not be dwelt upon here for two reasons:

First—The object of the narrative is neither praise nor blame, but only that military students may realize, more fully than they could without such an example, the infinite value of hours when a battle is on foot, and how easily hours may be lost.

Second—The excuses of the biographers will best be given after finishing the whole story; for, unfortunately, this loss of the first day is not the only, nor is it the worst, failure of Jackson during these Seven Days, to come to time as was expected of him. He nowhere, even distantly, approached his record as a soldier won in his every other battle, either before or afterward. As one reads of his weak and dilatory performance day after day, and recalls what he had always been before, and always was afterward,

one feels that during these Seven Days he was really not Jackson. He was a different individual. He was under a spell. Nothing he had to do was done with the vigor which marked all the rest of his career.

Crossing the Central R.R. at 10 A.M. on the 25th, he marched but eight miles farther that day, going into bivouac about five o'clock, at Hundley's Corner. He was here in easy reach of Porter's rear and in full hearing of the heavy cannonading and musketry going on at Mechanicsville, which will be told of presently.

He describes the march, as follows, in his official report:

"Pursuing the Ashcake road we crossed the Central R.R. about 10 A.M. Approaching the Totopotomoy Creek, the Federal picket crossed to the south side of the stream, and partially destroyed the bridge, and, by felling trees across the road farther on, attempted to delay our advance. After the Texas skirmishers had gallantly crossed over, Reilly shelled the woods for the purpose of driving the enemy from it, in order that we might safely effect a lodgment, beyond the creek. Whiting rapidly repaired the bridge and the march was resumed. That night the three divisions bivouacked near Hundley's Corner. . . . We distinctly heard the rapid and continued discharges of cannon, which announced the engagement of Gen. A. P. Hill with the extreme right of the enemy."

Gen. Stuart, in his official report, says:

"At Dr. Shelton's we awaited the arrival of Gen. Jackson, sending a squadron in advance to seize and hold the bridge at the Totopotomoy. The enemy, anticipating us, had torn up the bridge, and held the opposite bank, and obstructed the road, without, however, making any determined stand. Capt. W. W. Blackford, Corps of Engineers, assigned to duty with my command, set about repairing the bridge, and in a half-hour, with the details furnished him, the bridge was ready. Passing Pole Green Church, Gen Jackson's march led directly toward the crossing of Beaver Dam Creek opposite Richardson's. Reaching that point he bivouacked for the night."

Gen. Trimble, in his official report, writes:

"On the 26th we moved, with the army, from Ashland in a southern direction, passing to the east of Mechanicsville, in the afternoon, and at 4 P.M. distinctly heard the volleys of artillery and musketry in the engagement of Gen. Hill with the enemy. Before sundown the firing was not more than two miles distant, and, in my opinion, we should have marched to the support of Gen. Hill that evening."

Now we will go back to the Chickahominy where Branch's brigade some eight miles above the rest of A. P. Hill's division at Meadow Bridge is under arms and expecting to

receive the signal to advance not later than 4 A.M. It does not come until after 10 o'clock. As soon as it was received, Branch crossed the Chickahominy and moved toward Mechanicsville, the enemy's pickets falling back before him.

At one point the road pursued by Branch approached, within a short distance, a road upon its left, which was being followed by Ewell's column, and the two generals had a brief meeting, but there was no other communication between the columns until the next day. Meanwhile, since an early hour in the morning, the divisions of A. P. Hill at Meadow Bridge, and of D. H. Hill and Longstreet at the Mechanicsville bridge, two miles below, had been under arms and anxiously awaiting the sound of Jackson's guns.

President Davis was on the ground, having ridden out from Richmond, not only to see, but anxious to participate in, the coming battle. A few siege guns had been mounted on the low bluffs along the Chickahominy Valley, and they were now manned for use, in case our crossing at the Mechanicsville bridge was resisted. But hour after hour passed, and there came no sound of conflict from the direction of Jackson's advance.

At 3 P.M., A. P. Hill, of his own motion, decided to wait for Jackson no longer. It is strange that he should have taken this responsibility without orders from Lee, who was within two miles, and who, it seems, would not have approved it. Henderson states that, "A message from Lee, ordering Hill to postpone all further movement, arrived too late."* Doubtless Lee wished, now, to make a fresh start on the morrow, as Johnston had wished at Seven Pines.

The enemy made slight resistance to Hill's advance, and fell back through Mechanicsville to his works behind Beaver Dam Creek, opening the road to Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions. A. P. Hill's division moved so rapidly that it arrived at Mechanicsville a mile and a half ahead of Branch's brigade. No advantage was gained, however, by thus anticipating the coming up of Jackson.

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*Hend. II., 16.

The enemy held, behind Beaver Dam Creek, an intrenched position quite impregnable to assault.

It had not been intended to attack it with infantry, but to threaten it with artillery, while Jackson passed to the rear and cut off the enemy's retreat.

Already Jackson, in spite of his slow march and the time wasted at Totopotomoy Creek, was within three miles of the enemy's line of retreat and with no force opposing him, but a few cavalry. But here he stopped his march, which had only been about 13 miles that day, and went into bivouac regardless of the roar, not only of artillery, but, presently, of musketry also, appealing to him from Mechanicsville. For with haste and poor judgment Davis, Lee, Longstreet, and the two Hills, not content to merely cannonade the enemy in his position, were beginning to wreck whole brigades of infantry, as must now be told.

The position was one in which good troops could repulse treble their numbers if assailed in front, but it was easily turned. Jackson, three miles off to the northeast, was already in easy reach of Porter's line of retreat, and had but to push his advance a mile or two, and Porter would have been compelled to retreat precipitately or be caught in a trap.

On the 26th of June, in the latitude of Richmond, the sun rises at 4:38 A.M. and sets at 7:27 P.M., and twilight lasts until about 8:30 PM. There was no moon. As already told, Gen. Jackson arrived at Hundley's Corner at 4:30 P.M. and went into bivouac there for the night, after having marched from Ashland about 11 miles off in an air line, and perhaps 12 to 14 by the roads traversed.

At Mechanicsville the firing commenced at three o'clock, and rapidly grew heavy. It was at first a long-range duel with the Confederate siege-guns on the Chickahominy, and then with the field-batteries accompanying Confederate brigades as they came up. A. P. Hill's five brigades of infantry were also put into action as soon as they could be formed, and advanced within range of the enemy's intrenched lines, when they opened fire both of artillery and infantry. Thus the battle was maintained until dark. Mean-

while as the hours of daylight were closing, under urgent messages from Lee and President Davis, two regiments of Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division were launched in a direct charge on perhaps the very strongest point of the whole Federal position. A more hopeless charge was never entered upon. They were the 1st N. C. and the 44th Ga., raw regiments, which had never before been under fire. Their behaviour illustrated the morale inspiring the army. Had they been given anything to do which it was possible to do, they would have done it, and become seasoned veterans in their first battle.

They dashed across a wide plain through a storm of musketry, shells, and canister, and some even went across Beaver Dam and into the entangled shashing close under the Federal lines. There they were killed until their bodies lay, as a Federal account described it, "as thick as flies in a bowl of sugar," before the survivors realized the trap into which they had been sent, and got back as best they could.

The 1st N. C. suffered 142 casualties, including all three field officers and the adjutant. The 44th Ga. lost 335, including its Col. and Lt.-Col.—a regimental loss seldom equalled in so short a time. The total casualties of this battle were about 1350 and included 14 field officers. The Federals reported their loss as 361.

Porter, in his report, says that only during the night, by reports from scouts and outposts, did the Federals become aware of the close proximity of Jackson's force, and it was recognized at once that McClellan's army was in a very critical condition. He writes:

"But for the conception of the idea of a flank movement, changing our base by the left flank to the James River, our position would have left but one alternative—a hasty abandonment of our attack on Richmond, and a retirement by the way we had advanced."

This conception, as before told, had been developed two weeks before by Stuart's raid, and it had not only been developed, but what was much more important, already transports had been loaded and many important prepara-

tions for carrying it into execution had been made in advance. The matter was decided in McClellan's mind during that night, though no orders were issued. Porter's corps was ordered to withdraw to a strong position upon the north bank of the Chickahominy in close connection with the rest of his army.

This position, about three miles in rear of Beaver Dam, had already been noted and selected by the Chief Engineer, Gen. Barnard.

Porter, however, remained in his intrenched position until daylight, and then began to withdraw down the Chickahominy in good order, carrying with him guns of position which had been posted along the Chickahominy. The Confederate batteries reopened their fire at dawn, and, the Federal rear-guard replied heavily for over two hours. Had Jackson's corps made an early start, and been pushed as Jackson was wont to push, before and after this Seven Days' spell, he would have struck Porter's corps, on the flank as it marched toward Cold Harbor. But the advance was so late and slow that when at last, about eight o'clock, it appeared in rear of Porter's position, having marched about three miles, the last Federal soldier had withdrawn, and Jackson's artillery fired by mistake into the head of Hill's advancing column. The trap was sprung, but the bird had flown.

Gen. Gregg gives the following account:

"Early in the morning of the 27th, I received orders from Gen. A. P. Hill, to take the advance with the 2d Brigade and to drive the enemy from their position on Beaver Dam Creek at Ellison's Mill. The brigade advanced to the attack. Slight resistance was made here by the enemy, and the passage of the stream, which presented a strong natural obstacle, was gained. Many Confederate soldiers, wounded or killed, in a preceding unsuccessful assault, lay in the road toward the crossing of the creek, and had to be moved aside to allow the passage of our artillery. A small bridge, broken up by the enemy, had also to be repaired. This was toward eight o'clock in the morning. Crossing Beaver Dam Creek, the brigade advanced along the road among piles of knapsacks and other property, and burning stores abandoned by the enemy, with skirmishers—out to the front and left. Coming into the edge of an open field, Capt. Cordero's company, 1st S. C. deployed as skirmishers, were fired on by artillery in front and Lt. Heise and a soldier were wounded. Capt. W. T. Haskell's company of the same regiment, advancing in open

order, discovered that the forces meeting us in front from the left were those of Maj.-Gen. Jackson, and entered into communication with them so as to avoid the risk of future mischiefs."

At last then, the morning half gone, the four Confederate divisions were united and within three miles of the enemy. Porter had gone into the position selected behind Boatswains' Creek, with three divisions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and 20 batteries, in all about 27,000 men and 80 guns. The position was naturally strong, and it was being strengthened hourly with abattis and rifle-pits.

Its development covered only about two miles of convex front. Its left flank rested on the open Chickahominy bottom, where heavy batteries from the south side secured it from being turned. Its right flank was its weak point, its protection there being only tangled thickets which also covered much of the front. Where this was lacking were generally three lines of infantry, partially under cover, and abundant artillery so placed that its fire was over the heads of the infantry. His force was enough to cover his front six deep. Two bridges gave connection to the south side, and over them, during the action, McClellan sent Slocum's division (9,000) of Franklin's corps with two batteries, and French's and Meagher's brigades of Sumner's corps as reinforcements—say about 14,000 men. Porter himself was, perhaps, the hardest opponent to fight in the Federal army. No one in it knew better how to occupy and prepare his ground for defense, or was more diligent to do it; and in his corps were concentrated all of the regular regiments of the old Federal army.

To attack such a position was no easy proposition, and Lee's force, checked and 1,300 weakened by the ill-advised affair at Mechanicsville, had no margin to spare over the size of its task. Indeed, had McClellan reenforced Porter as he should have done, with a whole corps, he might have won a great victory. But he allowed himself to be imposed upon by the demonstrations made by Magruder and Huger, under orders from Lee, and neither attacked with his left, nor strengthened his right sufficiently. He weakly left the question of sending reenforcements to his four corps com-

manders. Franklin sent Slocum's division, and Sumner sent French's and Meagher's brigades, but Keyes and Heintzelman reported that they could spare nothing.

As it was, therefore, the fight should result in Lee's favor by a reasonable margin, provided it was well-managed and its force not squandered in partial attacks. But this took place to an extent perilously near losing the battle. It did lose the precious hours of daylight necessary to gather any fruits of victory, and made the victory much more bloody than it need have been. The importance of time should have been appreciated and the march pushed to locate the enemy's new position and develop it with strong skirmish-lines. Then, at the most favorable points, our utmost strength should have been marshalled and concentrated for simultaneous assaults of infantry, supported upon each flank by concentrations of batteries. It was but waste of time and blood to launch any small assault against that position, as had been done at Beaver Dam.

The fact that we finally carried the position by a general charge, after the repulse of many partial ones, shows that our men were good enough and that we had enough of them to have made a success early in the afternoon, had our energies been first concentrated for the effort.

During the morning of the 27th, the Confederates moved with a slowness only to be understood by remembering the inexperience in handling such large bodies, of many of our generals and staff officers. By noon, however, we had developed the enemy's position. On our left Jackson was at Cold Harbor with four divisions, his own, Ewell's, Whiting's, D. H. Hill's and Lawton's large brigade in addition. A. P. Hill, with Longstreet in reserve, confronted their left.

Porter, in the *Century*, writes:

> "The advance column of these troops (Jackson's) came a little earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more cautious, and, for some hours, not so aggressive."

What happened was this: D. H. Hill's division, crossing the Chickahominy behind A. P. Hill, had been pushed out to the left by Lee's battle order and brought up behind

and in support of Jackson's forces early on the 27th. But in the slow marching of the morning, D. H. Hill, with characteristic aggressiveness, had managed to pass Jackson's force and to take the lead. On approaching Cold Harbor and discovering the enemy's position, Hill at once moved his division up to the edge of the swamp held by the enemy upon the other side, and opened upon them with a battery. His battery was quickly answered by 10 guns, and after a brief action was withdrawn, crippled. Just at that juncture came orders from Jackson withdrawing Hill into some woods in rear, where the head of Jackson's long column was already standing halted. In his official report, Jackson thus explains his object in this maneuver:

"Soon after, Gen. A. P. Hill became engaged, and being unacquainted with the ground, and apprehensive, from what appeared to me to be the respective positions of the Confederate and Federal forces engaged that, if I then pressed forward, our troops would be mistaken for the enemy and be fired into, and hoping that Gen. A. P. Hill and Longstreet would drive the Federals toward me, I directed Gen. D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the wood on the right of the road (from which he is withdrawing D. H. Hill), an open space across which I hoped the enemy would be driven. Thus arranged, it was in our power to distinguish friend from foe in case the enemy should be driven as expected."

It is not necessary to comment upon this too elaborate explanation of how more than a half of Lee's army was paralyzed for three hours, just on the verge of battle, further than to say that the inaction, and the excuse for it, are both unlike anything ever seen in Jackson before or after these Seven Days. D. H. Hill was withdrawn about 2 P.M. It was about 2:30 P.M. when A. P. Hill's advance, pressed as rapidly as he was able to bring up his six brigades, developed into a battle.

Porter, in "Battles and Leaders," further describes the fight made by this single division (about 12,000 men) which had had, only the evening before, sharp losses at Ellison's Mill.

"Soon after 2 P.M., A. P. Hill's force, between us and New Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive disposition, independent of its own troops on its flanks, by advancing from under cover of the woods in lines well-formed and extending, as the contest progressed from in front of Martin's battery to Morell's left.

"Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade seemed to almost melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet the others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along the whole line to our extreme right.

"The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, heard above the roar of artillery and volleys of musketry, all combined, was something fearful.

"Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted ammunition by borrowing from more bountifully supplied and generous companions; some withdrew temporarily for ammunition, and fresh regiments took their places, ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their desperate enemy, for the purpose of retaking ground from which we had been pressed, and which it was necessary to occupy in order to hold our position."

It is to make one almost sick of regret to read of such desperate valor so lavishly wasted upon an impossible effort, while three times as many men stood by and looked on. A. P. Hill's account of it in his official report is as follows:

"The incessant roar of musketry and deep thunder of artillery told that the whole force of the enemy was in my front. Branch becoming hard pressed, Pender was sent in to his relief. Field and Archer were also directed to do their part in this murderous contest. Braxton's battery, accompanying Archer, had already opened. They were ordered to turn the enemy's left. These two brigades under their heroic leaders, moving across the open field, met the enemy behind an abatis and strong intrenchments at the base of a long wooded hill, the enemy being in three lines on the side of this declivity, its crest falling off into a plateau, and this plateau studded with guns.

"My front now presented a curved line, its convexity toward the enemy. Desperate but unavailing attempts were made to force the enemy's positions. The 14th S. C., Col. McGowan (having hurried up from picket duty on the other side of the Chickahominy and arriving in the thickest of the fight) on the extreme left, made several daring charges. The 16th N. C., Col. McElroy, and 22nd Lt.-Col. Gray, at one time carried the crest of the hill, and were in the enemy's camp, but were driven back by overwhelming numbers. The 35th Ga., Col. Thomas, also drove through the enemy's line like a wedge, but it was all of no avail. Gregg and Branch fought with varying success, Gregg having before him the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was suffering heavily, but stubbornly held its own. Field and Archer met a withering storm of bullets, but pressed on to within a short distance of the enemy's works, but the storm was too fierce for such a handful of men. They recoiled and were again pressed to the charge, but with no better success. These brave men had done all that any soldiers could do. Directing their men to lie down, the fight was continued and help awaited. From having been the attacking, I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly, was the ground held. My division was thus engaged fully

two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attacks afterward, in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army on that side of the Chickahominy.

"About four o'clock reenforcements came up on my right from Gen. Longstreet, and later, Jackson's men on my right and center and my division was relieved of the weight of the contest. It was then continued on more equal terms, and finally the extreme left of the enemy's line was most gallantly carried by Hood's brigade.

"At seven o'clock the General-in-chief, in person, gave me an order to advance my whole line and to communicate this order as far as I could to all commanders of troops. This was done and a general advance being made, the enemy were swept from the field and the pursuit only stopped by nightfall, and the exhaustion of our troops. The batteries of Crenshaw, Johnson, Braxton, and Pegram were actively engaged, Crenshaw and Johnson pretty well knocked to pieces. Pegram, with indomitable energy and earnestness of purpose, though having lost 47 men and many horses, at Mechanicsville, had put his battery in condition for this fight also."

Lee's official report of this battle was not written until eight months afterward, during which period Jackson's great military genius had manifested itself undimmed by any spell; and with increasing brilliancy on the fields of Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg. There was, most wisely and properly, every disposition to ignore and forget the disappointments felt during the Seven Days, and the facts are glossed over with but brief and, as it were, casual mention, but they are plainly apparent.

Lee by no means designed that A. P. Hill should alone engage the whole of Porter's force. He had had a personal interview with Jackson during the morning, and he knew that the head of his column was at Cold Harbor before 2 P. M. He expected it to immediately envelop and to turn Porter's right. He says that Hill—

"Immediately formed his line nearly parallel to the road toward McGehee's house, and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. Under this impression Longstreet was held back until this moment should commence."

Hill went into action anticipating that Jackson's whole force would almost immediately be demonstrating or attacking upon the enemy's right flank. Why were they not? The head of the column was up, but it was hidden from the

enemy's view in the woods, and its whole length, stretching for miles back, was simply standing idle in the road. Had the divisions even been closed up and disentangled from ordance wagons, artillery, and ambulances, and massed near Cold Harbor, the time would not have been entirely wasted, but this was not done. Stern necessity at length, forced Lee to call upon Longstreet's division to aid Hill (A. P.). Three brigades were advanced within musket range as supports, but held back from the charge while the remaining three were held near at hand and ready for action. At length, probably about 4:30, aroused to action both by the receding sounds of A. P. Hill's battle, and by urgent messages from Lee, Jackson sent D. H. Hill's division back into the wood from which he had withdrawn it before two o'clock. He also sent a staff-officer to his other divisions with instructions, quoted by Henderson, as follows:

"The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back rapidly along the line, and tell the commanders to advance instantly in echelon from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide, the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. Tell the commanders if this formation falls at any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing, and attack the enemy vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit, tell them to take in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear."

That the troops were still standing halted along the line of march appears in the official reports, as well as in the time consumed before they were able to make their power felt in the battle. This required from one to two hours.

Winder, commanding Jackson's division, reports:

"Left bivouac near Totopotomoy Creek at about 5 A. M., being in the rear of the column, except one brigade. The march was slow and tedious (about seven miles during the whole day). Firing was heard on the right. Between 4 and 5 P. M., I received orders from Gen. Ewell to move the brigade from the column filing to the right through a wood and swamp, to the point where I heard the heaviest fire."

Lawton's official report says:

"In the order of march toward the battle-field on that day my brigade brought up the rear of Gen. Jackson's army, and was, therefore, the last to engage the enemy. I had remained at a halt for several hours, more than two miles from the point where the brigade

afterwards entered the field, and was not ordered forward until nearly 5 P. M. I then marched rapidly on, retarded much by the artillery and ambulances which blocked up the narrow road."

While Jackson's troops were being brought up, the noise of battle waned, until an ominous silence seemed to possess the field as the sun drew near the horizon. Then the storm arose again and soon swelled to a magnitude never before heard on this continent.

It was about 7 o'clock when at last D. H. Hill, Ewell, Lawton and a part of Winder were all hotly engaged in the swampy tangle in front of the Federal right, and, though in great confusion, were making headway through it, and several Confederate batteries were returning the Federal fire. Opposite their left, Whiting's two brigades had just arrived, being directed by Lee as they approached from Cold Harbor, and two of Winder's brigades were also close at hand. A. P. Hill's brigades, though much diminished, were still holding their lines, and Longstreet was all in position. It was, practically, anybody's fight. A fresh division to Porter would have easily held his lines until night. It might even have enabled him to make an effective counterstroke, though the natural obstacles behind which his lines were located, offered but one or two possible opportunities. Two fresh brigades, French's and Meagher's were enroute to him, but were yet too far off to lend any aid.

But Lee, at last, was putting forth his whole strength. He issued orders for an advance of every command, regardless of the troops upon its right or left. A general advance was made, not simultaneous in its beginnings, but pressed to success by Whiting's two brigades supported by Longstreet's on our extreme right, by Lawton's and Winder's brigades in the centre, and by D. H. Hill with Garland's and parts of Ripley's and Rodes's brigades upon our left.

Had it been made two hours earlier, the fruits of the victory would have been important. As it was, they were so trifling as scarcely to be worth mention. Porter fell back in fairly good order under cover of his superior artillery, and our artillery could not be gotten forward across the swamps. Blessed night, for which the defeated pray, had

let down her mantle while the firing was still severe, and before we could even feel fully assured of our victory. Under its friendly cover, and the protection of the French and Meagher brigades, by 4 A. M. the whole Federal army had crossed the Chickahominy, damaging the bridges behind them, and leaving us, as the fruits of victory, but 22 guns, 2836 prisoners, and about 10,000 small-arms.

The Federal casualties were reported as: killed 894, wounded 3107, missing 2836, total 6837.

The Confederate casualties cannot be exactly divided, but I estimate the total losses of the different divisions for this battle, as follows:

A. P. Hill's division,	6 brigades,	2688	
Longstreet's division,	6 brigades,	1883	(Only 5 engaged)
D. H. Hill's division,	5 brigades,	1423	
Whiting's division,	2 brigades,	1017	
Ewell's division,	3 brigades,	764	
Jackson's division,	3 brigades,	91	(Only 1 engaged)
Lawton's division,	1 brigades,	492	
	26	8358	

The heavy character of much of the fighting is shown by some of the regimental losses, although in many instances the reports give only the total casualties for the Seven Days, and do not distinguish between the battles. The charge by Whiting's two brigades, under Hood and Law, was notable for being driven home on the first effort, without halting to open fire. The 4th Tex., the first regiment to enter the enemy's works, lost 44 killed and 203 wounded. There was no thicket or obstruction to seriously check the advance at this portion of the field, and part of the ground traversed was exposed to but little artillery fire.

Trimble, of Ewell's division, made the following observations in his official report:

"The subjoined list of killed and wounded best shows the severity of the conflict, and a comparison of those of different regiments fairly illustrates the superiority of a rapid charge over a standing fight, not only as the best mode of securing victories, but doing it with smaller loss. The 15th Ala. and 21st Ga., numbering 1315 men stood, under a destructive fire for an hour or more, returning the enemy's volleys all the time, and advanced half a mile, with only fragments of companies at the close of the day. Their loss in killed and wounded was 251 men. The 16th Miss., and 21st N. C., numbering 1244 men, passed under as hot a fire an equal distance in 15 minutes, losing in killed and wounded 85 men."

Briefly, it may be said that it seems to have been left in the hands of the division commanders until it was nearly lost. Only at the last moment was the hand of the general in command revealed. But had Jackson's march that morning been pushed with the fierce swiftness natural to him on such occasions, and had he, during A. P. Hill's attack, thrown his whole force upon McClellan's right, a comparatively easy victory would have resulted. As has been stated, the enemy's right flank was his weakest point. It was not found. D. H. Hill would have attacked it even before A. P. Hill's battle, had not Jackson stopped and withdrawn him, instead of reenforcing and pushing him, as it was naturally expected that Jackson would do—although no man ever needed pushing less than D. H. Hill. In the Century War Book, he wrote of this occasion:

"Had Jackson's command gone in on the left of the road running by the McGehee House, Porter's position would have been turned and the line of retreat cut off."

Seven Days' Campaign — The Pursuit

June 28—June 29—Magruder's Report—Jackson's Report—Lee's Report—Lee to Magruder—Savage Station—June 20—Waiting in Vain for the Signal—Holme's Division—Huger's Division—Wright Meets Jackson—Huger's Report—Jackson, June 29—Lee to Magruder—Jackson, June 30—White Oak Swamp—Franklin's Report—Jackson's Account—The Cannonade—Munford's Letter—Hampton's Crossing—Franklin's Comments—D. H. Hill's Explanation—Battle of Frazier Farm—Bayonet Fighting—A Successful Ruse—Lee's Report.

The day after the battle, Saturday, the 28th, was given to the care of the wounded, the burial of the dead, and the collection of the scattered troops. During the night McClellan had begun his retreat to the James, ordering Keyes, with the 4th Corps, to cross White Oak Swamp and take position to cover the passage of his trains, which were put in motion early on the 28th. On the 28th, also, the troops which had fought under Porter on the 27th were sent forward across White Oak Swanp.

On the Confederate side it was not yet clear what the enemy would do. Ewell's and Jackson's divisions had not been seriously engaged, and Ewell's was sent down the Chickahominy about seven miles to Despatch Station, to see if they showed any disposition to cross the stream and retreat down the Peninsula. Stuart's cavalry followed the railroad toward White House. Bottom's bridge was found burned, and the next morning, White House was also burned and evacuated. On Sunday morning, the 29th, the enemy's intrenchments opposite Magruder and Huger were found abandoned, and his camps and depots were being burned. It was then apparent that his destination was the James River, and Lee, no longer hesitating, issued orders to his whole army for a vigorous pursuit. His best chance, that of destroying Porter's corps, had been lost; but his adversary was on foot in the woods, encumbered with enormous trains which he would try to defend, and there should be opportunities to overwhelm him in detail, and unprotected by breastworks.

Magruder, immediately behind the enemy on the Williamsburg road, was ordered to pursue down that road.

Huger, on the Charles City road, was ordered down that road. From the battlefield of the 27th, A. P. Hill and Longstreet were ordered to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and passing in rear of Magruder and Huger to move by the Darbytown, the next road to the right. Ewell from Despatch Station was to rejoin Jackson. Jackson, with the largest force, was directed to pursue by the shortest and most direct route. He was to cross the Chickahominy over the Grapevine bridge, across which Porter had retreated, and which he had partially torn up, and to press directly upon McClellan's rear with his whole force. This comprised his own three brigades under Winder, Ewell's three, D. H. Hill's five, Whiting's two, and Lawton's one—in all 14 brigades, nearly 25,000 strong.

Looking back upon the course of events, it is interesting to inquire wherein lay the weakness of this order, apparently so simple and obvious in its execution. Yet the pursuit, from this moment, was bootless and a failure. It did capture a few guns and prisoners, but it paid for them in blood a price far beyond their value. There were two ways in which Lee might have pursued. One is that just set forth. The recommendation of that method is that it seemed to reach the enemy with his largest forces by the shortest roads. But, per contra, is the consideration that on the shortest roads will be found the enemy's most formidable rear-guards and obstructions. With energetic lieutenants these may be overcome; but the chance exists whether the proper leaders will be at the right places. The alternate course would have been to leave the direct pursuit over the obstructed roads, and against the enemy's rear-guards, to but two divisions,—those of Magruder and Huger,—while Lee himself with Jackson, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill moving swiftly around the rear by good roads, and reenforced by Holmes, put the bulk of his army, flushed with its recent victory, directly across McClellan's path near Malvern Hill.

Not only would it count for a great deal that all the divisions should be under the personal eye of the commander, but there was strong probability that Lee might be able to force upon McClellan the disadvantage of having to take the

offensive. On this occasion, as it turned out, Jackson was still under his "spell," and did nothing. Lee, having gone with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, lost touch of all three,—Jackson, Magruder and Huger,—and entirley failed to get any service from them for the two critical days, the 29th and 30th.

The orders for the pursuit were given soon after sunrise on Sunday, the 29th. Magruder had not entirely absorbed Lee's confidence that McClellan did not have in him the risking of a counterstroke. He knew that there were on the south side fully 60,000 Federals, and that between them and Richmond there were not but 25,000 Confederates. His official report thus describes the situation:

"I received repeated instructions during Saturday night from Gen. Lee's headquarters enjoining upon my command the utmost vigilance, directing the men to sleep on their arms, and to be prepared for whatever might occur. These orders were promptly communicated by me to the different commanders of my forces, and were also transmitted to Gen. Huger on my right. I passed the night without sleep and in superintendence of their execution. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced against any point in our line * * * * though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent.

"Our relief was therefore great when intelligence reached us almost simultaneously from Col. Chilton, and one of my staff, that the enemy, whose presence had been ascertained, as late as 3:30 A. M., had evacuated his works and was retreating.

"Col. Chilton, who rode into my camp on Sunday morning, hurried off to see Gen. Lee on the Nine Mile road, and I gave, while riding with him, the necessary orders to put in motion my whole command, which extended over a distance of some miles, directing Gen. Griffith's brigade, which was nearest to the road, to advance at once from the centre, and ordering Gen. Jones's division, in advancing, to incline toward Fair Oaks Station, as I had been informed that Maj.-Gen. Jackson had crossed, or was crossing, the Grapevine bridge, and would operate down the Chickahominy. Having overtaken Gen. Lee, we rode together down the Nine Mile road, and the general informed me of the plans which he had adopted for the pursuit of the enemy. They were as follows: Longstreet's division was to have crossed the New Bridge and to take position on our extreme right, so as to intercept the enemy in his attempt to reach James river; Huger's division to march down the Williamsburg road on my right flank, and Maj.-Gen. Jackson's division, which he stated had crossed or was crossing the Grapevine bridge, over the Chickahominy, was to operate down that river on its right bank, while my own command would press him vigorously in front.

"At Fair Oaks Station * * * Gen. Lee, having repeated his instructions, left the ground. * * *

"I also despatched a staff-officer toward Grapevine Bridge, some three miles off, to ascertain the position of Maj.-Gen. Jackson's troops, which I had supposed from the statements above given had already crossed * * * In the meantime, Maj. Bryan, the staff-officer who had been sent by Maj.-Gen. Jackson, returned with his (Jackson's) engineer, Lt. Boswell, who reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson was compelled to rebuild the bridge, which would be completed in about two hours. Maj. Bryan reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson had crossed but a small portion of his infantry, not more than three companies, over the broken bridge."

It is plain from this narrative that Lee's orders to Jackson to pursue by the Grapevine bridge road, above referred to, contemplated immediate performance on Jackson's part, and were given at an early hour on Sunday, the 29th. The name Grapevine, applied to this bridge, was taken from a ford of the Chickahominy well known in the neighborhood, and reached by a country road which crossed the swamp by the ford. In building a bridge the Federals utilized the road, and built the bridge near it, but without disturbing the ford, which was practicable at this time, the river being low, even while waiting to repair the bridge.

Meanwhile, too, New Bridge and another bridge, three-quarters of a mile above it, were opened by Lee's order on Saturday, the 28th. The extra distance, which would have been involved in marching from the battlefield to Savage Station by the New Bridge instead of by the Grapevine route, was only about three miles. But this was Sunday, and Jackson gave it strict observance. The greater part of his troops remained in camp all day and until after midnight Sunday night. Then they made a start at, or before 2:30 A. M. His official report entirely ignores the receipt of any orders from Gen. Lee, but says:

"The 28th and 29th were occupied in disposing of the dead and wounded and repairing Grapevine bridge over the Chickahominy, which McClellan's forces had used in their retreat and destroyed in their rear. During the night of the 29th we commenced crossing the Chickahominy, and on the following morning arrived at Savage Station."

Lee in his official report, written as told, eight months later, accepts the excuse of Grapevine Bridge, as follows:

"Jackson's route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but he was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine bridge. Late in the afternoon, Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his

three divisions (two brigades each), and two regiments of another. A severe action ensued, and continued about two hours, when it was terminated by night. The troops displayed great gallantry, and inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy; but, owing to the lateness of the hour and the small force employed, the result was not decisive, and the enemy continued his retreat under cover of darkness, leaving several hundred prisoners with his dead and wounded, in our hands."

This was the insignificant outcome of the day, and in his reference to Jackson's delay and to the lateness of the hour and the small force engaged, one may easily read that he had hoped to have had a very different story.

After giving Magruder his orders, but unfortunately without waiting to see that Jackson failed to arrive, Lee had gone over to the Charles City road, where Huger was advancing, and thence he passed on to the Darbytown road to join A. P. Hill and Longstreet. Soon after being left alone, finding that Jackson was not near, Magruder became alarmed at a demonstration of the enemy's rear-guard, and sent such urgent calls for aid to Huger that the latter halted two of his four brigades, and marched back with them to Seven Pines. This lost for his division the cream of the day. Here he discovered the needlessness of Magruder's alarm, and, getting urgent messages from Lee, he returned to the Charles City road, marched down it until he found the enemy's pickets late in the afternoon, and went into bivouac.

Lee was much disappointed that evening at the lack of results, and wrote Magruder the following note:*

"General, I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge then again to press on his rear, rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely."

This note had also a postscript which will be quoted presently in another connection.

Magruder had only brought into action two brigades, Kershaw's and Semmes's, and a half of Barksdale's. The force engaged against him had been Sumner's corps, and Smith's division of Franklin's. Heintzelman's corps had also been present in the morning, but in the afternoon it had crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett's ford. The remain-

*O. R. 13, 687.

ing nine Federal brigades were, doubtless, too heavy a task for Magruder with only six but had Jackson with his 14 brigades been present in the morning, the enemy should have been routed. Doubtless Magruder should have employed twice the force he did engage, and taken chances. His two and a half brigades were overmatched, though they fought until dark, losing over 400 men and capturing prisoners from each of the three divisions opposed to them. They reported next morning 400 dead left by the enemy on the field, but such reports are always overestimated.

Jackson arrived in person at Magruder's headquarters near Savage Station at 3:30 A. M. on Monday, the 30th, and informed Magruder that his troops would be up soon after daylight.

During the night, the entire Federal force had crossed the White Oak Swamp and McClellan had accomplished one-half his retreat safely. He had had only about 16 miles to traverse, and his trains were now upon the last half of it, with his army well concentrated to protect his flank. With one more day his column would be so shortened that no exposed flank would be left, and his whole army could be united in the rear of the train.

This was therefore, the critical day. Serious blows had threatened the Federals on the 26th at Beaver Dam, on the 27th at Gaines Mill, and on the 29th at Savage Station; but all had been escaped by bad handling on the part of the Confederates. Now a final opportunity was offered to repair all shortcomings, and every condition seemed favorable. Holmes's division, 6000 strong, with six batteries, had been brought from south of the James River, and was at New Market at 10 A. M. on the 30th. Longstreet with his own and A. P. Hill's divisions, had bivouacked on the Darbytown road, the night before, and this morning they moved into the Long Bridge road, and soon found the enemy's line covering Charles City cross-roads at Frazier's Farm or Glendale, and extending down the Quaker road toward Malvern Hill. These three divisions, 14 brigades, numbered about 23,000 men.

In addition to these, Lee, early on the 30th, had withdrawn Magruder's six brigades, now about 12,000 strong, from Savage Station, and brought them down the Darbytown road within striking distance by 2 P.M. and had halted them at that hour near Timberlake's store.

Huger's four brigades, about 9000 men, were advancing down the Charles City road, and were expected to open the action on this part of the field at an early hour. Either his guns or Jackson's would be the signal for Longstreet and A. P. Hill to take up the battle.

Meanwhile, Jackson, only four miles off in an air line, but all of 15 miles by the public roads,—the only ones generally well-known—was confidently expected to make up for his non-appearance of the day before by an early and very vigorous one this morning, assaulting the enemy's rear-guard with his 14 brigades, 25,000 strong, and emulating the reputation he had made in the Valley. Thus, with 44,000 men, all close at hand upon the enemy's flank, and Stonewall Jackson with 25,000 in his rear, fortune seemed at last about to smile broadly for once upon the Confederate cause. Unknown to us, another circumstance was rarely in our favor. The Federal army was temporarily without a head. On the 29th, 30th, and July 1, McClellan, on each day, left his army without placing any one in command during his absence, while he did engineer's duty, examining the localities toward which he was marching. Had the Confederates accomplished their reasonable expectations, the criticism of McClellan would have been very severe.

On the Confederate side, Lee, with Longstreet, and Hill, in a field of broom-grass and small pines, waited impatiently for the signal.

He was so close in rear of his line of battle that men and horses among the couriers and staff were wounded by random shots. For quite a time, too, President Davis and his staff were present, in conference with the generals, while missiles grew more frequent and wounded men begun to come in from the front.

For hours we stood there waiting—waiting for something which never happened. Every minute that we waited

was priceless time thrown away. Twelve o'clock came and the previous day was half gone. One o'clock, two o'clock, three o'clock followed. Even four o'clock drew near, and now, whatever was started, would be cut short by night. Our great opportunity was practically over, and we had not yet pulled a trigger. We had waited for either Huger or Jackson or both to begin, and neither had begun. As Beauregard, at Bull Run, had sent word to Ewell to begin, and then had gone to the center and waited; as Johnston, at Seven Pines had given orders to Hill and Longstreet about beginning, and then gone to the left and waited; so now, Lee, having given orders beforehand to both Jackson and Huger, had passed on to the right and was waiting; and in every case the opportunity passed unimproved.

Briefly, this is what had happened, beginning with the extreme right column under Holmes, which, with Magruder's column, was to support Longstreet's right:

The river road from New Market to Harrison's Landing passed under and around Malvern Heights, between them and the river. From a point on this road, perhaps a mile and a half from the river, across low, flat ground, one could see a considerable expanse of the Malvern Heights, 1000 yards off across the meadows on the left; and over these heights were passing many of the 5000 wagons composing McClellan's trains. No target is more attractive to an artillerist than his enemy's wagon train, and six rifled guns of Holmes's were sent down in the meadows to fire upon these wagons. Lee also saw the position, and approved the attack, and directed Holmes to bring up his whole division to support the guns. But no sooner did the six guns open than they were replied to by 30 of the heaviest rifles of the Federal Artillery Reserve, which, escorted by only about 1500 infantry Fitz John Porter, had just arrived on Malvern Heights to occupy the position. The fierce fire of this great battery was quickly aided by the fire of heavy guns from the gunboats in the James—lying in Turkey Bend, and directing their fire by wigwag signals between their mastheads—and the Federals on the Heights. The six guns were quickly wrecked. Two caissons were exploded, and so many horses

killed that the guns were with difficulty withdrawn. No fire is so appalling to unseasoned troops as that of heavy artillery received in a thick wood where every shot cuts limbs and smashes trees around them, even though the actual damage from it may be trifling. Holmes's whole division concealed in the woods in the vicinity of the six guns engaged was now exposed to such a fire, converging from opposite quarters. There was but one thing to do, and that was to get away. Some commands, especially among the infantry behaved well, and withdrew in perfect order; some were thrown into confusion, and among some cavalry commands and light artillery stampede took place. Two guns which had not been engaged were entangled in the woods and abandoned, and many men were run over and injured. Altogether the confusion was so great that Lee directed Magruder's six brigades to march to Holmes's support, though they could have done no good, as there was nothing for them to attack or defend.

Thus, Holmes and Magruder, 18,000 men, were diverted from the real work of the day. This was just about to begin when this side issue of the cannonade of Malvern Hill was ventured upon. The total casualties in Holmes's division (including 15 wounded among the six guns) were two killed and 40 wounded, besides some injured in the stampede.

Let us next turn to Huger's division. On Sunday, the 29th, the division made but a very short distance down the Charles City road for two reasons. Two of its brigades were called back, and had some miles of extra marching and countermarching in the hot sun by Magruder's false alarm when he found that he was not supported by the proximity of Jackson, as has been already told.

The other two brigades thought it imprudent to pass any road on their left leading across White Oak Swamp, until it had been reconnoitered as it was known that a large force of the enemy was still on the other side.

At the first of these crossroads, a force of the enemy was discovered attempting to cross to the south side. It was driven back and the resulting skirmish consumed the day.

It seems strange that Lee, though at no great distance on the next day (the 30th) should have still failed to see Huger, and either to bring him to the battle, which was waiting for his arrival, or to order it to proceed without him. But there is no intimation in the reports of any communication; nor, in Huger's proceedings, of any consciousness that important action was waiting upon him.

At another swamp crossing, called Fisher's, Huger's column, Monday morning, discovered that the enemy's forces on the opposite side had been withdrawn. Wright's brigade was then ordered to investigate. He crossed the swamp with his brigade and got into the deserted camps of the enemy on the north side, picking up a few prisoners and finding some abandoned stores.

By 2:30 P. M. he had made his way entirely across to the main road where Jackson, as is yet to be told, with his 14 brigades was standing at bay at the main crossing, called the White Oak Bridge. Jackson seems to have taken no special interest in Wright's arrival, though it proved that at least one unobstructed crossing of the swamp was within three miles. Jackson ordered Wright to return along the edge of the swamp, to look for crossings as he went, and if he found one, to try and force it; but he sent neither staff-officer to bring back a report, or reenforcements to aid if any favorable point should be found. Apparently, he was satisfied to remain where he was and to do only what he was doing—nothing. Wright started back, and at one and a half miles came to Brackett's Ford, a well-known road, across which a large part of the Federal forces had crossed during the night, and which they had then obstructed by cutting down trees and destroying a small bridge. Pushing two companies of skirmishers through the swamp, Wright captured the enemy's picket force on the south side, but saw, beyond the picket, a force of the enemy, with artillery, too strong for his brigade, so he withdrew. Continuing his march along the edge of the swamp another mile and a half, he found a cow trail which led him across it about three-fourths of a mile below his crossing of the morning, and here he encamped. The occupation of Huger's other bri-

gades, during the day is given as follows in his official report:

"The troops bivouacked in their position while it was dark, and resumed the march at daylight (Monday, June 30). Mahone advanced cautiously, captured many prisoners, and killed some cavalry scouts, one bearing an order to Kearny to retire and keep a strong battery of artillery with his rear-guard. After passing Fisher's house, we found the road obstructed by trees felled all across it. Gen. Mahone, found it best to cut a road around the obstructions. For such work we were deficient in tools. The column was delayed while the work was going on, and it was evening before we got through and drove off the workmen who were still cutting down other trees. As we advanced through the woods and came to an open field on high ground (P. Williams on map), a powerful battery of rifled guns opened on us. Gen. Mahone disposed his troops and advanced a battery of artillery, Moorman's, and a sharp artillery fire was kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe and we had many men killed and wounded. 'List of casualties sent herewith (25 killed, 53 wounded, total 78). I went to the front and examined the position. I withdrew most of our guns, and only kept up a moderate fire. On our left the White Oak Swamp approached very near. The right appeared to be good ground, and I determined to turn the battery by moving a column of infantry to my right. It was now dark."

It seems incredible that this division, within four miles of Lee could have been allowed to spend the whole day in a mere contest of axemen, wherein the Federals with the most axes, had only to cut them down, and the Confederates, with the fewest, to cut up and remove. The result could scarcely have been doubtful. Our army at this time compared with an organized and disciplined army about as a confederacy would compare with a nation. Each division was an allied but independent command, rather than a part of a single army.

This will be even more evident in the story of Jackson's column, now to be told. His command had always before

acted alone and independently. Lee's instructions to him were very brief and general in supreme confidence that the Jackson of the Valley would win even brighter laurels on the Chickahominy. The shortest route was assigned to him and the largest force was given him. Lee then took himself off to the farthest flank, as if generously to leave to Jackson the opportunity of the most brilliant victory of war.

His failure is not so much a military as a psychological phenomenon. He did not try and fail. He simply made no effort. The story embraces two days. He spent the 29th in camp in disregard of Lee's instructions, and he spent the 30th in equal idleness at White Oak Swamp. His 25,000 infantry practically did not fire a shot in the two days.

Here is the story: It has already been related that early Sunday morning, Lee, coming from Jackson's direction, told Magruder that Jackson had been ordered to pursue, and was even then supposed to be crossing the Chickahominy. Magruder was also ordered to attack the enemy, and he and his lieutenants soon sent messengers to establish communication with Jackson. Later, Magruder received a severe shock in the following note from Gen. Jones, commanding one of his three divisions, of two brigades each:

"MAJ-GEN. MAGRUDER:

"My line is formed to the left and somewhat to the front of Gen. Cobb. * * * I do not think it prudent for me to attack with my small force, unless there be a simultaneous attack all along our lines. I will keep a good lookout on my left. *I had hoped that Jackson would have cooperated with me on my left, but he sends me word that he cannot, as he has other important duty to perform.**

"Respectfully, D. R. JONES,
"Brig.-Gen."

This note, taken in connection with the withdrawal of the two brigades which Huger had sent, depressed Magruder very much. Later in the evening he received some encouragement. Maj. Taylor, of Lee's staff, bearing a message, arrived, hunting for Jackson. Upon being told that Jack-

*13 W. R., 675, incorrectly dated June 28. On the 28th the retreat of the enemy was not known, and there were no orders to attack, or for Jackson to cross the Chickahominy. The situation is that of the 29th. The italics are mine.

son had been "ordered elsewhere," as Magruder loosely quoted his message to Jones, Taylor did not hesitate to say that there must be some mistake. As he did not know the country, and Magruder had upon his staff a Chaplain Allen who did know it, the message for Jackson was instrusted to Allen, and Taylor returned to Lee. But Lee's note that night to Magruder, already quoted (p. 138) contained a post-script, as follows:

> "P. S. Since the above was written I learn from Maj. Taylor that you are under the impression that Gen. Jackson has been ordered not to support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to push the pursuit vigorously."

It scarcely needs the corroboration of Lee's word that upon his discovery of McClellan's retreat, and his putting the rest of his army in motion with orders to press the enemy, he must have given similar orders to Jackson; and his statement to Magruder, that Jackson was even then crossing at Grapevine bridge, and his sending Taylor later with a message to Jackson, show that he believed his orders were being executed.

The explanation of Jackson's message to Jones is clear in the light of his regard for the Sabbath, and from the particular expression used. He mentions no physical obstacle nor any other demand upon his troops, who, indeed, are all resting quietly in their camps, but the "important duty" to be performed seems to concern himself rather than his command, and to be entirely personal in character. Evidently, Jackson excused not only himself, but his troops also, because it was Sunday. He certainly considered attendance upon divine service an "important duty" of the first magnitude. He confidently believed that marked regard for the Sabbath would often be followed by God's favor upon one's secular enterprises. If so, why not upon a battle or a campaign? We have seen even Lincoln share the same belief when he stopped the advance of McDowell from Fredericksburg on Sunday, and thus broke up McClellan's campaign, as has been told (see page 101).

The rebuilding of Grapevine bridge was not a serious matter. Lee clearly anticipated no delay there whatever.

Jackson's engineer, early Sunday morning, reported that it would be finished in two hours. There was a ford close by, and other bridges within a few miles, but most of Jackson's troops spent the entire day in camp.

His early start next morning would seem to promise more vigor in the performance for that day, but its history does not bear out the promise. It was but seven miles from the bivouacs which his men left about 2:30 A. M. to White Oak Bridge where they went into bivouac at night. No obstacle to a swift march existed, but the earliest arrival noted in the reports is at 9:30 A. M. by Col. Crutchfield of the Artillery. Jackson himself puts it later.

White Oak Swamp rises between the Charles City and the Williamsburg road near where the Confederate lines crossed them, five miles from Richmond. The course of the stream is southeast, almost parallel to that of the Charles City road for about six miles. Then it turns and runs directly toward the Chickahominy some three miles away. Just above this bend was Brackett's Ford, and about a mile below it was the main road crossing at which Jackson arrived about 9:30 A.M., Monday. The stream itself was a small creek, averaging 10 to 15 feet wide and six inches deep, with sandy bottom. The swamp was merely a flat area densely grown up in trees and bushes, more or less wet in places, but generally with firm footing. Small farms and settlements were scattered along its edges, and residents and cattle had many paths in and through it. It was widest near its source, where the country was flatter. Near the bridge the country was rolling and the swamp grew narrow. Four crossings above the bridge were known to the natives, —Chapman's (or Goodman's), Jourdan's, Fisher's and Brackett's,—and one below called Carter's; but besides these were many less-known paths.

The road crossing was held by Franklin, who thus describes the operations of the day in his official report:

"About noon I was directed by the commanding general to assume command at the position guarding the crossing of the swamp. and repaired there at once. I found that a terrific cannonade had been opened by the enemy upon the divisions of Gen. Smith and Gen. Richardson and the brigade of Gen. Naglee. The two latter had been

placed under my command by the commanding general. The casualties in Richardson's division were quite numerous, but I have received no report of the action from him. In Gen. Smith's division and in Gen. Naglee's brigade the number lost was insignificant.

"The enemy kept up the firing during the whole day and crossed some infantry below our position, but he made no very serious attempt to cross during the day, and contented himself with the cannonading and the firing of his sharp-shooters. Nightfall having arrived and the wagons having all disappeared, I took the responsibility of moving my command to the James River, by a road to the left which had not been much used, and arrived at headquarters safely about daylight."

The infantry referred to by Franklin as having crossed were only D. H. Hill's skirmish-line. No effort was made to cross anything more. Jackson's own account of the day is as follows:

"About noon we reached White Oak Swamp, and here the enemy made a determined effort to retard our advance, and thereby prevent an immediate junction between Gen. Longstreet and myself. We found the bridge destroyed and the ordinary place of crossing commanded by their batteries on the opposite side and all approach to it barred by detachments of sharp-shooters concealed in a dense wood close by. A battery of 28 guns from Hill's and Whiting's artillery was placed by Col. Crutchfield in a favorable position for driving off or silencing the opposing artillery. About 2 P. M. it opened suddenly upon the enemy. He fired a few shots in reply and then withdrew from that position, abandoning part of his artillery. Capt. Wooding was immediately ordered near the bridge to shell the sharp-shooters from the woods, which was accomplished and Munford's cavalry crossed the creek, but was soon compelled to retire. It was soon seen that the enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Capt. Wooding's batteries turned in the new direction. The fire so opened on both sides was kept up until dark. We bivouacked that night near the swamp.

"A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of Gen. Longstreet at Frazier's Farm and made me anxious to press forward, but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage prevented my advancing until the following morning. During the night the Federals retired."

Considered as an excuse for Jackson's inaction during the whole day this report is simply farcical.

It appears from subordinate reports that the long delay between the arrival of the head of Jackson's column and the opening of his 28 guns was caused by cutting a road to enable the guns to be kept concealed while getting position. Concealment here was of little value and the time thus lost by the artillery, and the sending across of Munford's cavalry at the road crossing, illustrate the prominent feature of

Jackson's conduct during the whole Seven Days,—to wit: a reluctance to bring his infantry into action. Here infantry alone could accomplish anything, but only cavalry and artillery were called upon. He could have crossed a brigade of infantry as easily as Munford's cavalry, and that brigade could have been the entering wedge which would split apart the Federal defence and let in the 13 brigades which followed. The bridge, whose destruction is mentioned, was not necessary to a crossing. It was only a high-water bridge with a ford by it which was preferably used except in freshets. Now the floor of the bridge, made of poles, had been thrown into the ford but Munford's cavalry got through without trouble, and infantry could have swarmed across.

The cannonade, which was kept up during all the rest of the day, was not only a delusion, but a useless burning both of daylight and ammunition, for it was all random fire. The Federal and Confederate artillery could not see each other at all. They could scarcely even see the high-floating smoke clouds of each other's guns. They fired by sound, at a distance of three-quarters of a mile, across a tall dense wood, until they exhausted their ammunition. One Federal battery reported the expenditure of 1600 rounds. The noise was terrific, and some firing was kept up until nine o'clock at night, but the casualties on each side were naturally but trifling. Only one Confederate battery, Rhett's, mentions any, and it reported but two killed and five wounded.

No reconnaisance was made for other crossings, even of Brackett's over which much of the Federal force had passed, until Wright's brigade arrived and was sent back, as has been told. Meanwhile, two other crossings available for infantry were discovered within a very short distance below, and were both at once reported to Jackson by the officers discovering them, Col. Munford, commanding his cavalry, and Gen. Hampton, commanding the 3d Brigade of Jackson's division. I have in possession letters from Munford to Hampton, and from Hampton to myself, giving the following details.

I have already quoted from Jackson's report that his cavalry sent across the creek at first, was forced to retire. Col. Munford in a letter to Gen. Hampton, dated Mar. 23, 1901, writes:

"At the battle of White Oak Swamp, after Col. Crutchfield's artillery had disabled one gun, and driven the cannoneers from the battery which commanded the crossing at the old bridge at White Oak Swamp, Gen. Jackson directed me to cross the creek, with my regiment, at the ford and to secure the guns in front of us. The enemy's sharp-shooters were stationed in rear of the building overlooking the ford; and as soon as we neared the abandoned battery of the enemy, these sharpshooters, and another battery stationed in the road at the edge of the woods, and commanding the road and the ford over which we had passed, opened a furious fire upon us, and I was forced to move a quarter of a mile lower down the creek, where I found a cow path which led me over the swamp. But enroute, I found where Gen. Franklin's troops had been located, having now changed front. They had left a long line of knapsacks and blankets, from which I allowed my men to take what they pleased; and among their things were many late newspapers from Washington, which I despatched by a courier to Gen. Jackson, giving him full information of what I had seen and how and where I had crossed.

"Thirty-nine years is too long a time to attempt to say what I wrote him, but I know that I thought, all the time, that he could have crossed his infantry where we recrossed. I had seen his infantry cross far worse places, and I expected that he would attempt it.

"We remained near where we recrossed all day, with a vidette on the other side of the swamp. He put his sharp-shooters in on the right of the ford and made no attempt to cross where we recrossed.

"Why, I never understood.

"Yours sincerely,
"THOMAS T. MUNFORD."

All the crossings so far described were paths already marked by use of men and cattle, but another opportunity was discovered and brought to Jackson's notice by Hampton, who was an expert woodsman and hunter. While the infantry stood idly by and the useless cannonade went on, nothing was more natural to Hampton than a personal reconnaissance in front. He found a crossing and the flank of the enemy's infantry line. He returned and reported it to Jackson. In the last year of his life he wrote out the story as given below. He has only omitted from it, modestly, the fact that, when he reported to Jackson his discovery, he begged permission to take his brigade across immediately and attack it. This request was at first put off by the order to go and build a bridge. After the bridge was reported finished, the whole matter was silently ignored, as his narrative described.

Hampton's narrative is as follows:

"We left the Chickahominy on Monday morning, June 30, though my impression is that the Grapevine bridge could have been used on Sunday, and at any rate there was a good ford of the stream below the bridge near the road followed by the retreating enemy. Early on the morning of Monday we reached the White Oak crossing, my brigade being in advance; and about the same time the 2d Va. Cav. under Col. Munford came up. This regiment had accompanied Gen. Jackson from the Valley covering his advance.

"We found a large hospital tent on the brow of the hill overlooking the crossing of the small stream over which a little bridge of poles had been made. The enemy had pulled off the poles and thrown them in the stream above the bridge, and a battery of four guns on the opposite hill commanded the causeway and the ford of the stream. Gen. Jackson ran up some guns and soon silenced those of the enemy, disabling one of them. The battery was withdrawn, and Gen. Jackson accompanied by the regiment of cavalry crossed with a view, I suppose, of capturing the disabled gun, or of ascertaining the position of the enemy—none of whom were in sight, except those manning the gun. In a few minutes the General returned alone, while Munford took his regiment a short distance down the stream where he crossed without difficulty. As there were no further hostile demonstrations where we were, I placed my brigade in a pine forest and, desiring to ascertain the character of the ground in front of us, I rode to the edge of the swamp, accompanied by Capt. Rawlins Lowndes, and my son Wade, who was serving on my staff at that time. The swamp was comparatively open, the ground not at all boggy, and we soon struck the stream.

"This was very shallow, with a clear sandy bottom, and not more than 10 or 15 feet wide. Crossing this, we soon came in sight of the open land opposite our position.

"We could see a very wide and deep ravine in which was a line of Federals lying down in line of battle, and evidently expecting if any attack was made upon them, it would be from the open field below the ford of the stream. In this event their position would have been very strong.

"Withdrawing without attracting their notice, I returned across the swamp and gave to Gen. Jackson all the facts stated above.

"He asked if I could make a bridge across the stream to which I replied that I could make one for the infantry, but not for artillery, as cutting a road would disclose our position. He directed me to make the bridge. Ordering a detail of my men to cut some poles where they were standing and to carry them into the swamp, a bridge was made in a few minutes. I then again reconnoitered the position of the enemy whom I found perfectly quiet—unsuspecting. On my return to our side of the swamp, I found Gen. Jackson seated on a fallen pine alongside of the road that led down to the ford, and seating myself by him, I reported the completion of the bridge and the exposed position of the enemy. He drew his cap down over his eyes which were closed, and after listening to me for some minutes, he rose without speaking, and the next morning we found Franklin with the rest of the Federal troops concentrated on Malvern Hill.

"While we were waiting at the White Oak crossing we heard the noise of Longstreet's battle at Frazier's Farm, and Capt. or Maj. Fairfax of Longstreet's staff came with a message from the general to Gen. Jackson. Though I heard this message, I cannot recall it. * * * In speaking to Gen. Lee in 1868 on this subject, he expressed the

greatest surprise at my account of this matter, and he said that he never understood why the delay had occurred. * * *

"Gen. Jackson was too great a soldier and I was too much attached to him to venture to criticise his actions or his plans, but it seems to me that everything which throws light on the plans of our great chief, Gen. Lee, should go down in history. I believe that if Franklin, who opposed us at White Oak, could have been defeated, the Federal army would have been destroyed. * * *

"Yours truly,
"WADE HAMPTON."

Much comment suggests itself, but little is needed: Who fought with Lee can picture to himself without emotion what might have happened had the Jackson of the Valley had the opportunity presented to him which Gen. Hampton has described as offered in vain to the Jackson of the Chickahominy.

Franklin, commanding the Federal force here opposed to Jackson, wrote of this occasion as follows (Battles and Leaders, II., 381):

"Jackson seems to have been ignorant of what Gen. Lee expected of him, and badly informed about Brackett's Ford. When he found how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should have turned his attention to Brackett's Ford, also. A force could have been as quietly gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement at the ford would have easily overrun our small force there, placing our right at Glendale, held by Slocum's division, in great jeopardy, and turning our force at the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is likely that we should have been defeated that day, had Gen. Jackson done what his great reputation seems to have made it imperative he should have done."

D. H. Hill (who was Jackson's brother-in-law) writing in the *Century* of this occasion many years after the war, says:

"Our cavalry (Munford's regiment) returned by the lower ford and pronounced it perfectly practicable for infantry; but Jackson did not advance. Why was this? It was the critical day for both commanders, but especially for McClellan. With consummate skill he had crossed his vast train of 5000 wagons, and his immense parks of artillery, safely over White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed now than at any time in his flank march. Three columns of attack were converging on him and a strong corps was pressing upon his rear. Escape seemed impossible for him, but he did escape. * * * Gen. Lee, through no fault in his plans, was to see his splendid prize slip through his hands. Longstreet and A. P. Hill struck the enemy at Frazier's Farm (or Glendale) at 3 P. M. and both being always ready for a fight, immediately attacked. * * * There were 5 divisions within sound of the firing and within supporting distance, but not one of them moved. * * * Maj. Dabney, in his life of Jackson, thus comments on the inaction of that affair: 'On this occasion it would appear, if

the vast interests dependent upon Gen. Jackson's cooperation with the proposed attack upon the centre were considered, that he came short of the efficiency in action for which he was elsewhere noted.'

"After showing how the crossing of White Oak might have been effected, Dabney adds: 'The list of casualties might have been longer than that presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer wounded, but how much shorter would have been the bloody list filled up the next day at Malvern Hill? This temporary eclipse of Jackson's genius was probably to be explained by physical causes. The labor of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had sunk the elasticity of his will and the quickness of his invention, for the nonce, below their wonted tension.' "

D. H. Hill does not comment upon this explanation, but it will not bear examination. For two days Jackson and his command had been quietly in camp; and his lapse from duty, while culminating only on June 29 and 30, in fact dated from the very first of the Seven Days. Hill submits his own explanation of the matter as follows:

"I think that an important factor in this inaction was Jackson's pity for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches, and reduced in numbers by its numerous sanguinary battles. He thought that the garrison of Richmond ought now to bear the brunt of the fighting."

This last expression is but another form of a rumor which to my knowledge, had private circulation at the time among the staff-officers of some of the leading generals. It was reported that Jackson had said that "he did not intend that his men should do all the fighting."

Jackson's troops (his own and Ewell's divisions) had had a sharp campaign in the Valley, but the rest of the army at Yorktown, Williamsburg and Seven Pines had suffered just as many hardships, and done even more severe fighting, as the casualties will attest. There were no arrears to be made up. The total killed and wounded of Jackson's six brigades in the Valley campaign from Kernstown (March 23) to Port Republic (June 9) were but 2311. Three brigades—Rodes's, Garland's, and G. B. Anderson's of D. H. Hill's division—had had killed and wounded the first day at Seven Pines 2621. During the Seven Days they lost 2277 more, while Jackson's six brigades lost but 1152.

It is only natural and right that every division commander should feel both pity and affection for his own men, but to manifest either by shirking battle is no real kindness to them, apart from the tremendous consequences to the army and the nation.

We may now return to Lee, Longstreet and A. P. Hill at Frazier's Farm or Glendale, where we left them waiting vainly for the sounds of battle from Huger and Jackson. Between three and four o'clock the enemy, aware of their proximity, unwisely increased the fire of one of their batteries. Longstreet ordered Jenkins, second to none in either courage or ambition, to charge it. Jenkins charged the battery and got possession, but was attacked by the infantry in support. This brought on the battle at once, though not in the best shape; for, instead of one simultaneous attack by the whole force, more time was wasted, and the brigades came in in piecemeal. A very desperate fight ensued, and lasted until long after dark, with varying fortunes. There were present but the two Confederate divisions, 12 brigades, which had borne the brunt of the 27th at Gaines Mill, and had lost 4,300 men out of 22,000 engaged. They were taking the aggressive against Kearny's, McCall's and Hooker's divisions (about 25,000 men), carefully posted, with some protection and obstructions.

A fourth division, Sedgwick's, was in reserve in a second line behind McCall, and à fifth, Slocum's, was near on the right, each over 8000 strong. Almost the whole of these 40,000 troops took part in the battle. Within an hour's march were Richardson's and Smith's divisions and Naglee's brigade, 23,000 more, which could have been called in if needed. It goes without saying that while the Confederates might have more or less success, at the beginning, depending upon the cooperation of their brigades, only the approach of night could prevent their being finally repulsed and driven from the field, with losses proportionate to the persistence of their attacks.

No more desperate encounter took place in the war; and nowhere else, to my knowledge, so much actual per-

sonal fighting with bayonet and butt of gun. Randol's battery, over which it began, was taken and retaken several times. Once, when in possession of the 11th Ala. regiment of Wilcox's brigade, it was charged by McCall's Pa. reserves, and after a desperate bayonet fight on each side fell back to adjacent woods, leaving the guns deserted, but under fire from both sides. Wilcox's report gives illustrations of the character of the fighting:

"Capt. W. C. Y. Parker had two successive encounters with Federal officers, both of whom he felled with his sword, and beset by others of the enemy, he was severely wounded, having received two bayonet wounds in the breast and one in his side, and a musket ball breaking his left thigh.

"Lt. Michie had a hand-to-hand collision with an officer, and having just dealt a severe blow upon his adversary, he fell, cut over the head with a sabre-bayonet from behind, and had afterward three bayonet wounds in the face and two in the breast,—all severe wounds which he survived, however, for three days."

A little later, Field's brigade of Hill's division, in a counter-charge again had bayonet fighting and drove McCall's line back for a half-mile and held the ground until the captured guns were carried safely to the rear. Severe fighting continued to take place until after dark. The enemy became so aggressive that Lee felt it necessary to send for Magruder's six brigades which had been unwisely marched to reenforce Holmes, and which had lost distance and time by confusion of roads and guides. These unfortunate troops, which had been marching all day, were now marched and countermarched until long after midnight, so that they were thoroughly exhausted when they reached the field, and were put in front of those who had been equally worn out in the desperate fighting. Meanwhile a ruse which had been practised seems to have been successful in bringing the pressure of the enemy's fresh battalions to an end. A. P. Hill thus describes it:

"About dark the enemy were pressing us hard along our whole line, and my last reserve, Gen. J. R. Anderson, with his Ga. Brigade, was directed to advance cautiously and be careful not to fire on our friends. His brigade was formed in line, two regiments on each side of the road, and, obeying my instructions to the letter, received the fire of the enemy at 70 paces before engaging themselves. Heavy reenforcements to the enemy were brought up at this time, and it seemed that a tremendous effort was being made to turn the for-

tunes of the battle, the volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along the line, was terrific. Seeing some troops of Wilcox's brigade, with the assistance of Lt. Chamberlayne and other members of my staff, they were rapidly formed, and being directed to cheer long and loudly moved again to the fight. This seemed to end the contest, and in less than five minutes all firing ceased and the enemy retired."

In this battle the losses of Longstreet's division were about 2600 and in A. P. Hill's about 1700; total 4300. The Federal losses are not given separately, but were, doubtless, not very unequal. McCall was captured, riding into our lines by mistake, and we also secured 18 guns, besides some prisoners, and the gleanings of the field in small arms.

Lee, an example for all time of restraint in expressing personal feeling, wrote in his report of this battle:

"Could the other commands have cooperated in this action, the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy."

I have often thought that in his retrospect of the war no one day of the whole four years would seem to him more unfortunate than June 30, 1862. It was, undoubtedly, the opportunity of his life, for the Confederacy was then in its prime, with more men available than ever before or after. And at no other period would the moral or the physical effect of a victory have been so great as upon this occasion.

The Escape — Battle of Malvern Hill

Enemy's New Position—Line Formed—Pendleton's Artillery—Artillery Combats—Whiting's Reports—Sumner Seeks Cover—Lee's Reconnaissance—Lee Misled—Attack Begun—Wright's Report—Semmes and Kershaw—D. H. Hill's Report—Toomb's Report—Casualties—Lee's Report—Stewart Shells a Camp—McClellan Writes—Stuart's Report—Attack Abandoned—Casualties—An Artillery Raid—The South Side—Our Balloon.

Next morning (Tuesday, July 1) we began to pay the penalty for our unimproved opportunity of the day before.

Of course, the enemy was gone, and about three miles down the road we came upon his whole army, now united and massed, upon Malvern Hill.

This position is a high plateau stretching north from the lowlands along the valley of James River, over which it dominates in high steep hills, with Turkey Run on the west, and Western Run on the east. It is about a mile wide and, for two miles from the river, is open land, rolling and sloping toward the north where it ends in a heavy forest, intersected by marshy streams, with only one good road leading through the forest out upon the plateau. The Rev. L. W. Allen, already mentioned as on the staff of Magruder, was a native of this section, and had described to D. H. Hill its striking features, noting,—

"Its commanding height, the difficulties of approach, its amphitheatrical form and ample area, which would enable McClellan to arrange his 350 field guns, tier above tier, and sweep the plain in every direction."

Hill writes in the *Century Magazine*:

"Jackson moved over White Oak Swamp on July 1, Whiting's division leading. Our march was much delayed by the crossing of troops and trains. At Willis's Church I met Gen. Lee. He bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it. I gave him Mr. Allen's description of Malvern Hill and presumed to say, 'If Gen. McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone.' Longstreet laughed and said, 'Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped.'"

Reconnaissance, ordered by Longstreet on the right, found a position favorable if we could employ a heavy force of artillery. A hill across Turkey Creek on the west

gave ground whence 40 or more guns could enfilade the enemy's batteries and lines of battle. A wheat-field to the northeast gave positions whence a hundred guns could cross fire with them. Could we mass and open two such batteries, and follow their fire by a simultaneous charge of heavy column, we would have a chance of winning a victory. Lee ordered the plan carried into effect. Meanwhile, a line of battle had been formed through the woods and fields. Whiting was on the left with three bridgades (one of Jackson's under Hampton, and two of his own). D. H. Hill came next with five, then two of Huger's, six of Magruder's, and two more of Huger's, including Ransom's, detached from Holmes's division. The remainder of Holmes's was held on the river road, and was not engaged. Longstreet and Hill were in reserve behind Magruder; and Ewell's and Jackson's own division, behind Jackson. The enemy's batteries kept up a severe fire through the woods and along the roads and the gunboats in the James participated for some hours with their heavy guns, until at length some shells burst prematurely over their own lines, when their fire was ordered to cease.

The order to charge the enemy's lines was, however, not made absolute. Magruder, Huger, and D. H. Hill, with their 14 brigades were notified as follows about noon:

"July 1, 1862.

"Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same. By order of Gen. Lee.

"R. H. CHILTON, *A. G. C.*"

The charge, therefore, was made to depend upon our being able to inaugurate and conduct with success an artillery duel of some magnitude.

Pioneers were sent to open a road to the left, and it was expected that artillery would act upon both flanks; but here our organization broke down. Gen. Pendleton, Lee's Chief of Artillery, had a large artillery reserve, organized in four battalions of several batteries each, including our best rifled guns; but he was not able to bring a

single one of his batteries into action. His official report of the day is as follows:

"Tuesday, July 1, was spent by me in seeking, for some time, the commanding general, that I might get orders, and, by reason of the intricacy of routes, failing in this, in examining positions near the two armies, toward ascertaining what could be best done with a large artillery force, and especially whether any position could be reached whence our large guns could be used to good purpose. These endeavors had, of course, to be made again and again under the enemy's shells; yet no site was found from which the large guns could play upon the the enemy without endangering our own troops, and no occasion was presented for bringing up the reserve artillery. Indeed, it seemed that not one-half of the division batteries were brought into action on either Monday or Tuesday. To remain near by, therefore, and await events and orders in readiness for whatever service might be called for, was all that I could do. Here again it was my privilege to be thrown with the President, he having arrived some time after nightfall at the house near the battlefield where I had just before sought a resting-place."

Between the lines one can but read a disappointing story. Pendleton did not find Lee all day long, nor did any orders from Lee find him. He implies that his reserve artillery was not expected to go in until all the division batteries were first engaged. The division batteries were not organized into battalions, and, acting separately, were easily overpowered when brought out, one by one, in the face of many guns already in position. Pendleton's battalions of from three to six batteries each, would have stood much better chances; and while there were not many places, there were two extensive ones, in either of which all of these battalions could have been used—Poindexter's field, and the position on Magruder's right, to which Lee made the pioneers open a road. As matters were, our whole reserve artillery stood idle all day.

Pendleton graduated at West Point in 1830, one year after Lee. He resigned in 1833, and entered the ministry in 1837. In 1861, he returned to military life, and was appointed Chief of Artillery of the Army about Oct., 1861, under Gen. Johnston. His command did little during the Seven Days, and Col. Brown, commanding his largest battalion, in his report mentions "the greatest superabundance of artillery and the scanty use that was made of it."

Col. Cutts, commanding another battalion, also reported:

"My own small command (seven guns) was assigned a place near the battle-field of Tuesday, the 1st inst., and although I am sure that more artillery could have been used with advantage in this engagement, and also that my company could have done good service, yet I received no orders; therefore, I have not had the honor to participate in any of the many engagements for the protection of our capital."

Several field-batteries were brought in, one or two at a time, upon both flanks, but each was quickly overwhelmed. The artillery under D. H. Hill, which had been engaged, at White Oak Swamp the afternoon of the 30th, had entirely exhausted its ammunition and been sent to the rear to replenish. In the demand for guns, A. P. Hill sent two of his batteries, Davidson's and Pegram's. Pegram had been engaged in every battle, beginning with Mechanicsville. Including Malvern Hill, he had 60 casualties, out of 80 men, and was only able to man a single gun at the close. This fighting, the artillery part of the action, began about noon and continued until about half-part three o'clock. D. H. Hill thus described that in his front,—

"Instead of ordering up 100 of 200 pieces of artillery to play on the Yankees, a single battery, Moorman's, was ordered up, and knocked to pieces in a few minutes. One or two others shared the same fate of being beat in detail. Not knowing how to act under the circumstances, I wrote to Gen. Jackson that the firing from our batteries was of the most farcical character."

Whiting, on Hill's left, says:

"To our left was a very large wheat-field which afforded a good view of the enemy's position, and fair opportunities for artillery. Batteries were ordered up * * * * The first battery ordered into Poindexter's field found itself exposed to a vastly superior cross-fire and was soon compelled to retire with loss. Balthis's battery, better posted and better covered by the ground, fought well and continued the action until their ammunition was exhausted. Other batteries were ordered up. Our gunners replied with spirit, but from want of ammunition the contest was too unequal, and I caused them successively to withdraw. This cross-fire was excessively severe upon the supporting troops."

Of the artillery fighting on the right flank, Gen. Armistead reported:

"By a reconnaissance first made by Col. E. O. Edmonds of the 38th Va. * * * * I found that the enemy were in, near and around Crew's house, and that the hill in front of the ravine we occupied was a good position for artillery. It was asked for, and Capt. Pegram's and Grimes's batteries were sent. The fire was a terrible one

and the men stood it well. The enemy must have had 30 or 40 pieces opposed to ours and of superior calibre. No men could have behaved better than Capts. Pegram and Grimes. They worked their guns after their men were cut down, and only retired when entirely disabled. I sent for more artillery repeatedly."

These extracts sufficiently illustrate the character of the fighting during the hours devoted in theory to bringing a heavy enfilading and cross-fire of artillery to bear upon the enemy in his crowded position. The one advantage which we had was that all our shots were converging toward his centre, and stood fair chances of finding some of his troops, even when they missed their special targets. And, thin, scattered, and meagre as our artillery fire was, —"almost farcical," as D. H. Hill pronounced it, and directed entirely at the enemy's batteries, its effect upon his infantry lines was such that Sumner withdrew his whole corps from their positions, and took refuge under the crest of the hills nearest the river, and he ordered Porter also to withdraw. Porter reports that he

. . . "protested against such a movement as disastrous to us, adding that as the major-general commanding had seen and approved my disposition, and also Gen. Couch's, I could not change without his order, which could soon be obtained if desirable. He desisted and the enemy was soon upon us, compelling him to recall his own corps."

How eloquent is this episode of what might have been the effect of bold and energetic use, early in the day, not only of our large artillery reserve, but of all our brigade and division batteries, brought in under their protection, as might have been done under efficient management.

As it was, this inefficient artillery service so discouraged the prospects of an assault that before three o'clock Lee abandoned his intention to assault. Longstreet was informed* but no notice was sent to other generals, as there seemed to apparent need. The aggressive efforts had grown gradually weaker, and by three o'clock the firing on both sides had almost ceased.

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*His report says,—"A little after 3 P. M., I understood that we would not be able to attack the enemy that day, inasmuch as his position was too strong to admit of it."

Shortly before this, Lee had taken Longstreet and ridden over to our left in search of some route by which the enemy's position could be turned.

This should have been done early that morning, not by Lee in person, but by staff-officers under cavalry escorts. Jackson, on the left flank, had with him a fair supply of staff, and Munford's regiment of cavalry. In the Valley he would have done it without waiting for orders. By a movement inaugurated that day, a force might easily have reached the high ground known as Evelington Heights, overlooking Westover (of which there will be more to tell later), or any nearer point threatening the enemy's line of retreat, where a Confederate force in position might compel the enemy to take the offensive at a disadvantage.

A short reconnaissance induced Lee to order Longstreet at once to move his own division and Hill's to the left: Longstreet had rejoined his troops and was putting them in motion, when, to his surprise, he heard the sounds of battle break forth. He thought the enemy had taken the offensive, and that Magruder would soon be calling for reenforcements. His two divisions were, therefore, moved up to secure the right flank, though they did not become engaged.

Longstreet, in his narrative states that the battle was precipitated by accident, but this is a mistake. It was begun by a direct order from Lee given hastily under the influence of a misapprehension of fact, which occurred as follows:

When Sumner withdrew his corps under the cover of the hills, as has been told in the quotation from Porter, the movement was observed from our left by Whiting. He reported to Lee that the enemy were withdrawing both trains and troops. About the same time, a body of the enemy's skirmishers being advanced in front of Armistead's brigade, was attacked and easily driven back by three of his regiments. These followed the fugitives a short distance and occupied advanced ground, in a swale which afforded some shelter. This affair was considered a suc-

cess, and it was also reported to Lee as he was returning from his reconnaissance with Longstreet. Had Sumner's movement, and the advance and easy retreat of the Federal skirmishers, been planned as a ruse to decoy us into a charge, its success would have been brilliant. That part of our plan which had called for a tremendous preliminary cannonade was forgotten. Lee believed that his enemy was retreating and about to escape him, and he hastened to send a verbal order to Magruder through Capt. Dickinson of Magruder's staff, who wrote the order as follows:

"Gen. Lee expects you to advance rapidly. He says it is reported the enemy is getting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up Armistead's success."

Under Magruder's orders, the advance was commenced by Wright's Ga., and La. brigade, followed by Mahone's Va. brigade, both of Huger's division. These two brigades formed our extreme right, and went into action only about 2500 strong, many stragglers having been lost from the ranks in the marchings and skirmishes of the three previous days.

To the left of Wright, was Armistead of Huger's division, followed by Cobb's and Semmes's brigades. In support of these were all the rest of Magruder's and Huger's 10 brigades, Ransom, of Holmes's division, being also temporarily attached to Huger. Farther to the left came D. H. Hill's five brigades. Magruder's brigades consumed a little time in developing a full roar of musketry, but no sooner was it heard than D. H. Hill's division was also put in.

Fitz-John Porter, in Battles and Leaders, thus describes the opening of the battle from the Federal point of view:

"The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable, attack of our antagonists, at different points along our whole front, up to about four o'clock were, presumably, demonstrations or feelers preparatory to their engaging in more serious work. An ominous silence, similar to that which had preceded the attack in force at Gaines' Mill, now intervened, until, at about 5:30 o'clock, the enemy opened upon both Morell and Couch with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon after pressed forward in columns of infantry, first on one, then on the other, or on both.

"As if moved by a reckless disregard of life equal to that displayed at Gaines Mill, with a determination to capture our army or destroy it by driving us into the river, brigade after brigade rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister, while our infantry, withholding their fire until the enemy were in short range, scattered the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up and capturing prisoners and colors."

One can scarcely read the full story of this charge without believing that, made early in the day with the aid of all our reserve artillery on the flanks and of the 22 brigades of infantry who were spectators, we might, by main force, have crushed the enemy's army as it stood. Porter himself, who was practically in command of the field, and the most accomplished of the Federal corps commanders, records that, at one period of the action, as he rode to bring up reenforcements, he felt such apprehensions of soon becoming our prisoner, that he took from his pocket and tore up his "diary and despatch book of the campaign."

That the ground was less unfavorable for an assault from our right flank appears from the reports of Wright and Mahone, whose small force was not driven back at all, but made a lodgment and held their ground all night. Gen. Wright reports as follows:

"At 4:45 o'clock I received an order from Gen. Magruder through Capt. Henry Bryan, one of his staff, to advance immediately and charge the enemy's batteries. No other troops had yet come upon the field. I ordered my men forward, and, springing before them, led my brigade, less than 1000 men, against a force I knew to be superior in the ratio of at least 20 to 1. Onward we pressed, warmly and strongly supported by Gen. Mahone's brigade, under a murderous fire of shot, shell, canister and musketry. At every step my brave men fell around me, but the survivors pressed on until we had reached a hollow about 300 yards from the enemy's batteries on the right. Here I perceived that a strong force had been sent forward on our left, by the enemy, with a view of flanking and cutting us off from our support, now more than 1000 yards in our rear. I immediately threw the left of the 3d Ga. a little back along the upper margin of the hollow, and, suddenly changing front of the regiment, poured a galling fire upon the enemy, which he returned with spirit, aided by a fearful direct and cross-fire from his batteries. Here the contest raged with varying success for more than three-quarters of an hour; finally the line of the enemy was broken and he gave way in great disorder.

"In the meantime, my front, supported by Gen. Mahone, had been subjected, to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and had begun to waver, and I feared I would be compelled to fall back. Just at this moment firing was heard far away to our left, and soon

we saw our columns advancing upon the enemy's centre. This diverted a portion of the enemy's fire from us, and I succeeded in keeping my men steady. We had now approached within a few hundred yards of the enemy's advanced batteries, and I again gave the order to charge, which was obeyed with promptness and alacrity.

"We rushed forward, up the side of the hill under the brow of which we had been for some time halted, and dashing over the hill, reached another hollow or ravine immediately in front of, and, as it were, under the enemy's guns. This ravine was occupied by a line of Yankee infantry posted there to protect their batteries. Upon this we rushed with such impetuosity that the enemy broke in great disorder and fled. * * * *

"The firing had now become general along the left and centre of our line, and night setting it, it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe.

"Several of my command were killed by our own friends, who had come up on our immediate left, and who commenced firing long before they came within range of the enemy. This firing upon us from our friends, together with the increasing darkness, made our position peculiarly hazardous, but I determined to maintain it at all hazards, as long as a man should be left to fire a gun. The fire was terrific now, beyond anything I had ever witnessed,—indeed, the hideous shrieking of shells through the dusky gloom of closing night, the loud and incessant roll of artillery and small-arms, were enough to make the stoutest heart quail. Still my shattered little command, now reduced to less than 300, with about an equal number of Gen. Mahone's brigade, held our positions under the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, and poured volley after volley with murderous precision into their serried ranks. * * * *

"Just at this time a portion of Col. Ramseur's 49th N. C. regiment, having got lost upon the field, was hailed by me and ordered to fall in with my brigade. A strong picket was advanced all around our isolated position, and the wearied, hungry soldiers threw themselves upon the earth to snatch a few hours' rest. Detachments were ordered to search for water and administer to our poor wounded men, whose cries rent the air in every direction. Soon the enemy were seen with lanterns, busily engaged in moving their killed and wounded, and friend and foe freely mingled on that gloomy night in administering to the wants of wounded and dying comrades. * * * *

"Early on the morning of July 2, Gen. Ewell rode upon the field and coming to the position where my men lay, I reported to him and was relieved from further watching on the field. * * * * My loss in this engagement was very severe, amounting to 55 killed, 243 wounded, and 64 missing (total 362). I have no means of determining the loss of the enemy, though I am satisfied it was very heavy."

Gen. Mahone reports that his brigade carried into action 1226 and lost 39 killed, 164 wounded, and 120 missing (total 323).

Wright's report gives a clear idea of the fighting upon our right flank. Next, on the left, Semmes and Kershaw also made, perhaps, the farthest advance of the attack, actually getting among the enemy's guns, where lay the

body of a handsome young Louisiana officer, next morning, the farthest jetsam of the red wave which had stained all the green fields of our advance. Both of these brigades had been forced to fall back, not so much from the fire of the enemy in their front, as from that of their friends farther on the left, advancing on converging lines in the dusk. There were more troops concentrated in the forest in a small space than could be well handled, even in daylight; and the plateau over which their charge was to be made, when they got free of the wood, was so bare of shelter, and swept by such fire of musketry and artillery, that not a single brigade faced it long without being driven back. The official reports show that in the storm and smoke around them single brigades often thought themselves to be the only ones engaged.

D. H. Hill, whose advance was across the plateau, thus describes the attack by this division:

"While converging with my brigade commanders, shouting was heard on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed upon, and I ordered my division to advance. This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half before sundown. * * * *

"The division fought heroically and well, but fought in vain. Garland, in my immediate front, showed all his wonted courage and enthusiasm, but he needed and asked for reenforcements. I sent Lt.-Col. Newton, 6th Ga., to his support, and, observing a brigade by a fence in our rear, I galloped back to it and found it to be that of Gen. Toombs. I ordered it forward to support Garland, and accompanied it. The brigade advanced handsomely to the brow of the hill, but soon retreated in disorder. Gordon, commanding Rodes's brigade, pushed gallantly forward and gained considerable ground, but was forced back. The gallant and accomplished Meares, 3d N. C., Ripley's brigade, had fallen at the head of his regiment, and that brigade was streaming to the rear Colquitt's and Anderson's brigades had also fallen back. Ransom's brigade had come up to my support from Gen. Huger. It moved too far to the left and became mixed up with a mass of troops near the parsonage on the Quaker road, suffering much and effecting little. Gen. Winder was sent up by Gen. Jackson, but he came too late, and also went to the same belt of woods near the parsonage, already overcrowded with troops. Finally Gen. Ewell came up, but it was after dark, and nothing could be accomplished. I advised him to hold the ground he had gained and not to attempt a forward movement."

Gen. Toombs's account of the advance of his brigade will give some idea of the confusion of commands upon the field after the battle was in full tide:

The Escape—Battle of Malvern Hill

"Accordingly, I advanced rapidly in line of battle through the dense woods, intersected by ravines, occasionally thick brier patches, and other obstructions, guided only by the enemy's fire in keeping direction, frequently retarded and sometimes broken, by troops in front of me, until the command reached the open field on the elevated plateau immediately in front of, and in short range of the enemy's guns. Here, coming up with a portion of the troops which I was ordered to support, I halted my line for the purpose of rectifying it and of allowing many of the troops whom I was to support, to pass me and form. These objects were but imperfectly accomplished by me, as well as by the rest of the troops within my view, from the great confusion and disorder in the field—arising much from the difficulties of the ground over which they had to pass, and in part from the heavy fire of grape and canister and shells, which the enemy's batteries were pouring in upon them. But, having accomplished what could be done of this work, I ordered my brigade to advance. It moved forward steadily and firmly until it came up with the troops in advance, who had halted. I then ordered it to halt, and ordered the men to lie down, which they did, and received the enemy's fire for a considerable time, when an order was repeated along my line, coming from the left, directing the line to oblique to the left. This order I immediately and promptly countermanded as soon as it reached the part of the line where I stood, and arrested it in part. I saw that the immediate effect of the movement was to throw the troops into the woods and ravines on the left of the plateau, and necessarily throw them into great confusion. * * * *

"In the meantime Gen. Kershaw came into the field with his brigade, near one of my regiments, the 2d Ga., which still remained in very good order; and my adjutant, Capt. Du Bose, proposed to him to unite that, and some other companies of other regiments, with his command in the attack on the enemy's batteries, to which he assented; and this command, under Cols. Butt and Holmes, accompanied by Capt. Du Bose and Maj. Alexander (my quartermaster who acted as one of my aides on the field) advanced with Gen. Kershaw's brigade beyond the edge of the wood into the open field, but, under the destructive fire of the enemy's cannon and small-arms, wavered and fell back into the road skirting the pine thicket. * * * *

"My losses were very severe, the total being 194 killed and wounded, out of about 1200 carried into action. I am happy to add that the disorders which did arise were due rather to the difficulties of the ground, and the nature of the attack, than from any other cause, and that as far as my observation went, they extended to all troops engaged on the plateau in front of the enemy's guns. This is further evidenced by the fact that at roll-call next morning, over 800 of my command answered to their names, leaving under 200 unaccounted for, many of whom soon made their appearance."

There is no doubt that the entire force which had been engaged was wrecked for the time being, and that, had the enemy been in position for a counterstroke, the fragments could have made but little opposition. But A. P. Hill and Longstreet were close in rear, and Whiting's, Jackson's and Ewell's divisions were on the left, and Holmes a few miles off on the right. The enemy, moreover, having sent

ahead of all of their trains, were now very low both in ammunition and provisions, and could scarcely have ventured anything serious.

Whiting's division had suffered 175 casualties in its two brigades, and 19 in Hampton's brigade, from the enemy's artillery fire, while lying in support of our artillery in Poindexter's field. Including with these the losses in Jackson's and Ewell's divisions and Lawton's brigade, the casualties were 599. In Magruder's division the casualties were 2014, and in Huger's, including Ransom's brigade, 1609. In Rode's, Colquitt's and Ripley's brigades of D. H. Hill's division, the casualties were making 889, a total, so far of 5111. The other two brigades, Anderson's and Garland's, report only their total casualties for the campaign as 863 and 844, a total of 1707. A half, 854, is a moderate estimate for their losses at Malvern.

This would make our total losses 5965 or more; those of the enemy could scarcely have reached 2000, but the casualties of different battles are not separated.

Of Jackson's part in this action there is very little to be said. He took no initiative, though complying promptly with orders or requests as received. But had he been the Jackson of the Valley, being on the left flank that morning, he would have turned Malvern Hill by his left, and taken position commanding the road somewhere beyond Turkey Creek. Malvern should not have been attacked; only the enemy observed and held by Longstreet, while Jackson got a position which they would be forced to assault.

Lee's report sums up the subsequent operations, briefly as follows:

"On July 2, it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, leaving the ground covered with his dead and wounded, and his route exhibiting abundant evidence of precipitate retreat. The pursuit commenced, Gen. Stuart with his cavalry in the advance, but a violent storm which prevailed throughout the day greatly retarded our progress. The enemy, harassed and followed closely by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining Westover and the protection of his gunboats. He immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping in addition to those mounted in his intrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view

of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven days, under the most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need."

One episode of the pursuit, however, is worthy of note. On July 2, but little progress was made by the infantry, owing to the heavy rain-storm, but Stuart's cavalry (which had recrossed the Chickahominy by fording at Gorge Bridge on the afternoon of July 1) followed the enemy and endeavored to shell his columns wherever opportunity offered. About 5 P. M. the last of these columns had arrived at its destination on the James River, Harrison's Landing,—a peninsula about four miles long by one and a half mile wide, formed by Herring Creek on the northeast, running for that distance nearly parallel to the James before emptying into it. At its head a small inlet from the river on the southwest left but a narrow front exposed to attack.

But, across Herring Creek, an extensive plateau called Evelington Heights dominates the upper part of this peninsula so that if held by artillery the enemy would be forced to attack at a disadvantage—the creek being impassable for some distance above. During Wednesday night, Stuart, received a report from Pelham, commanding his artillery, describing this position and recommending its being seized. He forwarded the report to Lee, through Jackson, and early on the 3d, with a few cavalry and a single howitzer, nearly out of ammunition, he ran off a Federal squadron and took possession of the heights. It is a pity that there was any ammunition, for Stuart writes that—

"the howitzer was brought in action in the river road to fire upon the enemy's camp below. Judging from the great commotion and excitement below, it must have had considerable effect."

It did have considerable effect of a most unfortunate kind for us. It awaked the enemy to instant appreciation of the fact that it was essential for him to hold that ground, and that it behooved him to take it before we brought up any more force. A military lesson is to be learned from

the result, to wit, that dangers lurk in excess of enterprise as well as in its deficiency. In this campaign our cavalry affords two instances, Stuart's zeal, without necesity, led him to make the circuit of McClellan's army, June 11-15. The result was that McClellan was prepared to change his base to the James River as soon as he found Lee threatening his communications. Now, the temptation to shell a camp and wagon trains loses to our army its last chance to take a position which would compel the enemy to assume the offensive. One howitzer could, of course, accomplish nothing but to alarm the enemy, and precipitate their attack.

When Stuart opened fire, he thought that both Longstreet and Jackson were near. In fact, neither was within miles. Jackson had been sent in direct pursuit, being nearest the most direct roads, and his troops having been least engaged during the Seven Days. Two of the four brigades of his own division had been so little exposed as to have had together but two killed and 26 wounded, in the whole campaign. His 3d brigade, Winder's had had but 75 casualties at Gaines Mill, and 104 at Malvern Hill. Lawton's brigade, and Ewell's and Whiting's divisions, had only been severely engaged at Gaines Mill.

Longstreet, with A. P. Hill's and his own divisions, was on the 2d moved around the field of battle to Poindexter's house, and on the 3d was sent by roads to the left of Jackson. By mistake of the guides he was conducted too far to the left, and only reached Evelington Heights about dark on the 3d; Jackson's troops came up at the same time by the direct road.

Jackson's official report says:

> "On the morning of the 3d, my command arrived near the landing and drove in the enemy's skirmishers," but the date is shown by all other reports to be a clerical error for the 4th.

Had Stuart not opened fire, the enemy would not have disturbed him that day. During it McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War, as follows:

"I am in hopes the enemy is as completely worn out as we are. He was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. The roads are now very bad. For these reasons I hope we shall now have enough breathing space to reorganize and rest the men, and get them into position before the enemy can attack again. * * * * It is, of course, impossible to estimate, as yet, our losses, but I doubt whether there are today more than 50,000 men with their colors."

By the next morning 21 Confederate brigades had arrived and would have been upon Evelington Heights had Stuart not forced the enemy to come over and occupy them. McClellan's 50,000 men could then have had the task of removing them.

Stuart thus describes his resistance:

"I held the ground from 9 A. M. till 2 P. M., when the enemy had contrived to get one battery into position on this side the creek. The fire was, however, kept up until a body of infantry was found approaching by our right flank. I had no apprehension, however, as I felt sure Longstreet was near by, and, although Pelham had but two rounds of ammunition left, I held out, knowing how important it was to hold the ground till Longstreet arrived.

"The enemy's infantry advanced, and his battery kept up its fire. I just then learned that Longstreet had taken the wrong road and was then at Nance's shop, six or seven miles off. Pelham fired his last round, and the sharpshooters, strongly posted in the skirt of woods bordering the plateau, exhausted every cartridge, but had at last to retire. * * * * The next day, July 4, Gen. Jackson's command drove in the enemy's advanced pickets. I pointed out the position of the enemy, now occupying, apparently in force, the plateau from which I shelled their camp the day before, and showed him the routes by which the plateau, could be reached, to the left, and submitted my plan for dispossessing the enemy and attacking his camp. This was subsequently laid before the commanding general."

From the Federal reports it appears that the enemy occupied the heights on the afternoon of July 3 with Franklin's division. The next morning Longstreet was up with his own and A. P. Hill's division and two brigades of Magruder's. Jackson was also up with his own, Ewell's, Whiting's, and D. H. Hill's divisions. Lee did not reach the field until noon, and, as Longstreet ranked Jackson, he ordered the enemy's pickets driven in and preparation made for an attack.

A favorable opportunity was presented to regain the Evelington Heights by main force. They were occupied by but one division, and, being across Herring Creek from the rest of the Federal army, it could not have been rapidly

reenforced. There would have been very small risk in making the effort so earnestly urged by Stuart, for McClellan would never have dared a counterstroke, had we failed. The enemy's gunboats could have rendered little assistance, as their own camps and lines intervened. Briefly, the game seems to have been worth the candle, and it should have been played.

Jackson's troops, however, were in front, and Jackson protested against the attack, saying that the troops were not in proper condition, and asking for delay until Lee should reach the field. To this Longstreet consented, and when Lee arrived, Jackson's arguments prevailed, and the attack was given up. It was entirely unlike Lee, and he must have reluctantly yielded to Jackson's persuasion. Evidently Jackson was still not the Jackson of the Valley.

The next day the troops were moved back toward Richmond, and the campaign was ended.

The total casualties of the two armies for the Seven Days were:

Confederate:	killed 3286,	wounded 15,909,	missing 946,	total 20,141
Federal:	killed 1734,	wounded 8,062,	missing 6053,	total 15,849

Including the Federal wounded, we took about 10,000 prisoners and captured 52 guns and about 35,000 muskets. We lost two guns in the stampede in Holmes's division.

For a week after McClellan had established himself at Westover, he neglected to occupy the opposite bank of the James. As the fire of the gunboats commanded it, he could do so at pleasure, but as long as he did not, it was much better for us that he should not. Again, however, the temptation to shell a camp proved irresistible, and Lee was persuaded to authorize an expedition for the purpose under Pendleton's supervision.

On July 12 some 47 rifled guns were collected, positions chosen, and ranges marked for night firing. After midnight they opened fire upon the Federal transports, wharves, and camps, and used up their small supplies of ammunition in a random cannonade. The enemy replied in like fashion, both from the shore and from gunboats. Of

course, there was much commotion in the Federal camps, but the actual damage done was trifling. Some 40 casualties are reported among the Federals, and two or three among the Confederate artillerists.

The next day the Federals established themselves on the South Side. The strategic advantages of a position astraddle of the James River have already been referred to (page 61, Chap. III) but they were not yet generally appreciated. Fortunately for us, Lincoln and Halleck recalled McClellan and his army to Washington without ever realizing them; although McClellan had tried hard to impress them upon his superiors. Fortunately too, for us, Gen. S. G. French, in command at Petersburg, saw and appreciated the threat of the position, and immediately began the construction of a line of intrenchments about that city. These intrenchments, in 1864, defeated some attempts at surprise; and at last enabled Beauregard with two divisions, to withstand the attack of Grant's whole army, between June 15 and 18 of that year.

My personal duties during the Seven Days were the supervision and distribution of our ammunition supplies. Our organized division supply trains and brigade wagons worked smoothly and no scarcity was felt anywhere.

In addition to these duties, I was placed in charge of a balloon which had been manufactured in Savannah by Dr. Edward Cheves, and sent to Gen. Lee for use in reconnoitering the enemy's lines. It was made from silk of many patterns, varnished with gutta-percha car-springs dissolved in naptha, and inflated at the Richmond Gas Works with ordinary city gas.

I saw the battle of Gaines Mill from it, and signalled information of the movement of Slocum's division across the Chickahominy, to reenforce Porter. Ascensions were made daily, and when the enemy reached Malvern Hill, the inflated balloon would be carried down the river and ascensions made from the deck of a boat. Unfortunately, on July 4,—the boat—the Teaser, a small armed tug—got aground below Malvern Hill on a falling tide, and a large

Federal gunboat the Maritanza, came up and captured both boat and balloon, the crew escaping.

We could never build another balloon, but my experience with this gave me a high idea of the possible efficiency of balloons in active campaigns. Especially did we find, too, that the balloons of the enemy forced upon us constant troublesome precautions in efforts to conceal our marches.

As affording a bird's-eye view of our organization and of the forces engaged in the different actions, and the severity of the conflicts, a table of Confederate division casualties is attached, showing as accurately as can be determined, the losses of each action. The total Federal losses in killed and wounded (excluding prisoners) is also approximately divided for the principal actions as nearly as records permit.

DIVISION CASUALTIES, SEVEN DAYS BEFORE RICHMOND

DIVISIONS	No. of Brigades	Mechanicsville	Gaines Mill	Savage Station	Frazier's Farm	Malvern Hill	Other Affairs	TOTALS
Whiting's Div.	2	------	1017	------	------	175	------	1192
Jackson's Div.	3	------	91	------	------	117	------	208
Lawton's Div.	1	------	492	------	------	75	------	567
Ewell's Div.	4	------	764	------	------	223	------	987
D. H. Hill's Div.	5	586	1423	------	------	1743	15	3767
MAGRUDER'S Corps								
D. R. Jones' Div.	2	------	------	------	------	425	455	879
McLaw's Div.	2	------	------	357	------	315	------	672
Magruder's Div.	2	------	------	84	------	874	9	967
Longstreet's Div.	6	------	1883	------	2555	------	------	4483
Huger's Div.	3	------	------	------	------	1137	394	1531
A. P. Hill's Div.	6	764	2688	------	750	8	------	4210
Holmes's Div.	3	------	------	------	------	499	178	677
Pendleton's Art.	------	------	------	------	------	------	2	2
Stuart's Cav.	------	------	------	------	------	------	71	71
Totals								
10 Divisions	39	1350	8358	441	3305	5590	1124	20168
Federal losses (killed and wounded only)	------	361	4001	400	2034	2000	1000	9796

OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE

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IN THE

WAR OF THE REBELLION

PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF

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Telegrams and Letters

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Winfield Scott, May 2, 1862—9:45 p. m.

I think we will be ready for you on Monday, or at latest Tuesday night. Will it be possible for you to run up here to-morrow or Sunday for an hour or two to arrange final movements? I think your vessel should not make its appearance here by daylight, but arrive after dark and run through before daybreak. With the aid of the Navy, I think a glorious success awaits us.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

CAPTAIN JOHN RODGERS,
U. S. S. Galena, Hampton Roads.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding vessels off Yorktown, Va.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Hampton Roads, May 3, 1862.

SIR: The wooden gunboats may, and probably can, pass the batteries of a dark and otherwise suitable night without being sunk, but it must be borne in mind that the move takes them away from their supplies of ordnance, fuel, etc., and that they may possibly be compelled to repass them. Smith may not have such a night on the one after you open, particularly considering the present stage of the moon.

I was greatly in hopes that before the gunboats should be invited to run the gauntlet, Gloucester Point battery would have been turned and taken. Then matters would have presented themselves to my mind in a much more favorable light. Just as the enemy's forces are pressed at Yorktown, so will the desire increase to get the *Merrimack* and consorts off there, and the more cautious I must be about sending vessels away from this; they have been threatening us for several days past. Seven vessels of ours are already off Yorktown, and this, you are aware, is the full number originally agreed upon between us in our conferences as sufficient to answer ends, as then understood; but, if events will permit, I will increase the number between now and next Monday night, and as largely as I can consistently with my duty.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Near Yorktown, Va.

Letter from Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, to Commander Smith, U. S. Navy, regarding movements of the enemy.

MAY 4, 1862.

[SIR:] I learn that a large part of the rebel force marched to Bigler's Mill, on the York River, last night, to take sail from there to West Point, [Va.]. It is of the first importance to my operations that some of your gunboats hurry up to West Point to destroy the transportation and report to me the state of affairs.

Franklin's division will be ready to go up under convoy of the other gunboats as soon as I can hear from the river.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Commodore SMITH,
Commanding Fleet.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, *May 4, 1862.*

We have taken Yorktown. I will need the gunboats to move up York River.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Hampton Roads, Virginia, May 4, 1862.

With my whole heart I do most cordially congratulate you on your brilliant and important achievement. The gunboats shall accompany you up York River.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, etc., near Yorktown, Va.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, *May 4, 1862.*

If it appears that West Point is not strongly held, I would suggest pushing the *Galena* and some gunboats up the James River.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Hon. G. V. FOX.

Telegrams and Letters

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, *May 4, 1862.*

The enemy having evacuated Yorktown, General McClellan has no need of the *Galena* on York River. He would like you to send up James River immediately, as far as possible, to harass the enemy as much as may be in your power.

J. J. ASTOR,
Colonel and Aid-de-camp.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

[Telegram]

MAY 4, 1862.

Bigler's Wharf is burning. There are no batteries for 12 miles up the river. I have sent a steamer to burn the railroad bridge over Pamunkey River.

SMITH.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

[Telegram]

MAY 4, 1862.

Steamer *Chocura* has returned from West Point, [Va.]. No obstructions or batteries on the river. No guns or troops at West Point. White flag at that place and at other points on the river. The frames of two large vessels building at West Point.

W. SMITH.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

Cooperation of the Navy with the Army in the operations against Yorktown, Va., May 4 to 7, 1862.

Report of Commander Smith, U. S. Navy, transmitting report of Lieutenant Patterson, U. S. Navy.

U. S. S. WACHUSETT,
Yorktown, Va., May 5, 1862.

SIR: About 7 o'clock yesterday morning we saw an American ensign floating over one of the rebel redoubts at Yorktown, and a few minutes afterwards I received from General McClellan a telegraphic dispatch saying, "Yorktown is in our possession; please run up and help us in communicating with Gloucester," and requesting me to send some of the boats up York River to reconnoiter and seize schooners.

The squadron was immediately underway and stood up the river. When near Gloucester I sent Master Whitehead, of this ship, to hoist

the American flag at that place. I then dispatched the *Corwin*, Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, and *Currituck*, Acting Master Shankland, to reconnoiter up York River to the distance of 10 or 12 miles; the other vessels anchored at this place.

We found only one small schooner, which had been abandoned; all other vessels had gone up the river; some few were still in sight, but at a considerable distance.

At 11 a. m. I received a dispatch from General McClellan requesting me to send two boats to reconnoiter as far up as West Point, and let the rest escort Franklin's division, which was to go by water. I directed Lieutenant Commanding Patterson in the *Chocura* to proceed up the river to West Point, taking with him the *Corwin* (which had not yet returned), and to send back the *Currituck*.

At 2 p. m. the *Currituck* returned, and her commander reported that he had been about 12 miles up the river; that Bigler's Wharf, 10 miles above here, was burning, and he had not seen any batteries on the banks. Just as the *Currituck* returned I received a dispatch from General McClellan saying it was of the first importance that some of the boats should hurry up and destroy the transportation. I therefore dispatched the *Currituck*, with orders to go up the river and if possible destroy the railroad bridge over the Pamunkey River, and then telegraphed to General McClellan to inform him of what I had done.

At 4 p. m. I received another dispatch from General McClellan, requesting me not to burn the bridge, but to save it if possible. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant Commanding Henry in the *Sebago* up the river, with orders, when he should meet the *Corwin* returning here, to send her back in pursuit of the *Currituck* and prevent the burning of the bridge.

At 8 p. m. Lieutenant Commanding Patterson, in the *Chocura*, returned and reported that he had been to West Point; that he had not found any batteries or soldiers at that place, or at any other point on the river, but found there a white flag flying, and saw white flags flying at many places as he went up the river. I enclose a copy of his report.

At 9:30 p. m. Lieutenant Commanding Henry, in the *Sebago*, returned, having met the *Corwin* and sent her in pursuit of the *Currituck*.

The *Sebago* towed down a small schooner and launch captured by the *Corwin*, having on board four deserters from the rebel camp and five men belonging to small vessels in the transport service, all of whom had given themselves up to the steamer, and whom I have to-day transferred to the provost marshal; also ten negroes who had given themselves up and whom I have transferred to Colonel Ingalls, at Yorktown.

This forenoon General Franklin's division are arriving and anchoring here, preparatory to a start up the river to-morrow morning. We will accompany them.

The *Corwin* and *Currituck* have not yet returned.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. SMITH,
Commanding U. S. S. Wachusett

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Hampton Roads.

Insert this Opposite Page 854 of the Peninsular Source Book

Abstract log of the U. S. S. Wachusett

May 4.—At 7:00 A.M. discovered the national flag flying over a battery near Yorktown. At 7:40 received a dispatch from General McClellan, stating that Yorktown was in possession of the national forces. At 8:30 got underway with the rest of the fleet and steamed up the river toward Yorktown. Sent the second cutter ashore with Master Whitehead to hoist the Union flag on Glouchester Point; he did so and returned to the ship. The Corwin and Currituck proceeded up the river. The Marantanza went up a short distance and returned with a rebel schooner. At 11:15 sent second cutter ashore with Lieutenant Fleming and a guard of marines to occupy Gloucester Point. At 6:10 P.M. got underway and dropped down the river nearer Gloucester Point. At 9 the Sebago returned to her anchorage with a prize schooner. At 9 the second cutter returned from Gloucester Point with our marines, the officer in charge having delivered the forts to Colonel Stryker. In the forts at Gloucester were the following pieces or ordnance, all spiked: In the forts on the heights: Rifled guns, —; Dahlgren guns, IX inch, —; 42 pounder carronades, —; 32 pounder 27 cwt, —. In the water battery, —. In the batteries were found abundance of shot, grape, and unloaded shell. The ammunition, or part, has been poured into the wells inside the works. But few arms were found, and those of the poorest kind, fowling pieces generally. In the water battery were three furnaces for heating shot; they had been filled with shot and left; some of the shot were hot when Lieutenant Fleming took possession.

May 7.—Off West Point. At 1:15 P.M. went to quarters and fired six shell from XI-inch guns and some from rifled guns. Drove the enemy who had attacked General Franklin from their position. A large number of troops arrived.

[Enclosure]

U. S. Steam Gunboat Chocura,
Off Yorktown, Va., May 4, 1862.

Sir: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your order of this morning I left Gloucester Point at noon, and at 1:30 was joined by Lieutenant Commanding Thomas S. Phelps in the *Corwin*.

We proceeded up York River, prepared for action, but found every house deserted, apparently, except by females and negroes; a white flag was displayed as we approached.

Bigler's Wharf we found burning at each end, and in the immediate vicinity, from two buildings, hospital flags were flying. Zantzinger's wood and coal wharf, above Bigler's, and on the opposite side, is destroyed in several places.

On reaching West Point the narrow, intricate channel and shoal water prevented my approaching in this vessel as near as I would have wished, and it was too late to do so in boats, but I could easily distinguish the frames of two vessels (apparently intended for gunboats) on fire, and partially consumed.

Near the point is a small water battery with three embrasures which was deserted, and I think without any armament. Here also a white flag was displayed.

There are no obstructions in the channel of the river, nor batteries on its banks.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. H. Patterson,
Lieutenant, Commanding.

Commander W. Smith,
U. S. S. Wachusett, off Yorktown, Va.

Report of Commander Smith, U. S. Navy, forwarding reports of Lieutenant Phelps and Acting Master Shankland, U. S. Navy.

U. S. S. Wachusett,
West Point, York River, May 7, 1862.

Sir: On the afternoon of the 5th instant there was considerable fighting between our forces and the rebels about 6 miles above Yorktown. At 8 p. m. General McClellan sent an aid to request me to send two of the gunboats off the mouth of Queen's Creek, about 6 miles up the river, to shell the rebels, who, it was thought, were endeavoring to turn his flank. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant Commanding Nicholson with the *Marblehead* and Lieutenant Commanding McCann with the *Maratanza* to perform the duty. Before the gunboats reached the station the firing had ceased, and at 9:30 p. m. General McClellan telegraphed to General Franklin that our troops were 10 miles from Yorktown.

At 7 a. m., on the 6th, the transports conveying General Franklin's division began to move up the river to West Point, under the escort of this ship, the *Chocura*, and *Sebago*. At 1:15 p. m. I anchored here with a part of the transports and the remainder of them arrived in the course of the afternoon. The landing of the troops was immediately begun, and is still going on; we are assisting them. I found

here the steamer *Corwin*, Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, and *Currituck*, Acting Master Shankland. From these officers I received reports, of which I forward herewith copies.

The prisoners were delivered to the provost-marshal at Yorktown.

Last evening I sent the *Currituck* up the Pamunkey River to endeavor to capture some schooners reported to be there. She returned this morning, and her commander made me a report of his proceedings, of which I enclose herewith a copy.

About 1 p. m. to-day some of the enemy opened fire from some field-pieces, placed on a hill on the left flank of the camp. Our vessels immediately commenced shelling them, and in few minutes they retired, no damage having been done to our people.

I sent Lieutenant Commanding Phelps in the *Corwin* up the Mattapony River to-day to learn something of a party of rebels reported to be crossing that river. He returned this evening and reports that he went up the river 26 miles and ascertained that about 4,000 rebels passed last night across at Dunkirk Bridge. Soldiers were deserting rapidly; white flags were flying on the banks.

A deserter who came in last night reports that 40,000 rebels are in the neighborhood.

We have several prize vessels, all of them small and of little value. What disposition shall I make of them?

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. SMITH,
Commanding U.S. Gunboat Wachusett.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Hampton Roads.

[Enclosure No. 1]

U. S. S. CORWIN,
West Point, Va., May 5, 1862.

SIR: I deem it necessary to place before you as early as practicable the following items of information which I obtained from prisoners who appear to be friendly to the Union, and who, as they state, were forced to serve the rebels against their wishes, viz:

Eight feet of water can be carried up the Masapony [Mattapony] River to about 5 miles above Walkertown [Walkerton], but this river has been closed by sinking several schooners in the channel a short distance above West Point.

In the Pamunkey, 9 or 10 feet can be carried to the railroad bridge, but they have fifty vessels, mostly schooners, which they commenced to sink on yesterday near a place called the White House, or at Indian Town.

The rebels are prepared to destroy the railroad bridge, having saws and combustibles ready for this purpose.

The enemy are falling back upon the Chickahominy near Richmond, where they are fortified, etc.; also they intend to make a stand between Fredericksburg and Richmond, probably at the junction of the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads, or near Chesterfield, and from Yorktown back to the Warwick and Williamsburg.

General Johnston is supposed to have 125,000 men on the peninsula and has fallen back where he can escape being cut up by the naval forces.

This was decided upon in a council of war held at Yorktown on his taking command.

A new ironclad steamer superior to the *Virginia*, to be called the *Brandywine*, was launched at Norfolk some eighteen days since (to be commanded by Captain Pegram) and is thought to be nearly ready. There have been also several other gunboats fitted for service.

The channel near the naval hospital at Norfolk, Va., is obstructed nearly all the way across, leaving only room sufficient for the *Virginia* to pass through, and the old frigate *United States* is in readiness to be sunk in the gap if necessary.

I am informed that six gunboats (partially built) and the York River light-boat were destroyed on yesterday.

I am respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. S. PHELPS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Captain WM. SMITH,
Comdg. Div. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, York River.

Additional, and I believe reliable:

General Johnston and General Magruder are falling back to Hanover Court-House, [Va.], 13 miles from Richmond, to take up their line of defense on the Chickahominy. About 4,000 of the enemy have endeavored to cross the Mattapony River in this vicinity, but were prevented by the presence of our force, and they are pushing farther up the country. There are at present about 2,000 within 3 miles of us.

Some distance back inland, on the south side of the river (during the night), we observed the camp fires of the enemy, extending about a mile in length.

I am, respectfully,

T. S. PHELPS.

[Enclosure No. 2]

U. S. S. CORWIN,
West Point, York River, Virginia, May 5, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully report that in obedience to your order of the 4th instant, accompanied by the *Currituck*, Captain Shankland, I proceeded up York River at full speed, white flags being displayed on the north bank as we advanced; when near King's Creek, discovered a company of the rebel cavalry on the south side of the river, who were driven off by our shells, and it is believed that three saddles were emptied. Continuing on, discovered Bigler's Wharf to be on fire, and two schooners, one sloop, and a launch, loaded with stores and officers' effects, endeavoring to escape. Succeeded in capturing one schooner and the launch, when the others were abandoned and fired by the rebels and were destroyed.

Having reached the town of Cappahosic, where white flags were displayed, and feeling that my instructions would not warrant a farther advance to westward, I turned the vessels downstream intending to secure the various schooners at anchor which we had passed.

After capturing a small sloop, Captain Patterson arrived and directed me to cover his steamer while he made a reconnoissance near West Point. When that duty was accomplished we again started down the river, capturing another schooner, and when near Bigler's Wharf I met the *Sebago*, Captain Henry, who delivered your instructions to prevent the *Currituck* from destroying the railroad bridge, which duty I was enabled successively to accomplish.

On my arrival at West Point at 9:30 p. m. Captain Shankland reported that he had landed, taken possession, and hoisted the American flag.

Six white men were captured in the prizes; one I retained to act as pilot and the others I sent to you by Captain Henry, as they had information of importance to communicate which I deemed necessary for you to have at the earliest moment.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS S. PHELPS,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

Commander WM. SMITH, U. S. Navy,
Comdg. Division of North Atlantic Blockading Squadron,
U. S. S. Wachusett.

U. S. S. MARATANZA,
Off West Point, May 7, 1862.

SIR: About 11:15 this morning, hearing the sound of heavy firing in the rear of this place, I proceeded on board the *Wachusett* for the purpose of finding means to join my command, which I had passed on my way to report to you and to receive your instructions.

About half past 11 General Franklin telegraphed for the assistance of the gunboats, stating that he was attacked by a large force of the enemy and wanted immediate support. At this time the *Maratanza* was anchored about 2½ miles below, engaged in towing off the *Marblehead.*

Receiving your orders to go aboard the *Maratanza* and bring the vessel into action, I proceeded at once in your gig for this purpose. Immediately upon getting on board I weighed anchor, cleared for action, and, when abreast of and as close to the position of the enemy as we could get, I opened fire with the 100-pounder Parrott, about which time the *Sebago* also opened. The fire was kept up for about three-quarters of an hour (this vessel remaining under way) with terrible and telling effect upon the enemy, whose fire soon began to slacken, and they commenced retreating. At 2:22 p. m. ceased firing and anchored.

It is the generally received opinion, so I gather from the officers and men composing General Franklin's command, that the accurate and destructive fire of the gunboats was greatly instrumental in saving the army from serious reverse and disaster. I found the use of the army signals on this occasion invaluable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. H. STEVENS,
Lieutenant, Commanding.

Commander WM. SMITH,
Comdg. U. S. S. Wachusett, and Senior Officer Present.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT POTOMAC, *May 5, 1862.*

SIR: Your communication* of to-day just received. West Point is not occupied by the enemy, so that, important as it is to me to send vessels up James River, of course defer to your judgment. I will communicate further after I return from the front.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Hampton Roads.

[Telegram]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 7, 1862.

The Department desires to afford every possible aid to the movements of General McClellan, and endeavor to harass the retreat of the rebels whenever they can be reached by gunboats.

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of Navy.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Hampton Roads.

Order of the President of the United States to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James River.

FORT MONROE, VA., *May 7, 1862.*

SIR: Major-General McClellan telegraphs that he has ascertained by a reconnoissance that the battery at Jamestown has been abandoned, and he again requests that gunboats may be sent up the James River.

If you have tolerable confidence that you can successfully contend with the *Merrimack* without the help of the *Galena* and two accompanying gunboats, send the *Galena* and two gunboats up the James River at once.

Please report your action on this to me at once, I shall be found at General Wool's headquarters.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

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*Not found.

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U.S. Navy, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James River.

MAY 7, 1862.

DEAR COMMODORE: The President has read me the note he has addressed to you. Should it result in your sending the *Galena*, as indicated, may I ask the favor, unless you think it really injudicious, of letting the *Stevens* [*Naugatuck*] go with the *Galena*.

Yours truly,

S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to the Secretary of the Treasury, regarding the sending of gunboats up the James River.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Hampton Roads, Virginia, May 7, 1862—9:30 p. m.

MY DEAR SIR: I really do think it injudicious, for various reasons which I will explain to you hereafter, to send the *Stevens* with the *Galena*, but, if you insist upon it, of course, she shall go.

Most truly and faithfully, yours,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

Hon. S. P. CHASE,
Fortress Monroe.

Order of Flag Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Captain Rodgers, U.S. Navy, commanding U.S.S. Galena, to proceed with gunboats up the James River.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Hampton Roads, May 7, 1862.

SIR: Proceed with the *Galena*, *Aroostook*, and *Port Royal* up the James River, and with them do all that may be in your power to assist the army under command of Major-General McClellan, and endeavor to harass the retreat of the rebels wherever they can be reached. Inform the commanders of the *Aroostook* and *Port Royal* that it is my orders that they accompany you with their respective vessels, and act implicitly under your instructions. It is the desire of the President of the United States that the expedition should start at once, to-night.

In the discharge of this highly important duty I, of course, leave all details entirely to your own discretion, in which I have every confidence.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Commander JOHN RODGERS,
U. S. S. Galena, Hampton Roads, Virginia.

[Telegram]

McClellan's [Headquarters], *June 15, 1862.*

Have you not two more light-draft gunboats that you can send up the York River? It is important that more gunboats should be there to protect the transports, etc.

G. B. McClellan,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough.

P. S.—General Dix please forward.

[Telegram]

U.S. Flagship Minnesota,
Norfolk, Va., June 16, 1862.

Every available gunboat of light draft that I now have at my command is up either the James or York River. I may have a couple more in a day or two, and then I will endeavor to accommodate you.

L. M. Goldsborough.

Major-General McClellan.

[Telegram]

Fort Monroe, *June 16, 1862—3:30 p. m.*

Major-General McClellan desires me to request you to send without delay two additional gunboats to White House, where their services are much needed. Please send reply that I may communicate it to Major-General McClellan by telegraph.

John A. Dix,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, U. S. Army, to Captain Murray, U.S. Navy, requesting reconnoissance up the Pamunkey River by U. S. S. Currituck.

White House, Va., *June 16, 1862.*

Captain: The General Commanding the Army has sent Colonel [William W.] Averell with the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Captain Hildt, two companies, Regulars, across the river to-night at this point, to scout up the peninsula between the Pamunkey and Mattapony, as far as Ellet's warehouse.

Colonel Averell is anxious that you will direct the *Currituck* to ascend the river to-night as high as possible and return to her present berth to-morrow, in order to keep attention from his column and at the same time to perform any service that may suggest itself to the captain.

Very truly,

RUFUS INGALLS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Aid-de-Camp, Quartermaster.

Captain MURRAY,
Commanding the Fleet, Present.

Report of Commander Gillis, U. S. Navy, of affairs up the James River, Virginia.

U. S. STEAM SLOOP WACHUSETT,
James River, Virginia, June 17, 1862.

SIR: I respectfully forward several communications for your consideration. Acting Lieutenant Commanding Behm desires to see you in relation to some of his crew whose term of service has expired. He has taken on board here such articles on requisition as could be furnished; will supply from *Brandywine* deficiencies.

I sent the *Monitor* to relieve the *Galena* at Sturgeontown. On passage down the *Galena* was fired at from bluffs above Turkey Island. She returned yesterday to shell the place. The *Port Royal* accompanied her and returned same evening; she is taking in stores here. We are awaiting arrival of coal vessel by *Island Belle.*

The *Galena* returned this morning. Shortly after she had anchored our vessels were opened upon from the bluff at City Point (at 9:45 a. m.) by artillery and small arms. We returned the impertinent attack with shell and shrapnel, silenced and drove back the guerrilla rebel force.

It is thought necessary, to make the trial trip for speed of *Galena,* that she should have her coal bunkers filled, and to go down to where there may be sufficient water and reach of river to test her speed fairly, which will be attended to so soon as coal is procured.

Herewith please find Lieutenant Commanding Beaumont's report on examination and destruction of enemy's works along the Jamestown [Back?] River, as directed by you.

I feel quite unwell, therefore excuse my brief report of state of affairs here.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. GILLIS,
Commander, Comdg. Naval Force, James River, Virginia.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Norfolk, Va.

Order from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Acting Master Hays, U. S. Navy, commanding U. S. S. Morse, to proceed to duty in York River, Virginia.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 19, 1862.

SIR: With as little delay as possible you will proceed up York River, Virginia, with the U. S. S. *Morse* under your command, and report to Lieutenant Commanding T. H. Patterson, commanding the U. S. S. *Chocura*, and senior naval officer on the river, for duty in protecting the transports on the Pamunkey and otherwise assisting the operations of the army, as may be directed.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Acting Master Commanding PETER HAYS,
Commanding U. S. S. Morse, Hampton Roads, Virginia.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Goldsborough regarding proposed destruction of railroad bridge at Petersburg.

Private.] NEAR HAMPTON ROADS, *June 20,* [*1862*]—*11 a.m.*

MY DEAR FLAG-OFFICER: I received your note with a long growl just as I was leaving Washington, and I sent it to Sedgwick and Grimes. There is every disposition in the country and Congress to do full justice to the Navy, and if the present admiral bill fails in the Senate it will be because Navy officers are at work doctoring it. They could never pull together is the reason; the Army (a unit) go ahead in general legislation.

The President sent me down to enquire about the possibility of destroying the Petersburg railroad bridge. I endeavored to avoid this journey, as all the navy bills are before the Senate and House, and I feel the deepest interest in them; however, I had to go, so I took the *Yankee* and went directly to City Point, arriving last night at 11:30 p. m. I returned this morning and proceed directly to Washington without going on shore at the fort, unless we are detained to coal. I should have called up to Norfolk to see you but for the bills, so you must excuse the irregularity for the public good. I stayed three hours with Gillis and Rodgers, and left at 3:30 a. m. this day.*

* * * * * * *

Of course I said nothing except to get their opinion about the possibility of destroying the bridge. Neither seemed to know much about the Appomattox, but Rodgers promises to make all possible enquiries. I told them the Government would pay $25,000 or even $50,000 to have the bridge destroyed. The President considers it of vital importance, and wishes every exertion made to accomplish it immediately. My own opinion is that the chances are better with Rodgers than anyone else. Jenkins will take Gillis's place, but though a most accom-

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*Matter omitted of a personal nature.

plished officer, he is but one above Rodgers, who has already borne the "burden and heat of the day," and should hardly have anyone to step in over him at the last moment. I think you had better write a confidential letter to the Department, stating that every exertion will be made to destroy this bridge and that a competent force for any emergency is placed under Commander Rodgers, which will obviate any mention of the matter first in letters from the Department. There is another bridge at Swift Creek, 3 miles north of Petersburg, which may answer the purpose, unless it is a short one and can be easily replaced. The value of this communication destroyed (to our cause) can not be expressed in words or money, provided it is done before McClellan fights. Are you all ready to dash at Caswell? I ask it because Farragut is calling for these gunboats and hesitates to attack Fort Morgan without more force.

Regretting that I am not able to see you,

Truly, yours,

G. V. Fox.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

Order of the Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, regarding the use of the submarine propeller for the destruction of the Petersburg Bridge.

Confidential] NAVY DEPARTMENT, *June 21, 1862.*

SIR: As far as is practicable, you will keep secret the movements of the submarine propeller recently from Philadelphia, and take into consideration the propriety of her being used on the Appomattox River to operate against the Petersburg Bridge.

Very respectfully, etc.,

GIDEON WELLES.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Norfolk, Va.

Report of Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, regarding plans for destruction of the railroad bridge at Petersburg, Va.

U.S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 21, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit to you herewith a copy of a confidential letter I have just addressed to Commander Rodgers, in effect, with regard to the destruction of the railroad bridge at Petersburg. Money may bring about its destruction, but, from my knowledge of the existing state of things thereabouts, I doubt whether any mere naval force we may employ will be able to do so.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer, Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

[Enclosure]

Confidential] U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 21, 1862.

SIR: You will return to this place without delay with the *Wachusett* under your command, turning over to Commander Rodgers all the orders, instructions, and papers received from me or your predecessor with regard to the vessels or management of affairs up James River.

Say to Commander Rodgers that the President of the United States is especially anxious to have the railroad bridge at Petersburg destroyed, if possible, and that I wish him to accomplish the object, if it can be done. If it can not be done by a force, or rather, if it can be done sooner and more certainly by resorting to the use of money, he is hereby authorized to use any amount, not exceeding $50,000, that may be necessary for the purpose. North of Petersburg, at Swift Creek, there is another bridge. If it is not short, and therefore easily replaced, its destruction might answer the purpose of cutting off the enemy's retreat in that direction in case the bridge at Petersburg can not be destroyed. If, however, both can be destroyed, so much the better. A submarine propeller for clearing the obstructions, etc., in James River will be sent to Commander Rodgers the moment she arrives here from Philadelphia. She is now hourly expected, and she, perhaps, may be used to great advantage in destroying the bridges in view.

In mentioning the above large sum of money as a reward for any person or persons who will destroy the bridge at Petersburg, it is done rather to impress the great desire of the Department upon the subject than under the supposition that more, comparatively, than a moderate part of it will be necessary to be given. Still, if success can not be secured otherwise, the whole amount can be applied. All of the above that relates to the bridges in view, both you and Commander Rodgers will regard as confidential; for, unless secrecy be observed, the undertaking will probably prove a failure and the party employed detected.

Give either this paper or a copy of it to Commander Rodgers, and enjoin upon him to lose no time in getting the work it bespeaks done. It is of the utmost importance that it should be accomplished before the next fight comes off between General McClellan and the rebel army.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer, Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Commander J. P. GILLIS, U. S. Navy,
Commanding U. S. S. Wachusett, James River, Virginia.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, regarding the railroad bridge at Petersburg, Va.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 21, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: As far back as the 24th of last month I called attention to the Appomattox railroad bridge at Petersburg, etc., as you will perceive by the copy I send you herewith of a letter I then wrote

to Commander Smith. I also send you his statement of a reconnoissance up the Appomattox. Force—naval force—won't answer there, but dollars may. The river is obstructed and defended, and Petersburg is kept garrisoned. I have kept myself as well posted as possible with regard to the Appomattox, Chickahominy, etc., for I long since perceived the immense advantage that would result to our cause by destroying the railroad bridge at Petersburg.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.
Flag-Officer, Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Hon G. V. Fox, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, giving reason why railroad bridge at Petersburg, Va., can not be destroyed.

U. S. S. GALENA,
Off City Point, June 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant in regard to burning the railroad bridge at Petersburg, Va.

The subject had already engaged my attention, and I met the following difficulties:

The gunboats can not send a boat on shore without danger of an ambush. Every movement is carefully watched by armed men. We are not able to communicate with the inhabitants except with danger to them and to us.

I have concluded that in Norfolk or at Fortress Monroe, where free intercourse can be had with Union men, citizens of Virginia, must be sought the agents for this work. The Appomattox, scarcely wider than a canal, has its channel obstructed by vessels and lighters sunk in the bottom of the river. It runs through banks which absolutely command any rowboats upon its waters. We can not approach by steamers, and rowboats would be destroyed.

When I last heard from Petersburg, about a month ago, by two deserters, there were some 6,000 or 7,000 troops there under General Huger. If I see any opportunity of carrying out the subject of your letter, I shall zealously do so.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander.

Flag-Officer LOUIS GOLDSBOROUGH.
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Telegrams and Letters

[Telegram]

McClellan's Headquarters, *June 23, 1862.*

Quite a number of vessels loaded with provisions and forage will leave the Pamunkey River within a day or two for James River. The general commanding desires that these vessels be convoyed up the James and be placed in charge of the gunboats now in that river near City Point, or in some secure place near there.

Stewart Van Vliet,
Brigadier-General.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough.

[Telegram]

McClellan's [Headquarters], *June 24, 1862.*

Have the gunboats which I asked you for some days since, and which you expected soon, yet arrived and been sent to the White House? It is a matter of great importance that this additional protection should be given to our depots at the earliest practicable moment.

Geo. B. McClellan,
Major-General.

Captain Goldsborough,
Flag-Officer.

[Telegram]

Norfolk, *June 25,* [*1862*].

Your telegram* dated the 23d was received last night. Its wording was so mandatory that I desire to ask you if it is intended as an order from your general commanding to me?

L. M. Goldsborough.

Brigadier-General Van Vliet.

[Telegram]

U. S. Flagship Minnesota,
Norfolk, Va., June 25, 1862.

Enquire at the White House whether two additional gunboats have yet reached there.

L. M. Goldsborough,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General McClellan.

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*See telegram at top of this page.

[Telegram]

McClellan's Headquarters, *June 25*, [*1862*]—*3:30 p.m.*

(Received June 26.)

Your telegram just received. I am sorry that you should consider my telegram as mandatory, as it was certainly not so intended. The commanding general merely desired your cooperation in carrying out an important duty. The general is now in front, where a sharp fight is going on, or I should submit your telegram to him to be answered.

Stewart Van Vliet,
Brigadier-General.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough.

[Telegram]

[U.S.S.] Galena, *June 25, 1862.*

Dispatch received; night. Gunboats and false attack on City Point and on battery above barriers part of plan. Otherwise rowboats would be destroyed. Nothing else can get there. Four thousand troops in vicinity of Petersburg, and pickets everywhere. Execution must be prompt or a division would come from Richmond. Positive official information showing bridge 250 feet long; private, from 50 to 80 (about 50) high. The banks above command our decks. Men, screened by trees, fire and disappear before we can reply. An intolerable annoyance. Horse artillery put nine shot through the *Jacob Bell and got off before assistance could arrive. We can fight when needed, but we can not be in the narrow part of the river idle.

Panther,* on right or west bank of river, has heavy guns. Both sides must be taken before we can work at removing obstructions.

John Rodgers.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

[Telegram]

McClellan's Headquarters, *June 26, 1862—1:20 a.m.*

I am informed that the two additional gunboats ordered to the White House have arrived at that place.

Geo. B. McClellan,
Major-General, Commanding.

Flag-Officer Goldsborough.

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*Cipher; probably for battery.

Telegrams and Letters

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *June 26, 1862.*

Please notify Flag-Officer Goldsborough that there are now here, waiting for a convoy up James River, three tugboats, each with four schooners in tow. One more steamer with four schooners is momentarily expected.

C. W. THOMAS,
Captain, etc., [Assistant Quartermaster].

Captain LUDLOW.

[Telegram]

MCCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS, *June 26, 1862—10:20 a.m.*

Captain Rodgers informs me that he can leave his flotilla for a day or two without detriment and would like to communicate pesonally with me. Will you do me the favor to give him the permission to come?

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 26, 1862.

Commander Rodgers is under orders from me to execute an exceedingly important and delicate duty, requiring his whole attention. He must therefore undervalue his services, or the object to be accomplished, if he thinks that he can, before that duty is discharged, leave his station for a day or two without detriment. Before consenting to his proposition to visit you, I must hear further from him.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

[Telegram]

MCCLELLAN'S [HEADQUARTERS], *June 26, 1862—2:45 p.m.*

I have the honor to forward the following telegraphic correspondence between Flag-Officer Goldsborough and one of my staff-officers:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 23.*

Quite a number of vessels loaded with provisions and forage will leave Pamunkey River within a day or two for James River. The

general commanding desires that these vessels be convoyed up the James River and be placed in charge of the gunboats now in that river near City Point or at some secure place near there.

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding Naval Station, Fort Monroe.

NORFOLK, *June 25.*

Your telegram dated the 23d was received last night. Its wording was so mandatory that I desire to ask you if it is intended as an order from your general commanding to me?

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

Brigadier-General VAN VLIET.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862.

Your telegram just received. I am sorry that you should consider my telegram as mandatory, as it was certainly not intended. The commanding general merely desired your cooperation in carrying out an important duty. The general is now in front, where a sharp fight is going on, or I should submit your telegram to him to be answered.

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Brigadier-General.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Norfolk.

I would state that it was not my intention to give an order to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, but merely to request his cooperation in carrying out a measure, upon the success of which the safety of this army might depend. As the flag-officer appears so ready to take exceptions to my requests, I beg that he may receive positive orders not only to convoy these supply vessels up James River, but also to cooperate with this army so far as is in his power.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Hon. G. WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 26, 1862—9:10 p. m.*

(Received 10 p. m.)

General McClellan has forwarded the telegraphic correspondence between yourself and General Van Vliet, requesting that a convoy should be given certain transports. While the Department does not

approve the tone and address of General Van Vliet's dispatch, it desires that you will not let it interfere with the public service, but that you will order a convoy for the transports to City Point, and that you will cordially cooperate with the army in its onward movements.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, *June 26, 1862.*

Dispatch received. I take it for granted that Commander Rodgers will execute the service you alluded* to before he visits me. On my return from the field yesterday I saw your reply to General Van Vliet. I regret your complete misunderstanding of the meaning of General Van Vliet's telegram, and can not understand how you could possibly draw from it the inference you did. I did send copies to Secretaries of Navy and War, with the request that orders may be given to you that will insure a prompt compliance with such reasonable requests as I may make. The case of the provision transports in James River is a matter of vital importance to the safety of this army, and you will please pardon me for saying that I do not think this is a time for searching for points of etiquette, and that the tone of your dispatch surprises me exceedingly. It has ever been my endeavor to treat you with the utmost deference and politeness, but my situation is at present too serious to permit me to stand on trifles. I again request that the request made in my name by General Van Vliet in regard to transports in James River may be complied with. It is a matter of vital importance and may involve the existence of the army.

Very respectfully,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding convoy of transports.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862.

SIR: I telegraphed you yesterday with the view of letting you distinctly understand that, despite the exceptionable tone of General Van Vliet's telegram upon the subject of convoy, etc., I was perfectly willingly to do, with pleasure, everything in my power to further every reasonable and practical wish you might express toward accomplishing the great national object you have in hand. This, to my apprehension,

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*See p. 869.

is a matter not only paramount to every other consideration that can for the moment be presented to the mind of either of us, but one that should make every other sink into significance in our estimation. So I regard it, and so I shall govern myself accordingly. But I must be addressed in a different and more becoming tone than that assumed by General Van Vliet. I am your equal in rank, and assuredly it can not possibly be proper in him to address me precisely as he would have done an inferior, to serve upon me quite a peremptory notice without knowing whether I could comply with it or not, rather than a request for cooperation, if it could be afforded.

When I replied to General Van Vliet I was fully under the impression that you could not have seen his telegram, and so expressed myself to those about me. You have thought proper, however, virtually to approve it, and to say that you can not understand how I could possibly draw from it the inference I did. The paper speaks for itself, and I regret that our notions of conventional military propriety should differ so widely. You further inform me that you had sent copies of the telegrams to the Secretaries of Navy and War, with the request that orders may be given to me that will insure a prompt compliance with such reasonable requests as you may make. To this I have not the slightest objection to offer, provided you are not to be the exclusive judge in the premises, that your requests be properly preferred, and that the means of compliance be at my command.

The Secretary of the Navy informs me by telegraph this morning that the Department does not approve the tone and address of General Van Vliet's dispatch, and you may thus perceive how it is likely to strike the minds of others.

But enough of this. Let me repeat to you that I yearn for your success, and that I will do, most cheerfully and cordially, all in my power to assist you. I am in heart your friend and wellwisher.

Convoy has been given to your transports the best I could possibly command, and protection will be extended to them.

With the hope that you will inculcate a more grateful tone on the part of those under your command in addressing me than that used by General Van Vliet,

I am, your very obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General MCCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac, near Richmond, Va.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *June 27, 1862—11 a. m.*

(Received 12:50 p. m.)

I beg the Department to be assured that I will not permit the ignorance or impertinence of any army officer to interfere for a moment with my duty to the Government. I am well aware of the crisis at Richmond, and of the absolute necessity of prompt cooperation on my part with General McClellan. Immediately on the receipt of General Van Vliet's telegram, notwithstanding its exceptionable tone and address, I took measures to carry out everything it required, and at the earliest

possible moment gave orders accordingly. I had supposed, in addressing General Van Vliet upon the subject of his telegram, that General McClellan knew nothing of its wording, but as it now appears to have met his approval, I beg to express the hope that the War Department will enjoin upon him the propriety of inculcating better official manners of addressing me as his equal in rank; and, last of all, not permitting an officer under his command to address me as a subordinate and refuse to confer upon me the denomination given me by law. General McClellan, as I understand from one of his telegrams to me, wishes the Navy Department to give me such orders as will secure a prompt compliance with any reasonable request he may make—he, of course, to be the exclusive judge of reasonableness. This, in effect, is asking to put the vessels of this squadron subject to his disposition. There is, I regret to say, an evident disposition on the part of various army officers to override and disparage [those] of the Navy, and it is high time a stop should be put to a feeling at once so ridiculous and puerile. I scarcely need add that all the wishes of the Department about convoy, etc., have been fully anticipated, and that I will most cordially and cheerfully cooperate with the Army on all occasions to crush the enemy. I only demand to be treated with the respect due to my rank, position, and responsibilities.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram]

MCCLELLAN'S [HEADQUARTERS], *June 27, 1862.*

(Received 1:20 p. m.)

I have ordered vessels with supplies to be sent up James River, as it may be very important for us. I will thank you to give any aid in your power to forward and protect these vessels to the vicinity of your gunboats, where they will be protected from the enemy's guns.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Captain GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

[Telegram]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862—3:40 p. m.

SIR: In reply to your telegram of this date, just received, I beg to assure you that I will, with great pleasure, give every aid in my power in forwarding and protecting the vessels to which you allude.

By the mail of to-day I wrote you a letter. I beg also to congratulate you and my friend General Hooker on gaining the point you had in view so completely two days ago.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General MCCLELLAN,
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

[Telegram]

MCCLELLAN'S [HEADQUARTERS], *June 27, 1862.*

(Received 8 p. m.)

Will you do me the favor to send two light-draft gunboats at once up the Chickahominy as far as they can go? The enemy have pressed us heavily to-day, and we may have to fall back upon James River.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN.

Captain GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *June 27, 1862—9:30 p. m.*

SIR: I will dispatch a tug instantly up James River, with orders for the two light-draft gunboats to go up the Chickahominy without a moment's delay.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *June 27, 1862.*

SIR: It is sometimes difficult to get dispatches to you in haste. Will you please have some arrangement made which will insure the prompt delivery of your telegrams?

Very respectfully,

RICHARD O'BRIEN,
In Charge of Telegraph.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

Telegrams and Letters

[Telegram]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF POTOMAC, *June 27, 1862.*

(Received 12 o'clock midnight.)

I desire that you will send some light-draft gunboats at once up the Chickahominy as far as possible, and also that you will forthwith instruct the gunboats in the James River to cover the left flank of this army. I should be glad to have the gunboats proceed as far up the river as may be practicable, and hope they may get up as far as the vicinity of New Market. We have met a severe repulse to-day, having been attacked by vastly superior numbers, and I am obliged to fall back between the Chickahominy and the James. I look to you to give me all the support you can in covering my flank, as well as in giving protection to my supplies afloat in James.

G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

Letter from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, regarding his title and rank and the relative rank of officers in the Navy and Army.

Private]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I am neither particularly fastidious about unimportant concerns nor prone to verbo-casuistry, but there is a matter to which I wish to invite your attention and ask for its correction, because it is just that I should do so. Of late your transcriber, I suppose, of telegrams, is in the habit of addressing me "Captain Goldsborough, flag-officer." This is quite as unnaval as it would be unmilitary if I were to address one of your generals with the lineal rank of captain or major in the Army as Captain or Major Blank, brigadier or major-general. The act of Congress entitled "Act to amend an act entitled an act to promote the efficiency of the Navy," approved January 16, 1857, section 5, declares "that captains in command of squadrons shall be denominated flag-officers." This, I take it, is quite enough for me to say to you upon the subject; but for the better understanding of your transcriber, I beg to add that my official and legal address is Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. In this way I am always addressed by the Navy Department, by every officer in the Navy, and by every one else possessing a correct knowledge of my position.

I may as well also state that, under date of October last, I received from the Navy Department a communication informing me that, by decision of the President, flag-officers in the Navy were to rank with major-generals in the Army. General Scott, I know, was consulted about this decision and concurred in its propriety.

Very truly and faithfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

Report of Commander McKinstry, U. S. Navy, regarding convoy of steamers for the Army.

U. S. S. DACOTAH,
Hampton Roads, June 27, 1862.

SIR: On arriving at this anchorage at 5:30 a. m. I communicated with Captain [C. W.] Thomas, U. S. Army, who states that the steamers required for towing can not be here until to-morrow.

Whenever the convoy is ready I shall proceed to execute your order.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. MCKINSTRY,
Commander.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH,
Comdg. North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, off Norfolk.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *June 28, 1862—1 a.m.*

Just received your second telegram* upon the subject of the light-draft gunboats going up the Chickahominy and covering the left flank of your army. Without a moment's delay instructions shall be communicated to Commander Rodgers to comply immediately with all you desire.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Major-General MCCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 28, 1862—2:45 p. m.

Enemy has cut army communication with White House and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near that place. General McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James River; also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.

A. LINCOLN.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *June 28, 1862—3:30 p.m.*

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram to-day. I knew of General McClellan's position last night and sent up orders for gunboats to go up Chickahominy to protect the General's left flank and guard

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*See p. 874.

vessels with supplies. General Dix and myself will do everything in our power to communicate with General McClellan and to keep a communication with him open up the James River.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commodore.

Hon. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, of failure to burn the bridge at Petersburg and of movements of vessels in the James River.

U. S. S. GALENA,
Off City Point, June 29, 1862.

SIR: We failed to burn the bridge. The vessel got aground before we arrived at the point where the boats could leave.

I have not time at present to make a detailed report, having just returned to the vessel and being about to get underway.

The *Island Belle*, tug, is still aground. I have given orders should she not get off at this tide to burn her and retire. I think she will be got off, but if not, we can not spare the force at present to guard her. She is on Gilliam's Bar, in the Appomattox.

I take up James River the *Galena*, *Monitor*, *Aroostook*, and *Mahaska*. I leave the *Port Royal* and the *Maratanza* and *Southfield* to guard the army transports in James River and our own supplies in schooners.

I have sent the *Jacob Bell* and *Delaware* up the Chickahominy. The *Satellite* will follow them this evening.

Any vessel going above this point should be well protected against musketry.

The *Port Royal* has only a single day's coal. Please send a supply.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Instructions from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, regarding army transports and the submarine propeller.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., June 29, 1862.

SIR: The army transports up the James River are to be anchored where and protected as you may direct. They are entirely subject to your orders in these matters. Use, therefore, your own sound discretion in the premises.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Commander JOHN RODGERS, U. S. Navy,
Comdg. Galena and Senior Officer in James River, Virginia.

* * * * * * *

P. S. No. 2.—I have suggested to the army authorities at Fort Monroe that their transports should string themselves along between Jamestown Island and Harrison's Bar, and not to proceed above the latter point until further orders. In all there are some four hundred and odd, but my idea, is that no more of them than are absolutely necessary should be placed in the James River at any one time. I have ordered four of the seven gunboats in York River to quit there and come to Fort Monroe for the purpose of convoying and protecting the army transports.

L. M. G.

JUNE 30, 1862.

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 29, 1862—3:30 p. m.*

Send me by telegraph copy of General McClellan's dispatch to you at 12:30 Friday night, and also any later dispatches.

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

[Telegram]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, June 29, 1862—6 p. m.

(Received at Washington 8 p. m.)

The following is a copy of General McClellan's dispatch* to me on Friday night at 12 o'clock, since which time nothing from him has reached me. All his requests were promptly complied with, as you will perceive by copies of letters from Commander Rodgers, forwarded to you by the mail of to-day.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT VIRGINIA, *June 29, 1862.*

General Stoneman has arrived at Williamsburg. Everything has gotten off from White House in safety. Colonel Ingalls has reached Yorktown with 400 transports for James River; he wishes gunboats to convoy them up. What can be done? He will be here at 8 this evening.

JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

Flag-Officer GOLDSBOROUGH.

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*See p. 875.

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *June 29, 1862—10:20 p.m.*

(Received at Washington 10:30 p. m.)

If you can send me any suitable vessels to assist in convoying army transports up the James River I wish you would do so immediately. The number of transports is very large, and I can not take any of vessels up the James River away from there. The lighter the draft the better.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

G. V. FOX,
Assistant Secretary Navy.

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U.S. Navy, regarding cooperation with the army and movements of vessels.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *June 30, 1862.*

SIR: Your telegram in answer to mine of yesterday, communcating General McClellan's dispatch to you, has been received. I sent to you by request of the President, who desired to see the dispatch, as we supposed it later than anything we had received from him.

In the emergency now upon us I have never questioned that you would lend your efforts to aid and cooperate with the army. It is essential that our whole strength and efforts should be put forth. The crisis is in every respect important.

The *Yankee* and *A. C. Powell* leave Washington to-day, the *Tioga* leaves Boston to-morrow, and the *Adirondack* will leave New York in two or three days, all directed to report at Hampton Roads, and the *Wachusett* has been directed to wait events at and near Richmond.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding, etc., Norfolk, Va.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, regarding affairs up the James River.

Private] U.S. GUNBOAT GALENA,
Off City Point, June 30, 1862.

SIR: The army is, much of it, on the James River banks, just above City Point. It is safe.

I hope you will keep the machine for blowing up vessels safely out of the way of falling into the enemy's hands. It should not be suffered to run about these waters.

I have sent a letter to General McClellan containing suggestions in regard to the selection of a site for a base of military operations on James River.

I do not think it can be above City Point, without that point should be held by our own army, and scarcely above Fort Powhatan.

I fear the guns on the banks of the James River have not been as effectually destroyed as could be wished. They should be so broken as to be useless. I scarcely think this has been done. I would suggest, as the gunboats now here have quite as much as they can do, the propriety of sending, should it meet your views, a force of marines as large as you can get, and some of the larger steamers to do this work thoroughly. If those batteries should be reestablished, we shall not hear the last of it. By interrupting the train of supplies, the army might be much impeded. Have a report as to manner and extent of destruction.

The army is on the river banks. General Keyes and Colonel Alexander breakfasted with me. Communication is fully established.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

If I have taken a liberty in thus writing, I beg you to tell me, and I will not do so again.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, that the army has fallen back and rests on James River.

[U. S. S.] GALENA,
Above City Point, July 1, 1862.

SIR: The army has fallen back and rests upon James River.

We need in this vicinity all the gunboats we can get as soon as possible. Yesterday, I hear, we did good service in shelling the rebel army.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Letter from Major-General McClellan, U. S. Army, to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, requesting every available gunboat sent to James River.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
James River, July 1, 1862.

SIR: I would most earnestly request that every gunboat or other armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at once to this vicinity, and placed under the orders of Commander Rodgers, for the purpose of covering the camps and communications of this army.

May I urge that not an hour be lost and that you telegraph to the Navy Department reporting the request I make.

If this is illegible, I must offer as an excuse the extreme exhaustion under which I am laboring.

Very truly, yours,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

Letter from Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, requesting gunboats and ammunition to be sent up James River.

U. S. S. GALENA,
Above City Point, July 1, 1862.

SIR: The enemy presses the army; it rests upon the James River and needs all the support which gunboats can give. Please send all of them which you can spare. Please also send up ammunition immediately, 8 and 9-inch shell, 100-pound[er] rifle shell, and powder.

I am desired by General McClellan, who is on board going some 2 or 3 miles down the river on a reconnoissance, to say, on his part, that he will be obliged to you for any gunboat assistance which you can furnish. No firing at present moment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U.S. Navy, regarding affairs up the James River.

Private]

[U. S. S.] GALENA,
Off Harrison's Bar, July 1, 1862.

SIR: The army is in a bad way; the gunboats may save them, but the points to be guarded are too many for the force at my disposal. I presume you will have to send some one to outrank me. To save the army, as far as we can, demands immediately all our disposable force. Fort Powhatan is a most important point; it should be strongly guarded. City Point commands the channel past it; that demands a strong force of gunboats to insure the passage of supplies. Each end of the encampment on the river banks demands a force of gunboats. We shelled the enemy with good effect, I hear, yesterday.

Please send ammunition immediately—8 and 9 inch shells, 100-pound[er] rifle; cartridges for the 9-inch rifles and the 100-pound[er] wanted.

The general (General McClellan) has come down here in this vessel to make a reconnoissance for the position of a new camp.


The use for more gunboats is pressing and immediate.

The army, continually pressed by largely superior numbers and fresh troops, falls back continually, in good order. The fighting has been continual; the losses very great. We fall back in admirable order, disputing every inch of the way.

If, as I hope, we can get the army on a plain upon the river bank, and then protect each flank by gunboats, it can have time for rest. I think Harrison's Bar offers these advantages.

Captain McKinstry and some other force may be directed, if you choose, to guard Fort Powhatan. The channel there passes within 100 yards of the bluffs.

The fort is out of shape, but the main part of the labor of constructing it remains. Its position is formidable. It was selected in 1812 because it is so formidable. Guns may be placed in position in a night. It should be well guarded.



Now, if ever, is a chance for the Navy to render most signal service, but it must not delay.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Order from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Lieutenant Henry, U.S. Navy, to give convoy and protection to army transports.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., July 1, 1862.

SIR: On your arrival at Hampton Roads you will inform Colonel Ingalls or Captain Tallmadge, U. S. Army, quartermaster at Fort Monroe, that you are ready to afford convoy and protection to any army transports he may wish to send up James River. On his designating those he may wish you to take in charge, you will proceed with them up that river to the point or place he will mention, and on reaching it, should you find naval vessels on hand to protect them properly, you will leave them there and return to Hampton Roads for further service of the sort.

Afford every protection in your power in all cases to the transports placed under your charge.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Lieutenant Commanding E. W. HENRY,
Commanding U. S. S. Sebago, Hampton Roads, Virginia.

(Copies of the above order sent to Lieutenant Commanding J. C. Chaplin, commanding *Commodore Barney;* Acting Master Peter Hays, U. S. S. *Morse;* Acting Master W. F. Shankland, jr., commanding U. S. S. *Currituck.*

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *July 1, 1862—11:10 a.m.*

We want your spare gunboats up the James River; also the three at West Point should fall back to Yorktown at once. The enemy are at New Kent Court-House.

JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *July 1, 1862—2:30 p.m.*

Under date of yesterday, I have a letter* from Commander Rodgers, in which he says:

The army is, much of it, on the James River banks just above City Point. It is safe. General King [Keyes] and Colonel Alexander breakfasted with me. Communication is fully established.

General McClellan's headquarters are at Turkey Bend. He himself was on board the *Galena* yesterday. I have sent the *Dacotah* and *Wachusett* to Hardy's [Harden's] Bluff to destroy the guns there effectually, and also at Day's Point, if possible. The former vessel returned yesterday afternoon from convoying a number of transports up the James River, and it was my intention to send her back with another; but owing to a report that the enemy was probably trying to get two guns in batteries at Hardy's [Harden's] Bluff, I determined to send her off this morning, as stated. There are no guns at Fort Powhatan, up to my last accounts. It is even doubtful whether any were ever there, judging from the appearance of the place, which is overgrown with high grass.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

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*See p. 879-80.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *July 1, 1862.*

Do me [the] favor to telegraph to Yorktown on the receipt of this and direct one of your officers to communicate with the three gunboats at West Point, [Va.], and say to them that it is my orders they fall back at once to Yorktown.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

General DIX.

[Telegram]

Letter from Major-General Dix, U.S. Army, to Lieutenant Henry, U. S. Navy, requesting convoy for transports.

FORT MONROE, *July 1, 1862.*

Please let the *Jacob Bell*, the *Yankee*, and *Commodore Barney* go up the river to-night. We have sent a large number of transports. I will find service for you to-morrow.

Respectfully, yours,

JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.

Captain HENRY,
Commanding Sebago.

[Telegram]

FORT MONROE, *July 2, 1862—2 p.m.*

I have just received under date of yesterday the following dispatch* from General McClellan, addressed to me.

* * * * * * *

Also the following is the substance of dispatch† from Commander Rodgers, bearing same date and sent by same opportunity.

* * * * * * *

I scarcely need add that I am doing everything in my power to afford the assistance required, and am here for the purpose of expediting matters. The *Jacob Bell*, *Morse*, *Barney*, and *Yankee* have already gone up the James River. The *Currituck* leaves immediately, and so, too, with the *Sebago*. The *Baltimore* goes up in an hour or two with ordnance stores. I wish the Department to rest assured that nothing shall be wanting on my part.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

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*See p. 880-81.

†See p. 881.

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 3, 1862—2 a. m.*

Would it be considered very important for you to have some of the mortar vessels sent to you from the Gulf of Mexico?

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary Navy.

Flag-Officer GOLDBOROUGH.

[Telegram]

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., July 3, 1862.

I do not consider it very important to have some of the mortar vessels in the Gulf sent here at this time. They could not possibly reach here in season to assist General McClellan. If they were already here they might, perhaps, be used to advantage.

No news has reached me from either General McClellan or Commander Rodgers since that I telegraphed you yesterday from Old Point.

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington City.

Instructions from Flag-Officer Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, to Commander Rodgers, U.S. Navy, regarding cooperation with the army on the James River.

U. S. FLAGSHIP MINNESOTA,
Norfolk, Va., July 3, 1862.

SIR: The *Dacotah*, Commander McKinstry; *Wachusett*, Commander Jenkins; *Sebago*, Lieutenant Henry; *Commodore Barney*, Lieutenant Chaplin; *Morse*, Acting Master Hays; *Yankee*, Lieutenant Gibson; and *Currituck*, Acting Master Shankland, are all now up James River. These, together with the vessels originally there, will, I do most sincerely trust and hope, be able to save our army. The steamer *Baltimore*, Acting Master Mitchell, left Fort Monroe last evening with a full supply of the ordnance stores you required by your letters of the 1st instant. I ordered her to put those stores on board the ordnance schooner you have up James River and then return. If you want more, or, indeed, anything else, let me know.

I directed the *Sebago* to guard carefully Fort Powhatan. If she is not enough for the purpose, you must detail another to assist her. It is also very important to my mind that a vessel should be kept constantly at Jamestown Island to prevent the enemy from getting guns in battery there. Attend to this, if you please.

In case you should want more coal than I have sent you, borrow it from the Army.

Keep me fully informed of all movements of moment. The most intense excitement prevails at Washington and all over the country, and the President and Secretary of the Navy wish to be kept as fully advised as possible of every turn in our affairs.

Say to General McClellan that, agreeably to his request, I telegraphed his note to me of the 1st to the Navy Department.

I am hourly expecting the *Tioga*. She sailed three days ago from Boston. The moment she arrives I will send her, too, up James River.

This I send to you by the *Stepping Stones*.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Flag-Officer.

Commander JOHN RODGERS,
Commanding U. S. S. Galena, James River, Virginia.

[Telegram]

NORFOLK, *July 4, —12:30 p. m.*

No news of any kind from up James River up to this hour. I augur favorably from this, as Commander Rodgers is directed to keep me informed of all events of importance. Am told that both the President and yourself are naturally very anxious to know at the earliest moment possible all that transpires of serious occurrence. All the guns at both forts on Day's Point and Hardy's [Harden's] Bluff I have had burst or broken—rendered entirely useless. Seventeen gunboats in all are at the scene of action, and another, the *Coeur de Lion*, will go up the river to-night. She came down to be repaired. The *Tioga* has not arrived. Orders await her at Fort Monroe to go up the James River without a moment's delay.

Commodore GOLDSBOROUGH.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Report of Commander Rodgers, U. S. Navy, regarding affairs in James River, enclosing sketch giving position of gunboats.

U. S. S. GALENA,
Off Harrison's Bar, July 4, 1862.

SIR: Everything is quiet and goes on finely. I send a sketch of the position of the gunboats. The army is in high spirits. They are entrenching their front and by noon will be thoroughly ready for all comers.

I feel anxious about the navigation. I fear that the enemy may occupy the bluffs which command the channel below us. This would be inconvenient, at the least.

The enemy are at Haxall's, above City Point. They sent up a balloon this morning, but it remained up only a few moments. The *Monitor* and *Maratanza* will make a reconnoissance this evening in that direction.

If Captains McKinstry and Jenkins are in charge of the river below this, I can bring more vessels here to guard our flanks.

At present there are eight only, two up the river, four down, and the *Galena* and *Port Royal* as a reserve, to throw their force where needed. The *Stepping Stones* I shall use to carry orders.

This is the present arrangement of the vessels, or was this morning. The *Monitor* and *Maratanza* have gone above City Point on a reconnoissance:

At west end of base, opposite Jordan's Point—*Maratanza, Yankee,* 2.

At east end of base, opposite Windmill Point—*Aroostook, Monitor, Southfield, Currituck,* 4.

Reserve, to move to either end of base—*Galena, Port Royal, Stepping Stones,* tug, 2.

Total [at base], 8, tug, 1—9.

Guarding navigation below—*Mahaska, Commodore Barney, Dragon,* tug, *Sebago, Morse,* 5.

At Jamestown Island—*Jacob Bell,* 1.

Up Chickahominy—*Delaware, Satellite,* 2.

I have not seen the *Dacotah* nor the *Wachusett.* These powerful vessels will, if they remain below, allow the *Mahaska* and *Morse* to move up here.


It is now too late, I hope, for the enemy to attack the army here with any chance of success. The troops are in good spirits and everyone seems confident.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN RODGERS,
Commander.

Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

[Enclosure]

SKETCH OF POSITION OF GUNBOATS ON JAMES RIVER.



FOUR YEARS

WITH THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

BY

REGIS DE TROBRIAND

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. VOLS.

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE K. DAUCHY

LATE LIEUTENANT COMMANDING TWELFTH NEW YORK BATTERY LIGHT ARTILLERY, U. S. VOLS.

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

BOSTON

TICKNOR AND COMPANY

211 Tremont Street

1889

CHAPTER IX

Apprenticeship of the War

Siege of Yorktown—Attack on Lee's mill—The Harwood farm—Amongst the sharpshooters—The man hunt—Visit of the general-in-chief—Faults of administration—A black snake mayonnaise—Marching-out of the Confederate troops—The enemy abandons his positions—Evacuation of Yorktown.

The Virginian peninsula, as is well known, is formed by the course, nearly parallel, of the James and York rivers, which both empty into the Chesapeake. Ten miles above the mouth of the York, upon the right hand, is situated the small fortified town of Yorktown, which owes its first celebrity to the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, in 1781, after a siege in which Marquis Lafayette took a brilliant part. In the month of April, 1862, the Confederates had extended and completed the defences so as to command with their artillery the ground between the town and the small river called the Warwick. The latter rises about a mile and a half from Yorktown towards the south, emptying into the James, thus crossing the peninsula, whose breadth at that point is only ten or twelve miles. This was a natural obstacle, which the enemy had already improved by raising the water at the fords, by means of dams, and covering the more exposed positions by protected batteries. At the time of our arrival Magruder's Corps, which opposed us, had, at the most, ten thousand men.

If a vigorous attack had been made at the time of our first approach, nothing could have prevented our forcing a passage at some point. Broken anywhere, the line could not have been held an instant, and Yorktown, pressed on all sides, would have been ours in a few days. Unhappily, only a too long delayed, feeble, and isolated attack was made. Too long delayed, because it was not made till the 16th, eleven days after our arrival; isolated, because only a few companies of Vermont troops were used; unskilful, because the point chosen for assault was precisely the one most strongly fortified, the one which offered the most difficulties,

and consequently the least chances of success. The result was that our force fought bravely, but uselessly, for more than an hour, in the rifle-pits captured from the enemy, and that it ended in being driven back to the river with considerable loss.

The companies sacrificed in that unfortunate affair belonged to the division of General W. F. Smith, who acted on direct orders from General McClellan. General Keyes disclaimed any responsibility for it, saying openly that he had not even been informed of it beforehand, although the troops engaged belonged to his corps.

From the very first, the majority of the generals had advised forcing the Warwick lines without delay. The commander-in-chief, engineer officer in all his instincts, preferred digging ditches, opening parallels, and placing batteries around Yorktown. The former asked simply to beat the enemy by the power of an irresistible superiority; the latter wished to reduce the place by the scientific method, so dear to special schools. Such being the fact, is it far out of the way to suspect that he ordered the attack of Lee's mill less with the resolution to make it successful than with the thought of demonstrating, by its want of success, the superiority of his other plans? *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

However that might have been, the siege was resolved upon; the army sat down accordingly, and Magruder was able to await without danger, and receive without hurry, the reënforcements he needed.

Peck's brigade was on the extreme left of the army, near the mouth of the river, opposite Mulberry Island, where the enemy had quite a strong garrison. The Warwick, before emptying into the James, describes at this point a sharp turn, around a point of land which, from its sharp turn, made a salient angle in the enemy's defensive line. This position ws assigned to the Fifty-fifth.

On our side, the bank was higher, which gave our sharpshooters some advantage. On the other hand, the enemy had two batteries, which commanded all the ground which we occupied, and whose fire would have troubled us very

much if it had not been for large woods which hid our tents from the eyes of the Confederates. These woods extended along the water, and covered the point of the triangle, leaving some cultivated land at its base only, in the midst of which was the Harwood farm. An excellent position to accustom our men to fire. It was in our examination of this ground that we first heard the enemy's balls whistle, and on the establishment of our pickets that we first fired on the enemy.

At nightfall, the rations having been two days behind, I sent twenty-five men, under command of a lieutenant, to the farm buildings, with an order to bring away every suspicious person they found there, and also to report if they found anything which could answer the place of our missing rations and forage. They found the house completely abandoned, but abundantly provided with provisions. The farmer, it appeared, kept a country store. He had left there a large amount of excellent salt provisions, flour, cheese, sugar, etc. He had corn in his barns, cattle in his stables, fowls in his barnyard. The detachment returned loaded with the booty, which was distributed equally amongst the companies, and for several days the regiment, independent of the commissary, lived as in the land of *cocagne,* in the midst of abundance and table delicacies such as were never seen in camp before, and such as we never saw again.

Unfortunately, this godsend lasted but a very short time. The next morning the news was spread through the neighboring regiments, and in the afternoon a large number of visitors was attracted to the store. The first comers crept towards it stealthily; then, as the battery of Mulberry Island showed no signs of life, those coming afterwards boldly crossed the field without any precaution, until the house was full from cellar to garret. That, it appeared, was what the enemy was waiting for.

All at once, the battery was crowned with smoke; the cannon thundered. A first shot made a hole in the roof, another went completely through the house, at the third

shot the house was vacant. It was amusing to see how quickly this was accomplished. The intruders rushed out crowding together, some by the door, some out of the windows, bounding over the sills, leaping fences and ditches—all hurrying towards the woods, with a celerity hastened by the shells, which happily made more noise than they did damage.

It was probably one of these disappointed foragers who, to revenge himself for the fright he had had, set fire to the building that same evening. At midnight there was left but a pile of smoking ruins.

During that time, along the bank of the river, the musket firing was kept up. Six companies were disposed in the woods, each one furnishing the pickets to cover its front. The four others, held in reserve, sent out during the night the number of men necessary to guard the open field and to make the rounds.

Between us and the enemy the river was only forty to fifty yards wide. As I have said, on our side the bank was abrupt and wooded, except on the road to a bridge, which was destroyed, and of which there remained only a few piles. On the enemy's side the land was flat and marshy to the foot of a little hill, which rose a short distance back, where we could see some earthworks behind an abatis of large trees.

During the night the fire ceased on both sides, and the skirmishers were relieved under cover of the darkness. Nothing could be seen, but conversation was carried on between the two lines, very rarely with anything abusive in it. It was for the most part an exchange of soldiers' banter. Bull Run and Ball's Bluff were the subject on the part of the rebels, to which our side replied, Laurel Hill, Donelson, Roanoke, Newburn.

To these federal victories there were soon added others of more importance, for during the month of April the Confederates were beaten at Shiloh, in Tennessee, after a bloody battle of two days, where their general, A. S. Johnston, was killed; and New Orleans was surrendered to Admiral Farragut, after a naval battle in which he had forced the pas-

sage of the lower Mississippi, destroyed the enemy's flotilla, and compelled Forts Jackson and St. Philip to surrender.

When the news of these successes arrived at the camp before Yorktown, chance brought in front of the Fifty-fifth New York the Fifth Louisiana, which called itself "The Louisiana Tigers," so that Frenchmen were firing at each other across the river, and each evening, at the same hour, the retreat that the Parisians heard upon the Place Vendome was heard on the banks of the Warwick, in the opposing lines. Of course the nightly colloquies were in French. The capture of New Orleans and of Baton Rouge, the capital of the State put a damper on the spirits of the "Louisiana Tigers," and they thereafter replied to banter only by gunshots.

In the night the enemy crossed the swamps, to come and crouch near the water in the high grass behind some dead trees or some hillocks where they remained concealed during the day. With us, the men chose the best positions, sheltered by great roots, or behind stones, which permitted them to see without being seen.

When the day broke, everything was quiet and motionless on both banks, where nothing betrayed the presence of man. It was, however, the hour when the eyes, sharpened by the hunter's instinct, examined the smallest inequalities of the land, and carefully searched the grass and bushes for a mark.

On both sides the game was played with patience and a rare cunning, in the first place to find out the precise point where the adversary was concealed, and afterwards to put a ball through him. The most ingenious strategems were resorted to in order to draw the fire of the opponent upon some false appearance, and, at the same time, compel the man firing to show himself. Two rapid discharges were heard; two puffs of white smoke appeared and disappeared in a moment; but nothing was visible, only perhaps a wounded man dragged himself into the bushes, calling for aid, or a dead body was growing cold in a pool of blood.

Of all known kinds of hunting, that of man by man is certainly the most exciting. It is superior to all others, in being a strife between intelligences of the same nature, with equal arms and equal dangers. Thus the powers both of mind and body are put in play, and are developed with an ardor curious to study.

One morning I went out to one of our advanced rifle-pits to try and examine the nature of the works on which the enemy had been industriously laboring the whole preceding night. A few steps from there I saw a young soldier lying motionless, flat on the ground, a man of mild and inoffensive nature. His disposition was in accordance with his physical appearance, and he would have been averse to killing even a sheep. But the man chase had transformed him. With his head covered with leaves, and at the level of the earth, he had crept out there with his eyes intently fixed upon a single point of the swamp, watching as a wild beast of prey watches for his concealed victim. His loaded gun was pushed out in front of him, looking like a stick lying on the stones, but really directed under his hand, upon the bunch of rushes which absorbed his attention.

He heard my step, and, without changing his position or turning his head, he simply made a motion with his hand, which said distinctly: "Do not come up behind me; you will give him the alarm." I left him in that position, where he remained, I think, two or three hours, never tiring of his watch, never discouraged at waiting. At last the bunch of rushes moved; a shot was fired from it; but the marksman had shown himself. Almost immediately he bounded backwards and fell writhing in the high grass, while the other one leaped lightly into the rifle-pit, crying out with an air of triumpt, "I hit him!" "Bravo! well done!" said his comrades, somewhat jealous of so good a shot.

Whatever may be said, war responds to an instinct which nature has put into the heart of man. Instead of being a violation of an order of things divinely established, it is much rather the normal obedience to one of the mysterious laws which govern humanity, and preside fatally over

the development of its destiny. Explain the fact as you will, the human race, ever since it has existed, has never ceased to have its internecine combats, and has never ceased to multiply. The shedding of blood must be then a necessary condition of equilibrium in its propagation. And my good young man, who would not have given a fillip to a child, was, in killing his fellow-man *con amore*, only the humble but striking manifestation of what are called the "working ways of Providence."

This kind of drill in firing, whose usefulness I have heard discussed often, has incontestable advantages. Better than any other, it perfects the soldier in the use of arms of precision; it familiarizes him readily and without effort to danger, and finally it gives a tone to his character by the habitual application of his individual faculties to the common work: that is, to do the greatest possible amount of damage to the enemy, with the least sacrifice to ourselves. On this account I encouraged my men, although others did differently.

On the front of the neighboring brigade, they watched each other peacefully across the river. They lay around in the shade, or in the sunshine; going and coming in perfect security. Those who liked fishing threw their lines in the stream, and, instead of being man-hunters, became fishermen. On that part of the lines, the service of advanced posts was an eclogue in action.

On the other hand, along our part of the line, the artillery was soon put into play. The enemy brought into action some rifled guns, whose conical projectiles burst in the pines around my last company. To guard against these, a sentinel was posted specially to watch that battery. At every shot fired, as soon as he saw the smoke, he cried, *Look out!* and the men hid behind the trees until the shell burst. In that way the enemy burnt a great deal of powder for nothing. However, they very nearly gave us a hard blow.

The general-in-chief having expressed his intention of examining for himself the position occupied by the Fifty-fifth, his visit was announced to me by a staff officer, and

the companies were promptly put under arms. Soon, indeed, General McClellan came through the forest, accompanied by Generals Keyes and Peck, and followed by a numerous staff. They stopped first near the Zouaves, who were the farthest to the rear, and, tempted by the opportunity for observation offered by the open fields, they advanced a few steps out of the woods. The enemy, who was always on the lookout for our movements, saw that it was evidently a group of superior officers. He pointed his rifled guns with a great deal of care and fired. Two shells came one after another, whistling a well known air, and burst with a remarkable precision over our visitors, who reentered the woods without going farther along the line, putting off the promised visit to another day, which never came.

I regretted this *contretemps*. I would not have been sorry to have had the general-in-chief see with his own eyes what we had to endure from the negligence or incapacity of the quartermasters. Not an officer in the Fifty-fifth had a tent. For my part, I slept on the ground, at the foot of a tree, under the doubtful shelter of a double rubber blanket stretched upon a stick, and fastened down at the four corners by stakes. Worse yet, all my baggage had been left at Newport News, and, though we were only twelve or fifteen miles from there, we waited for it in vain day after day. More than two weeks passed before it was sent to us.

Rations were distributed to the soldiers very irregularly. The means of transportation, they told us, were wanting, and the roads were abominable. However, they had no great distance to go. The general depot was but a few miles back of our lines, on the navigable head of the Poquosin, where the transports could come without difficulty. As to the bad roads, that was provided for everywhere by corduroy.

The corudroy is a sort of rough floor, formed by small sticks resting on sleepers, and covered over with a light layer of leaves, mixed with earth. In a forest country, this is a quick and easy way to establish good means of communication for the artillery and wagons. Wherever we

stopped during the war, we constructed stretches of this kind of road. They last a long time, require very little repair, and are of continual utility, especially in a rainy season.

In front of Yorktown, what we were most in want of was much less the material than proper administration. The quartermasters and commissaries wanted experience, instruction, and too often honesty. As to staff officers, properly so called, they were not equal to the performance of their duties. They were generally young men recommended to the generals, to whom they were attached more by their family connections and their position in life than by their ability. If they had been drawn from the regular army, the service would have been much the gainer, but the officers of the regular army who could be spared from their regiments were employed in the engineer service, or held higher commands among the volunteers.

On the 16th of April I sent a report to headquarters of the division, to recommend the placing of a battery on a point which commanded the course of the river, and which would be very useful to facilitate the crossing, or to repel an attack, in case the enemy should attempt an offensive movement against the left of our line. General Couch came himself to examine the position. The plan was approved by the chief of artillery, and orders given in consonance. But the works proceeded so slowly, for want of proper supervision, that they were not yet finished when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown. One day the tools were wanting, and the men were sent back to their quarters; the next day it had been forgotten to detail the men, after the tools were sent. These shortcomings of the staff gave rise to frequent complaints; but it seemed as though no one knew how to remedy the evil.

The siege, however, took its course, and the cannonade became more and more continuous along the Third Corps front. In our front hostilities were limited to the exchange of shots between the picket lines. A few pieces of field artillery had been put in position behind the parapets; but with

the injunction to use them only in case of an attack by the enemy, who profited by it to collect the provisions and forage stored in some farm buildings which we could have destroyed in a quarter of an hour.

At this time a great deal of consideration was shown for the Confederates, which was the more singular in that they showed very little for us. The smoke of our fires no sooner showed where our tents were pitched than immediately a few shells were thrown at the place, which compelled the men to withdraw one or two hundred yards back, in the midst of the woods, to cook their meals. But in our front, out of rifle shot, the officers of the enemy collected openly, in a small farmhouse, which answered them for an observatory. We saw them from morning to night, nonchalantly smoking their cigars on the piazza and attending to business without being disturbed. I could never get the use of a couple of cannon to knock down that country seat.

The latter half of April passed away without other incident than that of sending a few wounded men to the hospital. I had no other occupation than the daily routine of service, and no other distraction than the visits, which were quite numerous on account of the position the regiment occupied. I thus had the opprtunity to accompany General Sumner to our advanced posts. His corps brought our force up to more than a hundred thousand men.

* * * * * * *

During the last days of the month the enemy appeared to strip his works of men and guns. To feel of him, we sent him a dozen shots, to which he did not reply. During the night of the 29th, he withdrew his advanced posts in front of Smith's division. On the 30th he unmasked quite an important movement of troops on Mulberry Island.

In the afternoon, a column composed of three regiments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, commenced to march along the edge of the woods which border the James, and finished by crossing the flat open land in front of the Harwood farm, five or six hundred yards

from a small work, where we had two pieces of artillery. The route they followed made a bend around a house, which was the nearest point to us. Twenty horsemen came there first, as if to reconnoitre our position, and, seeing we remained motionless, they dismounted and were soon joined by a group of officers, who installed themselves in the farmhouse, while the infantry continued defiling peacefully under our noses.

During this time I sent message after message to General Peck asking permission to open fire, of which the lieutenant commanding the artillery did not dare to take the responsibility, in view of the positive orders he had received to reply only to an attack. General Peck referred the matter to General Couch. Some aids came by turns to see what was passing, and returned to make their report. Meanwhile, time was going on, and the enemy continued his march without being interrupted.

He could not have had any choice of roads, whatever was the object of his movement, or he would not have thus openly exposed his troops; for our two guns were enough to break up his column, without counting the artillery, which could have been sent in a few minutes to stop his advance entirely, and throw him back into the woods and swamps, from which he had emerged. But no. The only order I received was to double my pickets, at the very time when the enemy was withdrawing his.

The troops which we had so benevolently allowed to pass established themselves a little further off, in a large wood, where, when night came on, they troubled themselves no more about lighting their fires than if we had been at Tenallytown. Then only was it decided to give them a few shots, and then their fires were extinguished. During the night they embarked on some boats sent to receive them. In the morning they had disappeared.

Thus the enemy retired from Mulberry Island. This was an indication at least: but it did not appear that any importance was attached to this fact at headquarters. The

next morning, the 1st of May, everything remained as before.

The 2d of May, in the morning, the regiment received its pay for the months of January and February, when a negro, having swum across the river, came to confirm to us the report of the evacuation by the enemy of all that portion of his line which was in front of us. I sent him immediately to General Peck, but heard nothing more from it.

I state this fact, which is not without some importance, to prove that upon the left of our lines we had been held motionless two days before abandoned positions and works evacuated by the enemy. If Couch's division and after him Smith's had been thrown across the Warwick, whose crossing by us was no longer disputed, we would most probably have succeeded in cutting off the retreat of the garrison of Yorktown, and in capturing a part of the force which still showed itself in front of the Third Corps.

Success would then have had a very different meaning, for a city captured is a victory, a city evacuated a deception.

I have never known if the information reached headquarters of the general-in-chief. It might not be impossible that during these two days the fugitive who brought it to us did not get any farther than the headquarters of the Fourth Corps. All I have ever learned about it is that, before the Congressional committee on the conduct of the war, General Keyes alluded to it in very vague terms. "The enemy," he said, "had for a day of two made preparations to retreat, *as I learned from a negro,* withdrawing his artillery from Griffen's Landing on the James, and, as I think, from other points on the Yorktown side." Not a word about the brigade which we had seen depart on April 30, nor of sending the negro to army headquarters.

On the 3d of May, in the evening, the enemy opened a violent fire on the right of our lines, which he continued without intermission the greater part of the night. This was to deceive us as to his movements, and he succeeded so well that our batteries were forbidden to reply for fear of spoiling a formidable bombardment, which was about to be

opened on the 6th. Labor in vain. After so much work and so long preparations, the rebels, whom we thought we held tight, slipped between our fingers. The morning of the 4th they left Yorktown without hindrance, leaving behind them only some empty tents and seventy guns of large calibre, which they had not been able to carry away.

CHAPTER X

The First Battle—Williamsburg

Pursuit—The enemy attacked at Williamsburg—He attacks Hooker's division—Peck's brigade the first to receive it—The Fifty-fifth under fire—Critical moment—Attack repulsed—Reënforcements arrive—Engagement of General Hancock—General McClellan's report—Advice of General Couch—A walk on the field of battle—Burial of the dead—Visit to the wounded—The amputated—The prediction of a Georgia captain.

The pursuit began at once. General Stoneman was sent with the cavalry to put to flight the enemy, whose rearguard he came up with in the afternoon before Williamsburg. But there he ran against a series of redoubts which barred the road, and he was compelled to halt and await the arrival of the infantry.

The latter had also been put in motion in the morning, the Third Corps by the Yorktown road, and the Fourth by the Warwick, the two roads coming together before reaching Williamsburg. At the point of juncture the enemy had thrown up a bastioned work called Fort Magruder.

Couch's division crossed the river at Lee's mill, where for the first time we comprehended with what deadly hatred towards us the Confederates were filled.

The road we followed was sown with murderous snares. There were cylindrical bombs, with percussion fuses carefully concealed, buried so as to leave the capsule level with the ground. The step of a man or horse upon it was sufficient to explode it, and it was always fatal. Sometimes the bomb was covered by a piece of board, inviting the tired soldier to sit down. Whoever yielded to the temptation never rose again. A few bodies, torn and blackened with powder, showed us the result of that invention of the South. But as soon as we were on our guard it ceased to be destructive, and the greater part of the projectiles, dug up, went to increase our stock of artillery ammunition. We continued the march, almost without intermission, nearly all the afternoon, meeting nothing but abandoned camps. The few tents

we found still standing were slashed with the sabre, so that they might be of no use to us. Tired, footsore, hungry, we reached our camping ground late, where the rain prevented us from having a night of rest.

In the morning, May 5, at seven o'clock, we renewed our march forward. The rain had not stopped during the night, and it continued to pour down all day. The heavens were hid by one of those thick curtains of gray clouds, behind which it seemed as if the sun were forever extinguished. The roads were horrible, if we could call roads the great mud-holes where the teams struggled, and the cannon and caissons, buried to the axles, were with difficulty drawn out of one deep rut, only to fall immediately into another.

However, the cannon were heard firing uninterruptedly at Williamsburg, indicating a serious engagement. The advance had evidently met with a vigorous resistance. They might need reënforcements, we must hurry forward. And we pushed on the best we could, through an ocean of mud, amongst the mired teams, in the midst of an inevitable disorder, which left behind many stragglers. As each one took his way by the road the least impracticable, it ended by the regiments, the brigades, and even the divisions becoming mingled in inevitable confusion. Whenever I reached a favorable place, I made a short halt of a few minutes, to rally my scattered companies and give the laggards time to rejoin us. Then we again started on, following the route of the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania, with which General Peck had taken the advance.

Behind us marched General Kearney, leading the head of his division, which came from Yorktown. His ardor had found means of passing all the troops which were ahead of him. He urged on our stragglers, and told me that Hooker's division, having marched during the night to join Stoneman, must have had the whole rearguard of the enemy on his hands.

Soon an aid of General Peck brought me the order to pass by Casey's division, which had halted, I do not know why, in a large open field, near a brick church. The sound of

the cannonade did not diminish. At this point, Kearney's division turned to the left to come into line by a crossroad less encumbered.

A little further along, I met Captain Leavit-Hunt, aid of General Heintzelman, who had been ordered to hurry forward reënforcements. He informed me that the conjectures of Kearney, as to Hooker, were correct; that Hooker, strongly opposed by superior forces, had lost ground, after a desperate contest of more than four hours, during which no assistance had been sent to him.

The Prince de Joinville, in his turn, passed by me without stopping, urging me to hurry forward. He was mounted on an English horse and covered with mud from head to foot. He was hurrying to Yorktown to endeavor to bring up General McClellan, who, ignorant of what was passing at Williamsburg, had not yet started.

In the absence of the general-in-chief, General Sumner and General Keyes lost time in consulting as to what was to be done. The former was senior in rank, but the latter alone had any troops within reach, and, between the two, no measure was taken, and Hooker lost not only his position but some of his guns.

When I led my troops out on the farm where that idle conference was going on, the Count de Paris and the Duke de Chartres, recognizing the uniform of the regiment, came on foot to meet me. I did not have time either to stop or to dismount; they did me the honor of accompanying me in this manner for several minutes across the furrows, to explain to me the position of affairs, and to wish me success.

"Everything is going to the devil," said the Duke de Chartres to me. "There is nobody here capable of commanding, and McClellan is at Yorktown. As several aids have not been able to induce him to come, my uncle has gone himself to look for him, knowing well that without him nothing will be done as it should be."

General Peck was on the edge of a strip of woods, which was all that separated us from the enemy. Learning that, on account of our hurried march, and the difficulties of the

road, I had left behind me half of my men, he ordered a halt of ten minutes, to rest those who had come up, and to give the others a chance to join us. In fact, the greater part of the regiment were in the ranks before it went into action. It was then about one o'clock in the afternoon.

The road on which we were left the woods in front of Fort Magruder in the midst of an oblong plain, which the enemy had fortified with a series of redoubts. As this was the narrowest point of the peninsula, the position would have been a good defensive one, if one were master of the two rivers. But the evacuation of Yorktown had opened one of them to our gunboats, and the other had been defended only by the Merrimac, whose destruction would in a few days be involved in the taking of Norfolk. The Williamsburg line, then, was not tenable by the Confederates. They thought so little of opposing us there that the greater part of their army had already passed on, when the attack of Stoneman compelled them to return, in order to delay our pursuit, and cover their rearguard. The fortified works proved to be very fortunately placed for them, so they occupied a part of them, and made particularly good use of Fort Magruder.

Peck's brigade, the first to come to the aid of General Hooker, was promptly deployed along the edge of the wood facing the enemy. The Fifty-fifth was on the left, resting its right on the road, on the other side of which the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania formed the centre, and the Ninety-eighth a little further on the right. The Ninety-third was in the second line, and the Sixty-second New York was held in reserve on the other side of the woods.

In front of us stretched an abatis of trees twenty to twenty-five yards deep, then a broad, open field, crossed parallel to our front by another road, which ours joined in front of Fort Magruder. On the other side of the crossroad the fields were bordered, at a distance of two or three hundred yards, by a wood, from which Hooker's left had been dislodged after a long and deadly conflict, and from which the

enemy, encouraged by a first success, was reforming for a new attack, whose shock we were about to receive.

My orders were to support the right of General Hooker; but it had fallen back into the interior of the woods, taking us, I suppose, for a brigade of Kearney's division, expected every moment to relieve it. I had also to cover a battery of artillery advanced into the field, where, in fact, we found it, but abandoned in a mud-hole, where the horses had been killed or drowned in their harness.

We had hardly time to notice these details, when, at the signal of a group of officers emerging at a gallop from Fort Magruder, the enemy's line started out of the woods with loud yells, and marched straight for us. When they had advanced half-way I opened upon them a fire by file, which promised well, while the One Hundred and Second fired a volley with its entire second rank. I do not know what harm we did them, but they continued to advance rapidly, with increased cries.

There was in front of my left a natural opening in the abatis, toward which two battalions of the enemy directed their course, with the evident intention of making it their especial point of attack. Unhappily, the company which was posted in front of that point was the worst commanded, and the one on which I could least depend. I had my eyes on it when it received its first volley. Alas! it did not even wait for a second. A man in the rear rank turned and started toward me. And like a flock of sheep after the leader, the rest followed in the twinkling of an eye. Almost immediately the next company gave way, then the third. The Zouaves, thus finding themselves left alone, broke in their turn and fell back; and, what is most shameful, some officers ran away with their men and even without them. The Ninety-third, in forming the second line could not stop the runaways. They broke through the ranks and disappeared in the woods—the cursed woods, which tempted the cowards by an easy refuge, and upon which, instead of rain, I wished at that moment to see fall fire from heaven.

However, in the breaking of the left, a handful of brave men, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, remained immovable. Posted behind the trees, they held firm, and endeavored to cover the opening by a rapid and well directed fire, under the command of Major Yehl, who gave them the example of a courageous coolness. Some officers, taken by surprise and led away by the current, stopped of their own accord, or retired slowly, rather hesitating than frightened, and as if seeking to find out what they ought to do. In spite of the density of the thicket, where my horse advanced with difficulty, I was soon amongst them. At my voice they stopped and formed around me. I gathered in this way a hundred, and led them quickly into line. But at the moment when I reformed them in front of the fatal opening, a strong volley broke them a second time.

The enemy had then advanced to the end of the abatis, and rushed into the passage which he thought open to him. In the midst of the smoke I saw six or eight gray-jackets advance to within a few steps of us. Are we about to be swept away? No. This time the men whom I led back under fire had not fled. The most of them had only taken shelter behind the neighboring trees, and from there directed a well sustained fire upon the assailants, whom the fire of my centre companies struck obliquely. Those nearest to us were killed or wounded, and the others fell back in front of the abatis.

My right had not yielded. On that side Lieutenant-Colonel Thourout, an old lieutenant of the French army, passed back and forth encouraging the men. Captains Four, Battais, Demaizure, Meyer, were brave officers, who kept their men in position without effort, for, when the officers set the example, the soldiers, sustained by confidence in their superiors and spurred on by pride, fight well. So it can be truly said that soldiers are what their officers make them.

Four, who commanded the first company, had learned war in the Chasseurs of Vincennes. Standing on the trunk of a tree, he directed the fire of his men upon each point where the enemy penetrated the abatis. Battais, abandoned

by his two lieutenants and a dozen men who had followed them, continued ordering as if on drill, with the tenacity of a Breton. The Irish company fought under the command of its senior sergeant, without troubling itself about the absence of its officers. The Zouaves, having rallied now, did their duty, with their first lieutenant, St. James, at his past. Finally, the remains of the three broken companies grouped upon the left had amongst them a second lieutenant named Prost. This brave man, having seen everything around him fleeing, disdained to leave, and remained at his post until the last, although he had but a dozen left him to command.

When I could see clearly for myself how matters stood, through the smoke which floated over the whole line, in the midst of the rolling of the small arms and the bursting of the shells among the trees, I breathed as a man would breathe rescued from the water where he was drowning. The flag of the regiment had not receded. Our honor was safe; the rest was nothing.

Perhaps it is too much to say it was nothing. For if we had succeeded in holding the enemy on the edge of the abatis and prevented his passing at the point where he had twice, unavailingly, attempted it, not the less did my left rest in the air. Let the enemy try to pass one or two hundred yards farther along and there was nothing to prevent his entering the woods and striking me in the flank and rear, in which event my only chance was in a change of front to the rear,—a maneuver always delicate but nearly impracticable in the forest, especially with troops who fought in line for the first time. So I kept going to the left to examine, with an intentness mingled with anxiety, that part of the deep and silent wood where nothing could be seen, neither friends nor enemies. The question was: "Which will show themselves first?"

What a tumult! The whole edge of the woods on fire; the musketry rolling uninterruptedly from one end of the line to the other, the balls striking the trees like hail and bounding amongst the branches; two batteries of artillery firing as fast as possible; the shells tearing the branches of

the trees and filling the woods with their explosions; shrapnel bursting in the air like petards;—such were the instruments of the diabolical concert.

If all of these had done as much damage as they made noise, the affair would have been quickly decided; happily, it was quite otherwise. The reality was much less terrible than the appearance. It is true that some men fell here and there, not to rise again; that others, covered with blood, limped or were carried back a short distance to the foot of a tree, where two surgeons dressed their wounds temporarily. But after all, the number was quite small. The missiles of the enemy, directed upon the interior of the woods, which they probably supposed to be full of troops, passed over our heads without doing us any harm. As to the infantry, troubled by the abatis which covered us, they fired too high.

When the boldest of the enemy sprang forward amongst the fallen trees and tried to get through them to reach us, impeded in their movements, held in a net work of branches, they furnished a good mark for our men and soon disappeared. A large number entered there never to go out again.

On the other side of the road, the abatis, not so thick or broad, rendered the attack apparently easier. The road itself forked to pass around a clump of trees. The principal attack was made there after the first shock which broke my left. It there struck the Ninety-third Pennsylvania (Colonel MacCarter), posted on both sides of the road and the One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania (Colonel Rawlins), entirely to the right of the road. The welcome received was the warmest. A terrible fire, at a distance of fifty feet, broke the enemy's ranks and compelled him to fall back in disorder.

The engagement lasted about an hour, when, for the first time, firing was heard on my left. I could perceive nothing yet, but the fire became more and more vigorous in that part of the woods. No more doubt. Kearney had arrived. Hurrah for Kearney!

His division, after leaving us near the brick church where Casey's division was calmly taking its coffee, had followed a road less obstructed but much longer than the direct one by which we had come. Berry's brigade now came into line. Colonel Poe of the Second Michigan had come through the woods to see for himself who we were and where we were. He had no difficulty in recognizing the red kepis, and advanced his regiment on our left. One may imagine if Berry's brigade was welcome. It could not have been more so even if I could have foreseen that it would be the first brigade I would be called on to command.

From that time the enemy could do nothing more than keep up his fire, which he did until twilight. Between four and five o'clock more reënforcements reached us. Devens' brigade took position in our rear, followed by Casey's division which General Keyes had finally gone himself to find. When my ammunition was exhausted the Sixty-second New York relieved me. At ten minutes past five o'clock by the watch, the last gun was fired from Fort Magruder. A little later the musketry fire ceased with the day, and the rain only continued to fall on the living and on the dead.

While on the left we thus stopped the offensive return of the enemy, the following is what happened on the right. On that side the rebels had not occupied the redoubts thrown up east of Fort Magruder lengthwise of the narrow plain, protected at that point by a marshy creek running through thick woods. At its extremity, the plain terminated in a steep bank, at the foot of which a long road transformed the creek into a pond. There was a formidable redoubt at that point. As it swept the road for its whole length, a regiment with a few guns would have sufficed to stop an army corps. But the enemy had put there neither a gun nor a man.

Hooker had sent a reconnoissance in that direction in the morning. The colonel commanding, meeting no enemy anywhere, informed General Hancock, who commanded a brigade in Smith's division, of that fact. On that information Sumner decided in the afternoon to send forward some

force in that direction, and Hancock, passing rapidly over the road, ascended the hill at the foot of the vacant battery and advanced into the plain unexpectedly. Two redoubts, both unoccupied, were near by. He put a force in them, and, as he had taken a battery with him, he put two guns in the nearest and took two with him to the edge of the woods, with which he drove out, without trouble, the feeble garrison from a third work.

This attack gave the alarm to the Confederates, who, not expecting us from that direction, had given General Hancock plenty of time to make his dispositions.

When they recognized the danger, Early was promptly detached to retake the redoubts and throw us back into the swamp. But Hancock was ready to receive him. He allowed them first to advance in line of battle, behind a swell of the ground. When they were well uncovered, he welcomed them with a deadly fire at short range; then, at the moment when he saw their line shaken, he charged them vigorously, and remained master of the field of battle, which in their flight they abandoned to him, covered with dead and wounded. The night coming on prevented Hancock from pursuing further the advantage of this short but brilliant engagement.

What was General McClellan doing in the meanwhile? He had finally decided to leave Yorktown, at the urgent solicitation of Governor Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, and had reached Williamsburg—when everything was over. One need not be very much surprised, then, that, knowing nothing himself of what had happened, but in a hurry to give an account of the battle, he had sent a despatch at ten o'clock in the evening, the errors of which bordered on the ridiculous.

At the very instant when the enemy, abandoning his position, hastily resumed his retreat toward Richmond, he wrote: "I have Joe Johnston in front of me with a large force, *probably much greater than mine, and very strongly intrenched.* I will, at least, try to hold them in check here. The total of my force is, without any doubt, *inferior to that*

of the rebels, who still fight well; but I will do all I can with the troops I have at my disposal."

Now, what was the number of the troops which General McClellan had under his orders? One hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-two (112,392) men *present* for duty,—so it appears in the official report, signed by his own hand, sixteen days before. At Williamsburg, the Third and Fourth Corps together amounted to sixty-eight thousand two hundred and nineteen (68,219) men. The Confederates had not one-half that number in front of us.

The next morning, the enemy having disappeared, the general celebrated our success in a very different tone. Now, "the victory is complete." Only, it is Hancock who has gained it. "He took two redoubts." In his delight, the general-in-chief forgets that they were not defended. "He repulsed Early's brigade in a *real* bayonet charge. He took a colonel and one hundred and fifty prisoners, killing at least two colonels, as many lieutenant-colonels, and many soldiers. The brilliant fight of Hancock resulted in turning the left of the enemy's works, who abandoned his position during the night, leaving all his sick and wounded in our hands. Hancock's success was gained with a loss not exceeding twenty, killed and wounded."

This was an error. Hancock had lost more. But would it not apear from this report that Hancock was the only one who had been engaged? As to Hooker, he hardly mentioned him. "I do not know exactly what our loss is; but I fear Hooker lost considerable on our left." This is all. Not a work about Kearney, nor of Peck. And yet Hooker's division had fought for six hours with a desperation, shown by a loss of about seventeen hundred men. Peck's brigade, the first to arrest the enemy's success, had lost 124 men, and Kearney's division about three hundred. Was the general-in-chief ignorant of this? Or were those accessories invisible to him, on account of the brilliant achievement of the capture of two unoccupied redoubts, and of a *real* charge—with the bayonet?

The First Battle—Williamsburg

The regiment passed the night in a field of mud—a miserable night. Since the second day before, we had made a hard march, fought fairly, eaten little, and slept not at all. Fires were kindled, which were kept up with difficulty on account of the rain, and around which we endeavored to pass the time by detailed accounts of all the incidents of the day.

At two o'clock in the morning, General Couch had the kindness to come in person and compliment me on the part we had taken in the battle. I was not disposed to accept more than what rightfully belonged to us.

"General," I said, "I thank you for the praises you have been so kind to express to me for the brave men, officers and soldiers, who surround me. They deserve them. But here is but two-thirds of my regiment. The remainder ran away at the first fire, and I do not know what has become of them. Among these last are eight or ten officers who have acted like cowards; I wish to get rid of them as soon as possible, and I propose to ask today for a court-martial, that justice may be done."

The general drew me aside to reply to me. Smiling, he said: "My dear colonel, you take the matter too much to heart. It is not at all surprising; and what has happened to you has happened to others I could cite to you, but who will say nothing about it. Do as they do; believe me, it is best. A court-martial is not possible at this moment, and, if it were, I would persuade you not to ask for one. The first fire has an unlooked-for effect on the nerves of many men, against which their inexperience is futile to fortify them. Surprised at the first encounter, they will be prepared at the second and will come out of the action as brave as any others. It is right to give those who have failed today an opportunity to repair their fault on the next occasion. If the thing occurs a second time, I will be the first to ask you to take severe measures. Until then, let us keep our family secrets and do our best."

General Couch was right. He judged wisely, as the conduct of the whole regiment soon proved, at the battle of Fair Oaks.

The enemy retreated quietly, without being pursued. The roads were in such a horrible condition that he had to abandon five pieces of artillery and several wagons in the mud-holes. What would have been the result, then, if we had followed him up closely? But General McClellan showed himself in no more hurry to take Richmond than he had been to take Yorktown; and as he had allowed Magruder's division to fortify and receive reënforcements on the Warwick where he could have easily captured it, so now he allowed Johnston's army to go and prepare for the defence of the Confederate capital without even attacking his rear-guard. Thus we had three entire days of leisure at Williamsburg to lie around in the sun and brush up our arms to the sound of military music, which celebrated our indolent glory by playing from morning till night "Yankee Doodle," "Hail, Columbia," and other patriotic airs.

I profited by the delay to visit the field of battle, where several detachments passed the day of the 6th in burying the dead. Not an exhilarating spectacle. And yet, to be sincere, I could not help feeling a little disappointed in finding only fifteen dead in the abatis behind which we had fought. Three hours of firing and sixteen thousand cartridges expended to kill fifteen men and put perhaps a hundred and fifty *hors de combat!* But the rebels had found even that loss too much, and so that must console us for not having done more.

Where Hooker's division had fought our loss was much greater than theirs. On the open ground, and especially on the sides of the road, lay many of the dead from Sickles' New York brigade. Further along in the wood, where the attack had begun, the New Jersey brigade had left the thicket full of dead.

Everywhere those who had been killed outright had retained, when fallen, the position in which death had struck them standing.

During the battle, Captain Titus, brigade quartermaster, having gone forward to the right of the Fifty-fifth, saw a Confederate soldier crawling into the abatis. He picked

up a musket, fallen from the hands of a man killed or wounded, and shot him just as he was taking aim at one of our men. The next morning we found him stretched out on his back with both arms in the position of taking aim. The captain's ball had passed through his heart.

The cannon which the enemy had not been able to carry off were buried in the mud to the axles. The two wheel horses were literally drowned in the liquid mud, their heads half buried. The others, killed by balls, mingled their blood with that of some artillerymen who had endeavored to release them by cutting the harness.

Human remains frightfully mutilated gave evidence here and there that the cannon had also done its part in the bloody work. One of these lay at the foot of a fence with nothing of the head left, but the face like a grinning mask. The remainder, crushed by a ball, adhered to the rails in bloody blotches. Strange curiosity, which by a natural impulse leads us toward the horrible—which led me there upon the field of battle, and which attracts you, also, you who read these lines, since your imagination completes the picture of which this is a sketch.

You will not hesitate, no more than I did, to step on the edge of these broad trenches, carelessly dug to-day by those for whom others will dig trenches elsewhere, perhaps in a year, perhaps in a month, perhaps to-morrow. The first to depart on the long journey lie stretched out before us, side by side, with marble features, glassy eyes, and in their torn and bloody uniforms. The comrades who will follow them hasten to finish their duty without philosophizing on the skull of poor Yorick, whose infinite witticisms but yesterday enlivened the bivouac. A layer of men and a layer of earth. The ditch filled, it is covered over with a little hillock, to provide for settling. Then they depart, leaving to a few friendly hands the pious care of marking a name and a date on small boards aligned at the head of the head, where no one will come to read them.

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CHAPTER XI

Days of Suffering

Forward march—Engagement at West Point—Subject for discontent—Dinner at headquarters—Fight of a new kind—The bull and the Newfoundland dog—The death of Bianco—Virginia plantations—Marsh fever—The Turner house—Delirium—Manna in the desert—Anxieties—Battle of Fair Oaks—First days of convalescence—Departure for the north.

On Friday, May 9, the Fourth Corps at last moved, followed by the Third. The Second, having remained at Yorktown, embarked there for West Point, at the place where the Pamunkey and the Mattapony unite to form the York River. One would naturally suppose that the last three days had been actively employed in arranging an advantageous concentration of the army, in getting together and completing the material for transportation, in assuring the regular service of the supply department,—in fine, in taking every possible measure to repair the lost time by a rapid advance. The days were long, the sun hot, the roads dried while you were looking at them. But nothing could hasten the methodical slowness of the general-in-chief, and our daily marches were those of the tortoise. We did not reach New Kent Court House until Tuesday the 13th, the fifth day after starting, and we did not leave there till the 16th, two days later. The distance is twenty-eight miles, two ordinary marches.

The enemy was not the cause of these delays. He thought only of continuing his retreat; we did not come across him, keeping ourselves at a respectful distance from his rearguard.

General Franklin alone, having arrived at West Point on the 7th by transport, and thus threatening with his division the flank of the Confederates, who were marching by at a distance of two or three miles, had an engagement with them, the importance of which was much exaggerated by the imagination of General McClellan. The most advanced

regiments were thrown back and kept near the river, and Johnston continued his march without being further troubled.

When it was known in the army of what little importance was the pretended battle of West Point, it began to be perceived what partialities the general-in-chief would show towards his particular friends. He had already cut out new commands for them by reducing the army corps to two divisions each. Great discontent was manifested. Not that the army took to heart the transfer of such or such a division from one command to another. That was an affair for the generals. But Hooker's division was deeply wounded by the injustice of which it had been a victim in the telegraphic bulletins upon the Williamsburg fight. The same sentiment prevailed in Kearney's division and in Peck's brigade. Personally, Hooker was incensed; Kearney protested vigorously; Peck complained against the injustice. As to the subaltern officers and soldiers, their discontent found vent in murmurs and epigrams.

Another grievance, more generally felt because it directly touched the soldier, was the excess of precaution and the severity of orders to preserve from injury any object, even the smallest, belonging to the rebels. Not a farmhouse, not a cottage, not a negro, but was furnished with a guard on our approach, by the troops of General Andrew Porter, especially ordered, not to protect the persons and the furniture, which ran no danger, but to watch over the farmyards, the stables, the forage, the wells, and even the fences.

I have seen our men, covered with dust and overcome by the heat, try in vain to get water from wells overflowing, from which stringent orders drove they away, because the supply of water for a rebel family might be diminished. I have also seen them, covered with mud and shivering with the rain, prevented by orders of the general-in-chief from warming themselves with the fence rails of dry wood which were ready at their hands, because the cattle of a rebel

farmer might get out and eat the grass in his fields, while he was rebuilding his fences.

In the first case, the soldier had to go a long distance to fill his canteen with warm and muddy water from a pool or creek. In the second, he had to cut down trees and use the green wood, hard to burn, not fit to dry himself by, and hardly answering to boil his coffee.

And it must not be imagined that the people, treated with such great consideration, were in the least grateful for it. They were animated with such irreconcilable hatred against us that they did not give themselves the trouble to dissemble. The women would sometimes even take advantage of their immunity to boast of their enmity. They were so many spies, whom we were guarding. Everything they heard, everything they could get out of any one was reported to the enemy as soon as possible. The horses, cattle, hogs, which we were so scrupulously compelled to respect, were sent on the first occasion to the Confederates, so that the Yankees might not profit by them.

When the army was before Richmond, letters of these enemies, whom we treated as friends, were intercepted. They were full of exact information as to the location of our pickets and the disposition of our forces. They designated also the farms where, under our safeguard, provisions were reserved for the Confederates, as soon as they could send for them. It is true that the Richmond papers, which were filled every day with invectives against us, showed themselves more courteous towards our general, whom they called "the only gentleman in his army." It can be seen that they had very good reason to feel so.

So the soldier lived poorly, having no way to add to the insufficient rations, which were furnished quite irregularly. On two occasions the coffee failed us, which, of all privations, is the one the soldier feels the most. The means of transportation are still incomplete, it was said. And the quartermasters incompetent, might have been added without injustice.

On the general's staff they possibly were ignorant of these things, for evidently they did not suffer from the want of anything. Near New Kent Court House, my bivouac being near the army headquarters, I profited by it to make a call on two of my friends, who kept me to dinner. It was an excellent dinner; certainly they were not in want of the means of transportation. The fare was of the best, and we had a certain mixture of Bordeaux and iced champagne, which still lingers in my grateful memory.

I finished my evening in the tent of the Orleans princes, who, influenced by their surroundings, appeared to me to see things somewhat differently from what they really were. At headquarters they had but one bell, and consequently only one sound was heard—praises of McClellan.

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THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG

AND THE CHARGE OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH VIRGINIA OF EARLY'S BRIGADE

BY

COLONEL R. L. MAURY

FROM

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS

1880

The Battle of Williamsburg and the Charge of the Twenty-fourth Virginia of Early's Brigade

By Colonel R. L. Maury

The Immortal Twenty-fourth.—The Yankee General Hancock said that the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia, for their conduct in battle before Williamsburg, ought to have this word inscribed upon their banners. The Twenty-fourth in the fight of yesterday vindicated its title to this honor. * * *Richmond Enquirer*, June 2, 1862.

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The Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry was one of the very first organized of the Virginia regiments. It was composed of companies raised in the mountain counties of Southwest Virginia, and as General Early was its first colonel, it was, particularly in the first days of the war, often spoken of as Early's regiment. It was formed in June, 1861, at Lynchburg, and proceeded forthwith to Manassas, where its Colonel was soon given a brigade, to which this regiment was attached.

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At odd times, when the army of Northern Virginia was inactive, the brigade of which this regiment formed a part—and which, from its earliest engagements, seemed to have attracted the attention of its commanders and gained their special confidence—went to Suffolk, North Carolina and Drury's Bluff in successful quests of glory and renown. After it was reorganized in 1862, Kemper commanded it, and Pickett was its Major General until the sad disaster at Five Forks (1865).

At Yorktown Early held the lines just outside the village. Outnumbered as the Confederates were, the incessant duty necessarily imposed upon them in picketing, skirmishing and constant watching by night and day without relief, was wearing and arduous in the extreme. The weather

was wet, the troops without shelter, the trenches full of mud and water and the supplies but scant. This exposure and hardship, greater than they had ever borne and so different from their snug quarters at Manassas, was quickly followed by sickness and disease, so that during the three weeks in the Yorktown trenches the seven hundred muskets of the Twenty-fourth Virginia were reduced to something like five hundred effectives.

On the retreat to Williamsburg, commencing the night of May 3d, Early's brigade was the rear guard—and the Twenty-fourth, being the left regiment, brought up the rear of all—the most fatiguing place, as every soldier knows, of the whole line of march.

All this was truly an ill preparation for the desperate charge to be set before them soon; but let it not be forgotten in reckoning the glory of their deeds.

The horrible roads are well remembered even now by all who passed them on that dark and rainy night. There had been constant rains for weeks and ceaseless use of every highway all the while. The mud and water were ankle and sometimes knee deep, and the infantry were often called to help the weary horses drag wagons and artillery from holes and ruts in which the wheels had sunk up to the very axles. So the march was tedious and dragging and slow. The men fell asleep on the wayside as they halted for a moment, and sometimes not a mile in an hour was made. Thus morning found them scarcely half way to Williamsburg (fourteen miles), and midday had long gone by ere the rear passed through the gray old town, and, weary and jaded, were allowed to take whatever of rest a halt in an open field a mile or so beyond and a tentless bivouac in the pelting rain might afford. Supperless but not to sleep they lay upon the soaking ground that night, and without breakfast, weary, wet and hungry, but jolly in spirits, they are ready at daylight to resume their march.

General Johnston had no intention of tarrying at Williamsburg, nor was the place defensible, for the enemy now had control of both James and York rivers on either flank and intended to push Franklin's division (30,000), kept on

transports below Yorktown so as to move in a minute, rapidly up the York to West Point in the vain hope of getting in our rear. Our orders were that Magruder should not halt at all and that the other divisions should take up their march to the Chickahominy at early dawn—Longstreet being in the rear. So Smith moved on at day, then the trains followed, and Hill's infantry were filing into the road when orders came to halt and then to return to town.

The enemy's van had come up and was disposed to skirmish with the rear guard—fresh troops were arriving every moment—there was no time to wait to deliver a regular battle, for Franklin was already sailing up the York—but our trains were not well away and 'twas deemed prudent for Hill to tarry as Longstreet might need aid; doubtless, too, General Johnston was not unwilling to turn and deal the enemy a blow to show how little demoralization his backward movement created, and how, though in retreat, his men were quite as ready and as able to fight as when on a victorious advance.

Thus Hill's trains went on, but his infantry and some artillery returned to Williamsburg and the former stacked their arms upon the college green and passed the day in waiting and expectancy, while the rain still fell and fell.

Longstreet was being pressed more vigorously, the skirmish was becoming a fight just beyond the town and could be distinctly heard by all, and wounded and ambulances and prisoners passed frequently by. Every one looked for orders to the front each moment; amid such scenes and sounds the tension of expectation and excitement was more intense; meantime evening, dark, gloomy and cloudy, drew slowly on, when, suddenly, about three o'clock galloped up the looked for courier. "Move quickly to the support of Longstreet," said he.

And now were seen a series of blunders by generals which, as often after, the priceless lives of our gallant soldiers were sacrificed to correct, and which in this brilliant Williamsburg charge caused the useless slaughter of the very flower of Early's brigade—for though it need never have been made, yet it ought to have been a grand success,

and to have resulted in the easy capture of Hancock's whole command, had due precaution been taken before commencing the attack and proper skill displayed in arranging, conducting and supporting it after it had commenced. To make this clear one should recall the surrounding circumstances.

The prudent forethought of General J. B. Magruder, who, with his troops, had so successfully held the lines from Yorktown to Mulberry island since the war began, had caused the construction of a cordon of redoubts just below Williamsburg, running entirely across the Peninsula from Queen's creek of York to James river. Commencing near Saunders pond on the York side near where the road crosses it, this line runs northwest for a mile or more, in which space are three redoubts; then due west some three hundred yards, passing another to Fort Magruder with several outlying smaller works, and thence westwardly in an irregular course, skirting a stream and swamp, some two miles more, passing six redoubts to the road leading to Allen's wharf on James river. The center of this line was Fort Magruder, a large, well constructed closed earthwork, located about one mile from Williamsburg on the main road running down the Peninsula, which, just beyond, falls into Yorktown and the Warwick roads.

The redoubts to the right, on the James river side, were all occupied by Longstreet's division, which relieved Hill—guarding the rear of the 4th—and whose obvious duty was to cover all the lines on which the enemy could advance. But this was not done; for on the morning of the 5th none of these left works were occupied in force, and only one or two of the nearest even with pickets.*

Thus the left of the Confederate line of works, like that of the English at Preston Pass, was undefended, and one of the few passes across the swamps stretching along its front remained entirely open to the enemy. The redoubt constructed expressly to guard this passage seems not to have

*See Colonel Bratton's statement, Southern Historical Papers, June, 1879, page 299. General Anderson says in his report: "My not occuying these redoubts was perhaps a mistake, but I did not understand Longstreet's orders to include them."

been considered worth a thought in the morning, when it could have been occupied without a loss, while in the evening time the lives of hundreds of the best soldiers were thrown away in a fruitless attempt to regain it.

Why were these redoubts not occupied? They were constructed for just such an occasion; for it was well known that the Yorktown lines would have to be evacuated sooner or later. General Johnston, in his narrative, pages 122-4, says he knew nothing of them, and so does Longstreet, and Hill, and Anderson, although they were all charged with their defense. Each is in sight from the other, and all are in a continuously open space. McLaw's, of Longstreet's division, who occupied this part of the line the afternoon before with Kershaw's and Semmes' brigades, knew of them, for Colonel Marigny, with his Tenth Louisiana, occupied this very work (see McLaw's report of the battle of Williamsburg) until relieved by R. H. Anderson. Colonel Bratton, of the Sixth South Carolina, of Anderson's brigade, whose regiment was posted near the glacis of Fort Magruder, knew of them; for he reported them unoccupied [see narrative —*Southern Historical Society Papers, June 1879.*] It would be interesting to know to whom he made this report. He also saw the Yankees later in the day take possession of that on the extereme left. Moreover, all the army had entered this entrenched line at Fort Magruder, and when preparing to defend it, surely common prudence, not to say ordinary generalship, should have suggested the importance of ascertaining the position of its flanks; and it should not have been presumed, as seems to have been done, that so skilful a soldier as General Magruder had constructed but half a line of fortifications. And, indeed, the Commanding General knew from the time he went to Yorktown, or very soon thereafter, that his army would soon withdraw (see Johnston's narrative, page 116), and this was the only road. It was apparent too, that at or about Williamsburg would be the first halt, and it was to be expected that the enemy's van would come up with our rear here. If 'twas "prudent to construct these works" [Johnston's narrative], would it not also have been prudent to ascertain their location?

But it is even stranger how Longstreet could have remained in ignorance of them, for they were in actual sight from Fort Magruder, where he must have been on both the 4th and 5th. As McLaws occupied them on the 4th, why did not Anderson, who relieved him, occupy all the posts he occupied? Who relieved Marigny's Tenth Louisiana and how came that relief to be withdrawn afterwards? Can it be that Bratton, who was posted on the Confederate left on the 4th and 5th, relieved Marigny, who occupied this position, and that he was also in fault in not having occupied this left redoubt also? But all these mistakes, growing out of ignorance or carelessness, might have been avoided had General Magruder been assigned to the defense of the rear on that day, for he and his troops were perfectly familiar with the whole country—they had been stationed here all the previous autumn and winter, and had themselves laid out and built these very fortifications.

As the Confederate army entered these lines about noon of the 4th, Longstreet, who led the van, and, by usual routine, would be in the rear next day, halted just within, while the remainder of the forces marched on past Williamsburg. In the afternoon the enemy's van appeared, driving in the cavalry, and McLaws, with Semmes' and Kershaw's brigades, went back to these lines, and the Yankee van retired. That evening McLaws was relieved, as already said, by R. H. Anderson, commanding the brigades of Anderson and Pryor. In the morning, after much skirmishing, without advantage to the enemy, he appeared on the right in force under Hooker, attacking with spirit, but though reinforced by Kearney, he was pressed back, driven and almost routed.* Here was fighting pretty much all day, but night found Longstreet holding his position, while the enemy seemed cured of any desire to again molest the Confederate rear.†

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*Testimony before Congressional Committee on Conduct of War. Part I pages 353-566.

†On the retreat the van of to-day is the rear guard of to-morrow. Such was the custom of the Army of Northern Virginia—and Longstreet having led the first day, was rear guard the second. Was he in *front* at starting because General Johnston had found him, as after-

Sumner, with 30,000 men, had also come up early on the 5th, but had sat quietly down across the Yorktown road, just out of sight and range. Although in command—for McClellan seems to have considered that position for the general-in-chief on a pursuit was fifteen miles in rear, and had remained below Yorktown*—he took no part in what was going on around him; and though importuned for aid by both Hooker and Kearney, who were "almost routed," he declined to part with a man; and when Hancock, finding the empty redoubt on the left, ventured into it, he actually commanded him to return. In fact, he seems to have forgotten that he was in pursuit of what was described as a flying and demoralized enemy, and though himself in command, and holding the van, his chief object on finding the foe seems to have been to let him well alone.

Not so Hancock, one of his subordinates, who was made of sterner stuff, and who had other views of the duties of pursuers of a flying foe; for on the morning of the 5th, between 10 and 11 o'clock, leaving Sumner at Whittaker's, full half a mile or more from the nearest Confederate line, he takes his own brigade and part of Naglee's—five regiments —and ten guns, in all probably over 4,000 men and learning that one of the redoubts on the extreme left of the Confederate line was unoccupied, he crosses Saunders' pond and marches into it, and then, in the language of the Comte de Paris, "seeing no enemy, he fearlessly proceeded to march into the next." But on approaching it, he perceives Bratton, with part of his Sixth South Carolina, preparing to oppose him, whereupon,

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wards General Lee did, "slow to move," and therefore started him first? Possibly, for the evacuation of the Yorktown lines had been ordered on a previous night, and D. H. Hill had moved out bag and baggage at the appointed time for a mile or more, but was then halted until nearly day, and then ordered back to his former position. Fortunately the enemy had not discovered his absence—a bit of rare good luck not to have been expected. It was then currently reported that the waiting had been for Longstreet, and as he had not moved out in time for the army to get well away before dawn, it was necessary to return.

*Evidence of Governor Sprague and others before Congressional Committee on Conduct of War.

although in far greater force, he halts, falls back, and calls for aid. But Sumner seems to have been in no mood to detain the "flying foe," and orders Hancock to retire. The latter, well knowing the lucky prize he had found, determined to stay; so falling back from the "fearless advance," spoken of by the Comte de Paris, to the redoubt he first occupied, he makes his dispositions for a stand, and Bratton, with commendable care, that might well have been imitated that day by others of higher rank, extends a line of pickets from his main body across Hancock's front and into the woods beyond. The latter gets his guns into battery, and occasionally throws a chance shot or shell here and there at a venture, but with little damage, if any. Thus the day wore on. Towards evening, this artillery fire becoming somewhat annoying to Fort Magruder, 'tis said, although Hancock showed no signs of making use of the position he had stumbled upon, which, in fact, was the key to the entire Confederate line, and opened to the enemy a road to Williamsburg, as well as Longstreet's rear, D. H. Hill and Early, anxious to have a share in the day's work, asked and obtained leave to assault General Hancock and drive him away. There appears to have been no necessity for this, however, for Hancock's fire had done no damage all day, and was not more harmful now—the fighting was well-nigh over—and he himself was preparing to fall back for the night. (See Hancock's report, battle of Williamsburg.) The Confederates had beaten off every attack made upon them, and the whole line was to be abandoned before morning. Nevertheless leave was given, with a charge from General Johnston "to be careful."

Forthwith Hill brings his command to the front. Early's brigade, eager for the first of a hundred battles, coming from the college green at the double-quick through the narrow streets of the old historic town, where the cheers and tears of the women and the maidens at the doors and windows waving adieux as they passed so quickly by, and the unaccustomed sight of dead, wounded and prisoners brought up from the field to which they were hurrying, the

rapid motion, the galloping of artillery, couriers and staff, with all the burning excitement of the approach to battle, sent the blood coursing through their veins, which tingles even now but the memory of it all flushes the cheek and brightens the eye, though eighteen long years have passed away.

The brigade hurries half a mile or more down the Yorktown road, files short to the left, passes through a newly plowed, soft and muddy field half a mile further, and forming into the line behind a wood, which screens from sight all beyond, breathless, hot and heavy of foot from rapid motion over such a ground, halts and prepares to load. Thus formed, it consists of the following regiments, counting from the right: The Fifth and Twenty-third North Carolina, commanded respectively by Colonels Duncan K. McRae and Hoke; and the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-fourth Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Powhatan B. Whittle and Colonel William R. Terry; the Twenty-fourth Virginia being thus on the left, and the Fifth North Carolina on the right. This brigade is assigned to the attack, and the remainder of the division—the brigades of Rodes, Featherston and Rains, with the second company of Richmond howitzers—is held in reserve close by. Major-General D. H. Hill will lead and takes special charge of the right wing, the two North Carolina regiments; and the Virginians, of the left, will be led by General Early.

Regardless of the rule which places commanding officers in rear of the line in a charge, Early, with his staff, takes position in front of his old regiment, the Twenty-fourth, and its field-officers, all mounted, do likewise. The order is given to load and then to fix bayonets—and the guns are loaded and the bayonets fixed. In a few words, Early, addressing his men, says they are to assault and capture a battery "over there" pointing to the woods—and grimly adding, that their safest place, after getting under fire, will be at the very guns themselves, advises all to get there as quickly as possible. Expectation is on tiptoe, and many a gallant heart, in generous emulation, resolves to be the first to reach these guns. With only these few moments to halt

to regain breath, the order is given to march, and the line moves forward.*

The generals did not know the position of the redoubt to be attacked, nor even its exact direction from where the line was formed; yet no skirmishers were thrown forward to discover it, nor was any proper reconnaissance made.† The latter might easily have been done, for from the point where Bratton was with the Sixth Carolina, he had a view of the whole field, and his pickets extended from his redoubt into the woods whence Early's brigade was soon to emerge. But these ordinary precautions do not seem to have been thought of, and the Major-General, arranging his forces to attack a strong enemy in a strong position, only to be approached across a large open boggy field (in his report he says it was half a mile wide), without knowledge of their numbers or location, and without reconnaissance or skirmishers, sounded the charge and ordered the advance. The disposition of the supports were made with equal lack of skill, for the three additional brigades and the battery of artillery, as brave and gallant soldiers as ever fired a gun, though close at hand, were never brought upon the field at all, and the attack failed for want of their aid. They were ample for the purpose, for they outnumbered the foe, and were quite sufficient to have captured General Hancock and his five regiments and ten guns, one and all, who were far in advance of General Sumner, and who could only retreat by a narrow road over Saunders' pond.

From all this want of generalship, skill and care, arose great confusion and greater misfortune. Not knowing exactly the location of the point of attack, it was scarcely possible that the line of battle would be properly arranged with

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*This little halt was even briefer for the writer and his part of the regiment than for the other portions of the brigade. In the run down from Williamsburg, the line had become opened and much extended. The Twenty-fourth Virginia was in the rear, and the writer's part of it in rear of all; so that when the halt was made, and line of battle formed, it was the last to get into position, and had barely time to load before the march forward began.

†Colonel Bratton's narrative, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, June, 1879, pages 299-300. Colonel McRae's narrative, *Southern Historical Papers*, August, 1879, page 364.

regard to it, and so it happened; for when at last it came in sight of the enemy, instead of the center being opposite the point attacked, as it should have been, with the line moving directly upon it, the extreme left (the left of the Twenty-fourth Virginia) was opposite the battery, and the remainder of the brigade away off to the right, and moving in a direction across the enemy's front. These sturdy old musketeers—some of whom were not inapt military scholars, and by dint of comparing notes, careful observation, and an occasional book or two, had learned as well how a battle should be set in order as many a general officer—understood from the advance being thus commenced without skirmishers, and from General Early's little address before starting, that they were as close upon the position to be attacked as could be, that the charge commenced then and there, that the battery to be taken was just over the wood, a hundred yards distant perhaps, and that they would fall upon the foe in a moment.

With this impression upon their minds, it was difficult to restrain the impatient valor and restlessness of the men as they moved off, but still they advanced across the field steadily, and, preserving their alignment well, though in more rapid step, they entered the woods. Here the miry ground, the dense and tangled undergrowth, dripping with wet, and the large fallen timber, somewhat impaired the line, which increasing excitement, running higher every moment, which was thought would bring them under fire, rendered it difficult for the officers to correct. Still every one pressed forward with all the strength he had left; there was no halting, only greater speed, though every moment less breath and more fatigue. But no enemy is seen yet. They have left the field whence they started, they have traversed the tangled woods down the hill, across a country road, into the forest again and up another slope, but heavy, weary, breathless, and almost broken down, and still no foe is found, although half a mile and more has been passed. But now light appears ahead, the trees are thinner and a large open field is seen towards the right and in front. It is there that the redoubt and battery of the enemy must be.

The glorious Virginians press forwards towards it, and in a moment more are on the edge of the opening, seeing before them, like a picture, the cordon of Confederate redoubts stretching away to Fort Magruder; that on the extreme left, directly in face of the left of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, is occupied by the enemy, whose entire force of five regiments and ten guns are well advanced in the field directly in front of it. As yet the Confederates have not been noticed. Ah, why were not these brave spirits marched quietly to this point and formed, where all could have been seen and clearly understood the work before them, then indeed would it have been done, and well done, and done quickly.

The enemy is seen for the first time; for the first time is seen the battery to be taken. His line faces farther to the southwest, while the advance is from the west. Owing to the unfortunate manner in which the attack was arranged, the Twenty-fourth alone sights the enemy, is much nearer to him, and issues from the woods some time before any other part of the brigade. Immediately upon seeing the Yankees they spring forward into the open with renewed energy, and remembering the address of Early, who is riding just before them, they press heartily onwards to lose not a moment in closing with those ten guns and four thousand muskets of General Winfield Hancock.

But the wild advance, at such a foolish speed, and over such a heavy ground, had brought disorder on the line. The two middle regiments are not to be seen, and do not issue from the woods during the entire action, while the right regiment, Colonel McRae's, does not reach the open until the Twenty-fourth Virginia had been well engaged for some time and was driving the enemy back; and when it does enter the field, 'tis far to the right where no enemy was, and, in fact, in rear of Bratton's line.

Thus, as it leaves the woods, the Twenty-fourth Virginia, alone and unsupported, with both flanks in the air, finds itself confronted by ten guns, defended by five regiments of infantry, with a strong redoubt in the rear. Clinging instinctively to the skirt of the woods bordering the

field on its left flank, so as to mask its weakness as well as might be, and opening out its files as far as possible to cover the foe's five regiments, these fearless mountaineers break at once into the double-quick and charge with a wild cheer that thrills through every heart. At once they are heavily engaged. In opening their files, several of the largest companies on the right became detached, and mistaking the redoubt held by Bratton for the objective point, rushed towards it.* But the remainder go straight on, and the brunt of the affair falls upon the left wing, led by the writer, they being closest to and moving directly upon the foe, and receiving fire from both front and flank. The advanced force delivered a steady volley at most uncomfortably short range and then give way, retreating towards the redoubt. As they retire, the guns, which have already been hurried back, again open; and these Virginians, but a portion of the Twenty-fourth regiment, weary and breathless, already shattered by shot and shell, received Hancock's whole fire of musketry, shell, grape and canister, as, pressing over the field with undaunted courage, they approach nearer and nearer the foe. None halt or hesitate, but all push forward with a vigor hardly to be paralleled and now with a silence that would do honor to the first veterans on record, though to many 'tis their first fight. A spirit of death or victory animates every bosom; and mindful of Early's advice, each one anxious to be the first at these guns, they still press on, not so quickly, perhaps, as they would have done had they not have been exhausted by their run through field and forest, but still without delay, and the enemy all the while gives way before them, though some of his regiments tarry longer than others.

The leaden hail was fearful, it poured in from front and either flank, and for the first time was heard the barbar-

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*This separation furnishes the explanation of part of Colonel Bratton's somewhat involved account of this affair in the *Historical Socie y Papers* for June, 1879. He speaks of the "Twenty-fourth regiment" and of "Early's regiment" as if they were two regiments, mistaking these companies thus separated for distinct regiment. The officer he speaks of as Lieutenant-Colonel Early was doubtless the gallant Sam. Henry Early, of General Early's staff.—R.L.M.

ous explosive bullet which the Yankees introduced and used. The artillery, too, was well served, and soon both grape and canister were cutting through the wheat with a terribly suggestive sound, carrying down many a brave spirit, and men and officers fell dead and wounded on every side. Yet the advance is maintained; down a slope first, and up again on the further side—still on and on. The regiment soon finds that it is alone; it knows that "some one has blundered," and marvels that the supports are nowhere seen, and that the Major-General, with part of his brigade, does not appear. Still none falter or cast a look behind. They are pressing the enemy well back, though receiving deadly wounds meantime, for his attention is engrossed by this attack, and the Virginians are drawing his whole fire. Gray-haired old Coltraine, of Carrol, that gallant, staunch old soldier, is well in front, his colors already pierced with many a bullet, and men and officers press quickly on unchecked by the murderous fire directed upon them. The ground is soft and yielding, the wheat half knee high, drenched with rain, clings heavily to the legs, and many trip and stumble and sometimes fall. The flag staff is shattered, but Coltrain grasps the staff and cheerily waves the silken folds in front. Away to the right is seen the gallant Fifth North Carolina coming up at the double-quick to our aid, led by that *preaux chevalier,* Colonel Duncan McRae, his horse briskly trotting in advance. A cheer bursts forth and all take heart and still press forward. But the Virginians are much nearer the redoubt, and the enemy, regardless of the approaching supports, still concentrate all their fire upon this devoted band, and with terrible effect. Early's horse has been shot, and in another moment he himself receives a wound, the effect of which his bended form still shows. Terry, too, that gallant leader, ever in the van of many an after battle, has gotten the first of frequent shots full in the face, and the dauntless Hairston also goes down desperately wounded; so the writer, then but a youth, finds himself for the first time in command of his regiment, and the only mounted officer there.* Captains Jennings and Ha-

*The Fifth North Carolina, with all its mounted officers, had not yet gotten up to the more advanced position of the Twenty-fourth Virginia.

den, and Lieutenant Mansfield, too, the bravest of all these braves, lie dead upon the ground. Lieutenant Willie Radford, soldier and scholar, has freely given up his young life, so full of bloom and promise, in defense of home and dear native land, and lies with his face up to heaven, and his feet to the foe, his noble brow, so lately decked with University honors, now pale and cold in death, and his Captain (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Bently), ever present in the field from Manassas even to Appotomattox, fell bleeding by his side many yards in front of their company, and Captain Lybrock and Lieutenant Shockley, too, fall wounded to the earth. But no pause is made. Ten minutes—fifteen—have passed while they cross that field of blood, and every other man is down. But the supports are approaching; not all the rest of the brigade, as was expected—or a part of the division, fresh and in order—but only a single regiment, the gallant Fifth North Carolina, who, seeing what odds the Virginians were fighting, had, as soon as it emerged into the field and found no enemy confronting them, sought leave to march towards the firing and were now hastening to an awful destruction in their zeal to share that glorious field. The enemy, too, fall back more quickly as they see reinforcements coming up, and run into and behind the redoubt, to which they have all retreated now. Confusion has seized upon them there, for the Virginians are within twenty yards and show no signs of halting. The fire of the enemy slackens, and as their assailants reach the fence of substantial rails with a rider, ceases entirely. The order to their artillery to "cease firing" and "limber up" is distinctly heard, and some of the guns are actually run off; the infantry, too, are in great tumult, their bayonets seem tangled and interlocked, some run into the fort, many make off to the rear, and voices calling to others to halt and stand steady are clearly heard. In a word, General Winfield Hancock's five regiments and ten guns have been attacked and driven in by a single Virginia regiment, and are now on the point of being routed.

As the Twenty-fourth gains the fence just spoken of, the enemy having ceased firing entirely, it pauses a moment

to breathe and reform its scattered line, preparatory to a last dash—no man thinks of turning back, for the enemy is retreating before them—and here, too, now are their gallant comrades fresh and eager for a share in the struggle. While the men were in the act of climbing this fence, the writer seeing a gap where his horse could pass, Adjutant McRae communicated to him General Hill's order to retire immediately; whereupon anticipating that the enemy would reform and open with terrible effect at such short range as soon as the backward movement was perceived, the regiment was obliqued into the woods upon which its left flank rested, and, retiring thus under cover, came off without further damage.

Not so its gallant comrades, who, having advanced with but little loss, and just rectified their alignment behind the fence, were now in perfect line right under the enemy's guns. Their retreat was across a broad, open field; and as they faced about, the foe, quickly rallying and reforming, more than five or six times their number, hurled shot and shell through their devoted ranks with awful destruction. The retreat was the signal for slaughter, and, as Colonel McRae says, the regiment "was scarcely harmed at all till the retreat began"—the loss was desperate in a few moments afterwards. [*Southern Historical Society Papers, August, 1879, page 362.*] Before they recrossed that fearful field, the best blood of all the Old North State fed the fresh young wheat at their feet, and a hundred Carolina homes were cast into direful mourning and distress.

And all for what? Had the regiments been allowed to go on, the redoubt would have been captured without further loss, and held until some one had thought of reinforcing them with part of the three remaining brigades of the division, or with the other two regiments of their own brigade, all of whom were within a thousand yards. If McRae had not come up, and by sending his Adjutant back, furnished the Major-General with a ready messenger, by whom to order the troops to retire, it seems that the Twenty-fourth regiment would have been left, as already had been done, to press forward alone until it reached the works,

into which a few might have gotten, as they afterwards did at Gettysburg, in the great charge of Pickett's division, where, by a singular coincidence, the line attacked was in charge of this same General Hancock. Then, as at Williamsburg, a handful left to dash themselves to atoms upon the enemy's entrenchments, while abundant support, stood quietly by and watched the fruitless onslaught.

Well, indeed, might friend and foe write highest laudations of so gallant a charge, rarely equalled, and never surpassed, in all the resplendent record of that ever glorious army. The blow thus delivered, at the very opening of that memorable campaign, not only stunned the enemy —who never attacked again on the Peninsula,—but furnished the whole army with an inspiring example, which could not but have an admirable effect.

The glowing language of General Hill's report has already been cited. Colonel (now General) Bratton, who was an eye-witness of the whole affair [although he seems to have had but a confused recollection of the regiments engaged], says: "The Twenty-fourth Virginia meantime emerged from the wood nearer the enemy than my redoubt, and moved in fine style upon them. * * * I have never on any field, during the war, seen more splendid gallantry exhibited that on that field at Williamsburg." [*Southern Historical Society Papers, June, 1879, pages 301-2.*] And a Captain of her Majesty's Scotch Fusileers, who was in Hancock's redoubt, and saw the charge, made himself known the next day to Dr. George T. Harrison, Surgeon of the Twenty-fourth, left at Williamsburg to attend the wounded, saying that he did so because he understood the Doctor belonged to the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and he desired to tell him that during his entire Crimean experience, he had never seen more gallantry displayed upon a field of battle.

Nor were the foes unwilling to declare their admiration or to testify to the impression made upon them by these dashing soldiers.

General Hancock declared that they should have "immortal" written upon their banner forever; and although he

had, as already said, five regiments of infantry and ten guns—4,000 men—he called loudly and frequently for reinforcements, which, to the extent of three brigades (Smith's two and Naglee's), General McClellan sent him immediately after his arrival from the rear.* The latter considered this action the most important of the entire battle. He made it the chief subject of his first two telegrams to Lincoln, pronouncing Hancock's conduct brilliant in the extreme (his loss was only twenty). And in his official report, written more than a year afterwards, he characterized it as one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and declared that General Hancock merited the highest praise. So far from pressing the Confederates, as he had boasted he would do, after this day's work he sat quietly down in the ancient borough of Williamsburg, while these same "demoralized and flying" Confederates sauntered up to the Chickahominy at their leisure, pausing on the route to reorganize their regiments whose period of service had expired, and to elect their officers. Nor did General McClellan ever again try the experiment of attacking General Johnston's men.

A few days after (May 9, 1862), the following animated account of the charge appeared in the columns of the New York Herald:

* * * "From the sharp fire of our skirmishers in the woods on our left, came the first information of a movement in that direction, and thus put all on the alert. * * * The fire grew hotter in the woods, and in a few moments, at a point fully half a mile away from the battery, the enemy's men began to file out of the cover and form in the open field. It was bold and proved an expensive way to handle men. Wheeler opened his guns on the instant, and the swath of dead subsequently marked the course of that brigade across the open field began at that spot. At the same moment our skirmishers in the field began their fire. Still the enemy formed across the opening with admirable rapidity and precision, and as cooly too as if the fire had been directed elsewhere, and then came on at the double-quick step in three distinct lines,† firing as they came. All sounds were lost for a few moments in the short roar of the field-pieces, and in the scattered rattle and rapid repetition of the musketry. Naturally their

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*It is noteworthy, that although McClellan's army was in pursuit of a retiring foe, he himself, instead of being in the van, remained below Yorktown, nearly twenty miles away, during the entire fight.—R.L.M.

†A mistake, for the Twenty-fourth Virginia was the only regiment making the attack from this point.—R.L.M.

fire could do us but little harm under the circumstances, and so we had them at a fair advantage and every nerve was strained to make the best of it. Still they came on. They were dangerously near. Already our skirmishers on the left had fallen back to their line, and those on the right had taken cover behind the rail fence leading from the house to the woods, whence they blazed away as earnestly as ever. Yet the guns are out there, and they are what these fellows want, in the next instant the guns are silent. For a moment, in the confusion and smoke, one might almost suppose the enemy had them, but in a moment more the guns emerge from the safe side of the smoke cloud, and away they go across the open field to a point near the upper redoubt, where they are again unlimbered and play away again. Further back also go the skirmishers.* And now for a moment the rebels had the partial cover of the farm and out-buildings, but they saw that they had all their work to do over, and so came on again. Once more they are in the open field, exposed to both artillery and musketry, but this time the distance they have to go is not so great, and they move rapidly. There is thus another dangerous line of infantry; they are near to us, but we are also near to them. Scarcely a hundred yards are between them and the guns,† when our skirmish line became silent. The lines of the Fifth Wisconsin and the Thirty-third New York formed up in close order to the right of the battery, the long range musket barrels came level, and one terrible volley tore through the rebel line. In a moment more the same long range of muskets came to another level, the order to charge with the bayonet was given, and away went the two regiments with one glad cheer. Gallant as our foes undoubtedly were, they could not stand that. But few brigades mentioned in history have done better than that brigade did. For a space, generally estimated at three-quarters of a mile, they had advanced under the fire of a splendidly served battery, and with a cloud of skirmishers stretched across their front, whose fire was very destructive, and if, after that, they had not the nerve to meet a line of bayonets that came towards them like the spirit of destruction incarnate, it need not be wondered at.

* * * * * * *

"This was the fight of the day—a fight that was in itself a hard fought and beautiful battle—a battle in which each side must have learned to respect the courage of the other, and which shed glory on all engaged in it. Different statements have been made as to the enemy's force. * * * It is probable that there were two brigades, or part of two. One of them was Early's, and comprised the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia regiments and a Georgia regiment, and the dead were found on the field in the uniform of the Louisiana Tigers. It would probably be safe to state their force as three thousand."‡

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*The "skirmishers" here spoken of are evidently the main body itself. See General Hancock's official report of the arrangements of his regiments.—R.L.M.

†The artillery, after retiring, had unlimbered again in rear of the redoubt.—R.L.M.

‡The Twenty-fourth Virginia did not carry as many as six hundred into that charge. The force of the Fifth North Carolina was about the same.—R.L.M.

In General Hancock's official report, it is stated that the retiring regiments abandoned upon the field one of their battle-flags, which his men found and brought in; but it was not the Twenty-fourth's colors; for trusty old Coltraine never lost his grasp upon his precious charge, and having borne it proudly aloft as well in the advance as in the retreat, it to-day droops sadly in the library in the capitol at Richmond, faded, tattered and pierced with many a bullet, but pure and unpolluted by touch of hostile hand.

In his first dispatch to Lincoln, General McClellan states that Hancock had repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge with the bayonet, and this statement is again and again repeated, until Mr. Swinton, generally accurate, amplifies upon it thus: . "A few of the enemy who approached nearest the fort were bayoneted"—[*Army of the Potomac, Swinton, page 116*]—and he adds a note: "This is official." Rather a doubtful verification, seeing the exceeding great difference in those days between facts and official accounts thereof.

Now, doubtless, by all the laws of war, five regiments and ten guns, drawn in line on ground of their own selection, when attacked by a single regiment in the open and unsupported, instead of giving back and retreating (some by orders and some without), or even "feigning to retreat," as Mr. Swinton says (page 116), should have held their ground, and when the venturesome regiment came up, quietly taken them prisoners—or, perhaps, they might have sallied out and captured it as it advanced. And similarly when this numerous force, abandoning the position they had chosen, and "feigning to retreat," had run into and behind the redoubt they were set to defend, five regiments and ten guns should not have allowed two, with unsupported flanks, to approach them within twenty or thirty yards, and utterly silence their fire, without giving them a taste of cold steel.

But so in fact it was. And in answer to General McClellan and Mr. Swinton and others, the writer hereof, who led the charge of "those who approached nearest the fort;" who himself approached it as near, or nearer, than any other

of the assailants, and there remained for several minutes; who being mounted had ample opportunity of seeing all that transpired in front; who entered the field as soon as any of his regiment, and left it later than all except those poor fellows who lay upon the sod, affirms that so far from any bayonet charge having been made upon the Twenty-fourth Virginia, that, as already stated, its advance was steady and uninterrupted from the commencement of the action till it reached the fence, and was ordered to retire; that during that advance the enemy was driven all the while before it, till they reached their redoubt, and that, in fact, the latter never advanced a foot while the regiment remained upon the field. Any charge made by them, therefore, must have been after the Twenty-fourth had retired; and if, as Mr. Swinton says, any of those who approached nearest the fort were bayoneted, it must have been after they were dead, wounded or prisoners.

The only approach to the use of the bayonet which the writer saw or heard of on that day (and his opportunities for knowing all that occurred there were of the best), was when Private Kirkbride, of Carrol, frantic at the fall of his brother, ran down a Federal officer (a captain of the Fifth Wisconsin), and was about to plunge his bayonet into him. Hearing the earnest call of the officer for quarter, across the field above the din of the battle, and seeing that there was no time to spare if the man was to be saved, the writer galloped to where he was, shouting to Kirkbride to hold. The officer begging to surrender, tendered his sword, and unbuckling the belt, with scabbard and pistol, asked that he might be put under guard forthwith, but was told there was no time to tarry for his pistol, and no men to spare for his guard, and he had better get to the rear; and Kirkbride and his companion hastened on. This occurred but a short time before the fence was reached and the order was given to retire, so that the Federal soon found himself with his friends again, some of whom (General Hancock himself among them, it is believed) sent the writer soon after, by exchanged prisoners, hearty acknowledgments and thanks for saving their comrade's life.

Battle of Williamsburg

General McClellan, with his usual exaggeration when counting Confederate soldiers, reported that Hancock had captured two Colonels, two Lieutenant-Colonels, and killed as many more. As a matter of fact, he captured none, and the only field-officer killed was the heroic Budham, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Fifth North Carolina, a very impersonation of courage itself. They claimed to have killed the writer also; but in this, as in many other statements, they were greatly in error.

RICHARD L. MAURY,
Late Colonel Twenty-fourth Virginia Infantry.

MILITARY HISTORY

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 1862

ILLUSTRATIVE SOLUTIONS

BY

COLONEL C. H. LANZA

Field Artillery

NOTE: The Approved Solutions are reprinted and issued as a guide.

ABBREVIATIONS USED:

Alex:	Memoirs of a Confederate, by Alexander.
Aver:	History of the 3d Pa. Cavalry, by Averill.
B & L:	Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.
CP:	History of Civil War, Count of Paris.
CW:	Commission on Conduct of War.
Long:	Manasas to Appomattox, Longstreet.
O'Brien:	Telegraphing in Battle, O'Brien.
MOS:	McClellan's Own Story.
NR:	Rebellion Records, Navy Department.
OOH:	Autobiography of Gen. O. O. Howard.
RR:	Rebellion Records, War Department.
SHS:	Proceedings of the Southern Historical Society.
Trob:	Trobriand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac.

The Union Advance on April 4 and 5, 1862

(See Cram's Map and Geo. Sur. Map)

1. The object of this advance was the capture of Yorktown, with the Confederate troops there stationed.

12 RR 8
14 RR 64, 66, 68
MOS 257

2. McClellan had available for this operation, about 58,000 men and 100 guns of the Army of the Potomac, camped in the vicinity of Hampton and Newport News. There was a shortage of wagon transportation for part of this command. Some 30,000 additional troops were enroute to Hampton by water from Alexandria. General Wool with more than 10,000 troops protected the Army base at Fort Monroe and Hampton.

12 RR 7, 9, 227, 358
14 RR 53, 73, 394, 403
MOS 249, 266
2 CP 8
2 B & L 108, 109, 189
1 CW 315, 428, 442

3. The troops present consisted of three corps, the II, III and IV.

14 RR 33
12 RR 9

4. McClellan's knowledge of the terrain he was to operate over, was obtained from officers stationed at Fort Monroe during the past winter. The results of the observations made by them was embodied in a map, known as Cram's Map, a copy of which appears in the Civil War Atlas, accompanying the Rebellion Records. The copy of the map in the Atlas is not the same as the one submitted to General McClellan; according to notes, the map in the Atlas is a corrected copy. Whether the corrections were made before General McClellan's orders had been issued for April 4th, is not known.

13 RR 8, 152
XVIII RR Atlas
MOS 253, 256
2 CP8
2 CW 393
14 RR 22

5. This map was inaccurate, but appears to have been accepted at the time without question. It showed one road available for the advance to Yorktown and

14 RR 37, 42, 43, 46, 403
MOS 253, 256, 264, 289
2 B & L 109
2 CP 6
107 RR 564
1 CW 17, 346, 429

a second road leading to Williamsburg. There were connecting roads, and for some parts of the distance, roads were doubled. The map did not show any streams of importance to be crossed, except at Big Bethel, and at Howard's Bridge, at both of which places fords were indicated. The map was supplemented by reconnaissances pushed as far as Big Bethel and the Halfway House, 4 miles beyond; and towards Young's Mill. The orders for these reconnaissances limited their extent to the points mentioned, with the idea of inducing the enemy to believe that the Federals intended to operate against Norfolk.

6. The distances from camps near Hampton were according to available maps:

To Big Bethel	7 miles
Howard's Bridge	11 "
Yorktown	18 "
Young's Mill	12 "
Warwick C. H.	14½ "
Halfway House, west of Yorktown	26 "

7. All roads were dirt roads and after rains became difficult for wheeled traffic.

2 CP
Geo Sur Maps
13 RR 405
Recon. by author

8. The terrain was low, but undulating, in places heavily wooded, with dense underbrush. Streams had usually marshy borders, which in turn were lined by banks 30 to 40 feet high.

12 RR 7, 265, 267
14 RR, 37, 42
MOS 249, 257
107 RR 564
2 B & L 109
1 CW 17, 346, 428, 567

9. According to reports made and accepted by General McClellan the Confederate troops around Yorktown under Magruder numbered 15,000 to 20,000, and information had been received that Yorktown was surrounded by earthworks in its immediate vicinity, with a number of

small works at points between Yorktown and Fort Monroe. It was understood that numerous strong batteries had been constructed, commanding the water approaches to Yorktown from both that point, and from Gloucester Point opposite.

10. The U. S. Navy controlled the entrance of the York River, but it was unable to send ships past Yorktown, whose batteries located on cliffs 60 to 70 feet high, above the water, together with batteries at Gloucester point, dominated all marine approaches to that place.

Atlas RR
12 RR 8
MOS 264, 267
2 B & L 266

11. The Confederates also held Norfolk, in which was their ironclad, the Virginia, or Merrimac. While there was no material obstacle to the Navy ascending the James River, as far as Drury's Bluff near Richmond, the possibility that the Merrimac with other Confederate gunboats might cut off the retreat of such forces, prevented any such attempt being considered by General McClellan.

12 RR 8
107 RR 573, 83
2 B & L 109
1 CW 632

12. McClellan planned to use both available roads in his advance, and issued his orders on April 3d.

12 RR 9, 14 RR 63
MOS 259

13. The right column consisting of Averill's cavalry and Porter's division was directed to march at 6:00 A.M. on Big Bethel, over the New Market and the New bridges. In his report, McClellan states that he did not expect any serious opposition at Big Bethel. From here but one road led towards Yorktown and it was apparently left to Porter as to how his two columns were to be united. After passing here the column was to proceed to Howard's Bridge, and capture Ship Point, us-

12 RR 9
14 RR 63
107 RR 563

ing such part of the force as might be necessary. Camp for the night was fixed as at Howard's Bridge.

12 RR 9
14 RR 63

14. Hamilton's division was ordered to follow Porter's on the New Bridge Road at 7:00 A.M., proceeding also to Howard's Creek. The time fixed for Hamilton's movement was not apparently calculated according to the march lengths of the troops in front of him, but was guess work. This is true also of other troops ordered to march on April 4th, and 5th.

12 RR 9
14 RR 63

15. The left column which consisted of Smith's Division with the 5th Cavalry, and followed by Couch's Division, was ordered to march at 6:00 A.M. by the James River Road to Young's Mill, where the leading division was to camp, the rear division camping at Fisher's Creek.

12 RR 227, 9

16. The reserve was ordered to march at 8:30 A.M. to Big Bethel. Sedgwick's Division marched in front of the reserve. Army Headquarters camped with the reserve.

17. The position assigned the reserve was approximately equally distant from the heads of the two columns at Howard's Bridge and Young's Mill and about opposite the center of the line. Roads led to both these places. As the flanks of the division rested on impassable obstacles, placing the reserve provisionally opposite the center, was warranted as being near the point which, if it gave way, would most endanger the Union Army.

MOS 260
12 RR 285, 292, 293, 294, 297, 299, 300, 358
14 RR 66
107 RR 81

18. Both columns reached their destinations on the 4th, although the right column was delayed by felled trees, and a

broken bridge at Big Bethel, and did not get into camp until after 5:00 P.M.

19. There were no engagements of consequence on April 4th, nothing being seen of the enemy except small parties which retired as the Union Army advanced. Ship Point was found abandoned. 12 RR 285, 292, 293, 14 RR 67 MOS 260 1 CW 632

20. Although both columns were given cavalry which was available for reconnaissance, neither column appears to have employed its cavalry for this purpose.

21. The orders for the 5th provided a continuation of the movements of the left column through Warwick Court House, to the Half-Way House, west of Yorktown. This column, consisting of two divisions of about 20,000 men, was to occupy the hill and ridge near the Half-Way House to prevent an escape of the Confederate garrison from Yorktown, and to prevent reinforcements reaching Yorktown. 12 RR 9 MOS 260, 289

22. The right column was ordered to march at the same hour, 6:00 A.M., to a point about two and three-fourths miles from Yorktown, to a position in readiness. 12 RR 9 14 RR 69

23. According to the maps in McClellan's possesion, the left column had fourteen miles to march, and the right column about four. Both columns started at the same time, although the one having the longer march to make, was the one upon whose arrival in position in time, the success of the proposed movement depended.

24. The approximate relative strengths of the two columns are 20,000 each, with a reserve of 10,000 men in rear of the right column. Apparently McClel-

lan thought that the 30,000 men available for the attack on Yorktown would cause the enemy to attempt to escape towards Richmond, and that the 20,000 men at the Half-Way House would be sufficient to prevent such an attempt to escape.

MOS 260
12 RR 9

25. It should be noted that the force ordered to the Half-Way House had a defensive mission after its arrival. They were not to attack the enemy, but to prevent his moving along the Yorktown-Richmond Road. It is questionable whether this disposition would have been as successful as an order for both columns to attack Yorktown simultaneously.

12 RR 10, 286, 288, 292, 295, 297, 299, 302, 303, 304, 305, 339, 403
107 RR 81
MOS 261

26. The right column moved forward towards Yorktown slowly. A heavy rain, which started at 7:00 A.M. and lasted until 11:00 A.M., seriously interfered with the progress of the artillery and wagons. Morrel's Brigade led the column, and encountering the enemy in his works about Yorktown, the artillery opened fire about 10:30 A.M. The infantry deployed later about noon, made a leisurely reconnaissance, exchanged fire with the rebel troops, resulting in the loss of a few men on each side. Morrel was supported by a small amount of artillery, and later by part of Martindale's Brigade, but no serious attempt was made to assault the Confederate works.

12 RR 300, 358
14 RR 69

27. The left column moving at 6:00 A.M. reached Lee's Mill about 11:00 A.M., the march being impeded by the rain storm that retarded the march of the right column.

12 RR 10, 13, 306, 339
14 RR 70
MOS 289

28. Enemy's skirmishers were driven in at 11:00 A.M. and an hour later the Union advance came to a halt at the War-

wick River, in face of enemy intrenchments, found on the opposite bank.

29. By reason of dams the Warwick River was unfordable, and was bordered by woods and swamps, and both the river and the Confederates were a surprise to the Federals. As a result the advance stopped with only a slight exchange of fire with the Confederates.

12 RR 11, 307, 318, 359
MOS 254
2 B & L 170
14 RR 72
2 CP 7
1 CW 428
1 OOH 211

Comments

30. McClellan's orders of April 3d and 4th are defective according to modern standards in that:

(a) Information concerning enemy is lacking.
(b) No mission is assigned to the Army.
(c) No instructions are given for reconnaissance.
(d) No instructions for trains.
(e) Post of Commanding General not stated.

31. The prime causes for failure of the Union Advance to achieve success was misinformation both as to the enemy's forces and as to the topography of the country. With regard to the topography of the country, there appears to be no reason why reconnaissance should not have been made on April 2d or 3d and also on the 4th to definitely establish the correctness of available maps. There was cavalry at hand for this purpose, two regiments, having been disembarked by April 2d. Such a reconnaissance ought to have discovered the Warwick River line which would have given a clearer idea of the enemy's force and dispositions. McClellan's statement that reconnaissances were limited in order not to alarm the enemy, was not a good

12 RR 287
MOS 257
2 B & L 108

reason, in view of the fact that the concentration of Federal troops in and about Hampton, was in itself sufficient to attract Confederate attention.

32. A cavalry reconnaissance could have been supplemented by an infantry reconnaissance in case the enemy's front was covered by advanced posts. Such reconnaissances should have secured information concerning the strength and dispositions of the enemy, and the character of the terrain. The neglect to make such reconnaissances resulted in the advance of the Federals on April 4th and 5th, being surprised both by the terrain and by the forces of the enemy.

12 RR 264, 267
MOS 254

33. The information as to the enemy's strength was obtained from Allen Pinkerton's reports. Pinkerton was a professional detective and in charge of the Secret Service, and furnished reports on the Confederate dispositions at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. This information was stated to have been obtained from a person evidently a spy, from a deserter, and from a colored man. The information which is quite extensive, dated prior to February 1, 1862. The extent of some of the information furnished leads to a suspicion that it was either untrue, or was knowingly disseminated by the enemy for his own purposes. Spies are often untrustworthy, deserters can seldom be relied upon for information outside of their own command, and negro slaves would not ordinarily be a good source of information on important military matters.

34. Besides defects of execution in McClellan's plans, their success depended

on the enemy remaining quietly in Yorktown while McClellan marched around and cut off communication with their base. Such a plan seldom succeeds. While McClellan had a great deal of imagination, as shown by the numerous plans which he at various times initiated, he had very little imagination as to what his opponent would do, and he seldom foresaw his opponent's moves.

35. After the skirmishing of April 5th, it was evident that the Confederates had fortified a line across the Peninsula from Yorktown following the Warwick River.

36. McClellan's own estimate of the enemy's forces were that there were from 15,000 to 20,000 against his 58,000. If the enemy held the whole line from Yorktown to Lee's Mill, they would not be strong at any one point, and yet no attempt was made to pierce the Confederate lines, and the Federal troops stopped without striking a blow.

12 RR 7
14 RR 76
1 CW 346, 360

37. The Confederate forces available to occupy this line, which was about eight miles long, were inadequate for an obstinate defense. It would seem that had McClellan attacked boldly the Confederate line could have been pierced. There were ample troops under McClellan's command to have made serious attacks at several places, and a penetration of the enemy's front at one point would have compelled an abandonment of the entire line.

38. But instead of proceeding boldly with his original plan, McClellan abandoned it on the first difficulty appearing, stopped his advance, and commenced a new plan of campaign.

1 CW 347, 319, 320

The Confederate Estimate of the Situation

May 3, 1862

14 RR 438, 448, 460, 484

1. The Confederate forces in the peninsula on this date consisted of four divisions as follows:

Magruder	17,302	men
Longstreet	13,816	"
D. H. Hill	12,634	"
G. W. Smith	10,592	"
Stuart's Cav.	1,289	"
	55,633	"

with 56 pieces of artillery exclusive of siege guns in permament works. General Joseph E. Johnston was in command.

Of these troops, D. H. Hill commanded in Yorktown, Magruder held the right of the Warwick River line, Longstreet held the center. Smith was in rear towards Williamsburg in reserve.

12 RR 11, 13, 16, 17, 229, 300, 318, 338, 359, 363, 405, 412
2 CP 6

2. The Warwick River was a small wooded stream flowing through swamp country, which had been dammed at points forming unfordable inundations in the river bottom. These dams which were the only ready means of crossing the stream were protected by redans, and the intervals were filled by light trenches. Yorktown was an inclosed work with considerable artillery, some of it firing over the York River, closing that stream, with the assistance of batteries at Gloucester Point, to the Federal Navy. A detached battery was near Mulberry Point on the James River, but this was not relied upon to close that stream. That mission was left to the Confederate Navy at Norfolk which had the Merrimac, or Virginia, with some un-

armored gunboats available for this purpose.

3. The Warwick River position was an important one for the Confederates. It was as good a line, possibly as any, to defend Richmond from McClellan's Army, and at the same time close the York River and James River to the Federal Navy. These two rivers were used by the Confederates as lines of supply and enabled them to be partly independent of the poor roads that led from the rear of their position through Williamsburg to Richmond. 14 RR 399

4. It was well understood by the Confederates that should the Warwick River line be abandoned, the York River would at once be opened to the Union Navy, who would then be able to move troops by water to any point as far inland as West Point. This would make it impossible to occupy a new line across the Peninsula in case of a withdrawal, unless a retreat was carried west of West Point. This, in turn, would open the James River to the Union Navy, which, when its forces occupied its north bank, might disregard the threat of the Merrimac at Norfolk, and the Federals would then be able of acting towards Norfolk by crossing the James River. As Norfolk had only a small garrison, it would be impracticable to defend it against an attack from McClellan's army and although the garrison might escape, the very valuable stores at Norfolk would undoubtedly be lost, as would also the major part of the Confederate Navy, which was also in that harbor. 14 RR 395, 399, 430, 433, 459, 473, 477, 485, 488, 490, 12 RR 275, 405, 412
2 B & L 204

5. The abandonment of the Warwick River line was not therefore to be lightly 14 RR 436, 437, 461, 469
12 RR 18, 230, 314

Alex. 66
1 CW 347, 429
2 B & L 204
2 CP 13

considered, but was a serious undertaking to be carried out only if unavoidable. There was opposed to Johnston's army, the Army of the Potomac under McClellan, which consisted of about 100,000 men but was reported to the Confederates as being as much as 200,000. But the Federal army was better equipped and had superior artillery to anything that the Confederates possessed. It was known that McClellan had been constructing siege batteries, mounting large guns opposite Yorktown since about April 17th, and some of these guns, 100 and 200-pound Parrotts, had fired on May 1st and, although no one had been hit by these large projectiles, they were evidence of what was going to happen when the bombardment really started.

14 RR 431, 439, 441, 450, 451, 456, 464, 463, 473, 479, 491, 471, 475, 478
12 RR 275, 346, 408, 409, 414, 411
Alex. 64
2 B & L 204

6. To the superior Federal artillery, the Confederates could oppose only smaller guns in smaller numbers, and for these there was a deficiency of ammunition, most of the guns having less than 65 rounds available, quite insufficient for prolonged counter preparation fire. Remaining in the works subject to superior bombardment was only delaying an evacuation which, if carried out under pressure of the enemy, might be disastrous. The troops were already becoming worn out by long hours of trench duties.

14 RR 463
12 RR 275, 412

7. An attack by the Confederates on the Union lines was considered. The Warwick River dams constructed to prevent Union assaults on the Confederate lines were an equal obstacle to Confederate assaults on the Federal lines. A[illegible] by either side would have to be made on [illegible] comparatively narrow fronts and the superior

forces of the Union army indicated that the probable result of Confederate attacks would be fatal.

8. The consideration of all the factors in the case indicated that although the abandonment of the Warwick River line was to be delayed as long as possible, as involving the certain destruction of much property and a large part of the Confederate navy, it had better be done under favorable circumstances by a voluntary retirement made in as short a time as possible before the Federal siege batteries were ready to open fire. 14 RR 473, 477
12 RR 275

9. There were available for the retreat two roads, one each from Yorktown and Lee's Mill which united southeast of Williamsburg about 12 miles distant. Near Williamsburg a provisional line of defense had already been constructed, extending from the head of College Creek to the head of Queens Creek. These two creeks had their head waters on either side of a small plateau about 2,000 yards across and this plateau, across which the main road led was closed by Fort Magruder. There were also some small redoubts scattered along the banks of the two creeks, which creeks had been dammed to assist in their defense. The Confederate reserve under G. W. Smith, was already near Williamsburg, available to defend this line if necessary. RR Atlas
2 CP 15
Alex. 66
2 B & L 205

10. The James and York Rivers could be relied upon to withdraw the sick and wounded and some stores, but the amount of river transportation available would not permit the troops being withdrawn in that manner. It was necessary that the latter retire by the two available roads. 14 RR 400

12 RR 275

11. It was desirable that the retreat be made as rapidly as possible until the vicinity of Richmond had been reached, in order to avoid the possibility of the retreat being intercepted by Federal troops landed at West Point. It was possible to withdraw the troops during several successive nights, but with the risk that if the retreat was discovered by the enemy, the remaining troops might be completely lost. Provided the roads were capable of withdrawing the entire force in one night, the latter procedure ran the least danger of serious interference by the enemy.

12. Provided the march was made in good order, and contact with the enemy was broken, and the rear covered by a suitable rear guard, the one available road from Williamsburg could be utilized day and night and if so used, would have enabled all of Johnston's army to have cleared West Point by the night of May 5th-6th.

14 RR 485, 486, 487, 489, 492
12 RR 275
2 B & L 204

13. General Johnston's decision was to withdraw on the night of May 3d-4th by both roads, and march as rapidly as possible to west of West Point, some 30 odd miles distant.

The Confederate Retreat from Yorktown

May 3-7, 1862

1. The Confederate forces prior to the retreat from Yorktown, were disposed along the line Warwick River-Yorktown-Gloucester Point and consisted of four corps, known as right, center, left and reserve and some detached troops. The strength of this command and their positions were as follows:—

12 RR 275, 405, 412, 601
14 RR 489, 683
MOS 323
1 CW 583, 585

Left (D. H. Hill)	11,515	men
Center (Longstreet)	13,816	"
Right (Magruder)	17,302	"
Reserve (G. W. Smith)	10,592	"
Cavalry (Stuart)	1,289	"
Gloucester Pt. (Crump)	1,119	"
Total	55,633	"

General Joseph E. Johnston was in command.

2. The roads available for retreat were:

RR Atlas
I OOH 217
2 CP 14

(a) Yorktown-Williamsburg Road;
(b) Lee's Mill-Williamsburg Road, which joined the road from Yorktown about a mile southeast of Williamsburg.

A road from Wynn's Mill connected with the above two roads, respectively near the Half-Way House about three miles west of Yorktown, and near Lebanon Church about three miles north of Lee's Mill. Water transportation was also available for sick, wounded and some of the stores.

3. From Williamsburg there was but one road available toward Richmond. All roads were dirt roads and difficult for wheeled traffic, after rains.

RR Atlas

12 RR 275
Alex 67
1 CW 206

4. It was General Johnston's intention to retreat toward a point west of West Point, as any halt east of West Point was liable to endanger the safety of his army, should the Federals, as he anticipated, move up the York River in boats and land between his command and his base at Richmond. As West Point could be reached in a few hours by the Federal Navy, it was important that the Confederate command withdraw secretly from Yorktown, obtaining as much of a start as practicable, and secondly, that the march be conducted with energy, as the total distance to be marched toward Richmond past West Point was some 50 miles.

12 RR 275, 411
14 RR 491

5. The morale of the Confederate troops was not of the best; they had suffered physically from exposure in the trenches. Sickness was prevalent.

12 RR 601
2 CP 13
Alex 65

6. The Federals had opposed to General Johnston's army, a superior force believed to consist of 120,000 men or more, with superior equipment; and in addition, they had a powerful navy, able to operate on both the York River and James River, on the flanks of Johnston's army as soon as the abandonment of the Warwick River-Yorktown line became known to them.

14 RR 485, 487, 488, 489, 492

7. Under these circumstances, General Johnston issued his orders for the retreat on May 2, 1862. This order provided that the artillery with the heavy guns would be withdrawn from the lines as soon as practicable after sunset, and sent at once to Williamsburg. The infantry were to follow, leaving pickets to continue demonstrations until midnight, when they also were to be withdrawn.

General Hill at Yorktown was directed to continue artillery fire from the heavy guns, which were not to be abandoned until midnight.

8. Magruder's command was given the right of way on the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road. Longstreet was to follow him on the same road from the vicinity of Lebanon. D. H. Hill and two brigades of the reserve was given the Yorktown-Williamsburg Road. No instructions are given in this order as to how commands would utilize the single road leading into and through Williamsburg, but it appears that for this short distance, columns were doubled, and this was probably generally understood. Generals Longstreet and Magruder were ordered to furnish a rear guard of one brigade with one battery to cover their retirement. The army reserve was charged with covering with three brigades and two batteries, the retirement of D. H. Hill. Crump's detachment at Gloucester was to retire independently north of the York River. This it did without molestation.

14 RR 489, 491
MOS 319
Long. 68

9. In addition, Stuart's cavalry was ordered to hold their position until after daylight and thereafter to keep in touch with the enemy.

12 RR 444, 489

10. Although General Johnston's formal order for the retirement did not cover in full, movements of trains, it appears that these were started to the rear on the morning of May 2d, thereby obtaining a considerable start, although in the condition of the roads, none too much.

14 RR 486, 487, 488, 489
2 CP 14
1 CW 660, 284
12 RR 457
38-SHS-Alexander

11. May 2d, General Johnston's order for the retirement was amended by in-

12 RR 275
Early's (D. H. Hill) Autobiography 66

structions to postpone the retreat 24 hours. This decision was probably caused by the slow movement of the trains.

12 RR 589, 602
14 RR 492

12. It would appear that the artillery commenced to withdraw about 7:00 P.M., May 3d, which would be just after dark. The quantity of this artillery was not very great and under the orders, the infantry should have commenced to withdraw immediately afterwards, probably by 8:00 P.M.

12 RR 18, 456, 602
1 CW 348

13. The heavy artillery in Yorktown continued its demonstrations as directed until midnight, when the artillerymen spiked their pieces and withdrew, and at about the same time, their buildings and certain property in Yorktown that had not been moved, were set on fire and destroyed.

Geo Sur Map
12 RR 444, 589, 590, 596
X-SHS-Alexander
8-SHS-Maury
22-SHS-105, 107, RR 90
Alex 66

14. The march to camping grounds near Williamsburg required an average march of the troops along the roads of about thirteen miles. It took considerable time to cover this distance due to the simultaneous withdrawal of all commands from all parts of the lines and the fact that the available roads all finally converged into one, with the further fact that the troops in many cases had field trains with them, which in the darkness, frequently got stalled. The main roads soon became congested with troops and trains, and the average rate of advance was only about one mile an hour.

12 RR 444, 589
MOS 319
2 CP 15

15. Longstreet's command, which was to follow in rear of Magruder's from Lebanon Church, near B. M. 82 on the Geo. Sur. Map, did not clear that point until nearly daylight on the 4th, and it was

about 5:30 A.M., when they cleared Blows Mill Run.

Longstreet's command was the last to arrive at Williamsburg, which point the tail of his column reached about 2:00 P.M., showing an average marching rate of about one mile an hour from Blow's Mill Run.

16. General Hill remained personally in Yorktown until about midnight, when he proceeded to Williamsburg, arriving there about 5:00 A.M. but the rear brigade of his command did not reach the same point until noon.

12 RR 602
8 SHS 281
22 SHS 106
X SHS 32

17. Stuart with the cavalry, had in the meantime established a line across the peninsula from Blows Mill Run to Black Swamp. At the latter place, about 1:00 P.M. a Confederate force consisting of a few guns and about a squadron of cavalry, was quickly driven in by Stoneman's Union cavalry and the same force was again driven in near Brumwell's Mill on Whitteman's Swamp about 2:00 P.M.

12 RR 275, 424, 426, 427, 431, 434, 444

18. While the resistance of the Confederate cavalry, due to their small numbers, did not, in these two small skirmishes, suffice to delay the Federals more than about 15 minutes at each place, this was sufficient to enable the Confederates at Williamsburg to become aware of the Federal pursuit, with the result that General Johnston ordered Semmes' brigade, which had entered Williamsburg about 1:00 P.M., to retrace its steps and occupy Fort Magruder about one mile and a half southeast of Williamsburg. Johnston probably heard the firing at Black Swamp, and understood what was happening.

12 RR 441, 446

Alex 66
2 CP 15
12 RR 19, 275, 424, 426, 431
MOS 323

19. Fort Magruder had been constructed some time previous, through the foresight of General Magruder, at the head of a clearing which covered the one road leading into Williamsburg, at a point where the road crossed a low ridge, from which two deep, swampy streams led in opposite directions respectively to Queen Creek, a tributary of the York River, and to College Creek, a tributary of the James River.

12 RR 19, 424, 426, 431
1 OOH 219

20. This fort was supplemented by a series of redans, stretching across the peninsula from near Queens Creek toward College Creek.

12 RR 19, 424, 427, 433, 434, 444

21. The Confederate cavalry at Blows Mill was not attacked by Union cavalry, but its retreat by the direct road to Williamsburg was cut off after the action at Whitteman's Swamp by a column of Union cavalry under General Emory, sent by General Stoneman, across to the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road to get contact with Federal infantry supposed to be advancing along this road.

12 RR 19, 433, 435, 444

22. This Federal cavalry, finding Confederate cavalry and some horse artillery between it and the Federal infantry, after a cavalry action occurring probably between Grove and Booth on the Geo. Sur. Map, forced the latter across country to the James River, where it subsequently retired to Williamsburg by a beach road along the James River.

12 RR 275, 441
107 RR 87
Alex 57
2 B & L 195
Long 72

23. General Johnston, aware of the Federal cavalry pursuit, the sound of firing being a warning, ordered Kershaw's brigade to reenforce Semmes. These brigades were part of Magruder's corps, but

belonged to different divisions. McLaws, a division commander, was assigned to command the rear guard, and by his orders, Manly's and McCarthy's batteries were also turned back and joined the rear guard.

24. Johnston's orders for the retreat provided for rear guards for his various columns, all of which were ordered to Williamsburg. But no halt order was issued, and all except Stuart's rear cavalry marched in on Williamsburg not knowing whether they were to stop there for the night or continue on. The rear guards thus marched by the important position at Fort Magruder, and had to be ordered back, when the sounds of firing indicated the Federals were coming up. They reached this position just in time, and occupied the works on the flanks of Fort Magruder after the Union cavalry had come into line opposite them.

12 RR 442, 445

25. About 3:00 P.M., the Union cavalry attacked Fort Magruder and endeavored to envelop its left, but the attack was repulsed by the troops ordered up, which successively came into line during the progress of the engagement.

12 RR 424, 425, 428, 431, 442, 590
Alex 67

26. There were no further actions on this day between the Union and Confederate troops.

27. Later on the 4th, General Johnston ordered Longstreet, who had camped west of Williamsburg, to relieve the brigades of Semmes and Kershaw, and Longstreet sent Anderson's and Pryor's brigades, with Macon's, Garrett's and McCarthy's batteries to form a new Con-

12 RR 564, 580, 590
Alex 67
Long 72

federate rear guard on the afternoon of the 4th.

12 RR 275, 443
Long 72

28. General Magruder's troops continued their march from Williamsburg on the night of the 4th-5th and cleared that town that night. Longstreet's command bivouacked just northwest of Williamsburg on the night of May 4th-5th.

12 RR 275, 435, 481, 602, 564
Alex 67
Long 74

29. During the night of the 4th-5th, it rained heavily, and in rain and deep mud, G. W. Smith's corps at about 5:30 A.M., on the 5th, followed Magruder on the road toward Richmond. He was to be followed by D. H. Hill's division as soon as the road became available for their use. Due, however, to the heavy rain, the march of the retreating troops was slow and by noon, it became evident that it would be impossible for the Confederates to all clear Williamsburg that day.

Alex 67
2 B & L 203
12 RR 564

30. In the meantime, the Federals had attacked Longstreet's troops near Fort Magruder, and the action had so far developed by noon that it was necessary for Hill's troops to be sent in to assist Longstreet. The fight that ensued, known as the battle of Williamsburg, was successful for the Confederates, in that they repulsed all attempts of the Union forces to break their lines.

13 RR 368, 565, 572, 586, 602, 607
Alex 67
Long 77

31. Johnston, who was at Williamsburg, realized that the rear guard would have to fight off any advancing Federals in order to save his trains, and a good part of his command, and he personally watched the fight.

12 RR 275

32. Under cover of this rear guard action, G. W. Smith reached Barhamsville

and Magruder, the Diascund Bridge on the afternoon of the 5th and camped at those places for the night.

33. There was no further fighting at Williamsburg and Longstreet and D. H. Hill, in the order named, both marched away unopposed during the night of the 5th-6th, and early on the 6th, covered by Stuart's cavalry. The withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Fort Magruder and adjacent works began about 7:00 P.M. and was noted by Federal troops, as early as 1:30 A.M., on the 6th, but no effort was made to attack, and no advance was made until daylight. About 5:30 A.M. on the 6th, Union troops took possession of the Confederate entrenchments defending Williamsburg, which by then had been completely abandoned, and followed the Confederate rear guard, then in sight, through that town. Union cavalry pursued cautiously for some six miles further, after which the Confederates proceeded unmolested towards Barhamsville, in the vicinity of which by morning of the 7th, their whole army was concentrated. The Confederate losses at Williamsburg were about 1200, and some 400 wounded were abandoned for lack of transportation.

12 RR 275, 496, 575, 605, 23, 460, 586, 588, 593, 597, 600
14 RR 684
MOS 334, 339
Alex 69
1 CW 584, 430
2 B & L 206
Long 72, 78

34. The Confederate retreat on the 6th was over horrible roads, and with cold, tired and hungry troops. Straggling was enormous, and many wagons had to be destroyed or abandoned through inability to move them through the slush and mud. There was at this time an excellent opportunity for a vigorous pursuit led by the cavalry, but it was not done; instead McClellan prepared to attack.

12 RR 605, 23, 425, 436, 454
MOS 339
Alex 69
1 CW 583
2 B & L 275, 429
2 CP 25
12 RR 247
14 RR 506
Long 79
Trob 204
Aver 48, 51

12 RR 138, 139
Alex 69
1 CW 622
MOS 172

35. Franklin's Federal division arrived by water off West Point, about noon on the 6th, commenced landing about 4:00 P.M., and completed its landing during the ensuing night. Sedgwick's division arrived at the same place on May 7th.

12 RR 276, 605, 619, 618, 621, 623, 626, 627, 628, 629, 631, 632
MOS 337
Alex 69, 70
1 CW 622
2 B & L 206, 276
14 RR 152, 506

36. There was no opposition to Franklin's landing on the 6th, although it was observed by patrols from G. W. Smith's corps. But on the 7th, as it was imperative to the safety of the Confederate retreat to prevent Federal forces from West Point blocking the road towards Richmond, Smith ordered Whiting's division of his corps to attack the Federals. An infantry fight in the woods followed. The Federals were not driven back, but they failed to advance and the Confederate retreat was not interfered with by them.

Alex 70

37. There was no further interference after this date with the Confederate retreat.

The Union Estimate at 7:00 A.M.

May 4, 1862

1. The mission of the Federal forces early on the morning of May 4, 1862, was the capture of Yorktown preparatory to an advance on Richmond. 12 RR 12, 17

2. There were available for this purpose, according to the returns of April 30th the following troops: 14 RR 130; 1 CW 323, 283; 2 B & L 437

IId Corps (Sumner)	19,054
IIId Corps (Heintzelman)	34,633
IVth Corps (Keyes)	33,586
Franklin's division	11,332
Cavalry Division, Hdq., etc.	13,787
Total present for duty	112,392

In addition there were 5,850 present on special duty, sick, etc.

3. The IIId Corps was in line opposite Yorktown, IVth Corps on the left, with the IId Corps in the center. Franklin's Division had just landed from transports. It had recently arrived from Alexandria, and it had been intended to disembark it on the north side of the York River, to attack Gloucester Point from the rear. Due to the shallowness of the water the disembarkation had not yet been found practicable. Atlas XVII-2; 12 RR 12, 18, 110, 134; 2 CP 12

4. A considerable number of batteries had been constructed by the Union forces opposite Yorktown and the bombardment of the Confederate works at that point was to have started about the night of May 5th-6th. 12 RR 18, 319, 272, 314; 2 CP 12; MOS 286; 1 CW 429; 2 B & L 437

5. McClellan was informed by his Secret Service that the Confederates in and about Yorktown numbered at least 100,000 to 120,000 men. 12 RR 11, 267, 268

12 RR 11, 12, 229, 318
107 RR 576, 583
1 CW 320, 598

6. The Confederates had held an entrenched line extending from Yorktown across the Peninsula, following the wooded Warwick River, which had been dammed at several points, causing inundations in the low river bottom. Each dam was defended by a redan, or redoubt. This line was eight to nine miles long.

12 RR 389, 338, 339, 423
2 CP 8
MOS 291
107 RR 83
2 B & L 267

7. There was a detached Confederate post at Gloucester Point, which with the batteries at Yorktown closed the York River to the Union Navy. Norfolk was also still held by the Confederates, and sheltered the Merrimac, or Virginia; and some smaller vessels, and the James River was unavailable to the Union Navy, due to the presence of these vessels which made occasional sorties.

12 RR 11, 16, 17
MOS 263, 267, 272, 274
MOS 274, 289

8. McClellan considered the Confederate position exceedingly strong, and with the large garrison which he believed to be occupying them, he had determined to attack it by siege operations to avoid hopeless attacks and heavy useless losses.

MOS 288
107 RR 591
14 RR 131, 312
12 RR 313, 318, 319, 348, 398
2 CP 13
Alex. 66
1 CW 283, 284, 567

9. It was confidently expected by McClellan that after the bombardment had commenced, the place would soon fall. It had not been anticipated that the enemy would avoid the bombardment by withdrawing. Yet it appears that the possibility of withdrawal should have been clearly seen and provided for, and indications of a Confederate retreat were not lacking. On the night of May 2d-3d, the enemy's quietness was so noticeable as to suggest a retreat by him on that night; on the morning of May 3d, the enemy was observed burning his barracks; and on the night of May 3d-4th, until about midnight, the Confed-

erates opened a heavy artillery fire which appeared to be at random. As on previous occasions, McClellan while very attentive to his own moves, failed to divine the probable moves of the enemy.

10. Word was received at McClellan's headquarters during the night of May 3d-4th, that fire and suspicious noises were being heard from Yorktown. By daylight the front line troops knew from deserters that the enemy had gone from their front, and small parties by 5:30 A.M. reached the Confederate entrenchments, finding them completely evacuated. The opening of the approach to Yorktown was at once started by front line troops, and by 7:00 A.M. the road to Yorktown was open.

12 RR 398, 399, 400, 233, 313, 348, 349, 401, 402
Alex. 66
MOS 288
2 B & L 194
1 CW 284

11. McClellan appears himself to have learned of the Confederate retreat by 4:00 A.M. or a little later, from telegraphic reports of information received from a deserter; and the first information was rapidly corroborated by other reports from along the front. The Navy observed the evacuation of Yorktown by 5:30 A.M. and at once occupied the Yorktown-Gloucester channel.

O'Brien, 84
12 RR 283
7 NR 310

12. McClellan's information of the country through which the Confederates were retreating was limited to the maps in his possession, of which Cram's map is a sample. The maps showed two main roads available for the Confederate retreat, one from Yorktown and the other near the James River, and these, unless destroyed, were available for a pursuit.

1 RR Atlas XVIII-1

13. In addition, the abandonment of Yorktown opened the York River to the

Federal Navy, and enabled pursuing troops to be sent by water as far as West Point.

12 RR 234, 19, 526, 456

14. The general rule for a pursuit is to advance rapidly on a broad front, utilizing cavalry and horse artillery to the maximum. McClellan could therefore be expected to send his mounted troops at once overland by the two available roads after the retreating enemy, to be followed by infantry and artillery. The opening of the York River, and the absence of a hostile navy, made it possible to send other pursuing troops to West Point, which if reached in time might offer an opportunity to oppose the head of the retreating force. All of these movements were ordered by McClellan, although under the excitement, and unexpectedness of the situation, at intervals after 7:30 A.M. The measures adopted were correct, but their execution was tardy.

1 CW 431

15. A pursuit by water up the James River was not practicable, under the conditions believed to exist on the morning of May 4, due to the Federal Navy being unwilling to operate on that river, as long as the Merrimac was still in Norfolk harbor.

16. Had the Confederate retreat been foreseen, and been provided for, many Confederates might have been captured. The cessation of the enemy's fire about midnight, the explosions and fires seen thereafter, which attracted the attention of the front line troops, should have led to reconnaissance patrols, in force if necessary, being sent out to determine the situation. By daylight, 5:00 A.M., the Confederate retreat should have been definitely established, and the Union pursuit at once started.

The Union Cavalry Pursuit

May 4th, 1862

1. About 8:00 A.M., on May 4th, General Stoneman received an order from General McClellan to pursue the retreating Confederate columns on the Yorktown-Williamsburg Road.

12 RR 19, 526
14 RR 137
MOS 319
1 CW 348, 429

2. Due to the unexpectedness of the Confederate retreat, the troops were not prepared to pursue promptly, rations not having been issued, trains being absent, so that the cavalry although in part warned by General Heintzelman as early as 8:00 A.M. as to the probability of its being called upon to pursue, did not actually start until after considerable delay.

12 RR 451, 456, 557
2 CP 16
1 CW 569
Aver 32

3. The head of the main body of the cavalry started from Yorktown about noon. They probably started from their camps about 11:00 A.M. Stoneman's command consisted of four batteries of horse artillery, the 1st and 6th U. S. Cavalry, 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, 8th Illinois Cavalry and Barker's Illinois squadron. There does not appear to have been any order of march issued by General Stoneman, but the troops seem to have taken position in column in the order in which they arrived at Yorktown. This was an easy way of determining position of the troops.

12 RR 19, 423, 427, 430, 434
MOS 320
2 CP 14
1 CW 566

4. General Cooke with the 1st and 6th Cavalry and Gibson's horse battery composed the advance guard, and probably left Yorktown about 11:30 A.M. General Emory with Barker's squadron and the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry formed the main

12 RR 424, 426, 427, 434, 444
13 RR 245
2 B & L 429

body. The 1st squadron of the 1st Cavalry formed the advanced party.

12 RR 19, 424
MOS 320
1 CW 568

5. General Stoneman's orders were to pursue and harass the rear of the retreating enemy and if possible to cut off a Confederate rear guard supposed to be on the Lee's Mill-Yorktown Road. General Stoneman was advised that Hooker's division would follow him promptly in support, and that the cavalry was to cooperate with Smith's division on the Lee's Mill road in cutting off the hostile rear guard.

Geo Sur Map
12 RR 424, 425
MOS 320
1 OOH 219
1 CW 568

6. The advance proceeded rapidly without incident until the advance party reached Black Swamp about 1:00 P.M., where the rebel pickets were first met. A short fire action followed when General Cooke, pushing to the front, ordered the horse battery to bring up three guns, which entering into action and firing a few shells, caused the enemy to retreat.

Geo Sur Map
12 RR 424, 426,
427, 431, 434

7. Advance was then resumed until about 2:00 P.M., another short action similar to the preceding one took place near Burnwell's Mill at Whitteman's Swamp. The Confederates being driven from this position, the advance proceeded until about 3:00 P.M. it arrived on the plateau about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Fort Magruder, where it came to a halt in view of that work, and of Confederate troops in its vicinity.

12 RR 19, 424, 426,
431
2 B & L 194

8. Fort Magruder lay at the end of a cultivated plain about one-half mile across. The Fort was surrounded by a water ditch nine feet wide and deep, and had a parapet six feet high and nine feet thick. The length of the interior crest was about 600 yards. There were supporting rifle

pits in front of this work and redoubts to the right and left. It was a formidable position for cavalry to attack.

9. General Cooke, commanding the advance, estimated the enemy force as a regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery and three regiments of infantry. Although such a force was larger than his own, he proposed to attack it and this decision was supported by General Stoneman, who himself arrived on the field shortly after contact with the enemy had been secured.

12 RR 424, 426
MOS 321

10. All of Gibson's battery, six pieces, was brought up, three pieces at a time, and placed across the road about 400 yards southeast of road fork 87 (G. S. Map). Due to woods and creeks on each side, the available space to deploy cavalry in was so small that not exceeding 300 troopers of the 1st Cavalry could be placed in line. The remainder of the force was held in reserve half a mile in rear to cover a contemplated retreat should Hooker's infantry fail to arrive. This reserve was probably posted near road fork 85 (G. S. Map).

12 RR 424, 426
MOS 321

11. A fire fight now took place in front of Fort Magruder, lasting about 40 minutes. Results were indecisive, the Confederates becoming steadily stronger as they deployed more troops, and the Federal cavalry being too weak to force a Confederate retirement. The losses from enemy artillery and rifle fire were becoming considerable and General Stoneman decided to withdraw his troops.

12 RR 20, 184, 424, 426, 428, 431, 442
107 RR 85
MOS 321
1 OOH 219
13 RR 245

12. On account of the mud the battery had difficulty in withdrawing, and one piece and several caissons were aban-

12 RR 20, 428, 429, 432, 442, 445, 446
2 CP 17

doned. The enemy's cavalry attempted to capture the entire battery, but were prevented by two mounted charges by the 1st Cavalry, who captured an enemy standard and some prisoners.

12 RR 20, 424, 427, 433, 428, 439, 436, 440, 444
MOS 321
2 CP 17

13. In the meantime, four squadrons of the 6th Cavalry had been sent about 3:10 P.M. to the right in an attempt to turn the enemy's left. This force crossed the ravine, probably about 3:45 P.M., near the head of Jones Pond (see G. S. Map), the banks of which were heavily wooded and caused the column to move by twos and by files, resulting in their being unable to deploy from the plateau on the west side of this ravine in face of Confederate troops of all arms found there. They, therefore, withdrew, suffering losses from Confederate carbine and rifle fire while recrossing the ravine. Confederate cavalry followed across, but were themselves in turn unable to deploy from the wooded ravine, and were driven back to the west side.

12 RR 20, 425, 438, 439, 442, 456, 464
MOS 322

14. This ended the fight for this day, so far as the cavalry main body was concerned. General Stoneman withdrew his forces a few hundred yards and took up a defensive position about 4:00 P.M. He sent for and expected assistance from Hooker's division with which he proposed to renew the attack upon the Confederate's rear guard, but he was informed that this division had been cut off by Smith's division, who was marching his troops in front of it. Stoneman knew nothing as to Smith's presence and as to what his orders were, and did not feel that he could count upon him, so he waited for General

Hooker who arrived on the field about 4:00 P.M. but stated that his division was two miles behind with the road in between crowded with troops.

15. About 4:30 P.M. General Sumner arrived, and announced that he had been detailed to assume command. He decided to attack, using Smith's division, the leading one, which had just arrived. About this time, Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. Smith's division was deployed, but the lines became confused in the dense woods, and darkness coming on, the troops were ordered to stop and lie on their arms.

2 CP 18
12 RR 20, 425, 451, 511

16. There was a side reconnaissance made by the Union cavalry under General Emory, who after the action at Whitteman's Swamp was ordered by General Stoneman about 2:00 P.M. to take Benson's horse battery, the 3d Pennsylvania regiment and Barker's Illinois Squadron and move by a wood road, probably via 81, 92 and 85, on the Geo. Sur. Map, from Whitteman's Swamp to the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road to cut off hostile troops retreating over it, and to gain contact with Smith's division which was expected to be on that road, and not on the same road as General Stoneman's command already was on. This operation of General Emory's was probably made in compliance with orders from General McClellan to cut off the hostile forces supposed to be in front of Smith's division.

12 RR 19, 424, 427, 433, 434
MOS 321

17. This command soon after it got started, probably about 2:20 P.M. had its advance party driven in by a mounted charge made by some of Stuart's cavalry,

12 RR 433, 435, 444, 574

made in column of fours in the road. The Confederate attack was stopped by two squadrons, dismounted to fight on foot, and supported by the horse battery in the center. The advance was then resumed until the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road was reached, probably near Booth. The Confederate cavalry under Stuart withdrew to the James River and subsequently retired along that stream toward Williamsburg.

12 RR 428, 433, 465
MOS 322
2 CP 17
1 CW 569

18. Emory not finding Smith, sent back for infantry support, to Stoneman who requested General Hooker to furnish one, but due to congestion of roads, no infantry reached Emory until that night. In the meantime, Emory quietly waited, probably near road fork 66 (Geo. Sur. Map) while Smith, with whom Emory had been ordered to cooperate, marched over to the Yorktown-Williamsburg road, from which Emory had started.

12 RR 433, 435
1 CW 569

19. Hooker's division which was supposed to be following Stoneman, finding themselves cut off by Smith's troops, marched later across to the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road, and at 10:00 P.M. at night on the 4th, one of his brigades passed Emory's forces, the balance of Hooker's troops following on the morning of the 5th.

The Union Advance on Williamsburg

May 4th, 1862

1. The evacuation of Yorktown and the Warwick River line by the Confederates during the night of May 3d-4th was discovered by the Federal troops between 3:30 A.M. and 5:30 A.M. on the 4th and by the latter hour small bodies of Federals had commenced to occupy the empty trenches opposite them.

12 RR 313, 348, 349, 398, 400, 401, 402, 403, 534, 556, 557
1 OOH 217
1 CW 568, 19, 284

2. General Smith, who was stationed opposite the left center of the line, without waiting for orders, repaired the dam on his front, sending over infantry under General Hancock followed by the 4th Squadron, 5th Cavalry, under Chambliss about 7:00 A.M. These troops were ordered to reconnoiter to the front.

12 RR 18, 440, 526, 534, 549
1 OOH 217

3. About 7:30 A.M. this cavalry reported that they had found a hostile rear guard of infantry and cavalry in their front. This information was telegraphed to General McClellan, and the cavalry was ordered by Smith to retire, by reason of the insufficient number of supporting troops then across the dam, but artillery was ordered forward in support and crossed the dam about 8:00 A.M.

12 RR 526, 534, 556
MOS 320
14 RR 137

4. Smith's troops which had advanced under Hancock had moved hastily and many of them were without rations.

12 RR 451, 534

5. On the right General Heintzelman, commanding opposite Yorktown, aware of the enemy's retreat, also issued orders, probably about 8:00 A.M. to the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry and to Hooker's and Kearney's divisions to prepare to march.

12 RR 456

12 RR 136
O'Brien 84
1 OOH 217
2 CP 16
1 CW 568, 19
14 RR 151, 331

6. While these measures were being taken by the front line troops, at General McClellan's Headquarters, the news of the Confederate retreat came as a surprise. It had not been expected and when it occurred, it was a shock, both to General McClellan and to his staff. There were no correct maps and considerable confusion resulted. Generals came to make suggestions as to what ought to be done, but without success prior to about 7:45 A.M., when McClellan suddenly decided to pursue with part of his force, apparently as a result of the message from Smith.

7. The measures then taken by General McClellan and his staff were of a piecemeal nature. Orders were issued separately for successive movements, without relation to each other, and seemingly whenever the idea seemed to strike the individual issuing the order.

12 RR 19, 526
14 RR 135
MOS 319
1 CW 19, 429

8. The orders first issued commenced with one to the cavalry to pursue and harass the rear guard of the retreating enemy., and if possible, to cut off his rear guard or that portion of it which had taken the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road. This order was issued probably about 8:00 A.M. and appears based on the information received from Smith. At about the same time, orders were sent to Smith not to engage the enemy, as arrangements had been made for cutting them off.

9. This last order was not a good one, for it could hardly be expected that the enemy would remain quietly in place while the cavalry surrounded them, unless forced to do so by an attack holding them to their position. This order called for

the same kind of a maneuver as General McClellan had in mind for April 5th, when he had purposed sending a column of some 20,000 men to the same Half-Way House with the view to cutting off a retreat which he assumed the Confederates at Yorktown would make under threats of an attack in front.

10. The maps in General McClellan's possession for the territory occupied by the Confederate forces and of which Cram's map was one of the principal ones, were inaccurate, and the importance of the Half-Way House to McClellan's mind can be understood on examining this map. The order was a hastily issued order, based apparently on Smith's message as to hostile infantry and cavalry being in front of him, and the sudden idea, that this force might be surrounded and captured.

12 RR 152
RR Atlas

11. At about the same time that orders were issued to Stoneman to pursue towards Williamsburg, a message was sent to General Sumner, directing him to have Richardson's and Sedgwick's division of his corps held in readiness to march without trains, which would follow later. These troops were in the center of the line, and had no available roads for an advance to the front, and if sent to the flanks would naturally follow in rear of troops already located there. A calculation of the time it would take for other troops to clear the road for these two divisions, shows that the warning order to the IId (Sumner's) Corps was premature, and the same is true if it had been the intention to move these divisions by water, in view of orders given shortly afterwards, direct-

14 RR 315
1 OOH 215, 216
1 CW 429

ing Franklin's division to board transports first. The II Corps divisions did not actually move until the 5th.

12 RR 185, 451, 549, 557, 562
2 CP 16
1 CW 569, 348

12. Due to the Confederate retreat not having been foreseen, the field trains of the Federal troops were not ready to pursue and many trains were absent, enroute to or at the depots, and they were not immediately available. Others that were near the troops were not loaded, not having the required quantity of stores at hand for this purpose. The result was that the pursuing infantry in part pursued without rations. This was especially so, in the case of troops from the divisions of Smith, Couch and Casey, who moved out early in the morning.

14 RR 139
12 RR 19, 519, 424, 425, 434
1 CW 359, 429
Aver

13. Probably near 7:15 A.M. orders had been sent to General Sumner, who was in command of the left wing, consisting of the IId and IVth Corps, to occupy Lee's Mill and to reconnoiter towards Groves Wharf and the Half-Way House, with a force specified as to consist of two brigades of infantry, cavalry, and three batteries of artillery.

12 RR 19, 450, 511, 516, 558, 560
14 RR 135, 139, 198
1 CW 442

14. Pursuant to this order, one brigade each from Couch's and Casey's divisions of Keyes' 4th Corps, a part of the 5th Cavalry, and probably three batteries, started out about 9:00 A.M. and reconnoitered slowly and cautiously in the directions ordered. These troops left on a half hour's notice, and by order went without tents, blankets or rations.

12 RR 557, 558, 511
1 CW 568

15. The brigade of Casey's division sent out was under General Naglee, and about 2:00 P.M. its head was in the vicinity of Halstead's Point in advance of other

troops, but was stopped by order from General Sumner. Further advances later on that day which were attempted, were prevented by other troops blocking the road and given precedence by orders of Generals Sumner and Heintzelman. The balance of Couch's and Casey's divisions appear to have followed a short distance in rear of the leading brigade.

16. About 8:30 A.M. on the 4th, orders were given in person to General Heintzelman, commanding the 3d Corps, to send Hooker's division to follow the cavalry as far as the Half-Way House, from which point he was to act, to cut off the supposed retreating Confederate forces in the vicinity of Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road. General Heintzelman was also directed to order General Porter to occupy Yorktown, and soon afterwards was ordered to have Kearney's division prepare to march, as General Heintzelman had already directed Hooker and Kearney to prepare to march, and it is possible that these orders of General McClellan were based on knowledge of this.

12 RR 19, 456
MOS 320
14 RR 136
1 CW 348

17. Hooker's division was delayed in its start due to waiting for detachments on duty in the trenches, and at the base at Cheeseman's Creek, and was not ready to start until about 1:00 P.M. General Heintzelman marched with the division, under orders which he understood directed him to take charge of the entire pursuit.

12 RR 456, 457
1 CW 19, 298, 576
MOS 298

18. McClellan next issued orders about 9:00 A.M. to General Franklin to re-embark his division on transports, with a view of moving under naval escort on that day to West Point to occupy that place

12 RR 136, 234, 614, 618, 621
14 RR 133, 134, 141, 143
107 RR 597
MOS 320, 335, 336, 352
7 NR 311, 312
1 CW 429, 621

as a base from which to intercept the Confederate retreat towards Richmond. But the transports were not assembled at Yorktown until the next morning, and then General McClellan held his final orders for the movement until late on the 5th. It was at that time too late in the day to start, as there were but few river pilots available and night navigation was considered impracticable, and the expedition did not finally sail until the morning of the 6th. While McClellan had originally intended that Franklin should occupy West Point on the 4th, upon finding this could not be done, the further delay was probably occasioned by anxiety as to the outcome of the battle in progress at Williamsburg. But this delay gave the Confederates the time they needed, and Franklin's move to West Point failed to intercept the enemy's retreat past that place.

14 RR 137
7 NR 310, 311, 314
12 RR 234

19. About 11:00 A.M. a request was sent to the Navy to have two gunboats reconnoiter as far as West Point. This reconnaissance was made and completed by 2:00 P.M., resulting in information being received that for twelve miles up the York river no batteries could be seen, and that Bigler's wharf was burning.

12 RR 526, 423, 433, 444
2 CP 16

20. Smith's advance was made to the Yorktown-Williamsburg road. He had seized the bridge over Skiff Creek about 11:30 A.M. finding it damaged by fire, and impracticable for mounted men, or artillery. This bridge was on the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road, and was the natural line of advance for the left of the Federal force, but Smith possibly failed

to realize this, and thought it was a minor road. A comparison of the Geological Survey Map with Cram's Map, which is what Smith seems to have had, indicates a probability that Smith passed Lebanon Church going north in the belief that he was still on the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg Road.

21. About 11:30 A.M., General McClellan issued orders to Sumner to advance with the 5th Cavalry, Smith's and Couch's division, and Casey's division, if necessary. None of these divisions belonged to Sumner's corps. His own two divisions had been ordered to be held in readiness to reenforce the right. Sumner received this order about noon, which further directed an attack should the enemy retreat.

MOS 299, 300
12 RR 450
14 RR 135
1 CW 430

22. In the meantime Smith, receiving the order of about 8:00 A.M. not to engage the enemy, finding the enemy was slowly retreating, and consisted of cavalry only, allowed his troops to follow cautiously, but avoiding any engagement. The 5th Cavalry by 11:30 A.M., reached a point about a mile south of the Yorktown-Williamsburg road, and by noon Hancock's infantry reached Lebanon Church (near B. M. 82, Geo. Sur. Map). In these positions, the troops were halted, by peremptory orders sent by Sumner, until about 2:30 P.M., when Sumner himself arriving on the field, pursuant to new orders just received by him, directed Smith's advance to be resumed.

12 RR 444, 526, 534, 558

23. Stoneman's cavalry finally started from Yorktown on the pursuit ordered about noon, and moved rapidly, and without opposition, along the direct road to Williamsburg until they arrived, about

12 RR 19, 424, 426, 427, 434, 444
MOS 320

2:00 P.M., near Black Swamp, where they came in contact with and engaged the Confederate rear cavalry.

12 RR 19, 20, 424, 426, 427, 431, 434, 436, 439, 440
14 RR 134, 135
107 RR 85

24. Stoneman arrived opposite Fort Magruder about 3:00 P.M. and soon after attacked this place, resulting in considerable fighting by the Union cavalry and horse artillery on one side against the Confederate troops of all arms, partly entrenched, opposite them. There was also some fighting between minor detachments of Federal and Confederate cavalry.

12 RR 234
14 RR 136

25. The firing resulting from these actions was distinctly heard at Army Headquarters and caused more or less alarm, resulting in orders to Porter's Division of Heintzelman's IIId Corps to prepare to follow Hooker towards Williamsburg.

14 RR 136
1 CW 430

26. As the firing continued, General McClellan decided that there were still not enough troops moving forward, and instructions were sent to General Sumner about 2:00 P.M. to move at least two, and if necessary three divisions toward Williamsburg and try to turn the enemy's position. Sumner appears to have received this order about 2:30 P.M., and at once started Smith's division forward and proceeded personally in advance, as stated in paragraph 22.

27. It will be noted that Hooker, and probably later Kearney's and Porter's Divisions were to follow the cavalry on one road while two other divisions were ordered to pursue on the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road. In addition, Smith was in between these points with his troops near Lebanon Church, which on the Geological Survey Map, is near BM 82.

28. Smith resumed his march about 3:00 P.M., and entered the Yorktown-Williamsburg road about 3:30 P.M. in advance of Hooker's troops. All roads were found in bad condition, being full of ruts and wheel holes. 12 RR 526, 534, 549, 89, 234

29. About 2:00 P.M. General McClellan sent another message to the Navy, stating it was of the first importance that some of the boats should hurry up and destroy the enemy transportation, and in accordance with this request, a gunboat was sent up the York River, with orders to destroy if possible the railroad bridge over the Pamunkey river. 7 NR 311

30. About 4:00 P.M., General McClellan sent another dispatch to the Navy requesting that the railroad bridge over the Pamunkey be not destroyed, but on the contrary saved. It is possible that McClellan in his dispatch of 2:00 P.M., did not intend to include railroad bridges under the term "enemy transportation," and his later message was sent to correct a misinterpretation of his wishes. 7 NR 311

31. Gunboats sent in pursuance of the foregoing requests returned by 9:30 P.M. reporting no batteries or soldiers at West Point. They also reported that information had been received that the Confederates were falling back to Hanover Court House, to defend the line of the Chickahominy, that about 4,000 of the enemy had been prevented by the gunboats from crossing the Mattapony, and that about 2,000 of the enemy were within three miles of West Point. 7 NR 311, 313, 314

32. Hooker's Division following Stoneman's cavalry reached the vicinity of Hal- 12 RR 20, 451, 452, 456, 464, 511
2 CP 14, 16
1 CW 576, 348

stead's Point (Geo. Sur. Map) probably after 4:00 PM. Here they ran into Smith's Division, then crossing into the road.

12 RR 457, 464, 465
1 CW 348
2 B & L 196

33. While enroute towards the front, Heintzelman, probably about 4:30 P.M., met Hooker, who had preceded him, returning, and at his request, Hooker received authority to march his division to the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road, via Cheesecake Church. This march appears to have been made via a cross road, probably near 79, 72, 85 and 84 on the Geological Survey Map, and commenced after 5:00 P.M., proceeding very slowly.

12 RR 433, 464, 465, 472, 526
1 CW 568, 576, 298
2 B & L 196

34. Hooker intended to march to the Williamsburg battlefield that afternoon, to attack the Confederate right the same evening, in conjunction with an attack on the enemy's left by Stoneman and Smith. But due to Smith's troops not clearing the road before about 7:00 P.M. Hooker's division did not renew their march until that hour. And in the dark, rainy night, over dirt roads cut up by large masses of troops, with men exhausted by an already long march and loss of sleep, and labor in the trenches during the preceding night, it became impracticable to continue on, and between 10:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M., the division was halted along the road, to get what rest it could, preparatory to marching forward again at daylight. The leading element of the division halted probably near Grove (Ge. Sur. Map) about 11:00 P.M., having passed General Emory's cavalry enroute.

12 RR 20, 451, 452, 456, 464, 511
2 CP 14, 16
1 CW 348, 576

35. General Sumner arrived opposite Fort Magruder about 4:30 P.M. and there

met Stoneman and learned of his repulse. Heintzelman and Keyes, arrived a little later. After a short consultation, General Sumner decided to attack at once. General Heintzelman had come up, and about 5:00 P.M. met Generals Stoneman, Sumner, W. F. Smith, Hancock, Keyes and Brooks. At the conference which ensued, General Sumner, who was the senior, announced the assumption of command by him of all troops in the field in compliance of General McClellan's orders to him, superseding similar orders claimed to have been received by Heintzelman. The orders for General Sumner to assume command were undoubtedly issued later than the orders Heintzelman states he received.

36. The head of Smith's division about 5:30 P.M. came up, and in accordance with Sumner's orders, commenced to deploy about 6:00 P.M. But the lines became confused in the dense woods, and darkness coming on, the attack was abandoned, the troops bivouacking in the woods about 8:00 P.M., many without overcoats or blankets.

12 RR 20, 451, 456, 527, 534, 549, 556
MOS 322
2 CP 18
1 CW 569

37. About 8:00 P.M. it commenced to rain heavily, making the roads already in bad condition, almost impassable, and interfering with the rest of the tired troops.

1 CW 361
12 RR 21, 234, 435, 456, 481, 520
MOS 322
2 CP 18

38. Couch's and Casey's divisions had followed their advanced brigades pursuant to orders from General McClellan issued probably after 2:00 P.M., but due to the congestion on the roads, advanced only to the neighborhood of the Half-Way House, where they bivouacked for the night. As some of the troops were without baggage or rations, they were sent back for them.

12 RR 511, 512, 516, 185
1 CW 442, 600
602

14 RR 139

39. Kearney's division advanced in rear of Hooker, some three miles from Yorktown, on the afternoon of the 4th, and there bivouacked for the night.

COMMENTS

1. The orders for pursuit were issued tardily and piecemeal—a connected pursuit covering a logical movement of so much of the army as it was practicable to move over existing roads was what should have been given. Part of the pursuit could well have been by water, and part by land.

2. Instead of such an order, successive orders were issued to various units of the command, finally resulting in the cavalry, and four divisions, over 40,000 men, trying to move over one road to Williamsburg in one afternoon. Naturally but one division got through.

3. Part of the road conjestion was due to the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road being considered i m p r a c t i c a b l e for mounted troops. As Sumner's troops, three divisions, who would naturally have used this road, did not care to advance without their artillery, they moved to the road assigned to the cavalry and Hooker's divisions.

4. The failure to repair the bridge over Skiff Creek, which was only partly destroyed, was a serious error, the results of which were felt by the Federal troops for days.

5. But the main fault was the failure to foresee the probability of a pursuit being required, resulting in no plan being prepared in advance for such a contin-

gency, and in the troops not being in readiness to move forward properly equipped without considerable delays, when the necessity for this advance arose.

6. The troops which moved out early in the morning, Smith's, Couch's and Casey's division, moved in part without rations, shelter tents or blankets. On the other hand, Stoneman's cavalry and Hooker's division, which did not complain of lack of subsistence or shelter, did not get started until about noon or later. 12 RR 451, 557. 185, 519 1 CW 569

7. The orders issued by McClellan in the morning prevented an energetic pursuit by Smith, who was the only one prepared to move promptly, and gave the Confederates about four hours' time, which they needed badly. As it was, the Confederates reached Williamsburg only an hour or so before the Federal cavalry arrived opposite Fort Magruder.

8. Except for the delay in starting, the action of the Union cavalry on May 4th appears to have been generally vigorous and suitable. It made a determined attempt to carry out its mission. There was, however, a failure to make cavalry reconnaissances during the afternoon of the 4th, which, had they been made, might have resulted in correcting the inaccurate maps in the Union possession, and might have avoided some of the confusion which resulted from the combined use of inaccurate maps, which caused a large congestion of troops on the Yorktown-Williamsburg road. Such reconnaissances as were made by engineer officers, do not appear to have resulted in desired information being available in time. 1 CW 398, 570

9. Certainly, General Emory's forces, after reaching the Lee's Mill-Williamsburg road should not have stopped and waited for General Smith to find him. He should have scouted vigorously in all directions and located General Smith, at the same time never losing contact with the enemy's cavalry.

10. Had Hooker's or Smith's division been able to support the Union cavalry at Fort Magruder, on the afternoon of the 4th, there was a possibility that the place might have been captured, opening a way for a serious attack on the Confederate troops conjested about Williamsburg.

11. But owing to the late hour at which the advance started, ignorance of the country, poor maps, and bad condition of the roads, the infantry arrived too late on the 4th to attack on that date.

12. The Confederate retreat also exhibits faults. Failure to calculate march distances, and to appreciate the condition of the roads, led to a road congestion, which might have resulted in heavy losses had the Federal pursuit started earlier.

13. The failure to direct a line of resistance to be held by the rear guard to cover Williamsburg was a serious fault, which was, however, corrected in time, by countermarching a part of the troops at Williamsburg.

14. Other comments applicable to this campaign have been given in the narrative account.

THE END

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